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Abstract  
All organizations consist of complex power relationships but few are as complex 
as institutions of higher education. Information is a key commodity in power 
relationships and at the center of this commodity in higher education is institutional 
research. Institutional researchers are skilled analysts that have the ability to influence 
decisions-making through the development and distribution of information. Yet, 
institutional researchers are not often included in the decision-making process. 
Analysts, according to Mintzberg (1983b), have five sources of power by which 
they are able to influence decisions: the control of a resource, technical skills, unique 
knowledge, legal prerogatives, or access to decision-makers. But simply having one or 
more of these power sources are not enough to intentionally influence decisions, an 
analyst must also have the will and the ability to influence decisions. 
This research sought to understand if institutional researchers have the power 
sources proposed by Mintzberg (1983b) and to see if institutional researchers also have 
the will and the ability to intentionally influence decisions. This was an exploratory 
quantitative research project that used an attitudinal survey to determine the presence of 
the power sources and to measure the participants’ feelings toward the use of power as 
reported by the participants themselves. Participants were institutional researchers 
recruited from the membership list of the Association of Institutional Researchers. The 
survey asked participants to express their level of agreement with a series of statements 
related to the individual power sources, their orientation toward power, their opinion 
about the use of power, and their ability to use power to influence decisions. The final 
xiii 
 
step in this project was to conduct a regression to determine which variables contributed 
the most to the variances in the participants’ ability to influence decisions.  
The study confirmed that institutional researchers have access to all five of the 
power sources although at various levels of strength. However, not every statement 
within the power source measurement tool was found to be present in the power sources. 
All five of the power sources were associated with the variance in the participants’ ability 
to influence decisions. The control and autonomy power orientation and the political 
connection power orientation were the most common power orientations; however, 
having personal charisma and political connections were found to contribute to the 
variance in the ability to influence decisions. The size of the institution for which the 
participants worked was also found to contribute to the variance in the ability to influence 
while the years of experience participants had at their institution was shown to have a 
negative relationship. In examining the differences in responses between subgroups by 
institutional size, institutional type, job description, managers by institutional type and 
managers by experience, the responses between managers and staff and between 
managers with more than 13 years of experience and those with less than 13 years of 
experience had the most differences in their responses.
 1 
 
1
 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
Organizations are complex social units that exist for a particular purpose and are 
based on intricate power relationships and political spheres of influences (Shafritz, Ott, & 
Jang, 2005). Few organizations are as complicated and diverse as institutions of higher 
education. These so-called cybernetic organizations  (the most complex of all 
organizations) are characterized by having both tight and loose coupling, conflicting and 
ambiguous goals, centralized and decentralized administration, and internal and external 
competition for resources by the large number of subunits that keep the organization in 
balance (Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 2009). A key commodity in the power relationships 
within higher education is institutional information that can be used for decision-making, 
issue identification, and defining the culture of the institution. According to Resource 
Dependency theory, information is a powerful resource and the individual or subunit that 
controls the information, possess a certain amount of power (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Institutional Research (IR) offices provide the most common source of 
institutional information throughout higher education and therefore possess a source of 
power as a result of controlling a valuable resource.  
In today’s tough economic and high pressured environment, corporations, small 
businesses, governments, and educational institutions are being held to a higher level of 
accountability than ever before. The public is demanding to know how tax money is 
spent and is expecting that every penny be spent as efficiently as possible and that waste 
be minimalized. Decisions can no longer be made from instincts or by what action was 
taken in the past. Organizations are expected to make more rational “data-driven” 
decisions that will ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. Nowhere is 
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this more true than in higher education where tuition price is sky rocketing and 
government funding is decreasing (Donhardt, 2012; Knight & Leimer, 2009). Politicians, 
parents and students are demanding to know how their tuition and grant dollars are spent 
and want to know that decisions are made that are based on sound reasoning and solid 
evidence. As recent as 2006, The Commission on the Future of Higher Education, a 
governmental group charged with examining and planning for the future of higher-
education and is often referred to as the Spellings Commission, demanded more 
accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency from all levels of higher education and 
proposed a major overhaul of the accrediting system (Spellings, 2006).  In response, 
coalitions such as “Achieving the Dream” have started a movement toward data-based 
decision-making in community colleges and urge colleges not to make decisions without 
first thoroughly researching the issue and listening to what their data are telling them 
(ATD, 2005).  
At ground zero in the accountability effort in higher education is the Office of 
Institutional Research where most institutional data are analyzed and information is 
created in order to make these data-driven decisions. According to the Association of 
Institutional Research (AIR, 2012, para.4). “Most of the important decisions made on 
campuses regarding an institution’s most vital programs and responsibilities are based on 
analytics produced by institutional research professionals.” Yet, despite being the ones 
who control the information resource by gathering or creating institutional information 
and interpreting the results of the research, institutional researchers are rarely a part of the 
decision-making process. Even though they are the analysts most familiar with the data 
and spend the most time working with the detailed information, on the surface, they 
 3 
 
appear to have little or no power to influence decisions in higher education. In the 
business world, the equivalent of the institutional researcher is the business analyst who 
has been described by Mintzberg (1983) as having no authority to make decisions. 
According to Mintzberg (1983), in order to influence a decision in a desired direction, a 
person needs to possess at least one of the five sources of power: the ability to control 
resources; the possession of technical skills; the possession of a unique body of 
knowledge; having legal prerogatives; and having access to high level decision makers. 
In higher education, the institutional researchers create and control most of the 
institutional information, possess the technical skills to manage and operate databases, 
and possess an appropriate body of knowledge related to the internal and external issues 
concerning the institution. Quite often their data, reports, and projects are required by 
outside governmental agencies and finally, institutional researchers have access to high 
level administrators as well. By having these primary sources of power, institutional 
researchers should have the ability to actively influence the decision-making process 
either by directly participating in the decision-making process or in more subtle ways 
such as determining what issues are or are not brought to the attention of decision makers 
or by controlling the timing of the release of information and to whom it is released. This 
research sought to confirm and to determine at what level institutional researchers 
possess the necessary power sources, as described by Mintzberg, to influence decision 
makers both directly and indirectly and if so, what are their orientations toward the 
concept of power and their feelings regarding their role in the decision-making process. 
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Background 
 Power has been called an incomplete and elusive concept that is multifaceted, 
difficult to describe, and difficult to analyze (Frost, 1987). A simple definition of power 
is the ability to get people to do something they normally would not have done. In this 
view, power is something that is intentionally and directly exercised. Power has also been 
described as the ability to limit action and decision-making in order to protect one’s 
position. This “non-decision-making” power is often seen in the political realm. An 
example of this in higher education is having tenure that serves to protect academic 
freedom and therefore the position of tenured faculty members. Another definition sees 
power as influencing other persons, not by telling them what to do but by changing what 
the other person thinks they want. And yet another description of power is the ability to 
limit what issues are brought to decision-makers and what issues are not. This can be 
seen as consciously or unconsciously setting barriers to the decision-making process 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Frost, 1987; Mumby, 2001). Power can also be related to 
personal attributes, social structure and hierarchy, personal drive, and motivation. It can 
be seen as a commodity, an interpersonal construct, a probability construct, or a 
philosophical construct. Lastly, power can be seen as the ability to control a valuable 
resource (Emerson, 1962; French Jr., 1959; Goldberg, Cavanaugh, & Larson, 1983). In 
order to avoid influencing orientation toward power of the participants in this study, 
power remained undefined. It is enough to say the ability to control a resource, in this 
case information, creates the presence of power that can potentially be used in decision-
making.  
 5 
 
 Most theories about power identify it is as an attribute of a person, while 
Resource Dependency theory associates power with a position and the relationships 
surrounding that position. According to Resource Dependency theory, the relationships 
are mutually dependent where one person controls a valuable resource and the other 
person is in need of that resource. Thereby, the person controlling the resource has power 
over the other; yet, the person controlling the resource is dependent on the other person 
needing the resource. For example, person A owns all the food in town and person B 
needs food, therefore person A has some power over person B as long as B needs food 
from A. When person C moves to town and also has food,  person B gains back power 
from person A because person B has the power to choose between persons A and C. 
Person A, therefore, was dependent on person B being dependent on him. Power can be 
found in the ability to control a resource as well as the ability to control the need for that 
resource (Emerson, 1962). Resource dependency, as it relates to IR, lies in the position of 
the institutional researcher and the ability to control information as a resource. IR 
controls information and has power in relation to those who need the information but 
only has power as long as the information is needed and valuable. By controlling 
information, IR has the power to delay projects and decisions, define issues or non-issues, 
portray departments in a positive or negative light, or to be subject matter experts when 
espousing its opinions, to name just a few of the possible uses of power related to 
information as a resource.  
Mintzberg (1983b) also views power as positional and describes three primary 
sources of power in his book Power in and Around Organizations and two secondary 
sources of power. The first is the ability to control a resource, and is based on the 
 6 
 
concepts of resource dependency theory. Information is a resource and institutional 
researchers are firmly in control of most of institutional-level information. They are in 
fact responsible for taking institutional data and creating information. While pieces of 
data and information exist throughout the institution, these data pieces are decentralized 
and only represent departmental or sub-unit information and therefore, partial 
information on the institutional level. IR is the subunit that gathers the decentralized data 
and compiles it into a clearer picture of the institution. The institutional researcher, 
therefore, has power to control when information is released, who has access to the 
information (at least initially) and more importantly if the information has a positive, 
negative or a neutral spin to it. To do this, institutional researchers must possess the 
second primary base of power, technical skills. 
  The technical skills of institutional researchers revolve around two main 
elements: data base management skills and statistical/ analytical skills. This system of 
expertise, according to Mintzberg (1983b) is the analysts’ primary means of influence. 
Institutions very often have many complex databases and while institutional researchers 
may not have in-depth knowledge of each database, they must know how the databases 
interact with each other and where to obtain needed information. Very few other offices 
or departments on campus maintain this level of understanding and utilize these skills. 
Statistical/analytical skills are a different story. Institutions of higher education are filled 
with faculty members who achieved an advanced level of analytics in obtaining their 
terminal degree. However, as faculty members become more specialized in their fields, 
they tend to utilized specialized techniques. Institutional researchers maintain a broad 
array of statistical and analytical skills because of the diversity of projects on which they 
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work. This broad knowledge and skills base enables institutional researchers to define the 
research question, identify problem areas or departments and make recommendations as 
to what action should be taken (Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972). Because IR works with 
everyone and is familiar with most functions of any campus, institutional researchers 
represent a rare presence. Additionally, the statistical and analytical (qualitative and 
quantitative) skills that are needed for decision-making in the higher levels of 
administration are the skills at which institutional researchers excel.  
 Because IR departments are often placed near the top of the organizational chart 
and because they gather or create institutional information, they maintain a unique body 
of knowledge that few others on campus have (Knight, Moore, & Coperthwaite, 1995; 
Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990; Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005). This is the third of 
Mintzberg’s (1983b) requirements. Institutional researchers are required to be 
knowledgeable about the entire institution (internal environment) as well as the external 
environment. Knowledge of the external environment and the institution’s relation to it is 
considered contextual intelligence while knowledge of internal matters is considered 
issues intelligence (Terenzini, 1999). Both contextual intelligence and issues intelligence 
are necessary for effective decision-making. In an organization known for having 
departmentalized professionals, having both forms of intelligences can be considered a 
specialized body of knowledge that only a few employees need to or care to possess. 
Whether or not this information is essential depends on its linkage to the decision-making 
process. If it is a data-driven process (based on numbers and statistics as opposed to being 
based on a feeling or intuition) and rational, it is considered essential. If decision-making 
takes a less rational approach, it is considered a less essential body of knowledge. Since 
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this knowledge is gathered in one place, it can be considered as concentrated and in short 
supply. Nowhere else is institutional-level knowledge gathered or created. Thus, it can 
also be considered as non-substitutable as well. To be sure, there are times and reasons 
when decentralized departments create and monitor their own data, usually when they are 
in a defensive posture or under accreditation review; however, they never maintain 
institutional level data nor do they usually interpret their data at the institutional level 
(Hearn, 1988). Because of this body of knowledge, it has been stated that IR has four 
faces: Institutional researchers are an information authority regarding the institution; they 
are a policy analyst as they review new policies and budgets; they are spin doctors as they 
report to external authorities;  and lastly, they are impartial scholars and researchers as 
they study their institution and the discipline of institutional research (Volkwein, 2003).  
 The fourth of Mintzberg’s (1983b) primary sources of power is that of legal 
prerogatives, which is perhaps the weakest of institutional researchers’ sources of power. 
Much of the reporting work performed in IR is required by outside governmental policy 
through mandates and grant requirements. National statistical surveys such as the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System of the National Center for Education 
Statistics and a constant barrage of questionnaires are the responsibility of IR but require 
information from multiple resources (Saupe, 1990). Institutional researchers do not have 
the legal power to enforce behavior; they can demand data from departments in order to 
complete their required work, but they are most often dependent on those with higher 
authority and legitimate power to enforce the departmental reporting requirements 
(French Jr., 1959). However, it could be argued that once the departmental reporting 
requirements are institutionalized, IR is then considered as having legitimate authority to 
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request specific reporting behavior. Since institutional researchers have access to and 
they can use higher level decision makers to help ensure their requests are fulfilled, they 
possess the final primary sources of power. 
 As previously mentioned, IR departments are often situated high in the 
organization chart. Often times reporting to the Provost or a Vice-President, institutional 
researchers have access to the decision makers who have legitimate power (Delaney, 
1997; Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005). Thus, if 
institutional researchers are lacking power themselves, they can use the power of their 
associations to influence behavior as needed. For example, if an academic unit is 
uncooperative with a data request from the institutional researcher, the institutional 
researcher may ask the Provost to request the needed data on behalf of the institutional 
researcher. However, in a normative organization characterized by strong decentralized 
subunits, the extent of legitimate power is dependent on the culture of the individual 
institution. 
 French and Raven’s (1959) theory on the sources of social power is a popular one 
that relates power to the attributes of an individual. While this study is interested in 
positional power, there is much overlap between French and Raven’s theory and that of 
Mintzberg’s (1983b). Reward power, the ability to award desired behavior, and coercion 
power, the ability to change behavior by the threat of force, are the first and second of 
French and Raven’s sources of social power. This is similar to Mintzberg’s (1983b) 
control of resources because the release or withdrawal of a resource can be used to 
reward or coerce a person. For example, the release of information, particularly positive 
information, can be construed as a reward while the threat to release negative information 
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can be construed as coercion. Departments that are compliant with the needs of 
institutional researchers may have their request for data or projects completed more 
timely than non-compliant departments. By controlling the project list, institutional 
researchers have the power to determine where a request is on the project list, thus they 
can reward or punish a department or individual by where they place their work request 
on the project list. The ability to control the timeliness of projects creates the power to 
enable, delay,  prevent, or promote the work of others (Dougherty & Kramer, 2005). If 
institutional researchers threatened to move a project or to report data in a manner that 
would reflect poorly on a department, institutional researchers would be using coercive 
power. This of course would be considered unethical, but nonetheless, a use of power. 
The ability to control information, the timing of its release and its positive or negative 
skew, creates the presence of both reward and coercive power for institutional 
researchers. 
 Legitimate power is French and Raven’s (1959) second power attribute and is 
described as having power based on a title or position within an organization. It is related 
to two of Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources: legal prerogative and access to decision 
makers. IR located high in the institutional hierarchy can be conceived as having 
legitimate power in certain requests and situations because of the location of the office in 
relation to decision makers. An IR department that has a well established reputation and 
processes can be perceived as having legal prerogatives because of the tradition of the 
well-established reporting process. A new IR department or institutional researcher may 
have little or no legitimate power, access to decision makers or established prerogatives if 
it is not yet established in the organizational culture or it may have instant legitimate 
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power depending on its location in the organizational structure. Institutional researchers 
can also increase their legitimate power by having earned a Ph.D., served as faculty, and 
published research (Delaney, 1997; Knight, Moore, & Coperthwaite, 1997; Rourke & 
Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). This would not be legitimate power that comes from a title 
or position, but that the institutional researcher could be called a “legitimate” researcher 
based on qualifications and experience (part of being a “legitimate” researcher is having 
“expert” power, which is discussed in the next paragraph). However, these are personal 
attributes that come and go with the individual assigned to the IR position. Concerning 
tasks and reporting, a new reporting requirement or process may not have the same 
legitimate power as an established way of doing business. Institutional researchers may 
struggle to complete the new process because it is not yet considered a legitimate process 
in the institutional culture. But with access to decision makers, legal prerogatives and 
time, the new task or reporting process will be accepted as legitimate and important to the 
institution.  
 French and Raven’s (1959) expert power corresponds closely with Mintzberg’s 
(1983b) technical skills and unique body of knowledge as discussed previously. It should 
be noted that IR will possess expert power on the institutional level but may not be 
considered experts on specific units or departments by those specific units or 
departments. However, IR maintains symbolic power as a central authority for the entire 
institution that may trump departmental level expertise (Hearn, 1988). 
Referent power, when someone likes and respects a person or wants to be 
associated with that person, is French and Raven’s (1959) social power that is least 
closely related to Mintzberg’s (1983b) power source. To whom IR reports and its location 
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within the organizational chart (access to decision makers) helps create referent power for 
IR, assuming that the person to whom they report is a trusted leader. Not necessarily 
because institutional researchers maintain a respected title or position, but because they 
are associated with a leader who is trusted and respected within the organization. An 
office that is further down the organization chart will not have the close relationship with 
decision makers, so the office loses the opportunity to cultivate or to be associated with 
the referent power of the leader. An office that has the ear of the provost or vice-president 
will gain referent power as others will view institutional researchers as individuals 
worthy of their attention (Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972; Walton, 
2005).  
French and Raven’s (1959) theory of social power focuses on the power related to 
the attributes of the individual whereas Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources focuses on 
the power related to a position, as does Emerson’s (1962) Resource Dependency theory. 
This study was interested in the power related to the position of institutional researcher 
because of its permanency compared to power associated with an individual’s attributes 
that leaves when the individual leaves. For example, institutional researcher A may be a 
charismatic leader who also controls a lot of information. Institutional researcher A 
leaves and is replaced by institutional researcher B, who has no charisma. The power 
related to charisma left IR when institutional researcher A left but the power related to 
the control of information is still present in the IR position with institutional researcher B. 
The charismatic characteristic is related to the person while the power source of 
controlling information is related to the position, which is the focus related to this study. 
Because French and Raven’s (1959) social power theory can be found within Mintzberg’s 
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(1983b) power sources, this study will use Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources and 
Emerson’s (1962) Resource Dependency theory as its theoretical foundation instead of 
French and Raven’s (1959) widely accepted social power theory. 
There is power associated with the position of institutional research related to the 
control of information as a valuable resource. How power is used, if at all, depends on the 
institutional researchers’ orientation toward power. According to Goldberg,  Cavanaugh, 
and Larson (1983), people who view power as a positive force will be more aggressive in 
obtaining power and using it for their own purposes; people who view power as being 
related to resources will value the possession and control of resources; people who see 
power as an instinctive drive view power as a normal and instinctive drive within all 
humans;  people who view power in a political sense will utilize political maneuvering in 
their work; people who relate power to charisma will provoke emotion and may take 
strong action to help achieve their goal; and people who relate power to control and 
autonomy will attempt to control others  through rewards and punishment while 
maintaining their own autonomy. The institutional researchers’ orientation may affect 
how they view their position as an institutional researcher and how they use their power 
related to the control of information as a resource.  
Mintzberg’s (1983b) “will and skill” statements must be briefly discussed. 
Mintzberg argues that analysts’ only real interest in using power is to preserve their jobs. 
This is done by creating a need for constant change that leads to a constant need for 
analysis. For example, analysts may evaluate the effectiveness or efficiency of a 
particular unit and determine that changes are needed to increase efficiency. After the 
changes are made, they re-evaluate the unit to assess the effectiveness of the changes. At 
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this point, the analysts can then suggest more changes that will require even more 
analysis. Thus, the analysts’ real interest is in using power to secure continual 
employment through constant analysis as opposed to promoting organizational goals or 
direction. If a unit no longer needs to be evaluated, the employment of the analysts is no 
longer needed. Kipnis (1974) has stated that power needs only arise when one person 
needs another person to act in a certain way. This is important to this study because there 
are many views, as will be discussed in the literature review, that believe IR should seek 
to actively influence decisions while others believe IR should not seek to influence at all. 
For the most part, the only action an institutional researcher needs another person to take 
is to provide timely data so that the institutional researcher can perform the required 
analytics. Some consider objectivity and rationality to be the hallmarks of the 
institutional researcher (Fincher, 1981; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Suslow, 1972). 
Therefore, institutional researchers are more likely to measure and assess programs than 
to try and influence change within programs as a means to secure their employment.  
 Despite IR having no agenda and needing to remain neutral in the decision-
making process, there have been calls of institutional researchers to become an active 
third force in the process. Citing the need for a mediator and/or interpreter between 
faculty and administrators, Perry (1972, p. 742) believes that IR is needed to provide a 
“rational interpretation of those presenting different views of education.”  This call 
extends beyond negotiations with legislators, who Perry perceived as making more 
decisions for the institutions than the institutions make themselves. More recently, voices 
from within IR have called for institutional researchers to take a lead in workforce 
development programs and in developing new and marketable programs of study 
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(Voorhees, 2005). Others have called for institutional researchers to take on the role of 
Chief Information Officer or Chief Strategy Officers (Donhardt, 2012; Knight & Leimer, 
2009). If institutional researchers were to take a more significant role in the decision-
making process, they would need to abandon their neutral analytical roles. The advantage 
of this, from an institutional perspective, is that it would have the input of an individual 
who understands the data, has a broad perspective of the institution, and who has little to 
gain or lose in the decision, unlike a representative of an academic department might. The 
advantages to the individual institutional researcher are an increase in campus status 
associated with being a decision maker and perhaps a salary increase as well. The 
disadvantage to the institutional researcher is that the individual is playing a game with 
higher stakes. Partaking in bad decisions may put reputations and jobs at risk. A 
disadvantage to the institution would be the loss of a neutral opinion in the representation 
of the data.  
What is clear from this discussion is that there is power related to IR by means of 
controlling information as a resource and that there is a basis for believing that 
Mintzberg’s (1983b) theory of primary sources of power is applicable to the specialized 
subunit of IR in higher education. There are also differing opinions of how institutional 
researchers should use their power and that their views on the use of power may be 
related to their orientation toward power, which will become more apparent in the 
literature review. Therefore, it was necessary to proceed in researching the topic in order 
to better understand the presence of power in IR. The context in which IR offices operate, 
the available sources of power, the orientations toward power held by the institutional 
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researchers, the institutional researchers will or desire to influence decisions, and their 
ability to influence decisions will be the focus of this study. 
Statement of the Problem 
 As the cost of higher education continues to rise, the pressure on institutions of 
higher education to demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency of their teaching, research, 
service, student development, and administration continues to rise, not only from tuition-
paying students and their parents, but also from state governments that provide funding 
for both public and private institutions and employers who hire college graduates. As a 
result, IR will increase in size and responsibilities, while the importance of the 
institutional researcher in institutional decision-making will also increase. Yet, very little 
is known about the power associated with the position of the institutional researcher nor 
the ability to influence decisions, the perceived role in influencing the decision-making 
process, and the orientation toward power of those who serve in that position. Research 
has been conducted on the power and politics of faculty and upper level administrators in 
higher education, but little research has been conducted in the area of IR; the position nor 
the practitioners. Although IR has been in existence for a while, it is an emerging field of 
study and a profession that is becoming increasingly more critical and important to many 
higher education institutions. Within the field of IR, there are conflicting opinions as to 
the role of institutional research in influencing decisions. This research addressed these 
two problems: the lack of research concerning power and IR and the conflicting opinions 
about the use of power by institutional researchers.  
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Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the level of power related to the 
position of institutional researcher in relation to the contextual background in which 
practitioners work and the sources of power available to them. The additional purpose of 
this study was to determine institutional researchers’ orientation toward power and their 
opinion(s) on how their power should or should not be used.  
Conceptual Framework and Components 
 This research considered five conceptual components in trying to determine 
power related to the position of institutional researcher. First, the context and background 
of the position was considered, which includes the type and size of the institution in 
which the institutional researcher serves. Task and responsibilities, length of 
employment, education level achieved and years of service were also considered. 
However, because most institutional researchers handle many tasks and deal with a 
multitude of different situations on a regular basis, this study asked the participants to 
consider the totality of their work and situations.  
 The second conceptual component was the five sources of power identified by 
Mintzberg (1983b). This includes: having technical skills, having unique knowledge, 
having legal prerogatives, having access to decision makers, and controlling resources. 
The context in which the institutional researcher works has an influence on which power 
sources are present, if any. How the sources of power are used is influenced by the 
institutional researcher’s orientation toward power. 
 Orientation toward power was the third component of this study. This includes 
seeing power as:  a positive attribute, politically based, being related to resource 
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dependency,  related to personal charisma, and a means for control and autonomy 
(Goldberg, et al., 1983). How an institutional researcher views power was thought to be 
related to context of the position and the available power sources, however; this does not 
guarantee that the institutional researcher has the ability or the will (desire) to use the 
available power. 
 The ability and the will to use power were the final two components of this study. 
The ability to use power was determined by the three prior components; the context of 
the position, the available sources of power, and/or the orientation of the institutional 
researcher toward power. Even though the context allows for the use of power and the 
power sources are available, the institutional researcher may not have the will or desire to 
use power to influence and may prefer to remain totally objective in their work. It is the 
intra-workings of these components that this research sought to identify. The following 
map is intended to further clarify the framework and flow of this research. 
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Research Questions 
 The following questions guided this study: 
1. Using Mintzberg’s work, what did institutional researchers report as their primary 
sources of power: control of a resource, technical skills, unique knowledge, legal 
prerogatives, and/or access to decision makers? 
2. How did the reported sources of power vary by institutional size, institutional 
type, job responsibilities, and experience? 
3. What were institutional researchers’ orientations toward power? 
4. How did institutional researchers’ orientations toward power vary by institutional 
size, institutional type, job responsibilities, and experience? 
5. What were institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their role in 
influencing institutional decisions? 
6. How did institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their role in 
influencing institutional decisions vary by institutional size, institutional type, job 
responsibilities, and experience? 
7. Which variables related to power best explained institutional researchers’ ability 
to influence decisions? 
Significance of this Study 
 This study hoped to expand the understanding of power in subunits of 
organizations, specifically in the profession of IR that is becoming more significant on 
many campuses. While much has been done with power and power players such as 
managers and executives in business literature, little attention has been given to the 
power of business analysts and support staff- those who have a direct influence on 
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information. In the area of higher education, the equivalent to the position of business 
analyst is the position of institutional researcher; almost no attention has been given to 
the study of power related to this subunit. Most studies have concentrated on faculty, 
higher level administrators such as deans, provosts, vice-presidents and presidents, or 
outside legislators; more research is needed regarding lower ranking staff in complex 
organizations, specifically, institutional researchers in higher education. Additionally, the 
majority of research on power in higher education has used case study methodology and 
therefore lacks generalizability. By using a survey methodology, this study fills a gap in 
the body of knowledge with more generalizable data. 
 If Mintzberg’s (1983) primary sources of power were shown to be present with 
the position of institutional researcher, it would open the door for further studies focusing 
on power applied by those who manage and analyze knowledge and information, power 
in relation to resource dependency theory, and power of lower level actors and subunits 
in higher education. Additionally, this study allows institutional researchers to rethink 
and re-evaluate their role in the decision-making process in higher education and perhaps 
raise the profile of institutional researchers by identifying how institutional researchers 
are oriented toward power and how they believe their power should be used. And finally, 
this study sought to confirm or deny the application of Mintzberg’s theory in this unique 
context. 
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Chapter II 
Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 The following literature review consists of four sections that offer a discussion of 
power as it relates to the position of institutional researcher in higher education. 
Organizational theory begins the discussion and includes the collegial, bureaucratic, 
political, and cybernetic models of governance related to higher education. This section 
informed the research by providing background information on organizational types, how 
decisions are made and how it relates to IR. A discussion of the role of IR follows and 
includes the topics of data management, reporting, framing questions, and policy and 
decision-making. This section provides information that is related the power sources in 
IR. The next section focuses on power and effectiveness in institutional research. It 
includes topics such as: power as it relates to the institutional researcher’s position, 
personal characteristics related to power, power in relation to location, the power of 
information, resource dependency, opinions about power in IR, and the barriers to its use. 
This section provides information useful for understanding sources of power, the 
institutional researcher’s orientation toward power, and views regarding the appropriate 
use of power in IR. Lastly, this literature review discusses what little research has been 
conducted concerning power in higher education and how the research contributes to this 
study. It has been said that power is involved in every transaction within an organization, 
which is why it was important to begin with an understanding of organizational theory 
(Dougherty & Kramer, 2005). This final section contributed to all five components of this 
research. 
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Organizations 
To understand the role of IR within an institution of higher education, it is 
important to understand higher education through the lens of organizational theory. 
Higher education shares many of the characteristics of for-profit organizations and 
therefore is partially explained through each of the different organizational theories. Few, 
such as cybernetics, attempt to fully explain the complexity of higher education and how 
these institutions function. Diversity of institutions is a hallmark of the American higher 
education system, and no one theory will cover all of the different cultures and 
administrative styles within the system. Some administrations are almost like 
dictatorships while others are governed by an extremely strong faculty. This review only 
touches on the major theories: collegial, bureaucratic, political, and cybernetic. Attributes 
of each theory appear in various aspects of higher education: attributes of a bureaucracy 
can appear in community colleges as well as in subunits with in a research institution 
such as the bursar’s office; political attributes can appear anytime there is a competition 
for resources that can occur in any level of higher education; collegial attributes are 
present anywhere faculty are present; cybernetic attributes are more present in larger, 
more complex institutions and is perhaps the best model to explain higher education. 
Each organizational theory approaches decision-making differently. By understanding the 
organizational theories that help explain higher education, the issues facing IR 
departments as they relate to power and influencing decisions are better understood. 
Thus, the intent of this section is to develop background information and the context  for 
the other components of this study; power sources, power orientation and the will and the 
ability of the institutional researcher to use their power. This section begins with a 
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discussion of the collegial organization and proceeds to the theory that best describes 
higher education, the cybernetic organization.  
Collegial Organizations 
 The collegial model of organizations has its roots in Human Resource models that 
view an effective and efficient organization as one that meets the needs of its members 
instead of focusing on production or politics. The members are, in fact, the functional 
element of the organization (Vires, 2009). In such an organization, members who share a 
common set of sentiments and values are considered equal. Higher education is often 
considered a collegial organization because of the democratic community of scholars that 
emphasize deliberation and consensus in decision-making. Universities and colleges have 
a layered system of subunits that share a general mission and set of values but have 
differing values and missions within the subunits that at times can seem conflicting 
(Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker, & Riley, 2000; Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 2009). For example, 
the entire institution may agree on the value of education, but while a student affairs unit 
may focus on retaining students, an academic unit may seek to eliminate students who are 
not academically prepared for the academic unit’s curriculum. These collegial 
organizations are loosely coupled with the external environment but more tightly coupled 
internally. Changes from an external force may affect only a specific subunit with which 
it interacts, but changes within the organization can affect all of the subunits (Birnbaum, 
1988; Vires, 2009).  
Administrators in the collegial system are generally elected instead of appointed 
and are considered first among equals. Their job is to create and maintain a sense of 
purpose for the organization, establish and maintain formal and informal communication 
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channels, and foster cooperation between the organization’s subunits. Baldridge (2000)  
has described the administrator’s role as  listening, gathering expert opinions, facilitating, 
and negotiating. Power is decentralized as the collegial organization places emphasis on 
equality, consensus, and shared input of the subunits and not the administration (Vires, 
2009). Administration is considered subordinate to the subunits and must follow the 
culturally established procedures when making decisions that will affect the focus of the 
subunits. The leadership is not expected to use coercion to achieve its goals but is to 
reflect the values of the subunits (Birnbaum, 1988). Social power found in the individual 
is more important in the collegial system than the legitimate power that can be found 
within a position (Vires, 2009). Institutional researchers may struggle with power 
because of their lack of social power, which is thought of as a personal attribute and not a 
positional attribute. An institutional researcher who lacks social power may be dependent 
on having access to decision makers or the control of resources if the institutional 
researcher wishes to influence decisions.  
In a system that emphasizes deliberation and consensus, decisions are made using 
social exchange theories rather than a rational system (Vires, 2009). Because institutional 
researchers specialize in data, they excel in rational decision-making and can be de-
emphasized in the collegial system. However, they can participate in the decision-making 
process by contributing needed information during deliberation or by providing feedback 
in the form of program assessment once a decision has been made and implemented. Data 
from IR in a collegial system is used to support a movement toward consensus but is not 
as important as the expertise and professional opinions of faculty who are participating in 
the decision-making (Saunders, 1983; Walton, 2005). Since higher education’s emphasis 
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is on teaching, research, and service and not on reporting and decision-making, power 
lies in the faculty that carry out this mission. Institutional researchers could increase their 
power by having a Ph.D., publishing research and by having class room experience. 
These variables have been shown to be correlated with an increase in referent power and 
power of expertise (Delaney, 1997; French Jr., 1959; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & 
Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). Additionally, an institution that has a history of IR as a part 
of their decision-making protocol, creates the impression of legitimate power for the 
institutional research subunit, whereas a “start-up” IR department may have trouble 
getting an invitation to the decision-making table (Delaney, 1997; French Jr., 1959; 
Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). The main way people 
influence each other in a collegial system is through referent power and the concept of 
first among equals. Without having experience as a member of the faculty, institutional 
researchers may not have the social power to be considered an equal, and because of its 
uniqueness, there are very few positions in higher education “equal” to the institutional 
researcher. The power sources for IR appear to be limited in the collegial model as the 
emphasis is on shared governance and equality. However, if IR can control the 
information resources and develop unique knowledge, then institutional researchers can 
be considered a subject matter experts and be included in decision making. Their 
orientation toward power may lean toward personal charisma, which they may feel they 
do not have. There may also be a tendency for the IR staff to take a more objective 
approach to their reporting in order to allow the faculty to make decisions.  
 
 
 26 
 
Bureaucratic Organizations 
Perhaps the most common theory used to explain an organization is the 
bureaucracy. The term itself conjures up images of red tape and inefficiencies, when in 
fact the bureaucratic structure was designed for just the opposite: to maximize efficiency 
through specialization  (Vires, 2009; Weber, 2005). Efficiency is achieved through 
specialization and standardization of work. The bureaucratic organization is one of great 
hierarchical structure and order. Specialization of processes and responsibilities define 
jobs and lines of responsibilities, while the hierarchy defines the flow of communication 
and decision-making. Specializations can be very effective in some areas of education 
such as the office of the bursar, yet higher education is also full of necessary, redundant 
specialization such as advising. Qualification, rank, and status determine power and the 
ability to use it (Birnbaum, 1988; Weber, 2005). Decisions are made using the rational 
approach whereby the organization attempts to control as many variables as possible 
through standardization and base decisions on research and data in order to gain or 
maintain efficiency (Birnbaum, 1988). An example of this in higher education would be 
an admissions office that is highly selective and uses algorithms to predict student 
success. This allows the office to control the student variables and therefore increase the 
chances of retention and higher graduation rates. The more complex an organization 
becomes, the more specialized the departments become, which increases the need for a 
techno-structure. Within this techno-structure are the administrative units that include the 
analysts who provide the research and data for decision-making (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Mintzberg, 1983a, 1983b; Vires, 2009). Institutional researchers fulfill this role in higher 
education because they are a specialized subunit, often centralized, who provide research 
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and data for decision-making. However,  higher education is known for being 
decentralized and highly specialized and is sometimes considered a Professional 
Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 2000). 
While traditional bureaucratic organizations base their specialization on tasks that 
are standardized, Mintzberg (2000) explains higher education as a professional 
bureaucracy that is based on the specialization of knowledge and loosely standardized 
tasks carried out by the faculty who have the freedom to work as they best see fit. 
Because of this combination of specialization and professionalism, there is less need for a 
large techno-structure to coordinate the work of the institution. Administration focuses 
more on issues outside of the organization than on disturbances within the organization 
(Birnbaum, 1988). The role of IR is focused on producing standardized data and routine 
reports (Saunders, 1983). 
Power in a truly bureaucratic organization flows up the hierarchical chain and is 
very centralized, while power in higher education tends to be decentralized and lies with 
the professional faculty. The diversity of specialization makes it difficult for a centralized 
administration to supervise and manage. Additionally, the expertise of the faculty is in 
demand from organizations outside of the institution. Grants and professional 
organizations dictate much of the work of the faculty and can limit the influence of 
internal authority. Faculty who wish to take on administrative responsibilities are able to 
increase their power to influence by adding legitimate and specialized knowledge to their 
sources of power (Birnbaum, 1988; Etzioni, 2000; Mintzberg, 2000). Individually, 
faculty are limited in their power, but the collective organization of the individuals makes 
it possible for the faculty to gain control over administrative decisions (Etzioni, 2000; 
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Mintzberg, 2000). The implications for institutional researchers are that they must 
understand the relationships within the institution and be aware of the different issues of 
interest related to each college or department. If institutional researchers have access to 
higher level decision makers, they must understand when to use that resource to 
accomplish their tasks, and when not to while they balance the interests of the centralized 
administration and the faculty. 
Rational decision-making in professional bureaucracy is more difficult due to the 
decentralization of power of the specialized units. Conflict occurs from the contradictions 
of a professional bureaucracy. The decentralized power prevents a true bureaucracy when 
the decentralized power attempts to make a centralized decision. If academic units 
attempt to collect their own data and manage their own variables (enrollment and 
retention for example) in order to apply a rational process, it can result in conflicting 
information as each academic unit seeks to understand and interpret their own data 
without regard to other academic units or the institution as a whole. Because  of the 
potential of conflicting information, the information provided by institutional research 
must be complete, accurate, and objective for it to be used in decision-making on any 
level (Walton, 2005). While the office of institutional research is part of the techno-
structure of professional bureaucracy, it has the potential to be a power player based on 
its ability to collect data and create information for both the subunits and the central 
administration. The ability to create information coincides with the ability to define the 
environment, identify internal disturbances, and create political alliances (Billups & 
Delucia, 1990; Birnbaum, 1988). The potential sources of power for IR existing in the 
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bureaucratic model included unique knowledge, technical skills, access to decision 
makers and the control of information as a resource. 
Political Organization 
When an organization is described as being political, it generally conjures up 
images of conflict, which is rightly so as conflict is a major characteristic of political 
organizations. Loose coupling, decentralized power, and the absence of clear goals are 
also prominent characterizations of these organizations. While a bureaucratic 
organization focuses on production, political organizations tend to be focused more on 
setting policy and acquiring resources, and it is in these areas that the conflict occurs 
(Baldridge, et al., 2000; Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1983b; Morgan, 2006; Vires, 2009). 
Public agencies, such as higher education, have a tendency to operate in a political model 
because they are not dependent on production for funding but receive most of their 
funding from outside interests. This dependence on outside resources attracts external 
parties who seek to influence decisions and engage in further politics (Mintzberg, 1983b). 
The competition for resources, and therefore politics, occurs internally as well. 
Administrators seek to maintain a stable organization, but the influences from outside 
sources create disturbances by introducing new regulations or increasing or decreasing 
funding (Mintzberg, 1983b). Because the political organization is a complex one with 
loosely coupled subunits, not every disturbance (disruption or threat to the statuesque) 
affects every subunit. Thus, coalitions rise and fall, and alignments are constantly 
changing depending on current issues and needs of the subunits (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Mintzberg, 1983b; Morgan, 2006). The political model is necessary in higher education 
in order to obtain resources (funding and space for example) and to set favorable policy. 
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The complex and changing coalitions make it difficult for any one group to be 
totally satisfied with the decisions that are made. Thus, decisions aim to only be 
satisfactory and not perfect, often resulting in goals being set but rarely achieved 
(Morgan, 2006; Vires, 2009). Decision-making is rarely done by just one person, and it is 
only those parties that are interested in the issue who engage in the political process. It 
results in ever-changing coalitions and a dispersion of power (Baldridge, et al., 2000; 
Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 2009). Institutional researchers need to understand the political 
system if they wish to be influential and become the basis of decisions (Saunders, 1983). 
As the issues change, coalitions realign in order to influence the decision, be it policy or 
resources, in their favor (Baldridge, et al., 2000; Birnbaum, 1988; Matsen, 1993; 
Mintzberg, 1983b; Morgan, 2006; Saunders, 1983; Vires, 2009). Coalitions form only 
when the groups will mutually benefit; however, when one group has more to gain from 
the pairing, that group tends to contribute more to the cause. Power then shifts to the 
subunit that is most able and most willing to positively influence the decision toward 
their desired outcome, and the larger the group, such as faculty, the more confounded the 
decision makers (Birnbaum, 1988; Saunders, 1983). Power associated with positions and 
titles lose their influence when power is dispersed, and the most powerful individual is 
the leader of the coalition at that particular time regarding that particular instance (Vires, 
2009). Once a subunit engages in politics and in developing a mutually satisfying 
decision, that unit loses the right to complain and/or oppose the decision and must 
become a champion for the larger cause (Morgan, 2006). 
Rarely do issues concern institutional researchers enough for them to engage in 
the political process for their own interests. The political process can dictate the choice 
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and priorities of issues to be addressed and who need to be involved in decision-making. 
However, they do act as a feedback loop once decisions are made by providing data and 
program evaluations. Data in the political decision-making process can be used in a 
variety of ways but are mostly used to support a coalition’s agenda (Matsen, 1993). 
Decisions are not made rationally but are usually  made through a give and take process 
that seeks to achieve a mutually satisfactory decision (Birnbaum, 1988). Data, then, are 
only one piece of the negotiated reality of the political environment (Matsen, 1993). The 
implication for institutional researchers is that they serve as a power tool that coalitions 
seek out for support. Administrators use the data to support decision and to create the 
perception of competence, persuade others, and to reinforce a political decision (Walton, 
2005). Again, institutional researchers gain power through the ability to define the 
environment through the interpretation of data as well as using expertise and skill in data 
management. They also gain power by controlling information as a resource. In 
discussions that are more emotional and self-focused, IR can be a rational and objective 
voice (Suslow, 1972). To be fully engaged, institutional researchers need to understand 
who the key decision makers and coalition leaders are, the style of the decision makers, 
the issues at stake, and the formal and informal lines of communication (Saunders, 1983). 
Saunders (1983) recommends that IR stay away from too many negative or unpopular 
issues and understand exactly what problem or questions are being asked of them in order 
to be effective in a political system. Institutional researchers must spend time and energy 
on issues, be persistent, facilitate the participation of the opposition, manage 
unobtrusively, and volunteer to write the final draft in order to survive in this system 
(Saunders, 1983). The implication for this study concerning the position of institutional 
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researcher in a political environment is that the information the institutional researcher 
controls is a valuable resource. The institutional researcher has power through the ability 
to shape information and through the determination of the release of information. 
However, the institutional researcher may or may not decide to intentionally use that 
power to influence decisions. The sources of power (control of resources, access to 
decision makers, unique knowledge, and technical skill) are present, but its use is 
dependent on the institutional researcher’s orientation toward power. For example, an 
institutional researcher who views power as being political may thrive in this type of 
environment. The political organization increases our understanding of the context in 
which power sources exists for IR and their dependency on the institutional researcher’s 
orientation toward power. There appear to be more sources of power for IR and more 
opportunity for institutional researchers to decide to use or not use their power. 
Cybernetic Organizations 
The cybernetic view of organizations is part of the school of thought that views 
organizations as systems (Vires, 2009). Regarding higher education, it is viewed as a 
complex system that is made up of both loose and tight couplings, conflicting and 
ambiguous goals, and with both a centralized and de-centralized administrative system. 
In order to deal with the complexity of the system and the conflicting goals, the 
cybernetic systems are made up of a large amount of subsystems and subunits. 
Institutional goals are usually vague due to the complex system. To simplify the goal 
setting and to add specificity, each subunit sets its own goals. The subunits respond to 
outside influences only as they pertain to their goals, resulting in a tight coupling. This 
allows those units not affected by the outside unit to maintain a loose coupling. However, 
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internal issues tend to have a tighter coupling with more of the subunits than do the 
external influences (Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 2009). Because the subunits are responsible 
for responding to external influences, they are charged with the task of making slight 
adjustments to their subsystem when external influences cause a disturbance in the 
system. Only when the disturbances are significant does the central administration 
become involved. A system of social and structural controls helps the subunits to make 
minor adjustments and allows the cybernetic organization to run itself with little 
involvement from a centralized administration. Social controls are the culture of the 
university and subunits, meetings, missions, and symbols, while the structural controls 
include the rules, requirements, and organizational structure (Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 
2009). Because of the complexity of the couplings, institutional researchers must be 
aware of issues across campus and have a strong understanding of the stakeholders 
affected by their research and reporting. When they are included in decision-making, they 
can be aware of who should be involved because of their unique understanding of the 
institution. 
Central administration in a cybernetic organization is tasked with designing 
communication systems, collecting data, responding to organizational crises, and subtly 
influencing the subunits. Because there are so many variables that can potentially affect 
an organization, central administration chooses a few variables that are significant to 
them and monitors only those variables while leaving other variables to be monitored by 
the subunits. The goals of central administration are achieved by obtaining funding, 
assigning the goals to the subunits, and then allowing them to carry out their tasks (Vires, 
2009). As the number of central goals increases, so does the number of subunits and 
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therefore the number of decision makers. This then shifts the power from the individual 
administrator to the subunit (Vires, 2009). Institutional researchers help monitor the goals 
of central administration and when invited, help monitor the goals of the subunits. Often 
they gather the information from the subunits to develop a comprehensive picture of the 
whole. 
Not only is the cybernetic organization complex in terms of its organizational 
structure, it is also complex in terms of its power structure because it combines the 
decision-making characteristics of collegial, bureaucratic, and political organizations 
(Vires, 2009). The centralized power stems from the bureaucratic structures found in the 
structural controls that are required to operate a university as well as the broader missions 
and goals of the university. Decentralized power can be found in the social controls, 
decisions made within the subunits, and in collective efforts of the collegial faculty when 
they engage in politics of the organization (Birnbaum, 1988; Vires, 2009).  
 The complexity and diversity within a cybernetic university presents ample 
opportunity for the IR department to utilize power and to engage in the decision-making 
process. Cybernetic organizations tend to be more interested in their inputs than outputs. 
This emphasis on inputs requires the help of IR to monitor what is coming into the 
university and make the involved subunits aware of changes or disturbances and 
irregularities (Vires, 2009). Outside influences tend to be interested in the outputs of the 
cybernetic organization, which also involves IR, as they evaluate programs and determine 
the success or failure of a subunit’s efforts. Structural controls and the bureaucracy seek a 
rational decision-making process that calls on the expertise of IR, while the collegial and 
political aspect requires IR to engage in coalitions by supporting their cause with the 
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needed data and information. Lastly, because cybernetic systems are continually making 
adjustments to irregularities in the system, IR can be called upon to monitor and identify 
what are irregular and what are not. This apparent chaos caused by the irregularities 
requires IR to consider multiple perspectives and monitor ever-changing coalitions. Yet 
they must always believe that their data is based on reality and answers the appropriate 
questions as they relate to the decision makers’ values and views (Matsen, 
1993).Therefore, IR determines  what gets attention and what does not (Birnbaum, 1988). 
It is the creation of information that determines the environment and to what the 
institution reacts (Billups & Delucia, 1990). The implication for IR in the cybernetic 
organization is that their power will not be consistent throughout the institution. In a 
situation that requires a rational decision, they may be quite influential, but perhaps not 
so influential in a collegial decision. The amount of power they have and how they use it 
will be determined by the situation and their personal orientation toward power. 
Regardless of the situation, all of the sources of power should be available to IR in the 
cybernetic organization. Because of the complexity of the decision making process, it 
was thought that the institutional researcher’s orientation toward power might be a more 
significant variable toward determining the use of power in this type of organization than 
in the bureaucratic, political and collegial organizations.  
 
The Role of Institutional Research 
 In 1966, Rourke and Brooks (1966) referred to IR as being at the heart of the 
trend toward modern management techniques in higher education. They believed that the 
trend toward data collection and its use in decision-making may signify or forecast a shift 
in power within the institutions. Since that time, the role of IR has continued to evolve 
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but yet remains poorly defined. Saupe (1990) stated that it is impossible to categorize or 
number the possible contributions IR can make toward decision-making. He defines IR as 
research within an institution of higher education that provides information that supports 
planning, policy making, and decision-making. It is the combined characteristics of the 
institutional culture and the skills and goals of the director of IR that mainly determine 
the role of the researcher and the office (Matsen, 1993; Rourke & Brooks, 1966). The 
collection and distribution of data is a common role for institutional researchers as is 
basic and routine reporting for areas such as enrollment management, financial aid, and 
academic units (Knight & Leimer, 2009; Leimer, 2011; Suslow, 1972). 
To understand the presence of power in IR or the potential use of power, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of the role of IR within the administration of the 
institution. This is somewhat challenging because of the variation in IR departments and 
the limited amount of research on the subject (Delaney, 1997). This section of the 
literature review informs the conceptual framework and components of this research by 
providing additional background information related to the context in which IR operates, 
identifying power sources, and opportunities for the use of power should the institutional 
researcher be oriented to do so. IR’s role in reporting, framing and identifying of 
appropriate questions, and decision-making are discussed in this next section. But at the 
core of all IR functions are data and its management.  
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Data and Its Management 
 The enormous amount of unmonitored information floating through society in 
general and organizations in particular has created a need for groups whose main 
responsibility is to capture, filter, sort, and distribute data. Knowledge management has 
become a $12 billion industry and is very present in the non-profit world of higher 
education (Serban & Luan, 2002). In fact, institutional researchers, if they follow the 
trend in the for-profit world, may eventually have the opportunity to become “Chief 
Knowledge Officers” (Donhardt, 2012; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Serban, 2002; Serban & 
Luan, 2002). The roots of IR may lay in the tasks of appraising higher education, but 
today its tasks are dominated by the management of data and the creation of information 
(Leimer, 2011). While institutional researchers may not always be the host or 
administrators of data warehouses, they are all involved in determining the needs of their 
clients and then capturing, pulling, and reporting the data (Delaney, 1997; Leimer, 2011; 
Lyons, 1976; Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990). This data consists of information concerning 
courses, facilities, financial services, financial aid, staff, and students (Lyons, 1976). 
Additionally, IR must manage data sets that are acquired from outside the institution or 
dedicated internally for data specific purposes, as well as data fused together from a 
variety of sources (Serban & Luan, 2002). Finally, data can be individual and can be 
described as residing with a single person; data can be structural as established in 
manuals and policies; and data can be organizational as established in the learned culture 
and activities (Serban & Luan, 2002). 
 Matsen (1993) stated that IR maintains three roles related to data: provider, 
interpreter, and critic. As the provider of data, IR gathers and cleans the data needed for 
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both standardized and ad-hoc reporting. This data must present a meaningful picture of 
the institution (Saupe, 1990). In the interpreter role, IR organizes the data and provides 
meaning and/or conclusions appropriate to the questions asked and the group doing the 
asking. This requires institutional researchers to anticipate questions that may be asked of 
them and frame questions so that they provide the most benefit to the decision-maker. As 
a critic, institutional researchers look at the data from different points of view and 
attempts to discover new ones in an effort to aid in the decision-making process. Serban 
(2002)  and Volkwein (2003) took the role of interpreter and critic further and called the 
institutional researcher a spin doctor, policy analyst, scholar, and information authority: 
all referring to the ability of IR to influence the use of data and the decision-making 
process. 
 Institutional researchers can improve the decision-making process only if they 
have quality data and a system to make sure the data is used effectively (Fincher, 1981). 
Executives expect high quality, comprehensive, objective, and accurate data and analysis 
and desire information more than raw numbers and percentages (Billups & Delucia, 
1990; Ehrenberg, 2005). It is when the data are placed in context and given meaning that 
institutional researchers can truly improve the decision-making process (Fincher, 1981; 
Serban & Luan, 2002). However, quality and contextual data are only as effective as the 
decision-makers’ inclination toward its use. Often times institutional researchers must 
undergo a process of educating the administration and faculty about what data sets are 
available, how they can be used, and the benefits of using them in a particular decision. 
Data education may be key to ensuring the effectiveness and influence of IR (Ehrenberg, 
2005).  
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The use of data in a decision-making process is a reflection of the culture of the 
institution. A culture that does not include a rational component in the decision-making 
process may see little value in data, so the institutional researcher must understand the 
needs of the administration and strive to educate on the benefits of data. Data must be 
delivered in a way that meets the needs, style, and preferences of the decision maker 
(Walton, 2005). In a cybernetic and/or political system, institutional researchers must 
strive for objectivity and balance in their data presentation. Information that caters too 
much toward the views of administration will cause the faculty to view the institutional 
researcher as a member of the administration, but too much faculty influence can set the 
administration against the institutional researcher (Suslow, 1972). The bottom line for the 
institutional researcher is to understand who is involved in the decision being made, get 
involved in the framing of the question, and provide the data in an understandable and 
useful format (Billups & Delucia, 1990). After all, to help define a question is to help 
influence the decision (Saunders, 1983). Ultimately though, institutional researchers must 
remember that data are not the only components in a decision and institutional 
researchers’ roles are complicated by many factors other than data (Walton, 2005).  
The control and management of data discussed in this section provides the 
opportunity for IR to have power sources in the way of controlling information and 
having technical skills. The potential to be Chief Information officers provides a glimpse 
of how IR can partake in decision making should they desire too. The power orientations 
of controlling resources and political awareness related to the control of information and 
the ability to understand the needs of the decision makers. Lastly, the identification of 
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organizational culture as being a determinant of IR’s role, emphasizes the importance of 
context in understanding IR’s power. 
Reporting 
 While data collection and reporting are traditional activities of IR, some 
researchers believe the roles of IR have narrowed to focus almost exclusively on 
reporting and supporting the research needs of others. Because of decreasing budgets, 
institutions have put more effort into monitoring the effectiveness of their programs. The 
smaller budgets have also caused the centralization of IR because smaller academic and 
administrative units can no longer afford the cost of research. As a result, IR departments 
are overwhelmed with reporting duties and unable to carry out other roles such as 
program evaluation and environmental scanning. Because of the focus on data and 
reporting, IR has begun working with data warehouses and data management in an effort 
to gain efficiency in their reports and consistency in their data (Leimer, 2011). Most of 
the reporting presented by IR, beyond government-mandated reporting, is in the areas of 
planning, enrollment management, and student surveys. Power sources that can be 
present in IR can then include legal prerogatives, having unique knowledge and 
controlling resources. In addition to the heavy reporting work load, institutions are 
seeking more information on enrollment management and student surveys to ensure they 
are competitive and retaining their students (Delaney, 1997).  
 The purpose of IR reporting is primarily program evaluation, but all activities 
related to reporting are intended to improve academics and administration (Suslow, 
1972). Institutional researchers must understand the characteristics of their customers and 
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the needs of the units they are serving in order to provide the most useful information 
(Billups & Delucia, 1990; Saupe, 1990). That includes threats to individual units and the 
system as a whole. Units that are not dealing with any threats or imbalances to the system 
can generally be left alone, but those units that have issues are identified and brought to 
light. When an imbalance occurs on the institutional level, institutional researchers can 
identify and encourage top level administrators, who are included as key-stake holders in 
the decision-making process, to open up lines of communication. Often time this includes 
broadening the group to include overlooked or neglected units (Fincher, 1981; Knight, et 
al., 1997). Saunders (1983) and Saupe (1990) referred to this reporting as “action 
research” that allows institutional researchers to act as agents of change. The ability to 
identify units that are “off track” can serve as a strong source of power. Often, it is those 
units identified by IR that are no longer fulfilling their mission or are unable to prove 
their contribution to the goals of the institution that lose their funding and support (Saupe, 
1990; Suslow, 1972). Thus, the ability to frame the question properly and address the 
concern accurately is a powerful attribute of IR.  
Framing Questions 
 The ability to understand the needs of the various units on campus and properly 
frame questions requires IR to maintain a broad understanding of the institution. Having a 
good relationship and experience with multiple disciplines helps IR consider the different 
realities that exist within an institution. This enables them to maintain an objective 
reality, while at the same time represent the various other realities when considering 
research questions (Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972). Having multidisciplinary skills in 
management technology, education psychology, social sciences, and analytics enables 
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institutional researcher to utilize a variety of techniques in gaining understanding and 
setting research direction (Suslow, 1972).  
 The multidisciplinary approach allows the institutional researcher to pose 
questions and structure problems in a way that gains a broader scope of involvement 
across campus and identifies appropriate resources (Saupe, 1990). As previously 
mentioned, this may involve re-educating units as to what data sets are available to them 
and how the data set applies to their questions (Fincher, 1981). The ability to properly 
frame research questions is a technical skill that provides a source of power in IR as does 
the unique knowledge institutional researchers have when they have a multidisciplinary 
approach. This may also require a political orientation toward power. When decision-
makers understand the multiple perspectives and realities across campus and are aware of 
the data that can help them answer questions, the information provided by IR can aide 
committees in their work and policy setting (Ehrenberg, 2005). 
Policy and Decision-making 
 Delaney (2009) argues that IR has always had a role in planning and policy 
making. While institutional researchers may not have been the source of the decision, 
their data and reports are at least an important part of the decision. Decisions are almost 
never made solely based on the work of the institutional researcher but are based on the 
academic and professional judgment of the decision makers (Saupe, 1990). However, as 
Rourke and Brooks (1966) point out, fact finding and decision-making are not mutually 
exclusive. The major studies and research produced by IR represents their very active 
role in policy formation (Suslow, 1972).  
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Institutional researchers’ role in policy formation and decision-making is the area 
they can apply the most power. Of course, this is very much dependent on the culture of 
the institution in which they work. An institution that uses a rational approach to 
decision-making might ask staff from IR to be present at the decision-making table or an 
institutional researcher may simply provide data to the decision makers. In a more 
collegial environment, IR may not be viewed as a significant enough stakeholder to be 
included in the decision or they may be asked to bring a rational voice to the conflicting 
parties. Whatever the case, IR reflects the culture of the institution and the role of IR is 
set by the decision-making and policy formation processes established by the culture 
(Matsen, 1993). IRs must use their access to knowledge and seek the privilege of sitting 
at the decision-making table in order to be involved in the decision-making process 
(Serban, 2002). Usually, it is as a subject matter expert on the institution or higher 
education that the institutional researcher is involved in a decision and not as a researcher 
(Saupe, 1990). 
 Because institutional researchers generally have broad knowledge of the whole 
campus, they need to build a system of relationships in order to properly frame questions, 
collect the needed data, and have an influence on the decision. But having positive 
relationships is not enough; institutional researchers must also understand how 
relationships work across campus in the political realm (Serban & Luan, 2002). Suslow 
(1972) suggests that IR must have an attitude toward diversifying their skills in multiple 
disciplines in order to gain understanding of the college and to enhance their political 
relationships. But to truly enhance their ability to be included in the decision-making 
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process, the IR department must be located near, and report to, the higher levels of 
administration and have cross-campus responsibilities (Suslow, 1972).  
 Whether or not IR attempts to intentionally influence a decision in one direction 
or another is determined by the organizational culture and the individual researcher’s 
characteristics; but the intention of IR is to promote action (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; 
Serban, 2002). This may be in the role of consensus building or by suggesting a possible 
course of action. Institutional researchers have expressed frustration in being unable to 
make suggestions or in being admonished for pushing too hard in trying to get their 
suggestions adopted. It more often seems to be the case, however, that institutional 
researchers only give their opinion or recommendation when asked: and it is not a part of 
their regular routine (Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005). Institutional researchers can increase 
their chances of participation in decision-making: by getting more involved in 
committees and/or acting as a third voice or mediator during discussions by confirming 
or questioning anecdotal knowledge (Lyons, 1976; Suslow, 1972). The tendency for IR is 
to assume that decision-making is a rational process and that effectiveness is defined by 
rationality, but that is usually not the case (Saunders, 1983). An understanding of political 
relations, the organizational culture, and how their skills and out-puts can benefit the 
decision makers is required in order to influence decisions. The ability to influence 
decisions in a chosen direction is power.  
 This discussion of IR’s involvement with policy and decision-making identified 
most of the power sources potentially found in IR. Control of resources is present in 
providing information, having unique knowledge relates to the campus-wide perspective 
that IR may have, and access to decision makers would be present in discussing policy. 
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The desire to engage in policy-making may be influenced by the individual institutional 
researcher’s orientation toward seeing power as positive as well as seeing it as political.  
  
Power, Influence, and Effectiveness in Institutional Research 
 
 Power is a topic rarely discussed in relation to IR but is often alluded to. Terms 
such as influence and effectiveness are more often discussed but usually remain 
undefined. There has been very little research on power in higher education at the 
departmental or individual level and even less on the power of IR (Thompson, 1990). A 
sociologist may view power as a hierarchical social structure, a psychologist understands 
power as an individual’s internal drive and motivation, while a social psychologist will 
view power as the ability of one individual or group to influence another individual or 
group (Goldberg, et al., 1983). Power exists on the surface of an organization but also 
throughout the organization embedded in the social system (Frost, 1987). This section 
contributes to the conceptual framework of this study by reviewing themes from the 
literature that hint at the presence of power, identifying some sources of power common 
in IR, and orientations toward power as they relate to institutional researchers. Beginning 
with a definition of power and effectiveness, the section will then discuss some of the 
sources for power in IR and, finally, some of the limitations and barriers to power. 
Defining Power and Effectiveness in Institutional Research 
 Thompson (1990) defined power as the ability to get people to do something they 
might not have otherwise done. This usually involves a specified and desired course of 
action, but specificity is not truly necessary to change another person’s course of action. 
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The ability to change or set a person’s or group’s direction, in any direction- specified or 
unspecified- other than what they were intending to go, is reflection of power and 
influence. Power can be used consciously or unconsciously to cause action or to prevent 
action (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Frost, 1987). It can be used to create new situations or 
to reinforce existing situations, it can be used or not used, and lastly it can be based on a 
person or a position (Emerson, 1962; Mumby, 2001). 
Power is an invisible, elusive construct that is only measurable as a theoretical 
construct, which is why there has not been a lot of research on power, even though every 
interaction that occurs within an organization involves a component of power (Dougherty 
& Kramer, 2005; Goldberg, et al., 1983; Thompson, 1990). When discussing IR’s ability 
to influence a decision, it can never be proven that the same decision would have been 
made without the influence of IR (Rourke & Brooks, 1966). What is known, however, is 
that information is power and information is seen as a commodity (Bahniuk, Hill, & 
Darus, 1996; Farley, 1987; Frost, 1987; Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). This is evident by 
the way information is sometimes withheld or released at certain times and in certain 
quantities. When institutional researchers create and provide information from their data 
and reporting, they are providing power to the recipient (Rourke & Brooks, 1966). If a 
person can control information and keep others dependent on him or her for information, 
that person can control and influence the decision-making process (Saunders, 1983). 
Dependency is a key concept related to power and is based on relationships (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962). When one is dependent on another person for a 
particular resource, the person controlling the resource maintains a certain level of power 
over the one in need. When knowledge and data are the resources in demand, IR becomes 
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more powerful. Because of the connection between power and information, IR can be the 
provider of power (Hearn, 1988). Dependency may be less of an issue in higher education 
because individual units and professionals can perform their own research and create 
their own information (Thompson, 1990). However, as previously mentioned, the 
centralization of institutional research because of the increased demand for reporting and 
shrinking budgets, the dependency on IR for information has increased (Delaney, 2009; 
Leimer, 2011). Rourke and Brooks (1966), in the formative days of IR, wrote of a shift in 
power because of a change toward new management techniques. The current emphasis on 
accountability and quality in higher education today is again placing more power and 
influence with institutional research. The concept of controlling information is one of the 
sources of power and also a type of power orientation. An institutional researcher who 
believes in power is gained by controlling resources will seek to do so by controlling the 
release of information coming from IR. 
But power is not generally a term used within institutional research; instead, 
effectiveness is more often used. The problem is that the term “effective” is just as vague 
as the term “power,” and defining it has been an ongoing process (Knight, et al., 1997). 
Being effective might simply refer to one’s ability to perform one’s work or it might 
mean the ability to influence policies and decisions. In case of the latter, effectiveness is 
often related to rationality. When institutional research provides data-driven reports, it 
increases the likelihood that the outcome for a particular decision will be the most 
rational one; therefore, institutional research could be considered effective (Billups & 
Delucia, 1990; Saunders, 1983). Billups and Delucia (1990) also believed that in order 
for institutional research to be effective, institutional research must move from being 
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reactive to the needs of the institution, to a more proactive role- one in which the 
institutional researcher is an “information activist.” The information activist is one who 
takes the initiative in research and identifies areas of potential improvement. One who 
sees IR as information activists will probably have a power orientation toward viewing 
power as a positive attribute and also have the will and desire to use their power. 
Regardless of whether or not the institutional researcher is proactive or reactive, the 
researcher is rarely effective without data. Power, in the situation of the institutional 
researcher, is related to the position and access to the control of data and information. 
The personal ability to influence is only relevant in some relationships so the researcher’s 
ability to influence is dependent on both the organizational culture and structure and, to a 
certain extent, the institutional researcher’s personal characteristics (Emerson, 1962; 
Knight, et al., 1995; Walton, 2005). 
Power and Personal Characteristics 
Institutional researchers who most consider themselves to be effective and 
influential in their jobs tend to hold a Ph.D. (area of specialty is irrelevant), serve as the 
assistant director, and have held the position for a significant period of time. Having a 
Ph.D. increases the likelihood of being involved in policy making and planning. Larger 
institutions are more likely than smaller ones to have Ph.Ds. on their institutional 
research staff. An institutional researcher who has been with the institution for a longer 
time and who has been in institutional research for a while, five years for example, has 
more influence in the decision-making process than those who are new to the institution 
(Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). 
Additionally, Billups and Delucia (1990) found that having good presentation skills, 
 49 
 
acting as a facilitator in discussions, and being a team player increase the effectiveness 
and influence of the institutional researcher. Having people skills and a sense of 
community are also important for institutional researchers. The power orientations that 
are most closely related to this topic are charisma and political. Institutional researchers 
with charisma or political orientations will use their people skills to influence decisions. 
Utilizing their people skills, institutional researchers must build a network of 
relationships across campus. Having cross-campus responsibilities increases the chances 
of developing this network (Serban & Luan, 2002; Suslow, 1972). Good political skills 
help institutional researchers maintain productive formal and informal relationships and 
are imperative to having a good relationship with the decision makers on campus 
(Delaney, 1997). Positive relationships help institutional researchers understand the 
decision-making process, the expectations of the leadership team, and the audience they 
are trying to influence (Billups & Delucia, 1990; Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993). 
However, the personal characteristics of institutional researchers are not the focus of this 
study but do provide some contextual information for this research. Personal 
characteristics leave when the person leaves, but the power related to the position 
remains. How institutional researchers use the power associated with the position 
depends on their orientation toward power. 
Power Orientation 
Power orientation refers to how people assign meaning to power and is a 
reflection of their past experience (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Goldberg, et al., 1983). 
Orientation toward power is considered a relatively enduring trait that will predispose 
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people to how they choose to gain and/or use power (Bahniuk, et al., 1996). People may 
be oriented toward power in six ways: People who see power as good and as in 
instinctive drive may be aggressive in pursuing power; people who view power as 
political will seek power through a political relationships and processes; people who view 
power as an issue of resource dependency will seek to gain and control resources to 
preserve or increase their power; one who views power as charisma will believe that 
power is related to the individuals who are able to make an impact on a situation whether 
they intend to or not; and lastly, people who see power as control or autonomy will view 
power as the ability get others to do as they wish and in doing so, the person who gains 
power also gains independence and autonomy (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Farley, 1987; 
Goldberg, et al., 1983). Power orientation was included in the conceptual framework of 
this study in order to gain an understanding of how institutional researchers might seek to 
gain and use their power if there is a difference between institutional research related to 
the different types of higher education, reporting structure, and job title. It was thought 
that a common consensus may provide insight as to which direction the profession of 
institutional research may go in the future. 
Power and Location 
The reporting structure of the institution and the location of the institutional 
research office also influence the power and effectiveness of institutional research. 
Naturally, an IR office that reports to the president will have more influence than one that 
does not (Knight & Leimer, 2009; Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972; 
Walton, 2005). Delaney (1997) found that more than 50% of institutional research offices 
report to various administrators; within that 50%, 14% reported to a president and another 
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14% reported to an academic dean. Institutional research at larger institutions tended to 
report to a president or vice-president while institutional research at smaller schools 
tended to report to various other administrators. The location of the office affects the 
work and responsibility of institutional research. An office that reports to a higher level 
will have a broader scope of responsibility and influence while an office that reports to a 
specific subunit (enrollment management for example) may only deal with issues related 
to that department (Leimer, 2011). Reporting to the higher levels of the institution 
indicates institutional research as being of central importance to the effectiveness of 
governance (Saupe, 1990). When IR staff reports to the president, they can be seen as the 
president’s “right-hand-man” and is often a member of the president’s cabinet (Matsen, 
1993; Rourke & Brooks, 1966). However, as Suslow (1972) points out, institutional 
research must have a degree of independence if it is to remain objective. Working too 
closely with the administration will create the impression that they are administrators and 
may strain their relationship with the faculty and create credibility issues. Serving on a 
faculty committee, teaching, and having a PhD can help balance the relationship and 
ability to influence faculty (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Saunders, 1983; Suslow, 1972). The 
location of the IR office and the reporting structure directly relates to having access to 
decision makers as a source of power and possibly the political power orientation. 
Power and Information 
Of course the location of the office is of little importance if the data and reporting 
are not objective (without influence of feelings or opinion) and accurate. The number one 
strength of IR is the ability to provide and analyze information, which is considered as a 
unique expertise (Knight & Leimer, 2009; Leimer, 2011; Matsen, 1993; Saunders, 1983; 
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Terenzini, 1999). Power related to information is related to the power sources of 
controlling information and having a unique expertise. It is not enough to be able to 
provide numbers and percentages; effective institutional researchers interpret the data and 
provide analysis. While quantitative data is usually more powerful in decision-making 
than qualitative data, especially in a rational process, an institutional researcher must 
have skills in qualitative research as well (Leimer, 2011; Walton, 2005). Analytical, 
presentation, and people skills must be accompanied by organizational intelligence. A 
broad understanding of the institution is necessary to place the data into context, properly 
frame questions, identify assumptions, and make appropriate recommendations. 
Institutional researchers must have knowledge of internal and external issues as well 
(Knight, et al., 1997; Saupe, 1990; Terenzini, 1999). Most departments understand the 
issues related to their specific objective, but only a few individuals on campus possess an 
understanding of the broader issues and how they affect all of campus. Institutional 
researchers are such individuals. 
 This broad knowledge base enables the institutional researcher to properly frame 
questions and make recommendations in the appropriate context. When data are 
understood in context, information is created (Serban & Luan, 2002). By applying a 
systematic approach, institutional researchers can analyze the data and take advantage of 
their understanding of campus issues to create new and useful knowledge (Matsen, 1993). 
With the new knowledge comes the ability to submit recommendations and influence 
decisions (Rourke & Brooks, 1966). By creating new knowledge and making 
recommendations, institutional research engages in social construction that can define the 
institution based on its strengths and weaknesses, both internally and externally, by 
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identifying effective academic and administrative units and those that are not (Matsen, 
1993). Rational decision-making relies on objective data, but it is nearly impossible to 
interpret data without a subjective component. For example, by simply stating that 40% 
of students failed a math course, the institutional researcher was subjective in presenting 
the negative aspect of the data. A more objective would identify that 60% passed and 
40% failed. Administrators do not always trust data from just anyone, so when IR 
becomes a trusted source, they have the power to help define reality for the institution 
(Matsen, 1993).  
 Part of defining reality is identifying early indicators of problems and reporting 
threats to the stability of the institution (Fincher, 1981; Knight, et al., 1997; Saupe, 1990). 
For example, identifying an issue with the number of students taking and failing remedial 
math, the institutional researcher can identify a possible threat to the retention and 
graduation rates as well as the number of college level math instructors needed for the 
next semester. When the institutional research staff  have the audience of the president or 
other high ranking executives, they stimulate interest and activity in the troubled area. If a 
unit is struggling, institutional research can influence whether the unit gets more funding 
or is eliminated based on a report and/or recommendations from IR (Knight, et al., 1997; 
Suslow, 1972). Every action an administrator takes can be influenced by a report or study 
from institutional research. For example, how the report structures the problem can 
influence who is involved in the problem as well as the solution. A student retention issue 
might involve enrollment management and recruiting, but if institutional research 
identifies that the retention problems are related to developmental math, then the math 
department is also involved. To control the information is to control the decision-making 
 54 
 
process (Suslow, 1972). A smaller institutional research office removed from the 
decision-makers will not have this influence (Fincher, 1981; Suslow, 1972). However, in 
a political and cybernetic system, decisions are seldom rational and often made without 
the use of institutional research (Birnbaum, 1988). Often times, it is after the decision is 
made that institutional research is called upon to provide data to support the decision. 
And just as often, institutional research is called upon to provide data that can be used to 
persuade a decision maker, to refute an accusation, or to increase the power of a smaller 
player in a political conflict (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). Using data and 
information symbolizes a rational decision and allows institutional research to have at 
least a symbolic value within the culture of the institution (Hearn, 1988). These are 
further examples of how controlling information and having unique knowledge serve as 
power sources for IR or the decision makers. Rather than provide the information 
necessary for decision-making, the information from IR becomes an after-the-fact 
justification and is thus a means of enforcing or upholding power. 
Resource Dependency 
 Resource dependency theory holds that individuals or organizations that control a 
resource that is valuable to another individual or organization has power over that 
individual or group. To have power, the resource must be valuable, irreplaceable, and 
uncertain (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962; Frost, 1987; Morgan, 2006; 
Pfeffer, 1981). Additionally, one who controls the resource must be able to control access 
to the resource and the release of the resource in terms of timing and quantity (Morgan, 
2006; Pfeffer, 1981). However, power related to resources is based on a mutually 
dependent relationship. One party is dependent on the other to supply the resource, while 
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the party that controls the resource is dependent on the other to need the resource. In fact, 
the party in need of the resource can increase its power by finding another supplier for the 
resource and decrease its dependency on the original supplier (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Emerson, 1962; Frost, 1987; Pfeffer, 1981). These relationships may also be 
symbiotic within an organization where one department is dependent on the output of 
another department (Pfeffer, 1981). Frost (1987) has referred to organizations as a 
grouping of mutually dependent relationships. This is true with institutional research 
where the resource is information and they have mutually dependent relationships with 
other departments. Institutional research needs data from the individual departments, 
while the individual departments need the institutional information from institutional 
research.  
 Ultimately, though, institutional research is the department that controls 
institutional information and therefore has the related power source as well as the 
potential of having the resource dependency orientation toward power. The ability to 
control information is one of the strongest personal characteristics related to success 
(Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Pfeffer, 1981). Resource dependency, however, does not view the 
control of resources, in this case information, as a personal characteristic. Power is based 
on a relationship, not a person. It is based on the position, not the person. Personal 
attributes may or may not be relevant in a particular relationship but the need for a 
resource is always present (Emerson, 1962). Through the position of institutional 
research and the control of the information resource, an institutional researcher can 
influence decision-making in four ways: controlling the premises, controlling the process, 
identifying the issues and defining the situation, and being a subject matter expert. 
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Controlling the premises involves determining what gets talked about and what does not. 
Controlling the process involves identifying who are involved and who are not. 
Identifying issues and defining the situation involves deciding what issues get brought to 
light and how good or bad is the situation. Lastly, being an expert involves knowledge 
and preparation of a situation and how to research problems (Morgan, 2006). Because 
resource dependency theory explains power related to the ability to control resources and 
views power as positional and not personal, it is important to the conceptual framework 
of this study.  
Opinions about Power and Barriers to Its Use 
 Opinions about the use of power in IR develop the portion of the conceptual 
framework concerning the will of institutional researchers to use their power. Even 
though IR may have five sources of power at their disposal, they may or may not have the 
desire to use the power to intentionally influence decisions. There are two schools of 
thought concerning IR and power: those that think IR should actively try to influence 
decisions and those that do not. Saunders (1983) stated that the objective of IR is 
institutional influence, and he is not alone. Institutional researchers have been called to be 
change agents with research that is action-oriented by identifying issues and providing 
plausible solutions (Delaney, 2009; Donhardt, 2012; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Serban, 
2002). In times of institutional difficulty, IR can be a powerful and necessary resource for 
decision makers, but institutional researchers are often frustrated by their limited 
influence on policy (Hearn, 1988; Knight & Leimer, 2009). Billups and Delucia (1990) 
point out that data that are not considered in the decision-making process are useless and 
call for institutional researchers to know and understand the decision makers and work to 
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create a bias toward the use of data and institutional reports. They believe marketing 
institutional data sets and getting involved on committees are an important part of the 
institutional researcher’s job. IR, according to Perry (1972), should be a third voice in 
planning and management. Institutional researchers should be involved with interpreting 
and articulating information and providing a rational opinion. Saunders (1983) agrees 
with this notion and adds that institutional researchers should be involved in policy 
making and process development. Saunders (1983) also suggests ways to have more 
influence. He states that it is important for institutional researchers to spend time and 
energy on significant issues and be persistent with their suggestions. Focusing more on 
substance instead of status and facilitating involvement of the opposition in an issue will 
increase the respect and acceptance of institutional researchers at the decision-making 
table. Lastly, Saunders (1983) recommends volunteering to write the final draft of 
committee reports as a way to build relationships.  
 Others in the field of institutional research have advocated for IR to create a 
whole new level of influence. Donhardt (2012) calls for an increase of positions such as 
Chief Institutional Research Officer and Chief Information Officer that reports to 
executive boards and coordinates the information infrastructure of the entire institution. 
Knight and Leimer (2009) call for the institutional researchers to act as Chief Strategy 
Officers who engage in all levels of assessment, strategic planning, and information 
functions. They recommend this position act as members of the president’s cabinet. This 
then utilizes the power source of having access to decision makers. How institutional 
researchers use their power will depend on their orientation toward power. Those who 
feel called to be action-oriented in their research may view power as natural and good 
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and that power should be used for positive influence. Other institutional researchers may 
utilize their political orientation to gain access to decision makers.  
 There are plenty others who believe IR should not be concerned with power. This 
does not mean they do not have power, but that they may not have the will or desire to 
use it. Perry (1972) states that IR, as a profession, lacks any real philosophic orientation 
to lead them, which results in differing opinions about the role of IR. Those against IR 
influencing decision-making argue that institutional researchers have no leadership skills, 
lack the motivation to lead, and should not seek to develop leadership skills (Fincher, 
1981). The most common anti-power belief is that IR should remain neutral and objective 
and stick to the “housekeeping duties” of basic fact-book reporting and the likes. IR can 
be instrumental in the decision-making process but IR must remember that they are not 
the source of the decision and should not push to monopolize decision-making (Rourke & 
Brooks, 1966). Suslow (1972) suggested that IR is already plenty involved in the 
decision-making process through their research projects and reporting and should only 
state their preference or recommendations when asked. He believes that institutional 
researchers can get in trouble by not removing themselves from the decision-making 
process at the right time. This creates a conflict with their objectivity. After all, IR, 
Suslow feels, should remain objective: if their goal is to set direction, they should go into 
administration. Saupe (1990) was perhaps the most clear regarding the role of IR. He 
wrote that the work of IR should be free of personal philosophy, politics, or desired 
results and that IR has served its purpose when it has provided information and 
stimulated reflection. When asked for an opinion on an issue, institutional researchers 
should discuss no more than their expertise and experience allows them.  
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There are also several barriers to an institutional researcher’s ability to use power; 
most are related to a lack of skills, qualifications, or institutional structure. Within the 
conceptual frame work of this study, this applies to the ability to use power. Institutional 
researchers may have the five power sources available to them, and they may have the 
desire and will to use that power, but they may not have the ability to influence decision. 
Contextual knowledge of the issue is an area where institutional researchers feel under 
qualified (Knight, et al., 1997). Even so, they still have more institutional and contextual 
knowledge than most people on campus. Qualifications of the institutional researcher 
vary from each individual but often include skills in the area of technology, analytics, 
leadership, and presentation (Billups & Delucia, 1990; Saunders, 1983). Where 
institutional researchers fail most often is in allowing gaps in communication of data, not 
keeping up with shifting goals of the institution, not grasping new technology, and not 
understanding the needs of the institution and the administration. Presenting data and 
reports in a format that is not consistent with the decision-making style of the leader and 
the institution results in unused and wasted information  and strained relationships 
(Billups & Delucia, 1990). Serban (2002) points out that failure to properly manage data 
warehouses and information hinders the reporting process and reputation of IR. Not 
having a Ph.D., having no faculty experience, and not being tenured can limit 
institutional researchers’ ability to influence faculty in addition to being too closely 
associated with administration (Delaney, 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Saunders, 1983). 
Lastly, reporting to lower levels of administration or being housed within specialized 
subunits limits institutional researchers’ access to decision makers and leadership 
(Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Serban & Luan, 2002). Without access to the 
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decision makers, it is difficult to influence much of anything. The barriers to using power 
demonstrate some of the struggles IR may have if they are missing some of the power 
sources or if their orientations toward power do not match the culture of the institution.  
Research on Power in Higher Education 
 Research concerning the power of the individual is difficult because power is 
invisible and can only be measured as a theoretical control (Thompson, 1990). This final 
section of the literature review focuses on what little research has been conducted 
regarding power in higher education. It begins with research about power in general, 
moves to research focused on power orientation and concludes with research that has 
been conducted on power in higher education. Woven throughout this section are 
comments on how the research relates to IR and how it contributes to the conceptual 
framework of this study.  
Mechanic (1962) in his article entitled “Sources of Power of Lower Participants in 
Complex Organizations” defines power as any force that induces behavior that otherwise 
would not have occurred. By this definition, it could be argued that the outputs of IR have 
the potential to act as a power force. For example, an assessment report that reflects 
poorly on a program may result in a change in behavior that otherwise would not have 
occurred. Power used in this method may reflect an orientation toward using power for 
control and autonomy. Mechanic also states that the way for subunits to achieve power is 
to control resources, which supports the concept that IR has a source of power in 
controlling information as a resource. An interesting concept from Mechanic’s article is 
the idea that it is impossible to compare power of individuals at different levels. Thus, it 
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may be difficult to compare the power of a faculty member to that of an institutional 
researcher or staff in IR to the director. Therefore, this research only focused on IR staff 
and directors.  
Basing his research on the work of French and Raven’s (1959) social bases of 
social power, Cobb (1980) measured the relations between power base utilization and 
informal influence. Cobb found that, among work unit peers, legitimate authority was the 
most used source of power while coercive power was the least. Expertise and reward 
power were used to influence in an up and down direction while referent power was used 
in a lateral direction. This research will not examine the use of power within the IR office 
but on how it is used outside of the office. Still, Cobb’s work is beneficial by 
demonstrating the directional use of power. It could be expected that the IR staff would 
perceive themselves as using their expert power mostly to influence higher management 
and lower staff positions while using it to a lesser extent with their lateral equivalents. 
One reason for this is that institutions of higher education have very few analyst positions 
and those can usually be found in the IR office. Some institutions may have analysts in 
specific areas such as enrollment management or assessment, but those analysts serve a 
much narrower function within those departments so there are limited opportunities to 
use lateral power. Cobb’s (1980) work relates to the concept of using technical skill and 
unique knowledge (expertise) as a power source.  
The application of contingency theory helped Boeker (1989) determine how the 
environment helps to develop and institutionalize subunit power. He found the 
environment in which the subunit was founded is a powerful determinant of its structure 
but that the ever-changing market also influences its power. Other factors that affect the 
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power of the subunit are the expertise of the founder and the age of the organization. In 
an age of accountability where institutions of higher education are being asked by 
politicians and the public in the external environment to prove their value and justify their 
costs, IR takes on a more important role. This does not necessarily mean an increase in 
the power of the IR subunit will occur. However, using Boeker’s findings regarding the 
founder and the environment, it could be argued that if the IR office had very little 
expertise power and no real demands from the external environment when it was created, 
the IR staff would have had little power and would not have been institutionalized as an 
influential power player. Of course, the opposite would be true as well. Boeker’s study 
implications for this study is that the context in which institutional researchers work, has 
an influence on their power sources and how they believe their power should be used. 
One of the most intriguing articles concerning the measurement of power was a 
piece written by Keith Provan. In “Recognizing, Measuring, and Interpreting the 
Potential/Enacted Power Distinction in Organizational Research,” Provan (1980) 
introduces the concept that power should be studied and measured as both potential 
power and enacted power. Potential power is the capacity of one social actor to influence 
another that is not acted upon. While this article is not empirical research, Provan makes 
a convincing argument for measuring both types of power. The implication for this study 
is that power may exist within IR, but that does not mean the IR staff are willing to use it. 
This researcher attempted to measure the presence of power in the position of 
institutional researcher by determining the strength of the power sources and to determine 
if that power is used to influence. The use of power to influence is dependent on the 
individual’s understanding of power and orientation toward power. 
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Goldberg, Cavanaugh, and Larson (1983) sought to understand meaning as 
defined by the individual, which is part of the conceptual framework of this study. They 
understood that power is an elusive concept, so they sought to determine how individuals 
respond to the term “power,” Through their review of literature, they developed the 
Power Orientation Scale (POS). The POS rates persons in six different power 
orientations: those who see power as (1) good,  (2) a natural drive, (3) related to 
dependency of resources, (4) a political tool, (5)  a charismatic characteristic, and (6) a 
way to control and gain autonomy. The authors of this study believe that one’s 
orientation toward power will be reflected in one’s communications and actions 
(Goldberg, et al., 1983). The POS constructs were used as a way to measure institutional 
researchers’ feelings, or orientations, toward the power they have as institutional 
researchers. It was hoped that the orientation would provide insights as to what 
institutional researchers do with their power and how they believe their power should be 
used.  
Bahniuk, Hill, and Daris (1996) used the POS in their study of power-gaining 
communication strategies as they relate to career success. Although they used other 
measurements in addition to the POS, they found that the POS had a significant overall 
relationship with career success. Participants who viewed power as good perceived 
themselves to be successful in their careers, while participants who viewed power as 
political actually attained success as measured by titles, income, and responsibility 
(Bahniuk, et al., 1996). There are no real implications for this study other than providing 
background information for the POS used in this study. 
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In her study concerning the differences between power orientations and 
communication styles of nursing managers and nurses, Farley (1987) used the POS as a 
key research tool. She found that nurses and their managers did in fact have different 
orientations toward power. Managers were found to be statistically different from nurses 
in the orientations of power as good, power as political, and power as control and 
autonomy. This would indicate that managers would tend to be more aggressive in 
seeking power, use political tactics to do so, and be motivated to seek control and 
autonomy over their responsibilities. This study and the previous one are examples of 
what I hoped to find in this research. Specifically, is power orientation related to how 
institutional researchers perceive their role in decision-making and how does power 
orientation differ by institutional type, organizational structure, and job title? This review 
now turns to the examination of the literature that addresses power in higher education. 
In addition to calling IR to action in his article “Institutional Research: Vital Third 
Force in Higher Education,” Perry (1972) identifies three  power sources within IR 
offices: access to databases, continuous training, and expertise in interpretation. He 
argues that IR staffs have a combination of management skills and knowledge of 
academia required to be active participants in the decision-making process. Additionally, 
he believes IR focuses too much on studying what is wrong with the institution and needs 
to focus more on what it is doing right. By doing so, IR staff can offer more positive 
solutions to problem solving and be more active in decision-making. This non-
empirically based article offers hope for impact but only a few solutions on how IR can 
be more influential. Additionally, Perry identifies only three forces in education - faculty, 
administration, and IR - and only briefly mentions one external influence, legislators. In 
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reality there are countless influences on education; still, IR can provide a rational base for 
decision-making as he mentions. The implications for this study are that the unique 
knowledge and technical skills that IR staff may have can be considered a power source. 
A possible power orientation identified in Perry’s (1972) work is viewing power as a 
natural desire that can be used for positive influences.  
 Delany (2000) conducted research similar to this research project. In her study 
entitled “Institutional Researchers as a Leader in Policy: Prospective and Possibilities” 
she asked two questions: How effective are institutional researchers in influencing 
policy? What factors make institutional researchers more effective in the policy areas? 
The implication for this study is that some institutional researchers may not have the 
ability to influence decisions. Delany used no theoretical basis for her research but simply 
measured the self-perceived effectiveness of the institutional researchers and their stated 
characteristics. She found that IR staff perceive themselves as more effective if they had 
been employed for a greater number of years, held a Ph.D., were at least associate 
directors and reported to the president. A more autonomous office is also perceived as 
being more effective. This research does a good job of identifying characteristics of the 
individual but fails to address the position of institutional researcher. Thus, if the person 
is removed, the influential characteristics are also removed and there is nothing left to 
determine the power of the position. However, if the IR staff view personal 
characteristics as being important to having power, they may view power as being 
oriented to charisma. 
 In the same theme as policy influence, Heim and Keith (1991) addressed the 
faculty as participants in policy making. Of course, their focus is on faculty while this 
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study focused on IR, but much of their work can be applied to IR. They found that how 
closely the department’s function is related to the institution’s mission affects their level 
of influence. This concept is certainly applicable to the IR office. External support of a 
department is also a factor. This can mean external funding or political policy support. 
While IR may not bring in external funding, they often work closely with states’ 
Department of Education in reporting and special project work. Similar to external 
support, departments that have an effect on policy-making such as education or political 
science gain additional power if their research does in fact influence policy. Institutional 
researchers, however, usually are not able to conduct research at this level. Additional 
factors of influence include the status of the department’s graduates in society, which of 
course does not apply to IR, and the faculty’s participation in institutional government. 
IR staffs have the potential to participate in many committees that help make decisions, 
and their work is often considered by these committees. Heim and Keith’s (1991) 
research relates to this research in that there are those who work in the IR profession who 
believe that IR should be involved in policy-making, which would require the necessary 
power sources and a political power orientation. 
“Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach” by Gross (1968) focuses 
on defining universities as organizations based upon their goals. What is beneficial to the 
study of power in IR is his methodology even though it offers little in the way of 
contributing to the understanding of power. His survey asked faculty to rate the goals 
they thought should be most important and those goals that actually are most important. 
While Gross’s (1968) research does not contribute to this study, this is an area of 
potential study for power in IR: A gap analysis between what institutional researchers 
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perceive as their power of influence to be compared to what they say their power of 
influence is. It is worth noting that a review of the list of important goals found in Gross’ 
work demonstrates that IR has some sort of impact on several of the goals whether it be 
reporting information or providing analytical work for the goal. University prestige, 
quality improvement, and assessment are a few of the goals involving IR.  
 Another research project that focuses on faculty was conducted by Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1974): “The basis and use of power in organizational decision-making: The Case 
of a University.” Salancik and Pfeffer define a subunit as an academic unit and note the 
significance of the subunit’s ability to provide resources to the university as a whole. 
Power and resources go to those units that generate resources. Their empirical study 
identified research funding as the best predictor of power but also mentioned that 
subunits can increase their power by participation on committees and university 
governance. Like most research that focus on universities, this one remains focused on 
the academic subunit and ignores the support staff subunits. Institutional researchers do 
have opportunity to obtain grants but rarely have the time to pursue them. More often, 
they are providing data and information to grant writers so that they may obtain the 
funding/resource. However, because IR staff participates in institutional committees, a 
question regarding their involvement was been added to my study. Committee work is 
also a way that IR can gain access to decision makers and strengthen their power sources. 
 In Bess’ book Collegiality and Bureaucracy in the Modern University (1988), he 
addresses all of the concepts of power sources previously mentioned in this paper. Bess 
introduces two noteworthy contributions applicable to this study. The first is a discussion 
of rationality that provides background and context to this study. One of the 
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characteristics of professional and collegial organizations is a trust and belief in the 
rationality of decision-making. This being the case, institutional researchers should hold a 
level of legitimate power as rational decisions must be based on known information that 
comes from IR in many situations. The second contribution Bess makes to this study is 
the idea of IR being involved in coalitions. At universities where the faculty forms a 
strong coalition, the institutional researcher may not be as important a resource to them 
and may be more important to the administration. At a community college, which is 
generally more bureaucratic, IR may be used to justify and further enhance the 
bureaucracy and reduce coalitions or IR may be recruited by faculty to provide 
supportive data (Mintzberg, 1979). As the producer of institutional knowledge, it is easily 
conceivable that institutional researchers would be sought after as part of a coalition: not 
only because of their influence on and access to information, but because of their access 
to high level decision makers. This work implies that IR has sources of power in having 
access to decision makers and controlling information and that a political power 
orientation would be effective way to utilize power. 
 Buorgeois and Nizet (1993) identified the means of influence in a professional 
bureaucracy in academic decision-making. Their case study of a Belgian university 
focused on monetary resources, information, time, rules, coalitions and language, and 
symbols as sources of power. They further cite legitimate and coercive power as a way of 
influence. Their contribution to the field is in the way they combined the source and the 
method to create 14 combinations of power. They found that legitimate power is used 
more than coercive power and that legitimate/expertise power was the most powerful 
combination followed by legitimate/information. The equivalent of legitimate/expertise 
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power would be the power sources of access to decision makers/technical skills/unique 
knowledge. While this research does not combine sources, it does seek to determine 
which power sources are most prevalent. If institutional researchers were proven to have 
different sources of power and in fact use that power to influence others, Buorgeois and 
Nizet’s combined power method may be a good tool for explaining power in IR in future 
research.  
 In one of the few research articles that focuses on IR, Knight and Leimer (2009) 
researched job satisfaction of institutional researchers and their intention to remain in the 
profession. This study, which consisted of a literature review, a survey, and frequency 
counts, found that one third of institutional researchers were planning on leaving their 
jobs. Increasing demands for work and decreasing research were some of the factors 
related to the desire to leave. But the study also identified issues related to this research 
project. Institutional researchers have a need to feel that their work is recognized and 
valued by their institution and that their work has a tangible effect on decision-making, 
planning, and policy formation, in other words, the power to influence. Participants self-
identified that they preferred influencing decisions through their expertise and saw 
themselves as being objective. Participation in decision-making was a factor in job 
satisfaction and lack of participation was a factor in the desire to leave their job. This 
study also identified that institutional researchers have technical expertise that is in high 
demand and that also leads to their desire to leave. The authors recommended exposing 
institutional researchers to senior administrators, expanding their responsibilities to 
include strategic planning and assessment, and acting as chief strategy officers. The 
implications for this study is that institutional researchers have the desire and will to 
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actively influence decisions,  they possess expertise power that is related to having 
technical skills and unique knowledge, and should have access to high level decision-
makers, all of which are power sources that are a focus on in this study. 
 The last article in this literature review also focuses exclusively on IR and the 
factors that result in the decentralization of institutional research functions. Hearn and 
Corcoran (1988) confirm that the information generated by IR is in fact a source of power 
and that administrative and academic departments seek to use it. Control of this 
information provides power to these departments, especially if the department is 
struggling or feels threatened or under accreditation review. By attempting to perform 
their own institutional research, they can control their own image and use data as needed 
to support their causes. Other factors that lead to decentralized IR functions include IR 
staff who leave and continue to apply their skill and expertise out of habit in another part 
of the institution, management who value data and seek to manage their own, and 
technology that makes it easier to conduct research within the department. Hearn and 
Corcoran (1988) also note that a centralized IR can serve as symbolic power by creating 
the impression that decisions are made rationally by upper management. Although this is 
a case study of a single university, by demonstrating how information power is sought 
out and attempted to be controlled by other subunits, it demonstrates that information is a 
source of power for IR. My study includes the control of information as a power source 
and a power orientation. 
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Summary of Literature Review 
This literature review provided contextual background needed to understand the 
different organizational types and their decision making styles in which institutional 
researchers work. Institutions of higher education are complex organizations that have 
characteristics of collegial, bureaucratic, political, and cybernetic organizations that 
influence the power sources available to IR. The size and type of the institution, IR 
responsibilities, and the levels of committee participation are included in the research 
survey. Miztberg’s (1983b) five power sources were identified in the literature: access to 
decision makers, control of information, unique knowledge, technical skills and legal 
prerogatives. The context of the organization influences which power sources are 
available; however, how power is used is dependent on the institutional researcher’s 
orientation toward power. Orientations identified in the literature include; seeing power 
as a natural and positive attribute, as being political, as being related to resource 
dependency, personal charisma and the need for control and autonomy. The literature 
also identified different viewpoints as to the role of IR and how power should be used. 
The will and desire to use power is related to the orientation toward power and the power 
sources as is the ability to use power. These key points, back ground, power sources, 
power orientation, desire to influence and ability to influence form the conceptual frame 
work of this study. 
The literature on power discussed in this section identifies sources of power 
within universities or subunits of larger universities and mostly focuses on case studies or 
a survey of employees within a single university; therefore, it is difficult to generalize 
their findings to the larger sample. My study fills in the knowledge gap by focusing on IR 
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while using survey methodology with stratified random sampling techniques. Thus, the 
sampling was more representative of the United States’ higher education system and 
therefore more generalizable.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of power related to the 
position of institutional research. The study was necessary because of the increasing 
demand for the assessment of productivity in higher education and justification for 
increases in the cost of higher education that has increased the responsibility and 
visibility of institutional research and the importance of data/information produced by 
institutional research. Very little research has been conducted concerning institutional 
researchers who have the ability to control information but who traditionally have little 
interest in obtaining or using power, which created the need for this research.  The 
conceptual framework for this study consisted of five parts. First, the background of the 
IR department and the institutional context in which they work was thought to influence 
the sources of power available to them. Second, Mintzberg (1983b) proposed that 
analysts have five sources of power at their disposal: control of a resource, technical 
skills, unique knowledge, legal prerogatives, and/or access to decision makers. This 
research sought to understand if institutional researchers have these sources of power. 
Resource dependency theory was applicable because institutional researchers gather, 
produce, and distribute data and information internally and externally. Therefore, it was 
presumed that institutional researchers would have the ability to influence information 
used in decision-making. The third concept of this research considered institutional 
researchers’ orientations toward power. Power can be defined, gained, and used in 
multiple ways, even within the same or similar institutions. As previously mentioned, 
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power was not defined in this study; instead, this study sought to understand how power 
was understood by the institutional researchers in this sample. Potential power 
orientations included seeing power as good, as resource dependency, as an instinctive 
drive, as political, as charisma, and as a means of control and autonomy (Goldberg, et al., 
1983). Orientations toward power was thought to have an influence on determining if 
institutional researchers have the will and desire to use their power to influence decisions. 
The will and the ability to influence decisions were the fourth and fifth concepts of this 
research. Mintzberg (1983b) believes that analysts, such as institutional researchers, have 
very little interest in using their power to influence decisions. Therefore, analysts need 
both the will and the skill to be able to use their power. However, professionals in the 
field of institutional research have demonstrated varying views as to the role institutional 
researchers should take when it comes to influencing decisions, indicating that some have 
the will to influence decisions and some do not. The graphic below reiterates the 
conceptual framework used for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey research utilizes questionnaires to gather information from a large 
population for the purpose of understanding and summarizing the self-reported 
characteristics, attitudes, and opinions of the group and was therefore appropriate for this 
study (Ary, Cheser Jacobs, & Razavieh, 2002; Mertens, 2005). The population of interest 
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was institutional researchers, and it was their opinions and attitudes toward power as well 
as the presence of power sources that I sought to understand. As I did not measure 
attitudes toward power over time, a longitudinal survey was not necessary. Instead, a 
cross-sectional survey approach was appropriate in order to capture a snap shot of a 
sample of the population at a single point in time. It was hoped that a larger sample size 
would offset the potential problem of potential biases and dishonest answers by the 
respondents (Ary, et al., 2002; Mertens, 2005). The study was intended to be descriptive 
as the subjects self-reported their own attitudes and beliefs. The cross-sectional design 
allowed for the examination of the differences between various groupings (institutional 
size and type for example) of institutional researchers and utilized both descriptive and 
inferential statistics (Ary, et al., 2002).  
Research Questions 
As discussed, institutional researchers have power based on their ability to 
influence data and information. As analysts, they would also have additional sources for 
power, according to Mintzberg (1983b), though they may or may not have the will or 
interest to use their power to influence decision. The following research questions were 
answered in this study in order to understand institutional researchers’ power, their 
orientations toward power, and their feelings toward the use of their power:  
1. What did institutional researchers report as their primary sources of power: 
control of a resource, technical skills, unique knowledge, legal prerogatives, 
and/or access to decision makers? 
2. How did the reported sources of power vary by institutional size, institutional 
type, job responsibilities, and experience?  
 76 
 
3. What were institutional researchers’ orientations toward power? 
4. How did institutional researchers’ orientations toward power vary by institutional 
size, institutional type, job responsibilities and experience?  
5. What were institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their role in 
influencing institutional decisions?  
6. How did institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their role in 
influencing institutional decisions vary by institutional size, institutional type, job 
responsibilities, and experience?  
7. Which variables related to power best explained institutional researchers’ ability 
to influence decisions? 
Participants 
 The participants for this study were institutional researchers employed in public 
and private not-for-profit institutions of higher education that reflected the diversity of 
institutions and their various backgrounds from research institutions to community 
colleges, from departments with ten practicing professionals to departments where there 
was only one. Participants were first grouped according to the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) classification in order to examine differences. Two 
groups emerged: institutions with less than 5,000 compared to institutions with 5,000 
students or more,  and public four-year or above institutions compared to private non-for-
profit four-year or above institutions(NCES, 2011). For-profit institutions were not 
included in order to focus on analysts (institutional researchers) who were not influenced 
by the need of the organization to earn a profit, although comparing for-profit institutions 
with non-profit institutions would be interesting for future research because of the 
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difference in organizational goals, processes and inputs. The next subgrouping did not 
use IPED classifications, but instead, compared IR staff, analysts, and/or researchers to 
IR managers based on how they self-identified their most descriptive role and 
responsibilities. The final two comparison subgroups examined only IR managers: IR 
managers who work for public, 4-year or more institutions compared to IR managers who 
work for private non-profit, 4-year or more institutions, IR managers with 13 or less years 
of experience in IR compared to IR managers with 13 or more years of experience in IR.  
 Potential participants came from the membership list of the Association of 
Institutional Researchers (AIR), the national professional organization for this field. AIR 
is the largest institutional research professional group with over 4,000 members 
internationally, although this study included mainly institutions within the United States. 
The primary purpose of AIR is to “support the members in their collecting, analyzing and 
converting data into information that supports decision-making in higher education” 
(AIR, 2012). For over 50 years, AIR has been helping institutional researchers work 
behind the scenes to support leaders in wise programming and fiscal decisions (AIR, 
2012).  
To qualify for the study, AIR members must have self-identified themselves as 
having experience working in IR or a related field in higher education on the first page of 
the survey invitation. AIR members who self-identified as “manage/staff- assessment” 
were included if they self- reported having duties that include the following: “supervision 
of other professional institutional research staff,” “institutional research for internal 
decisions and institutional use,” and “institutional research for external reporting.” 
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Assessment staff who do not have institutional research responsibilities were not included 
in order to create a more manageable and homogeneous population. 
Sampling 
This study intended use a stratified random approach as the sampling activities 
begin with an identified group, institutional researchers who are members of the 
Association of Institutional Researchers (Mertens, 2005). The professional association 
formed the sampling frame, and this researcher worked closely with AIR’s administrative 
personnel to gain access to their membership and to ensure compliance with AIR 
policies. Having access to the target population established population validity (Mertens, 
2005). While the potential participant list was randomly selected by AIR using their 
membership list, AIR was not able to do a stratified random sample. However, the 
participants were still divided by institutional sector and size according to IPEDS (NCES, 
2011). Two examples include: a grouping which consisted of institutional researchers 
associated with private not-for-profit, four or more years institutions and a grouping 
which consisted of institutional researches associated with institutions that had 
populations of 1,000 to 4,999 students. There were 12 potential groupings; however, 
there were a total of 5 groups in the final analysis. The sampling unit was the individual. 
Using the rule of thumb as described by Mertens (2005), the study originally sought a 
minimum of 30 subjects from each subgroup for a total of 360 subjects based on the 
previously mentioned IPEDS institutional classification and size; that sample size was 
not achieved. See the results section for information about the final sample size and 
groupings.  
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Instruments 
 After submitting the original survey instrument to a peer review by institutional 
researchers in the Oklahoma Association of Institutional Researchers and Planners 
(OKAIRP) and a blind peer review by members of AIR, the survey was shortened and 
modified based on their recommendations. Reviewers felt the length of the survey would 
result in a low yield, possibly less than 100 respondents. AIR also felt that a survey that 
was too lengthy would offend their members and might hinder the ability to conduct 
future surveys. This researcher listened to the feedback from the reviewers and worked 
with AIR to reduce the survey to a length AIR felt more comfortable with, yet still meet 
the needs of this research.  
The original survey began with general questions related to power and 
institutional research. These questions were designed to capture the participants’ interest 
and to help with the reliability of the survey as explained in the reliability section of this 
study. This initial section was deemed redundant and added to the length of the survey 
and so was removed from the final survey knowing that it could create a less reliable 
survey. Like the original instrument, the final research instrument consisted of a four-part 
survey. The first portion was developed by this researcher and was designed to gather 
information regarding Mintzberg’s five power sources. The next was also developed by 
the researcher and was designed to measure the participants’ ability to use power, and 
their attitude regarding the use of power. This was followed by a measure of the  power 
constructs  developed by Goldberg, Cavanaugh, and Larson (1983) in their “Power 
Orientation Scale” (POS). The forty question POS instrument was not used in the final 
survey; instead, a single question based on the POS constructs was used. The last section 
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consisted of demographic questions designed to capture the background and demographic 
information of the participants.  
 The new survey began with the questions designed by this researcher to measure 
institutional researchers’ power sources as defined by Mintzberg (1983b). This section 
originally used a ten point rating scale in which respondents were asked their level of 
agreement with a series of statements; however, responses from the peer review indicated 
that they were uncomfortable with a scale of this range. The final survey used a six-point 
scale with responses ranging from one to six: 1= strongly disagree and 6= strongly agree, 
with no neutral options. Statements for this section were drawn from the literate review. 
The statements were confirmed by other institutional researchers in the peer review 
process.  
“Control of resources” power source was measured by 11 statements revolving 
around the participants’ experience in gathering, manipulating, and distributing data and 
information. This measure maintained its original length because shortening it would 
require the loss of information or the creation of double-barreled questions. The power 
source of “technical skills” was reduced from 11 statements to 8 and asked about the 
skills common to IR, such as the ability to work with statistical methods. Redundant 
questions asked in the negative form were removed. Ten statements made up the original 
section for the “unique knowledge” power source that focused on the participants having 
a greater understanding of the institutional issues than most of the faculty and staff on 
their campus. Only five statements were used in the final survey. Statements about legal 
requirements and grant requirements measured the “legal prerogative” power source. 
Five statements from the original six were used to measure this power base. Finally, four 
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of the original eight statements made up the section measuring the “access to decision 
makers” power source. However, two questions that were part of the original background 
section were added here. This group of statements and questions focused on the 
participants’ ability to meet with high level decision-makers and the participants’ 
reporting structure. Each power source measure originally included at least one negative 
statement that was intended to increase the reliability of the responses (Suskie, 1996). 
However, because the development of a research tool was not the intent of this research, 
these were removed in order to shorten the survey at the risk of some reliability. Mean 
scores and standard deviations were reported for the individual statements as well as the 
collective power source. The mean scores and standard deviations for the collective 
power base were calculated using all the questions related to that particular power source. 
The same process was used to measure institutional researchers’ ability to 
influence decisions. Again, the tool consists of a series of statements to which the 
participants are asked to express their level of agreement using a rating scale: Strongly 
Disagree=1 to Strongly Agree=6. This section consisted of 16 statements, two of which 
are stated in a negative form. Statements were developed from the literature review and 
reflected ways IR can influence decisions. Two examples are; “My data are often used in 
decision-making” and “I help identify excellence/success on campus.” Mean scores and 
standard deviations were also be reported for the individual statements and for the entire 
section. 
The next section of the survey sought to measure institutional researchers’ 
feelings and attitudes toward the use of power in their role as institutional researchers. 
Once again, this section was made up of a series of statements in which the participants 
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were asked to express their level of agreement using a rating scale: Strongly Disagree=1 
to Strongly Agree = 6. All perspectives identified in the literature review were 
represented in the statements. Therefore, the 13 statements, reduced from 15, reflected 
both the aggressive opinion and the more objective view. A statement such as, 
“Institutional researchers should be change agents who provide solutions to problems” 
represented the more aggressive opinions while a statement such as, “ The work of IR 
should be free of personal philosophy and politics” represented the more passive or 
objective view of IR work. Like the previous sections of the survey, the mean scores and 
standard deviations were reported for the individual statements and for the entire section.  
The next section of the survey represented the constructs of the Power Orientation 
Scale (POS). “Power orientation refers to the meanings that a participant assigns to the 
term ‘power’ ” (Goldberg, et al., 1983, p. 90). Power orientation is important in 
understanding how a person views power and how the participant might act or choose not 
to act in pursuit of power or in the use of power. For example, if an institutional 
researcher views power as being related to political connections, it could be expected that 
the institutional researcher would have a very strong understanding of the political 
network within the institution and, therefore, seek to have access to high level decision 
makers if the institutional researcher, in fact, wish to gain or use power. The POS, as 
designed by the original authors, consists of 40 questions and used a six-point Likert 
scale as follows: 1= I disagree very much, 2= I disagree on the whole, 3= I disagree a 
little, 4= I agree a little, 5= I agree on the whole, and 6= I agree very much. For scoring 
purposes; 1=-3, 2=-2, 3=-1, 4= +1, 5= +2, and 6= +3. Six power orientations were 
derived from the survey. The orientation of “power is good and positive” is measured by 
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five questions with the lowest possible score of five and the maximum of 35. The “power 
as a resource dependency” orientation consists of four questions with a minimum score of 
four and a maximum of 28. “Power as an instinctive drive” is measured by three 
questions and has a minimum score of three and a maximum of 21. The orientation of 
“power as political” is measured by only two questions and has a minimum score of two 
and a maximum of 14. The “power as charisma” orientation also has only two questions 
and a minimum and maximum score of two and 14. The last orientation of “power as 
control and autonomy” is measured by four questions and has a minimum score of four 
and a maximum of 28 (Goldberg, et al., 1983). In order to make the survey significantly 
shorter, the full POS was replaced with one question that asked the participants to rank 
six power orientation statements, derived from the POS, in an order that best represents 
their understanding of power; a ranking of one represented the statement with which they 
most identified, a rank of six was the least. The frequency and percentage were reported 
for each orientation, and comparisons were made between groups. 
The final section of the survey included the demographic section. This consisted 
of questions regarding the participants’ title, place of employment, level of education, 
and their involvement with committees. These questions serve two purposes: to paint a 
picture of the participants and as a final way to ensure the respondents meet the criteria 
set forth in the sampling frame work. 
Validity 
 Validity is the confirmation that an instrument measures what it is intended to 
measure (Ary, et al., 2002; Mertens, 2005). Or, as Suskie (1996) defined it, validity is the 
truthfulness of the survey. For any instrument to be useful, it must reflect the constructs 
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of the research topic and capture their presence as accurately as possible. To establish the 
validity of the POS, the researchers tested the predictive and concurrent validity using 
studies of decision-making behavior, managerial performance, and dogmatism 
(Goldberg, et al., 1983). Predictive validity is defined as the instrument’s ability to 
predict future behavior while concurrent validity measures behavior at the time of the 
instrument is issued (Mertens, 2005). Results of the POS were compared to the actual 
behavior of district court judges, nursing managers, and various business managers. The 
criterion-related coefficients ranged from .63 to .82 (Goldberg, et al., 1983). Farley 
(1987) states that subsequent studies found a .60 correlation between  selected 
communication behaviors, locus of control, and the IPA category system. A coefficient 
score of .40 is considered acceptable for a new instrument, and a .65 is sufficient when 
comparing with other instruments (Ary, et al., 2002). As the POS has no instruments to 
compare it to, this researcher considered the validity tests acceptable and sufficient for 
this research project. Likewise, the constructs developed from the POS were considered 
acceptable, and therefore, the POS was reduced to a single question ranking all of the 
POS constructs.  
 Validity for the remainder of the instrument consisted of a series of construct 
validity tests. Construct validity is defined as the evidence and rationales that support the 
trustworthiness of the scores (Mertens, 2005). As previously mentioned, the 
agree/disagree statements designed to measure Mintzberg’s power sources were derived 
from the literature review focusing on the tasks, responsibilities, and reporting structures 
of IR. For example, the statement, “I distribute institutional level data and information” 
came from the literature review and was designed to measure the “control of resources” 
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power base and reflected Delaney’s (2009) writings regarding the use of IR reports in 
decision making. To measure the ability to use power, statements were again derived 
from the literature review. The statement “My opinion is often considered in decision-
making” was an example of an institutional researcher who has been given the 
opportunity to provide a subjective opinion as a subject matter expert as described by 
Saupe (1990). Statements designed to measure the participants’ opinion about the use of 
power by institutional researchers were again taken directly out of the literature review. 
“The work of institutional research should be free from personal philosophy and politics” 
was also found in the writings of Saupe (1990). Validity based on content is the result of 
the researcher’s analysis of the subject matter and construct and is ultimately up to the 
researcher to determine whether the instrument meets the need of the researcher (Ary, et 
al., 2002). However, additional steps were taken to help ensure the research instrument 
was a valid tool to measure power in IR. 
 Content validity can be determined by having the measurement instrument 
reviewed by content experts and by those with diverse experience and opinions (Mertens, 
2005; Suskie, 1996). Members of Oklahoma Association of Institutional Research and 
Planning (OKAIRP), a sub-group of AIR, were asked to pilot test the survey. This group 
represented a variety of institutional types, sizes, and locations. They were diverse in 
their organizational structure and size of IR department, so their responses provided 
multiple perspectives on the content and the functionality of the tool. After completing 
the survey, the test group was asked to comment on the clarity of the questions and their 
appropriateness to the subject. In addition to the pilot test, the survey was subjected to a 
team of blind peer reviewers who work in IR and are members of AIR. This was a 
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required process by AIR in order to use their membership list but also served as an 
additional means of validating the content of the survey. As a final means of ensuring 
validity, the original survey asked questions in a positive and negative format will 
increase the internal validity of the survey (Ary, et al., 2002). However, most of these 
questions were removed in the final version in an effort to shorten the survey. 
Reliability 
 Reliability in a research instrument concerns the instrument’s ability to 
consistently measure what it is intended to measure (Ary, et al., 2002). To be effective, it 
must be both valid and reliable (Mertens, 2005). To confirm the reliability of the POS, 
Goldberg et al. (1983) used a test-retest method on 40 college undergraduate students 
with a time lapse of three weeks. The six factor’s coefficient reliability scores for the 
power orientations are as follows: power as good=.83, power as resource 
dependency=.77, power as instinctive drive=.49, power as political=.62, power as 
charisma=.54, and power as control=.63. These are considered to be in the moderate to 
strong range (Goldberg, et al., 1983). Scores in the lower range are a result of the factors 
that have a smaller number of questions associated with them (Farley, 1987; Goldberg, et 
al., 1983). In this researcher’s opinion, the reliability coefficients for the POS 
demonstrated sufficient reliability for this study and therefore, the constructs were 
acceptable. According to Ary et al. (2002), coefficient scores as low as  .50 are 
acceptable for research purposes in which no decisions are being made about a group or 
individuals.  
 To determine the reliability of the remainder of the instrument, which included 
the sections measuring power sources and the participants’ opinion on the use of power, 
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internal consistency was to be measured by asking similar questions at different points 
during the survey as well as by asking questions in both the positive and negative form. 
For example, it was intended that the statements “I am good at statistical methods” and “I 
do not consider myself to have any specialized skills” were both to be used to measure 
the “technical skills” power source. This type of reliability measurement was appropriate 
because the instrument measured one consistent construct throughout the survey (Suskie, 
1996). As previously mentioned, asking two very similar questions at different points in 
the survey would also increase the reliability of the survey (Suskie, 1996). For example, 
the statement “I seek to influence decisions toward my desired outcome” was asked at the 
beginning of the survey and would be compared with the statement “I prefer not to be 
involved in the decision-making process other than providing information” that was 
located toward the end of the survey. Pilot testing the survey provided the opportunity to 
make adjustments to the reliability prior to the final issuance of the survey (Suskie, 
1996). However, because of the pilot testing, the need to shorten the survey became 
apparent out of concern that participant fatigue would result in a low participation rate or 
a high rate of incomplete data. Acknowledging the risk to internal validity, it was decided 
to remove redundant questions that appeared at various points in the survey as well as 
questions asked in the negative form. Because the purpose of this survey did not include 
the development of a new research tool to be used again, the researcher determined that it 
was more important to have a larger number of respondents than to have a highly 
validated instrument. The final shortened survey still captured the information needed to 
answer the research questions and to provide ample generalizable data to inform the 
profession. 
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External Validity or Generalizability 
Generalizability is a measure of how well the findings from the sample population 
can be applied to the larger population from which the sample was taken (Mertens, 2005). 
It was hoped that the use of stratified random sampling would maximize generalizability 
of the findings of this study; however, while it was still a random sampling, stratification 
was not possible as previously mentioned (Mertens, 2005). Regardless, a threat always 
existed due to the complex nature of higher education and the multiple combinations of 
office structures and job descriptions. The use of means, skewness, kurtosis and standard 
deviations also helped identify the level of variance in the responses and provide a better 
feel for the range of responses. A narrow range of responses would also be an indication 
of generalizability while a wide range of responses could indicate a lack of 
generalizability. Additionally, a sample that is reflective of the population’s 
characteristics increases the ability to generalize the results of the study. 
Data Collection 
 As previously mentioned, potential participants were recruited from members of 
AIR. In order to do so, this researcher worked with the AIR publications department who 
first submitted the survey to a blind peer review process. Following the final changes 
needed to shorten the survey, AIR randomly selected potential participants from their 
database who potentially represented the possible subgroupings discussed earlier and 
emailed them the survey. The email consisted of an introduction of the researcher, the 
project, and the invitation to participate. The survey remained open for two weeks with a 
reminder email sent after one week. Upon closure of the survey, the data was sent to this 
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researcher in an Excel spreadsheet. Respondents’ names and emails were not collected by 
SurveyMonkey and therefore were not available to this researcher or the AIR staff. 
Analysis of Data and Research Questions 
 Because of the nature of this exploratory descriptive survey, complex statistical 
analysis other than a multiple regression was not necessary to analyze its results other 
than the use of analysis of variance (ANOVA). The multiple regression was used to 
determine which aspects of power related to institutional researchers most determines the 
ability to influence decisions. Basic descriptive statistics were used to evaluate the 
responses to the survey statements while inferential statistics were used to compare the 
subgroupings (Ary, et al., 2002; Mertens, 2005; Suskie, 1996). Descriptive statistics 
included measures of central tendency including the mean, median, mode, and standard 
deviations that served to define the characteristics of subgroups and the entire sample 
(Mertens, 2005). The inferential statistical method of choice was the ANOVA, which is 
appropriate when comparing more than two groups or when there is more than one 
independent variable. Tukey’s post hoc analysis was conducted when appropriate to 
determine the statistical significance between the means of the subgroupings and the 
Kruskal-Wallis method was used when there were inequality in sample sizes (Lomax, 
2001; Mertens, 2005). As previously mentioned, multivariate statistics were used in the 
form of a multiple regression, which is appropriate in predicting an independent variable 
(ability to influence) from a group of dependent variables (institutional context, power 
sources, power orientation, and will to influence). Additionally, I used random sampling 
and the independent variable was continuous while the dependent variables were either 
continuous or nominal (Grime & Yarnold, 2006; Kachigan, 1991; Stevens, 1999). SPSS 
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software was used in data analysis. Data was compiled and displayed in a crosstab format 
listing scores from each statement by the subgroupings. 
 Research question one asked, “What did institutional researchers report as their 
primary sources of power: control of resources, technical skills, unique knowledge, legal 
prerogatives, and/or access to decision makers?” Each of these power sources were 
addressed in the survey with the series of statements asking participants to rate their level 
of agreement on a rating scale ranging from 1 to 6 as discussed in the description of the 
survey instrument. Inferential statistics for each statement were displayed. The individual 
statement scores were then compiled to create a composite score based on the average 
response for each of the power sources; these were then ranked by the highest means. 
 Question two asked, “How did the reported sources of power vary by institutional 
level and by job responsibilities?” This question was answered by the comparison of 
means and their level of statistically significant differences using the ANOVA method. 
Responses to the statement concerning power sources by the subgroups were compared 
and displayed in a cross-tab format. Additionally, a comparison of differences between 
IR staff and IR management were made. 
 The third research question asked, “What were institutional researchers’ 
orientations toward power?” The POS constructs were used to measure the participants’ 
power orientation toward the six possible orientations previously mentioned. Descriptive 
statistics were reported, including frequencies for all six of the power orientations.  
 A cross-tab comparison of the subgroups’ orientation toward power answered the 
fourth research question, “How did institutional researchers’ orientations toward power 
vary by institutional type and level and job responsibilities?” Again, the ANOVA 
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statistical technique was used to compare the scores of the different IPEDS subgroupings 
and job responsibilities. 
 The fifth research question asked, “What were institutional researchers’ feelings 
and attitudes about their role in influencing institutional decisions?” The participants’ 
ability to use power to influence decisions as well as their opinions on the use of power 
was addressed in the survey with a series of statements similar to the statements covering 
the power sources. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a rating 
scale ranging from 1 to 6 as discussed in the description of the survey instrument. 
Descriptive statistics for each statement were displayed for each individual statement. 
The individual statement scores were then compiled to create a composite score of each 
power sources, which were then ranked by the highest means. 
 The sixth research question asked, “How did institutional researchers’ feelings 
and attitudes about their role in influencing institutional decisions vary by institutional 
type and level and job responsibilities?” Like the section measuring the power sources, 
this question was answered by the comparison of means and their level of statistically 
significant differences using the ANOVA method. The responses of the IPEDS 
subgroupings to the statements concerning power sources werr compared and displayed 
in a cross-tab format. Additionally, a comparison of differences between IR staff and IR 
management was made. 
 The final research question asked; “Which variables related to power best 
explained institutional researchers’ ability to influence decisions?”  This question was 
answered by conducting a multiple regression using the ability to influence composite 
score as the continuous independent variable. The five sources of power composite scores 
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and will to influence composite scores were the continuous dependent variables as were 
most of the background and context questions. Those that were not, including the POS  
construct responses, were transformed into dummy variables with values of 0 or 1 
(Kachigan, 1991).  
Limitations 
 This study was limited in its ability to fully measure power and the use of power. 
Because it was a strictly quantitative survey with no open-ended questions, it did not 
allow the respondents to fully express their feelings regarding power. This was 
intentional because of the innumerable possibilities of combinations of sizes, reporting 
structures, responsibilities, and staffing of IR departments. This researcher does 
acknowledge that this could possibly hinder the validity of the survey by restricting the 
possible range of answers. However, the survey was formed out of the literature review 
that found very little acknowledgment of the differences between institutional type and 
size. Perhaps, after this descriptive survey, a qualitative study can be conducted that 
focuses on the different views identified in this study. For-profit institutions were also not 
included in this study, which limits generalizability. Having a profit-based bottom line 
could significantly change the dynamics of an institutional researcher’s power and how 
the individual reports and analyzes information. It is conceivable that in a for-profit 
institution, IR staff may have less power than the IR staff at a non-profit institution. A 
comparison of the two types of institutions may be needed for future research. The most 
significant limitation of this study was that it only attempted one correlation, which 
variables influence the ability to influence decisions, but did not attempt to correlate 
power orientations to views toward the use of power or to the different institutional types. 
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This study was mainly exploratory and descriptive and left most correlations to future 
predictive studies. It is this researcher’s opinion that an initial exploratory study was 
appropriate to establish foundational data in order to better understand the position of 
institutional researcher and the power associated with it. The opinions toward power, 
roles of IR, and concepts of power that form this research were derived from the previous 
literature make it useful for the profession of IR and the study of power. Another 
limitation of this study involved the reduced validity in an effort to shorten the survey. 
When the redundant and negative questions were removed, it introduced a greater 
possibility of a participant not fully engaging in the survey. However, the researcher and 
AIR agreed that it would be more beneficial to the profession to have a greater number of 
respondents, which would allow for better comparisons of groups, than it would be to 
have stronger validity, especially since the intent of the survey was to capture self-
reported attitudes in an exploratory manner. The survey was not intended to be 
reproduced or used for further research. The final limitation of this study is limited 
amount of groupings that were able to be studied. AIR was unable to utilize stratified 
sampling techniques so the original groupings were not achieved. Instead, only five 
groupings were able to be studied: institutional size, institutional type, job description, IR 
managers by institutional type, and IR managers by years of IR experience.  
Assumptions 
1. It was assumed that the position of IR engages in some form of knowledge/data 
management and reporting. 
2. It was assumed that institutional researchers work with institutional-wide data and 
not solely at the departmental level.  
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3. It was assumed that institutional researchers produce outputs that are made 
available to others outside of IR.  
4. It was assumed that the job description and responsibilities of the position of 
institutional researcher remain essentially the same at each institution regardless 
of who is occupying the position. 
5. It was assumed that participants in this research will provide truthful responses 
that accurately reflect their situation, attitudes, and beliefs. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
 
Introduction 
 
 Chapter Four follows the flow of the research design; after a discussion of the 
survey’s response rate and resulting sample of the study, it moves into a discussion of the 
background demographics of the five comparison groupings. The background 
information includes topics such as, years of experience, institutional size and time, level 
of education achieved, and size of their IR department as determined by the number of 
employees conducting institutional research. From there, the chapter addresses each 
research question in order. Research questions one, three, five, and seven addressed the 
overall sample of the study, while questions two, four, and six addressed the differences 
in sub-groups of the overall sample. For each comparison of sub-groups, a section of this 
research was written that reports the results for the research question in its entirety. For 
example, the differences between IR at small institutions will be compared to IR at large 
institutions will be reported followed by the reporting of the differences between IR at 
public institutions and IR at private institutions. In order to maintain the flow of the 
discussion, the tables that contain the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results are 
located at the end of each comparison group’s discussion. A brief summary of the results 
of each research question is located after the end of the final set of tables. Research 
questions three and four have been combined into one section because of the reduced 
Power Orientation Survey. Before the results are presented, it is important to understand 
the targeted population in this study. 
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Survey Response 
 The targeted population of this study was higher education staff and/or faculty 
who engage in institutional research. Potential participants were randomly selected by the 
Association of Institutional Researchers (AIR) using its membership list. In all, 495 
potential participants were emailed an invitation to participate. By mere chance, this 
researcher was randomly selected and was removed from the sample. Of the remaining 
potential participants, one had previously notified AIR that he or she did not wish to 
receive invitations for surveys and six had inaccurate email addresses. Thus, the number 
of potential participants was reduced to 487 AIR members. Seven days after the survey 
was activated, 102 participants had responded, representing an initial response rate of 
20.6%. A reminder was emailed on day 10, four days before the closing of the survey. 
After being open for two weeks, 157 participants had responded to the survey, resulting 
in a final response rate of 31.7 % of the original 495 potential participants or 32.3% of 
the adjusted number of 487 potential participants.  
 Mertens (2005) defines response rate as the number of complete surveys divided 
by the number of eligible units in the sample but provides a complete formula for what is 
called Response Rate 1, which was adapted from the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research: the number of complete surveys divided by the number of surveys 
(complete plus partial) plus the number of non-surveys (refusals plus noncontacts plus 
others) plus all cases of unknown eligibility (unknown housing unit plus unknown other). 
This study included 128 complete surveys, 29 incomplete surveys, 2 refusals, 6 
noncontacts (email address error), 1 other (researcher), 18 unknown households who 
skipped the informed consent, and 9 unknowns who said they did not work in IR. Using 
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this formula the calculated response rate is 66.3%. This, of course, does not factor in the 
potential participants who ignored the survey invitation altogether.  
 Although it was hoped that a significantly larger sample size would have been 
obtained, 128 complete responses is regarded as an adequate number of responses for the 
major group to be studied in survey research, in this case, institutional researchers 
(Mertens, 2005). Despite having a lower response rate than anticipated, this researcher 
felt the sample size was large enough to meet the main goals of the study and therefore 
contribute new and meaningful knowledge to the field of study. Additionally, if the 
responding sample is reflective of the total population, what a study lacks in quantity of 
responses may be made up for in quality of responses (Suskie, 1996). As will be 
discussed in the next section, the background of the survey participants is a reasonable 
match for the background of the total AIR population.  
The number of subgroups able to be used in comparisons was limited. Sub-groups 
of 20 to 50 participants are considered adequate for survey research (Mertens, 2005). 
Two groups were used for comparing institutional size: 0 to 9,999 (n=60) and 10,000 and 
above (n=58). Two groups were used to study institutional type: public 4-year or more 
(n=51) and private non-profit, 4-year or more (n=41). Two groups were used to study job 
descriptions: IR staff (n=30) and IR management (n=67). Lastly, this study compared IR 
managers from two different approaches: a comparison of IR managers who work at 
public 4-year or more (n=27) and IR managers at private non-profit, 4-year or more 
(n=25) and a comparison of IR managers who have worked in IR for less than 13 years 
(n=33) and those who have worked in IR for more than 13 years (n=34).  
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Background Demographics 
Overall Sample Demographics 
 Questions regarding the respondents’ background information were located at the 
end of the survey and consisted of both closed and open-ended questions. Answers 
returned in text form were changed to numerical answers and answers that provided no 
information were removed. For example, when asked “how many people in your office 
engage in some form of institutional research,” an answer of “five” was changed to “5” 
and a participants’ answer of “All of them” was removed because there was no way to 
determine the number of IR staff.  
 On average, at the time of the survey, the respondents had 10.86 years of 
experience working in IR and 16.68 years of higher education experience with 40.3% of 
the sample having 11 or more years of experience. Participants had been in their current 
positions for 9.07 years and their offices included an average of 4.36 staff members 
engaged in some form of institutional research work. On average, participants served on 
4.71 institutional-level committees over the past two years and on 2.02 departmental-
level committees (see Table 1.1 for more detail regarding these demographics). This 
information was significant to this study because the years of experience was used to 
form sub-groups for comparing the differences in responses. Experience, staff size and 
committee service were used as variables in the final research question that sought to 
determine the contributing factors to an increase in the ability to influence decisions. 
Additionally, the size of the IR staff can affect the work of the participant. In smaller 
offices, the participant might have a wider variety of IR responsibilities while a 
participant in a larger office might be more specialized. 
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Table 1.1 
Background Experience for Overall Sample 
 N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional Research 119 10.86 8.00 5 8.42 
Years of work in Higher Education 119 16.68 15.00 20 9.63 
Years of work at current institution 119 9.07 5.00 5 8.57 
Number of staff in your office doing IR work 115 4.36 3.00 2 3.52 
Number of institutional level committees 116 4.71 4.00 5 3.45 
Number of departmental level committees 112 2.02 1.00 0 2.91 
 
Regarding job titles, just over half, 51.3 %, of the participants chose “Director” as 
the title that best describes their positions while 10.9% chose “Associate Director,” 
25.2% selected “Analyst/Researcher,” and 12.6 % selected “Other.”  When asked what 
best describes your work; 56.8% selected “Manager IR,” 25.4% selected “Staff IR,,” 
11.9% selected “Manager/Staff Assessment,” 0.8% selected “Faculty/Teach IR,” and 
5.1% selected “other.” Of those who responded to this study, 2.5% had no degree or an 
Associate’s degree, 10.9% had earned a bachelor’s degree, 42.9% had a master’s degree, 
while 43.7% had earned a doctorate (see Table 1.2 for more details). This information 
was used to create subgroups of staff and managers in order to compare the responses. 
Level of education achieved was used as a variable in the final research question that 
sought to determine the contributing factors to an increase in the ability to influence 
decisions. The differences between managers and staff have inherent differences in power 
levels but it was thought that the level of education achieved might also influence power. 
 Concerning institutional type, 42.9% of the respondents were affiliated with 
public, 4-year or more institutions. The second largest group in this study was those 
affiliated with private non-profit, 4-year or more institutions. This group represented 
34.5% of the respondents. Those affiliated with public, 2-year institutions formed the 
third largest group at 13.4%. The remaining participants were affiliated with non-U.S. 
 100 
 
institutions, private non-profit, 2 year institutions or selected “other” as their institutional 
type. When it came to institutional size, institutions with less than 5,000 students formed 
33.1% of the sample in this study while institutions with 5,000 to 9,999 students 
represented 17.8% of the sample in this study. The next grouping, 10,000 to 19,999 
students, represented 18.6% of this study. Lastly, the largest institutions with 20,000 or 
more students represented 30.5% of the sample this study (more details in Table 1.2.) 
Institutional type and institutional size were used to form subgroups in this study in order 
to compare the differences in response and both variables were used variables in the final 
research question that sought to determine the contributing factors to an increase in the 
ability to influence decisions. Both the type and the size of the institution were thought to 
influence the responsibilities of the IR office as well as the organizational structure and 
the decision-making process of the institution. 
The sample for this study differed from the AIR population in some areas; 
however, it should be noted that some of the differences were due to the survey having a 
more narrow focus than the more open membership of AIR. AIR membership is not 
restricted to only those who work in IR so the potential participants who did not work 
with IR were eliminated at the beginning of the study. AIR does not have separate data 
for those who work in IR and those who do not, which made it difficult to determine how 
closely the study sample reflected the total AIR population who work in IR. Managers 
made up the largest group of both the study sample and the AIR population but the 
percentage of  managers in the study sample was higher than population as were 
participants affiliated with large institutions and public 4-year or more institutions (Ross, 
2013). Unfortunately, but understandably, AIR was not able to provide a potential sample 
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population made up exclusively of those who worked in IR at the time of the study. Due 
to the nature of the organization’s data, this researcher was unable to determine how 
closely the sample reflected the 2011-2012 AIR membership who worked in IR. This 
created a potential limitation to the external validity of the results (see Table 1.2. for the 
comparison of the sample and the population).  
Table 1.2 
Background Credentials Comparing Sample to AIR Population 
 Study Sample AIR Population 
 N f % f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?      
Director 119 61 51.3 NA NA 
Associate Director 119 13 10.9 NA NA 
Analyst/Researcher 119 30 25.2 NA NA 
Other 119 15 12.6 NA NA 
What term best describes your work?      
Staff- IR 118 30 25.4 750 27.6 
Manager-IR 118 67 56.8 1116 41.0 
Management/Staff-Assessment 118 14 11.9 166 6.1 
Faculty- Teach IR 118 1 0.8 85 3.1 
Student-Full-Time 118 0 0.0 102 3.8 
Retired 118 0 0.0 31 1.1 
Work-non-profit other than higher ed. 118 0 0.0 88 3.2 
Work-for-profit other than higher ed. 118 0 0.0 25 0.9 
Other 118 6 5.1 356 13.1 
What is your level of education?      
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 119 3 2.5 42 1.5 
Bachelor’s degree 119 13 10.9 319 11.7 
Master’s degree 119 51 42.9 1247 45.9 
Ph.D./Ed.D. 119 52 43.7 1111 40.9 
What IPEDS sector best describes your institution?      
Public, 4-year or above 119 51 42.9 445 28.8 
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 119 41 34.5 646 41.8 
Public, 2-year 119 16 13.4 369 23.9 
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 119 1 0.8 5 0.3 
Other 119 6 5.0 81 5.3 
Non-U.S. Institution 119 4 3.4 0 0.0 
What IPEDS categorization best describes the size of your institution?      
Less-than 1,000 118 5 4.2 107 7.2 
1,000- 4,999 118 34 28.8 610 40.9 
5,000 – 9,999 118 21 17.8 294 19.7 
10,000-19,999 118 22 18.6 268 18.0 
More-than 20,000 118 36 30.5 211 14.2 
 
 The final piece of background information that was captured in this study was 
regarding the roles the participants performed. The most reported role performed was “IR 
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for decisions and institutional use”, which was identified by 110 participants or 87.3%. 
This was followed by “IR for external reporting” and “statistical analysis” at 104 (82.5%) 
respondents and 101 (80.2%). The two lowest roles were “assessment of learning 
outcomes” and “IPEDS key holder/coordinator (see Table 1.3 lists the complete list in 
order.) The high percentage of participants performing IR work for decisions and 
institutional use verified that it is common for institutional researchers to be involved in 
the decision-making process. 
Table 1.3  
Roles Performed by Institutional Researchers 
Rank Role Frequency Percentage 
1 IR for decisions and institutional use 110 87.3 
2 IR for external reporting 104 82.5 
3 Statistical Analysis 101 80.2 
4 College/university planning 84 66.7 
5 Institutional effectiveness studies 82 65.1 
6 Accreditation 81 64.3 
7 Qualitative analysis 71 56.3 
8 Supervise other IR staff 69 54.8 
9 Assessment of learning outcomes 66 52.4 
10 IPEDS key holder/coordinator 59 46.8 
 
Institutional Size Comparisons 
 Participants were divided into two groups based on institutional size; institutions 
with less than 10,000 students (n=60) referred to as the “Smaller Institutions” group and 
institutions with 10,000 students or more (n=58) referred to as the “Larger Institutions” 
group. In the Smaller Institutions group; five institutions, or 8.3% had less than 1, 000 
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students, 34, or 56.7% had 1,000 to 4,999 students, and 21, or 35.0% had 5,000 to 9,999 
students. In the Larger Institutions group; 22 institutions, or 37.9%, had 10,000 to 19,999 
students and 36 institutions, or 62.1% had 20,000 or more students. Participants in the 
Smaller Institutions group had an average of 10.13 years of working in IR and 17.27 
years of experience working in higher education compared to the Larger Institutions 
group that had 11.45 years of IR experience and 16.02 years of higher education 
experience. The Smaller Institutions group also had more years in their current position: 
9.59 compared to 8.63. As to be expected, the smaller institutions also had a smaller IR 
staff with an average of 2.37 employees working in IR compared to 6.38 employees in 
the Larger Institutions group. This was the only statistical difference between the group at 
the p>.05 level, F(1,112)=5.373,p=.000. The effect size was medium (2= .33). On 
average, participants in the Smaller Institutions group served on 4.53 institutional level 
committees and 1.88 departmental level committees over the past two years compared to 
the Larger Institutions group who served on an average of 4.89 committees and 2.16 
committees respectively (see Table 2.1 for more details). 
Table 2.1 
Background Experience Comparing Institutional Size 
 Less than 10,000 Students 10,000 Students or More 
 N M Mdn Mode SD N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional Research 60 10.13 7.50 5 7.24 58 11.45 8.00 5 9.49 
Years of work in Higher Education 60 17.27 16.00 16 8.86 58 16.02 12.50 10 10.48 
Years of work at current institution 60 9.59 7.00 5 8.03 58 8.63 5.00 2 9.17 
Number of staff in your office doing IR 
work 
59 2.37 2.00 2 1.45 55 6.38 5.00 5 3.86 
Number of institutional level 
committees 
59 4.53 4.00 4 2.74 57 4.89 5.00 1 4.07 
Number of departmental level 
committees 
57 
 
1.88 1.00 0 2.93 55 2.16 1.00 0 2.92 
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 The comparisons of job titles reflect the differences in the sizes of IR staff 
between the two groups. Nearly 62 percent (61.7%) of respondents in the Smaller 
Institutions group indicated that “Director” was the title that best represented their 
position. This was followed by “Analyst/Researcher” (20.0%), “Other” (10.0%), and 
“Associate Director” (8.3%). The Larger Institutions group shared the same order of titles 
with the “Director” title as their most representative title but at a lower percentage; 
39.7%. The remaining percentages were as follows: “Analyst/Researcher” (31.0%), 
“Other” (15.5%), and “Associate Director” (13.8%). The actual job title probably had less 
influence on the power related to IR than the actual description of the work performed. 
Titles and their significance vary by institution but the work performed is more consistent 
across the profession. When asked what best described their work, respondents 
demonstrated the same patterns, but with lower percentage, again reflecting the larger IR 
staff in the Larger Institutions group. “Manager IR” was the most selected at 66.1% for 
the Smaller Institutions group and 46.6% in the Larger Institutions group. This was 
followed by the “Staff IR” at 18.6% for the Smaller Institutions group and 32.8% in the 
Larger Institutions group. The third highest description for both groups was 
“Manager/Staff- Assessment” at 10.2 % for the Smaller Institutions group and 13.8% for 
the Larger Institutions group. The last description for the Smaller Institutions group was 
“Other” at 5.1%. “Other” was 5.2% for the Larger Institutions group but they also had an 
additional group, “Faculty/Teach IR,” which had 1.7% of the responses.  
 The two groups did show some differences when it came to the highest degree 
earned at the time of the survey. Fifty percent (50.0%) of participants in the Larger 
Institutions group held a Ph.D./ED.D compared to only 36.7% of the Smaller Institutions 
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group, which was the second highest degree. The master’s degree choice was first in the 
Smaller Institutions group at 43.3% and second in the Larger Institutions group at 43.1%. 
The third degree on both lists was the bachelor’s degree at 5.0% for the Smaller 
Institutions group and 6.9% in the Larger Institutions group. No one in the Larger 
Institutions group had less than a bachelor’s degree while 5.0% of the Smaller Institutions 
degree did. See Table 2.2 for more details. 
 Private non-profit, 4-year or above institutions were strongly represented in the 
Smaller Institutions group at 58.3% followed by the public, 4-year or above institutions at 
28.3%. The remaining order was as follows: public, 2-year at 10.0%, private non-profit, 
2-year at 1.7% and Non-U.S. also at 1.7%. The largest percentage of institutions in the 
Larger Institutions group were the Public, 4-year or above group at 58.6% followed by 
the Public, 2-year institutions at 17.2%, the Private non-profit, 4-year or above 
institutions at 10.3%, other institution at 8.6% and lastly, non-U.S. institutions at 5.2% 
(Table 2.2 provides greater detail regarding the comparisons of the Smaller Institutions 
and Larger Institutions groups). 
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Table 2.2 
Background Credentials by Institutional Size 
 Less than 10,000 Students 10,000 Students or More 
 N f % N f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?       
Director 60 37 61.7 58 23 39.7 
Associate Director 60 5 8.3 58 8 13.8 
Analyst/Researcher 60 12 20.0 58 18 31.0 
Other 60 6 10.0 58 9 15.5 
What term best describes your work?       
Staff- IR 59 11 18.6 58 19 32.8 
Manager-IR 59 39 66.1 58 27 46.6 
Management/Staff-Assessment 59 6 10.2 58 8 13.8 
Faculty-Teach IR 0 0 0.0 58 1 1.7 
Other 59 3 5.1 58 3 5.2 
What is your level of education?       
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 60 3 5.0 58 0 0.0 
Bachelor’s degree 60 9 15.0 58 4 6.9 
Master’s degree 60 26 43.3 58 25 43.1 
Ph.D./Ed.D. 60 22 36.7 58 29 50.0 
What IPEDS sector best describes your institution?       
Public, 4-year or above 60 17 28.3 58 34 58.6 
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 60 35 58.3 58 6 10.3 
Public, 2-year 60 6 10.0 58 10 17.2 
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 60 1 1.7 58 0 0.0 
Other 60 0 0 58 5 8.6 
Non-U.S. Institution 60 1 1.7 58 3 5.2 
 
 Having a smaller IR staff seems to also have affected the roles that the 
participants perform. The Smaller Institutions group had a higher percentage of 
participants identifying that they perform each of the roles than did the Larger Institutions 
group. The top five roles performed by the Smaller Institutions group included: IR for 
decision and institutional use (96.7%), IR for external reporting (95.0%), Statistical 
analysis (86.7%), Accreditation (80.0%), and Institutional Effectiveness Studies (73.3%). 
The roles the Larger Institutions group performs were similar to the Smaller Institutions 
group with IR for decision and institutional use being the role with the most responses at 
89.7%. The remainder of the top five was as follows: Statistical analysis (82.8%), IR for 
external reporting (81.0%), College/university planning (77.6%) and Institutional 
effectiveness studies (63.8%). The larger IR staff in the Larger Institutions group means 
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that some participants may specialize in the work as opposed to the Smaller Institutions 
group who were required to act as generalists and have many responsibilities (Table 2.3 
provides a comparison of the roles performed by the two groups). The background 
variables for the two comparison groups were considered in the reporting of the results of 
the research questions and the final discussion.  
Table 2.3 
Roles Performed by IR: Comparison by Institutional Size 
 Less than 10,000 Students 10,000 Students or More 
Role Rank f % Rank f % 
Supervision of IR staff 9 35 58.3 7 33 56.9 
Assessment of learning outcomes 10 33 55.0 7 33 56.9 
IR for decision and institutional use 1 58 96.7 1 52 89.7 
IR for external reporting 2 57 95.0 3 47 81.0 
College/university planning 6 39 65.0 4 45 77.6 
IPEDS key holder/coordinator 6 39 65.0 10 20 34.5 
Accreditation 4 48 80.0 6 33 56.9 
Institutional effectiveness studies 5 44 73.3 5 37 63.8 
Statistical analysis 3 52 86.7 2 48 82.8 
Qualitative analysis 6 39 65.0 9 32 55.2 
  
Institutional Type Comparisons 
 As previously mentioned, the two types of institutions with a significant amount 
of participants were the Public, 4-year or above institutions and the Private non-profit, 4 
year or above institutions. The sample of these two subgroups consisted of 40.5% (n=51) 
participants from 4-year or above public institutions and 32.5% (n=41) from 4-year or 
above private non-profit institutions. These two groups are referred to as the Public and 
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Private groups. At the time of the survey, the respondents in the Public group had 11.35 
years of experience working in IR compared to 10.90 years of IR work in the Private 
group. Practitioners in the Public group also had 16.85 years of experience in higher 
education and 10.19 years of experience in their current institution. The Private group 
had more years of experience in higher education with an average 17.13 years of 
experience but they had fewer years of experience at their current institution, 9.02 years. 
The Public group reported having an average of  4.74 staff members performing 
institutional research work in their offices compared to 3.04 in the Private group. This 
was the only significantly statistical difference between the group at the p>.05 level, 
F(1,87)=6.585, p=012.The effect size was small (eta-squared= .07). They were also fairly 
similar regarding the number of committees on which they serve. Public group 
participants served on 4.44 institutional level committees over the past two years and 
1.64 departmental committees. Over the past two years the Private group served on 4.37 
institutional level committees and 1.95 departmental committees (see Table 3.1 for more 
details).  
Table 3.1 
Background Experience Comparing Institutional Type 
 Public, 4-year or More Private, 4-year or More 
 
N M Mdn Mode SD N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional Research 51 11.35 8.00 5 9.16 41 10.90 8.00 3 8.37 
Years of work in Higher Education 51 16.85 15.00 20 10.11 41 17.13 16.00 16 9.75 
Years of work at current institution 51 10.19 5.00 5 9.62 41 9.02 6.00 3 8.45 
Number of staff in your office doing 
IR work 
49 4.74 4.00 2 3.53 40 3.04 2.00 2 2.53 
Number of institutional level 
committees 
50 4.44 4.50 5 3.33 41 4.37 4.00 5 2.69 
Number of departmental level 
committees 
50 1.64 1.00 0 6.56 38 1.95 0.50 3.21 10.32 
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 A greater percentage of participants in the Private group chose “Director” as the 
title that most closely reflects their title at 58.5% compared to 47.1% in the Public group. 
Both groups chose “Analyst/Researcher” as the second most popular with the Public 
group at 29.4% and the Private group at 17.1%. “Associate Director,” 15.7%, and 
“Other,” 7.8 were the remaining two titles for the Public group. In the Private group, 
these two titles were even at 12.2%. The responses were similar when asked what role 
best describes their work. The Public group selected; “Manager IR” (52.9%), “Staff IR” 
(31.4%), “Manager/Staff Assessment” (11.8%), and “Other” (3.9%). The Private group 
responded in the same order; “Manager IR” (61.0%), “Staff IR” (19.5%), “Manager/Staff 
Assessment” (12.2%), and “Other” (7.3%). Regarding the highest level of education they 
had achieved, the Public group had more master’s degrees than any others at 54.9% while 
the Private group had more Ph.D./Ed.D.’s than any other group at 41.5%. The Public 
group had 41.2% of participants with a Ph.D./Ed.D. and 3.9% with bachelor’s degrees. 
The Private group had 39.0% of participants with master’s degrees, 14.6% with 
bachelor’s degrees and 4.9% with less than a bachelor’s degree (see Table 3.2 for more 
details). 
 The background demographics of the Public and Private groups looked similar to 
the background demographics of the Smaller Institutions and Larger Institutions 
subgroups because the Public group had a higher percentage of larger institutions 
represented while the Private group had higher percentage of smaller institutions 
represented. In the Public group consisted of 15.7% of the participants affiliated with 
institutions with between 1,000 and 4,999 students, 17.6% from institutions with 5,000 to 
9,999 students, 21.6% from institutions with 10,000 to 19,999 students, and 45.1% from 
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institutions with 20,000 or more students. While they had a larger representation from the 
larger institutions, they also had greater diversity of size than the Private group. The 
Private group consisted of 9.8% of participants affiliated with institutions with less than 
999 students, 53.7% from institutions with 1,000 to 4,999 students, 22.0% from 
institutions with 5,000 to 9,999 students, and 7.3% from each of the remaining categories, 
10,000 to 19,999 students and 20,000 or more students. Table 3.2 provides additional 
information of the comparison groups.  
Table 3.2 
Background Credentials Comparing Institutional Type 
 
 Public, 4-year or More Private, 4-year or More 
 N f % N f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?       
Director 51 24 47.1 41 24 58.5 
Associate Director 51 8 15.7 41 5 12.2 
Analyst/Researcher 51 15 29.4 41 7 17.1 
Other 51 4 7.8 41 5 12.2 
What term best describes your work?       
Staff- IR 51 16 31.4 41 8 19.5 
Manager-IR 51 27 52.9 41 25 61.0 
Management/Staff-Assessment 51 6 11.8 41 5 12.2 
Other 51 2 3.9 41 3 7.3 
What is your level of education?       
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 51 0 0.0 41 2 4.9 
Bachelor’s degree 51 2 3.9 41 6 14.6 
Master’s degree 51 28 54.9 41 16 39.0 
Ph.D./Ed.D. 51 21 41.2 41 17 41.5 
What IPEDS categorization best describes the size of your 
institution? 
      
Less-than 1,000 51 0 0.0 41 4 9.8 
1,000- 4,999 51 8 15.7 41 22 53.7 
5,000 – 9,999 51 9 17.6 41 9 22.0 
10,000-19,999 51 11 21.6 41 3 7.3 
More-than 20,000 51 23 45.1 41 3 7.3 
 
 The final piece of comparative information was regarding the roles performed by 
the two groups. Because of the larger representation of smaller institutions, the Private 
group was similar to the Smaller Institutions group in the previous comparison in that the 
participants demonstrated a broader array of roles the carry out in their duties than the 
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Public and Larger Institutions groups. The top five roles performed by the Private group 
were: IR for decision and institutional use and IR for external reporting both at 95.1%, 
Statistical analysis at 90,2 %, and Accreditation and Institutional effectiveness studies 
both at 73.2%.The top five for the Public group were: IR for decision and institutional 
use at 92.2%, IR for external reporting at 86.3%, Statistical analysis at 78.4%, 
College/university planning at 70.6%, and Institutional effectiveness studies at 66.7%. 
Like the Larger Institutions group, the Public group appeared to have more specialized 
roles in IR while the Private group appeared to be more generalist, carrying out more 
roles in their work (Table 3.3 shows the rankings of each group). The background 
variables for the two comparison groups were considered in the reporting of the results of 
the research questions and the final discussion.  
Table 3.3 
Roles Performed by IR: Comparison of Institutional Type 
 Public, 4-year or more Private, 4-year or more 
Role Rank f % Rank f % 
Supervision of IR staff 7 29 56.9 9 23 56.1 
Assessment of learning outcomes 9 25 49.0 10 22 53.7 
IR for decision and institutional use 1 47 92.2 1 39 95.1 
IR for external reporting 2 44 86.3 1 39 95.1 
College/university planning 4 36 70.6 6 26 63.4 
IPEDS key holder/coordinator 10 24 47.1 8 24 58.5 
Accreditation 6 31 60.8 4 30 73.2 
Institutional effectiveness studies 5 34 66.7 4 30 73.2 
Statistical analysis 3 40 78.4 3 37 90.2 
Qualitative analysis 8 26 51.0 7 25 61.0 
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Job Responsibility Comparisons 
 The third grouping of participants was based on the question; “What best 
describes your work?’ Although the sample sizes were not equal, there was enough 
participants who described their work as IR Staff (n=30) and IR Management (n=67) to 
form to the “Staff” group and the “Management” group. As could be reasonably expected 
based on having a superior position, the Management group scored a higher means in 
much of the background information. At the time of the survey, the Management group 
had twice as much experience; 13.8 years in IR work compared to 6.47 years for the Staff 
group, 20.51 years of higher education experience compared to 10.12, and 10.65 years 
working at their current institutions compared to 5.58. IR managers also served on more 
institutional level committees, 5.29 compared to 2.97 for the Staff group. IR managers 
were also slightly more involved at the departmental level serving on an average of 1.97 
committees compared to 1.24. However, the Staff group did report working in an office 
with more IR staff. The group had an average of 5.48 IR staff members compared to 4.03 
for the Managers (see Table 4.1 for more details).  
Table 4.1 
Background Experience Comparing Job Description 
 IR Staff IR Management 
 
N M Mdn Mode SD N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional Research 30 6.47 5.00 2 6.48 67 13.82 13.00 5 8.91 
Years of work in Higher Education 30 10.12 9.00 10 7.81 67 20.51 20.00 20 8.65 
Years of work at current institution 30 5.58 4.75 2 4.37 67 10.65 10.65 7 9.77 
Number of staff in your office doing IR 
work 
27 5.48 4.00 3 3.44 66 4.03 3.00 2 3.46 
Number of institutional level committees 30 2.97 3.00 1 2.55 65 5.29 5.00 5 3.62 
Number of departmental level committees 29 1.24 1.00 0 1.40 61 1.97 1.00 0 3.01 
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 The Managers group had 76.1% (n=51) of their participants who held a title of 
Director, or similar, while the Staff group had 76.7% (n=23) of their participants who 
held a title related to Analyst/Researcher. The Manager group was more educated with 
47.8% of the group having earned a Ph.D./Ed.D. compared to 16.7% of the Staff group. 
Fifty-seven percent (56.7%) of the Staff group had earned a master’s degree as their 
highest degree compared to 40.3% of the Managers group. Concerning the size of the 
institution for which they work, 46.7% of the Staff group worked for institutions with a 
student population of 20,000 or more, 20.0% worked for  institutions with 1,000 to 4,999 
students, and the remaining two categories, 5,000 to 9,999 and 10,000 to 19,9999 each 
had 16.7% of the responses. The largest percentage of the Manager group, 31.8% worked 
for institutions with 1,000 to 4,999 students. The second most represented category were 
institutions with 20,000 students or more, 24.2%, and was closely followed by the 5,000 
to 9,999 category at 21.2%. Institutions with 10,000 to 19,999 students and institutions 
with less than 1,000 students were the lowest with 16.7% and 6.1% respectively. As with 
previous comparisons, Public, 4-years or above and Private non-profit, 4 year or above 
had the largest representations in both groupings. The Public institutions had 53.3% of 
the Staff group compared to 40.3% of the Manager group. The Private institutions were 
represented by 26.6% of the Staff group and 37.3% of the Manager group (see Table 4.2 
for complete data on all of these measurements).  
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Table 4.2 
Background Credentials Comparing Job Descriptions 
 IR Staff IR Management 
 N f % N f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?       
Director 30 1 3.3 67 51 76.1 
Associate Director 30 3 10.0 67 7 10.4 
Analyst/Researcher 30 23 76.7 67 4 6.0 
Other 30 3 10.0 67 5 7.5 
What is your level of education?       
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 30 1 3.3 67 2 3.0 
Bachelor’s degree 30 7 23.3 67 6 9.0 
Master’s degree 30 17 56.7 67 27 40.3 
Ph.D./Ed.D 30 5 16.7 67 32 47.8 
What IPEDS categorization best describes the size of your institution?       
Less-than 1,000 30 0 0.0 66 4 6.1 
1,000- 4,999 30 6 20.0 66 21 31.8 
5,000 – 9,999 30 5 16.7 66 14 21.2 
10,000-19,999 30 5 16.7 66 11 16.7 
More-than 20,000 30 14 46.7 66 16 24.2 
What IPEDS sector best describes your institution?       
Public, 4-year or above 30 16 53.3 67 27 40.3 
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 30 8 26.7 67 25 37.3 
Public, 2-year 30 5 16.7 67 9 13.4 
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 30 0 0.0 67 1 1.5 
Other 30 1 3.3 67 2 3.0 
Non-U.S. Institution 30 0 0.0 67 3 4.5 
 
 In ranking the roles they perform, the Manager group and the Staff group selected 
the same activates as their top three, but groups rated them at different levels. Nearly the 
entire Manager group, 98.5%, indicated that they performed IR work for decision and 
institutional use compared to 86.7% of the Staff group. The second highest ranked 
activity for both groups was conducting institutional research for external reporting. 
Ninety-four percent (94.0%) of the participants in the Managers group and 83.3% of the 
Staff group performed this role. The third most common role selected by participants in 
both groups was the role of performing statistical analysis; 92.5% of Manager group 
participants and 80.0% of the Staff group participants selected this as the third highest. At 
the lower end of the scale, both groups’ participants selected performing the roll of 
IPEDS key holder at rank nine; 67.2% of Managers and 23.3%. Staff indicated they 
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performed this role. The least common role performed by participants in the Manager 
groups was Assessment for Learning Outcomes with 52.2% of Managers performing this 
role. Supervision of IR Staff was the least common role for the Staff group where only 
20.0% of the participants perform this role. Many participants in the Managers group 
work at smaller institutions with smaller staff and perform much of these roles 
themselves. This helps explain why supervision was only fifth in the rankings by the 
Manager group and why the percentages are so high on most of the roles performed. 
Conversely, a larger percentage of participants in the Staff group were affiliated with 
larger institutions and appeared to work in more specialized roles, which explains why 
the overall percentages are lower for each role performed (Table 4.3 shows the complete 
ranking of roles). The background variables for the two comparison groups were 
considered in the reporting of the results of the research questions and the final 
discussion.  
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Table 4.3 
Roles Performed by IR: Comparison of Job Description 
 IR Staff IR Management 
Role Rank f % Rank f % 
Supervision of IR staff 10 6 20.0 5 52 77.6 
Assessment of learning outcomes 5 14 46.7 10 35 52.2 
IR for decision and institutional use 1 26 86.7 1 66 98.5 
IR for external reporting 2 25 83.3 2 63 94.0 
College/university planning 5 14 46.7 4 53 79.1 
IPEDS key holder/coordinator 9 7 23.3 9 45 67.2 
Accreditation 5 14 46.7 7 50 74.6 
Institutional effectiveness studies 8 13 43.3 5 52 77.6 
Statistical analysis 3 24 80.0 3 62 92.5 
Qualitative analysis 4 15 50.0 8 46 68.7 
 
IR Managers and Institutional Type Comparison 
 The next comparisons of subgroups explored the differences between participants 
who indicated that “IR manager” was the role that best describes their work and who 
were affiliated with either a Public, 4-year or more institution or with a Private non-
profit, 4-year or more institution. The two groups were Public Manager (n=27) and 
Private Manager (n=25). Naturally, these groups shared the characteristics of the 
managers previously discussed and also the characteristics of the subgroupings by 
institutional type that included the fact that the Private group had a larger percentage of 
participants from smaller institutions while the Public group had a larger percentage of 
participants from larger institutions.  
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 Managers of public institutions had worked in IR for an average of 14.89 years 
compared to Private Managers who had 14.16 of experience at the time of the survey. 
There was slightly more difference in the number of years worked in higher education as 
Public Managers had 22.00 years of experienced compared to 20.58 of the second group. 
A greater difference in experience was apparent when comparing years worked at their 
current institution. The Public Management group had 14.20 years of work while the 
Private Management group had only been at their current institution for an average of 
8.76 years. Working for larger institutions increased the chances of having a larger IR 
staff. Public managers had an average of 3.87 staff working in IR while the Private 
Managers had only 2.00. Regarding service on institutional committees the two groups 
were similar with means of 5.15 and 4.96 respectively. Working for smaller institutions 
appeared to have increased the chances that IR managers were more involved at the 
departmental level as the Private Manager group served on an average of 2.48 
departmental committees over the past two years compared to the Public Management 
group who only served on an average of 1.12 committees (see Table 5.1 for more details 
regarding the background characteristics of the two groups).  
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Table 5.1 
Background Experience Comparing IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Public, 4-Year IR Managers Private, 4-year IR Managers 
 
N M Mdn Mode SD N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional Research 27 14.89 13.00 6 9.33 25 14.16 16.00 4 8.99 
Years of work in Higher Education 27 22.11 21.00 20 8.83 25 20.58 20.00 16 9.05 
Years of work at current institution 27 14.20 12.00 5 11.29 25 8.76 5.00 1 8.75 
Number of staff in your office doing IR 
work 
26 3.87 3.50 5 2.73 25 2.70 2.00 1 2.63 
Number of institutional level 
committees 
26 5.15 5.00 5 3.61 25 4.96 5.00 5 2.84 
Number of departmental level 
committees 
26 1.12 .50 0 1.51 23 2.48 1.00 0 3.84 
 
 The title that most closely reflected their positions was Director for both the 
Public and Private Management groups with 74.1% and 88.0% of the responses 
respectively. Another 18.5% of the Public Management group selected Assistant Director 
and 8.0% for the Private Management group (see Table 5.2 for the few remaining titles 
chosen). Twelve participants in each group had earned a Ph.D./Ed.D., which is 44.4% of 
the Public Manager group and 48.0% of the Private Managers group. The remainder of 
the Public Management group had all earned a master’s degree. Nine, or 36%, of the 
Private Management group had a masters, three (12.0%) had a bachelor’s degree and one 
(4.0%) had less than a bachelor’s degree. As alluded to earlier, the two groups differed 
considerably in the size of the institution for which they worked. The largest percentage 
of the Public Management group worked for institutions with 20,000 or more students, 
37.0%, while the largest percentage for the Private Management group, at 60.0% were 
institutions with 1,000 to 4,999 students. Forty-four percent (44.4%) of the Public 
Management group worked at institutions with 5,000 to 19,999 students compared to 
24.0% of the Private Management group (see Table 5.2 for more details).  
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Table 5.2 
Background Credentials Comparing IR Manages by Institutional Type 
 Public, 4-Year IR 
Managers 
Private, 4-year IR 
Managers 
  N f % N f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?       
Director 27 20 74.1 25 22 88.0 
Associate Director 27 5 18.5 25 2 8.0 
Analyst/Researcher 27 1 3.7 25 0 0.0 
Other 27 1 3.7 25 1 4.0 
What is your level of education?       
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 27 0 0.0 25 1 4.0 
Bachelor’s degree 27 0 0.0 25 3 12.0 
Master’s degree 27 15 55.6 25 9 36.0 
Ph.D./Ed.D 27 12 44.4 25 12 48.0 
What IPEDS categorization best describes the size of your 
institution? 
      
Less-than 1,000 27 0 0.0 25 3 12.0 
1,000- 4,999 27 5 18.5 25 15 60.0 
5,000 – 9,999 27 6 22.2 25 5 20.0 
10,000-19,999 27 6 22.2 25 1 4.0 
More-than 20,000 27 10 37.0 25 1 4.0 
 
 The roles performed by each group reflected the characteristics of managers from 
the previous subgroups in that the percentage of those reporting that they perform these 
tasks were high, unlike the IR Staff group who reported much lower percentages. This 
was true for both the Public and Private Management groups. The top three highest 
ranked roles were the same for the two groups, as have been for most all of the 
comparisons: IR for decision and institutional use, IR for external reporting, and 
Statistical analysis. Having larger staff caused the Supervision of IR Staff role to be 
ranked fourth for the Public Management group but only eighth for the Private 
Management group. The Private Management group ranked institutional effectiveness 
studies, Accreditation, and IPEDs higher than the Public Management group. At the low 
end of both rankings were the Assessment of learning outcomes and the qualitative 
analysis roles, as they were on all the comparison groups (Table 5.3 has the complete 
rankings for the Public and Private groups). The background variables for the two 
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comparison groups were considered in the reporting of the results of the research 
questions and the final discussion. 
Table 5.3 
Roles Performed by IR: Comparison of IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Public, 4-Year IR Managers Private, 4-year IR Managers 
Role Rank f % Rank f % 
Supervision of IR staff 4 22 81.5 8 18 72.0 
Assessment of learning outcomes 9 12 44.4 10 14 56.0 
IR for decision and institutional use 1 27 100.0 1 25 100.0 
IR for external reporting 2 26 96.3 1 25 100.0 
College/university planning 5 21 77.8 6 19 76.0 
IPEDS key holder/coordinator 7 19 70.4 6 19 76.0 
Accreditation 8 18 66.7 5 20 80.0 
Institutional effectiveness studies 5 21 77.8 4 21 84.0 
Statistical analysis 3 24 88.9 3 23 92.0 
Qualitative analysis 10 16 59.3 8 18 72.0 
 
IR Managers and Experience Comparison 
The final comparison grouping looked again at IR managers except this time it 
divided them by years of experience in IR. The mean, median and mode for years of 
experience for IR managers was 13 years; there were three participants with 13 years of 
experience. Rather than lump an additional three participants into either group, these 
three were divided by their years of experience in higher education. Two participants had 
less experience and were moved to the Less Time group (n=33) that represented 
managers with 13 years of IR experience or less. The remaining manager, who had 13 
years of  IR experience and who had more total experience higher education, was moved 
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to the More Time group (n=34) that represented participants with 13 or more years of IR 
experience. The two groups turned out to be remarkably similar. 
By definition, the Less Time group had a lower mean for years working in IR 
6.48 years compared to 20.94 years for the More Time group. The More Time group also 
had more experience in higher education, 24.29 compared to 16.62 for the Less Time 
group, and more years working for their current institution, 13.34 compared to the Less 
Time mean of 7.88 years. The Less Time group tended to work in offices with less IR 
staff as they reported a mean of 3.33 persons while the More Time group reported 4.69 
persons. The More Time group served on an average of 6.69 institutional committees 
over the past two years and 1.77 departmental committees. Perhaps their experience had 
given the opportunity focus more on the institutional level decisions. The Less Time 
group only served on 4.22 institutional level committees but on more departmental level 
committees, 2.16 (Table 6.1 contains the background characteristics for these two 
groups). 
Table 6.1 
Background Experience Comparing IR Managers by Experience 
 13 Years or Less 13 Years or More 
 
N M Mdn Mode SD N M Mdn Mode SD 
Years of work in Institutional 
Research 
33 6.48 6.00 5 2.827 34 20.94 20.00 20 6.697 
Years of work in Higher Education 33 16.62 14.00 20 8.042 34 24.29 23.50 16 7.562 
Years of work at current institution 33 7.88 5.00 5 8.703 34 13.34 12.00 15 10.111 
Number of staff in your office doing 
IR work 
32 3.33 2.00 1 3.369 34 4.69 3.50 2 3.464 
Number of institutional level 
committees 
32 4.22 4.00 5 3.319 33 6.33 5.00 5 3.637 
Number of departmental level 
committees 
31 2.16 1.00 0 3.387 30 1.77 1.00 0 2.609 
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The title that most closely identified their position was “Director” for both groups; 
75.8% of the Less Time group selected this title and 76.5% selected from the More Time 
group. The second most selected title was “Analyst/Researcher” for the More Time group 
(12.1%) and “Associate Director” for the More Time group (11.8%). The Less Time 
group had considerably more participants who had earned a doctorate degree than the 
More Time group; 60.6% compared to only 35.3%. Half (50.0%) of the More Time group 
has a master’s degree and both groups reported one participant with less than a bachelor’s 
degree. With the large difference of managers who had a doctorate degree in the Less 
Time group, one might expect significant differences in the type of institutions for which 
they worked, but that was not the case. In fact, a larger percentage of the More Time 
group worked for a 4-year or more institution. The Less Time group had 39.4% who 
work for a public, 4-year or more institution, and 33.3% who work for a private non-
profit, 4-year or more institution. For the More Time group 41.2% worked for each of 
these two types of institutions. The other types of institutions were equally represented 
(see Table 6.2 for details). The comparison of institutional size was also similar but had 
slightly more differences than the institutional type comparison groups. The Less Time 
group reported 30.3% who work for institutions with 1,000 to 4,999 students, 24.2% who 
work for institutions with 5,000 to 9,999, students and 21.2% who work at institutions 
with 20,000 or more students. The top three for the More time group were; institutions 
with 1,000 to 4,999 students (30.3%), institutions with 20,000 or more students (27.3%), 
and institutions with 10,000 to 19.999 students (21.2%). The More Time group had 
slightly more participants who work for institutions with more than 5,000 students (see 
Table 6.2 for more details).  
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Table 6.2 
Background Credentials Comparing IR Managers by Experience 
 
13 Years or Less 13 Years or More 
  N f % N f % 
What title most closely identifies your position in IR?       
Director 33 25 75.8 34 26 76.5 
Associate Director 33 3 9.1 34 4 11.8 
Analyst/Researcher 33 4 12.1 34 0 0 
Other 33 1 3.0 34 4 11.8 
What is your level of education?       
Less than a Bachelor’s degree 33 1 3.0 34 1 2.9 
Bachelor’s degree 33 2 6.1 34 4 11.8 
Master’s degree 33 10 30.3 34 17 50.0 
Ph.D./Ed.D 33 20 60.6 34 12 35.3 
What IPEDS categorization best describes the size of your institution?       
Less-than 1,000 33 3 9.1 34 1 3.0 
1,000- 4,999 33 11 33.3 34 10 30.3 
5,000 – 9,999 33 8 24.2 34 6 18.2 
10,000-19,999 33 4 12.1 34 7 21.2 
More-than 20,000 33 7 21.2 34 9 27.2 
What IPEDS sector best describes your institution?       
Public, 4-year or above 33 13 39.4 34 14 41.2 
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 33 11 33.3 34 14 41.2 
Public, 2-year 33 5 15.2 34 4 11.8 
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 33 1 3.0 34 0 0.0 
Other 33 1 3.0 34 1 2.9 
Non-U.S. Institution 33 2 6.1 34 1 2.9 
 
In examining the roles performed by these managers, there are some differences. 
Both groups reported IR for decision making and institutional use as their number one 
role, but the More Time group also reported IR for external reporting as their number one 
role, both activities had 97.1% of More Time participants select them. The second most 
selected role for the Less Time group was statistical analysis and then external reporting. 
Because of the larger number of IR staff working in the More Time group’s offices, 
supervision was their third selection. Both groups selected the assessment of learning 
outcomes as the least popular role. The remaining roles varied in the popularity but there 
were a few with considerable differences in percentages. In particular, the More Time 
group reported a higher percentage of IPEDs key holders and effectiveness studies but 
the Less Time group was considerably higher in accreditation and qualitative analysis. 
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Table 6.3 shows the complete rankings and percentages for the Less Time and More 
Time groups. The background variables for the two comparison groups were considered 
in the reporting of the results of the research questions and the final discussion. 
Table 6.3 
Roles Performed by IR: Comparison of IR Managers by Experience 
 13 Years or Less 13 Years or More 
Role Rank f % Rank f % 
Supervision of IR staff 8 20 60.6 3 32 94.1 
Assessment of learning outcomes 10 18 54.5 10 17 50.0 
IR for decision and institutional use 1 33 100 1 33 97.1 
IR for external reporting 3 30 90.9 1 33 97.1 
College/university planning 4 26 78.8 6 27 79.4 
IPEDS key holder/coordinator 8 20 60.6 7 25 73.5 
Accreditation 4 26 78.8 8 24 70.6 
Institutional effectiveness studies 7 24 72.7 5 28 82.4 
Statistical analysis 2 31 93.9 4 31 91.2 
Qualitative analysis 6 25 75.8 9 21 61.8 
 
Brief Summary of the Demographics 
As seen by the discussion of the background demographics, the sample of the 
study reflected the background and demographics of the larger AIR population fairly 
well. Managers made up the largest portions of each subgroup as well as those who had 
earned PhD’s and master’s degrees. However, there were a greater percentage of large 
institutions in this study than in the AIR population. The Smaller Institutions and the 
Larger Institutions comparison groups were similar except in the areas that one would 
expect; the size of the IR staff, and therefore, the number and types of roles they 
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performed. This was also reflected in the Public and the Private groups and the Public 
Manager and Private Manager groups because of the greater representation of smaller 
institutions in the Private and Private Manager groups. The managers groups divided by 
experience were remarkably similar except for few areas. The More Time group of 
managers with 13 years of experience or more, naturally had more experience, but also 
supervised more and served on more institutional level committees. However, less of 
them had earned doctorate degrees. All subgroups significantly engaged in IR work for 
decision making, institutional use and external reporting, apparently utilizing a good deal 
of statically analysis. Qualitative analysis and assessing learning outcomes occured much 
less often in these subgroups. These similarities and differences were considered in 
analyzing the results of the research questions. 
 
Research Question One 
“Using Mintzberg’s work, what did institutional researchers report as their 
primary sources of power: control of a resource, technical skills, unique 
knowledge, legal prerogatives, and/or access to decision makers?” 
 
The first research question sought to determine if the power sources proposed by 
Mintzberg (1983b) were present in the profession of institutional research. Participants 
were asked to express their level of agreement with a series of statements for each of the 
five power sources. A composite score was computed for each of the power sources. The 
composite score was based on the un-weighted average of responses. Descriptive 
statistics were calculated to determine the level at which power sources were present. 
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Because of the six-point rating scale, the lowest possible average was 1.00 while the 
highest was 6.00. A mean of 3.5 was considered to be the breaking point as to whether 
the power source is present or not. The results of this research question are presented by 
power source and include tables offering further details. 
The first power source was the control of resources and was measured with 11 
statements that are listed along with the detailed descriptive statistics in Table 7.1. A 
distinction was made between data and information. The term “data” was defined on the 
survey as a single number or statistic or a set of numbers or statistics while information 
was defined as providing context in relation to the numbers or statistics. The first six 
statements were about the collection, generation, and distribution of institutional level 
data and information and all had a mean of over 5.00. The lowest of these statements 
was; “I collect institutional level data” with a mean of 5.13 while the highest was; “I 
generate institutional level information” with a mean of 5.41. All of these responses had a 
strong negative skew with a strong leptokurtic kurtosis. The negative skewedness 
indicated the responses to be unevenly distributed toward the higher end of the rating 
scale while the highly peaked kurtosis indicated that the responses clustered closely 
together around the mean (Lomax, 2001). However, the statement with the highest mean 
at 5.49 was “Faculty, administrators, and /or staff often ask me for information and/or 
data.” The highest kurtosis (5.284) was the statement; “I generate institutional level 
information” indicating a higher concentration of answers around the mean. The lowest 
rated statement with a mean of 3.75, “When there is a departmental decision to be made, 
it is my office that provides the data and reports needed,” demonstrated that IR tend to 
work more at the institutional level than on the departmental level. The skewness for this 
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statement was positive but near zero (.064) indicating a near perfect distribution of 
responses. This was also reflected in the kurtosis of -.511, which is mildly platykurtic 
(see Table 6.1 for all of the descriptive statistics regarding the Control of resources) 
(Lomax, 2001).  
 Clearly, institutional researchers believe they have the “control of resources” 
power source in the form of collecting, generating and distributing data and information. 
However, in addition to the lower means on the departmental decisions statement, 
participants left open the possibility that institutional researchers may not be the only 
resource for data and reports. Both statements “Most institutional data and/or reports 
come from my office” and “When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it is 
my office that provides the data and reports needed” had means of 4.59 and 4.48 
respectively but have skewness and kurtosis approaching zero. This indicates a normal 
distribution, and therefore a more equal number of responses on the lower or negative 
end of the scale. The statements with the lower means served to balance out the higher 
means of the first statements. The combined “control of resources” score mean was 4.87 
and the skewness was weaker (-.967) with a more balanced kurtosis (.975). The range for 
the combined score was 4.26 with a low of 1.64 and a high of 6.00. These scores are the 
highest of all the combined power source scores (see Table 7.1 for the descriptive 
statistics).  
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Table 7.1 
Control of Resources: Study Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data 126 5.13 1.620 -1.666 1.297 
I collect institutional level information 124 5.14 1.456 -1.737 2.037 
I generate institutional level data 124 5.11 1.624 -1.678 1.326 
I generate institutional level information 123 5.41 1.227 -2.392 5.284 
I distribute institutional level data 123 5.40 1.253 -2.295 4.519 
I distribute institutional level information 123 5.37 1.277 -2.249 4.353 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information and/or data 123 5.49 .944 -2.133 4.990 
I manage data warehouses and repositories 125 3.81 1.991 -.272 -1.544 
Most institutional data and/or reports come from my office 123 4.59 1.330 -.643 -.508 
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it is my office that 
provides the data and reports needed 
124 4.48 1.272 -.716 -.092 
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my office that 
provides the data and reports needed 
124 3.75 1.260 .064 -.511 
Control of Resources combined score 126 4.87 .8389 -.976 .975 
 
The next power source to be measured was “technical skills.” Technical expertise 
is considered to be the main source of influence for analysts (Mintzberg, 1983b). 
Participants were asked to rate their skills regarding: data management, presentations, 
writing reports, statistical methods, conceptualizing and planning research, quantitative 
research and analytics,  qualitative research and analytics, and data mining. A six point 
scale was again used so that the lowest mean possible was 1.00 while the highest was 
6.00. The skill with the highest mean was “writing reports” with a mean of 5.02, 
skewness of -.827 and leptokurtic kurtosis of .216. This was closely followed by 
“conceptualizing and planning research” (M=4.99, Skew= -1.066, Kurt= 1.128) and “data 
management” (M=4.98, Skew= -.694, Kurt= -.444). “Data mining” had the lowest mean 
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of 3.82, a skewness of -.229 and a platykurtic kurtosis of -.902. Because of the amount of 
data related work performed in IR, it is somewhat surprising that “statistical methods” 
only ranked sixth on the list with a mean of 4.39. Institutional researchers appear to be 
confident in their ability to design research and to write the report, but less confident in 
their ability to analyze the data, both quantitative and qualitative data. The combined 
technical skills mean was still strong at 4.63 with a skewness distributed toward the 
higher ratings (-.516) but a flatter, platykurtic kurtosis (-.207). The range for the 
composite score was 3.38 with a low of 2.63 and a high of 6.00 (see Table 7.2 for the 
complete descriptive data).  
Table 7.2 
Technical Skills: Study Sample 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management 125 4.98 1.020 -.694 -.444 
Presentations 124 4.94 1.069 -.900 .063 
Writing reports 125 5.02 .975 -.827 .216 
Statistical methods 125 4.39 1.121 -.476 .082 
Conceptualizing and planning research 124 4.99 1.032 -1.066 1.128 
Quantitative research and analytics 125 4.77 1.001 -.841 1.030 
Qualitative research and analytics 124 4.16 1.192 -.405 -.131 
Data mining 125 3.82 1.505 -.229 -.912 
Technical Skills combined score 125 4.63 .7238 -.516 -.207 
 
 Having unique knowledge was the third power source to be measured in this 
study. Unique knowledge is knowledge that is not widely known. It is different than 
controlling information, in that unique knowledge derives more from experience and 
position but is not necessarily distributed or withheld (Mintzberg, 1983b). Five 
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statements made up the unique knowledge segment, all of which had a mean between 
4.08 and 4.85. The statements “I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus” and “I have responsibilities that involve many 
departments across campus” were scored the highest with means of 4.85. Both are 
negatively skewed at -.985 and -1.290 respectively although the campus responsibilities 
statement was more strongly skewed and was less peaked. The “ability to understand the 
impact of a decision” had a leptokurtic kurtosis of 1.316 indicating a tighter clustering of 
responses around the mean. However, the lowest statement was “I know more about 
camps politics than most people on campus” with a mean of 4.08. While the skewness 
was negative, it was only -.562 with a kurtosis of .-.358 indicating a more normal 
distribution of responses (Lomax, 2001). The mean for unique knowledge combined 
score was 4.61, negatively skewed at -.906 and a leptokurtic kurtosis of .626. The 
composite score range was large, 4.40 with a low of 1.60 and a high of 6.00. Overall, the 
unique knowledge power source was present but to a lesser extent than the previous two 
power sources. Because of their cross-campus responsibilities, institutional researchers 
have an understanding of the impact decisions have across campus and they feel that their 
opinion is respected because of this. However, they have less understanding of campus 
politics and the interrelations of departments (Table 7.3 has the related statistics).  
  
 131 
 
Table 7.3 
Unique Knowledge: Study Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good understanding of the 
issues at my institution 
124 4.73 1.185 -.881 .273 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on departments and 
resources across campus 
123 4.85 1.025 -.985 1.316 
I have responsibilities that involve many departments across campus 124 4.85 1.377 -1.290 .837 
I know more about the interrelationships of departments than most people on 
campus 
123 4.48 1.345 -.665 -.333 
I know more about campus politics than most people on campus 122 4.08 1.370 -.562 -.358 
Unique Knowledge combined score 124 4.61 .9764 -.906 .626 
 
 The lowest of all of the power sources was having legal prerogatives. This is the 
ability to use a legal basis to get others to do as you wish (Mintzberg, 1983b). All five 
statements had means above the 3.5 cut score but the legal prerogative combined score 
was only 4.30. It had a modest negative skew of -.708 and a flatter, platykurtic kurtosis of 
-.221 and the highest possible range of 5.00, a low of 1.00 and a high of 6.00. These are 
indications that more responses were in the lower ranges but more spread out along the 
scale. The statement with the highest mean was “I complete reports that are required by 
law or government regulations.” It had a mean of 4.80, a moderate negative skew of -
1.237, and a mesokurtic kurtosis of .010. Evidently, institutional researchers’ constituents 
understand the reporting requirements of the participants as the statement “People on my 
campus comply with my requests for information because they understand my required 
reporting needs” was the second highest statement with a mean of 4.61. Reporting related 
to grants and funding was the third highest statement followed by the statement “legal 
reporting requirements give me the authority to demand work from other individuals on 
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campus.”  Despite having reports required by the government, institutional researchers 
did not necessarily feel they have authority to demand work from others. This was 
confirmed by the lowest statement of “I have used legal obligations to get data and 
information I need from faculty and/or staff.” This statement had a mean of only 3.88, 
was negatively skewed at -.708, and a platykurtic kurtosis of -1.151 (see Table 7.4 for the 
complete descriptive statistics). 
Table 7.4 
Legal Prerogatives: Study Sample 
 N M SD Skewness  Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand work 
from other individuals on campus 
121 3.98 1.742 -.446 -1.137 
I complete reports that are required by law or government regulations 122 4.80 1.742 -1.237 .010 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding sources 120 4.19 1.677 -.548     -.939 
People on my campus comply with my requests for information 
because they understand my required reporting needs 
120 4.61 1.311 -.900 .176 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and information 
I need from faculty or staff 
120 3.88 1.755 -.407 -1.151 
Legal Prerogatives combined score 122 4.30 1.2438 -.708 -.221 
  
The final power source was having access to decision makers. These four 
statements combined to make the second highest combined score of any of the power 
sources. The access to decision makers combined score was 4.67 with a negative skew of 
-.951 and a leptokurtic kurtosis .308. The range for the combined score was 5.00 with 
low and high at each end of the scale. The highest rated statement was “My boss is a high 
level decision maker” with a mean of 5.06. It also had the most skewness of -1.370 and 
the most peaked leptokurtic kurtosis of .986. An additional open-ended question asked 
the participants how many levels was their office removed from the president; the 
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average response was 1.48 levels. Titles of the participants’ bosses varied widely but 26 
participants reported to the President (11) or Provost (15). Variations of other titles to 
whom they report include: Vice President (24), Vice (assistant, associate) Provost or 
Chancellor (8), Dean- of faculty/students (4), Executive Director (8), Director- 
IR/Assessment (21), Chief Information Office (2), and others (7). Percentages were not 
calculated because many of their superiors had multiple titles and roles. A sample of the 
departments mentioned include: Academic Affairs, IR, Assessment, Planning, Student 
Life, Enrollment, Registrar, and Effectiveness. The proximity to decision makers was 
reflected in the statement “If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene 
on my behalf”, which had a mean of 4.73 and also had a strong negative skew of -1.048 
and a leptokurtic kurtosis of .141. However, the statement with the lowest mean, 4.37 
was “I meet with high level decision makers regularly.” This had less of a negative skew, 
-.660 and a platykurtic kurtosis of -.787. Most respondents considered their office to be 
centralized with a mean of 4.53 Clearly, institutional researchers have access to high 
level decision makers either by reporting to a high level decision maker or by virtue of 
the their office being centralized and not far removed from the president (see Table 7.5 
for more details on the access to decision-makers power source).  
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Table 7.5 
Access to Decision Makers: Study Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly 124 4.37 1.640 -.660 -.787 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene on my behalf 123 4.73 1.426 -1.048 .141 
My boss is a high level decision maker 124 5.06 1.305 -1.370 .986 
I consider my office of institutional research to be centralized within the 
organizational structure of my institution 
120 4.53 1.466 -.742 -.540 
Access to Decision Makers combined score 124 4.64 1.1841 -.951 .308 
How many levels is your office of institutional research removed from the 
president on the organizational chart? 
122 1.48 .972 .509 .252 
 
 Based on the combined scores in each of the power source measures, institutional 
researchers believe that they have each of the power sources. All of the combined scores 
had means between 4.00 and 5.00 with control of resources being that highest at 4.87. 
This was followed by access to decision makers (4.67), technical skills (4.63), unique 
knowledge (4.61), and legal prerogatives (4.30). The highest cluster of statements 
included the collection, generation, and distribution of data and knowledge; each 
statement had a mean over 5.10. Only two other statements had a mean over 5.00: my 
boss is a high level decision maker (5.06) and having reporting skills (5.02). Five 
statements had means below 4.00 indicating only a small presence of these particular 
aspects of power sources. The absolute low had a mean of 3.75; “When there is a 
departmental decision to be made, it is my office that provides the data and reports 
needed.” The other statements with lower means include: “I manage data warehouses and 
repositories (3.81),” data mining skills (3.82), “I have used legal obligations to get data 
and information I need for faculty and/or staff (3.88),” and “Legal reporting requirements 
give me the authority to demand work from other individuals on campus (3.98).” In 
 135 
 
summary, institutional researchers have all five power sources but more specifically, they 
have power through their ability to gather and create information in the form of report 
writing. They are also closely connected to high level decision makers through the 
reporting structure of their institution. They have less power in the areas of data mining 
and providing data and reports for departmental decisions. Despite having to complete 
reports that are required by law or government regulations (4.80), they do not feel they 
have any particular authority to demand data or work from others on campus.  
 
Research Question Two 
“How did the reported sources of power vary by institutional size, institutional 
type, job responsibility, and experience?”  
  
After establishing the presence of all five of Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources 
in IR, the second research question explored the differences in power sources when 
comparing different institutions based on the established comparison groups: institutional 
size, institutional type, job description, managers in different types of institutions, and 
manager’s experience in IR. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for every 
statement within each power source measure. The one-way ANOVA was used because of 
its ability to test the difference between two or more means and it is robust to enough to 
cover violations of normality and homogeneity  (Ary, et al., 2002; Lomax, 2001; Stevens, 
1999). The normality assumption was not met on many of the statements on the survey. 
Group sizes were comparable on two of the four groups. The institutional type 
comparison (n=51, n=41) and the job description comparison (n=30, n=67) had 
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significantly different group sizes so the Kruskal-Wallis one-factor ANOVA was 
conducted to determine the significance of the different means (Lomax, 2001). Because 
of the length of the tables related to this research questions, all tables are presented at the 
end of each grouping. Only the statements with statistically different means are discussed 
in addition to a few points of interested. More detailed information is located in the 
related tables.  
Institutional Size Power Source Comparisons 
  The results from the ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference 
between the responses of participants affiliated with institutions with less than 10,000 
students and those affiliated with institutions with 10,000 students or more on any of the 
Control of Resources power source statements except one. For the statement “I collect 
institutional level information,” the mean for the Smaller Institutions group was 4.81 
compared to the Larger Institutions group whose mean was 5.44, F(1,116)=5.314, 
p=.023. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.044) (see Table 8.2 for the complete 
ANOVA table). The descriptive statistics provided more information about the 
differences in the groups. The Smaller Institutions group had a higher means for 
generating and distributing institutional data and managing data warehouses. They also 
had higher means with the statement; “Most institutional data and/or reports come from 
my office.” The Larger Institutions group had a higher mean regarding their involvement 
with departmental decisions. One might expect that a centralized office might be more 
involved with the departments at smaller institution than a larger one but that did not 
appear to be the case. Similar to the total sample, the statements regarding the collection, 
creation, and distribution of knowledge were all negatively skewed and leptokurtic 
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indicating a tight cluster of responses on the higher end of the rating scale. The means for 
the Control of Resources combined score were nearly identical, 4.83 and 4.89, and both 
were negatively skewed. However, the Smaller Institutions group had a medium level 
leptokurtic kurtosis (1.831) while the Larger Institutions group was platykurtic (-.329) 
indicating more variance, or diversity in the responses of the Smaller Institutions group 
than in the Larger Institutions group. The range of combined scores for the Smaller 
Institutions group was 4.36 with a low of 1.64 and a high of 6.00. The range for the 
Larger Institutions group was narrower, 3.27, with a low of 2.73 and a high of 6.00 
(Table 8.1 has the descriptive statistics and Table 8.2 has the results for the ANOVA).  
 When technical skills in IR were rated, there were differences between the two 
groupings. The Larger Institutions group rated themselves higher than the Smaller 
Institutions group on every statement in the Technical Skills power source. This may be a 
result of the Larger Institutions group having a higher percentage of its participants 
having earned a doctorate degree than the Smaller Institutions group. Three skills had 
means of over 5.00 for the Larger Institutions group: presentation (5.21), report writing 
(5.14), and conceptualizing and planning research (5.09). Two of these were also highest 
in the Smaller Institutions group: report writing (4.93) and conceptualizing and planning 
research (4.88). The second highest was data management with a mean of 4.90. 
Conceptualizing research and quantitative research (M=4.97) skills had negative 
skewness and very peaked kurtosis, 3.447 and 4.025 respectively, for the Larger 
Institutions group indicating very little variance in the way they feel about their skills in 
these areas. Three ANOVAs yielded results that were statistically different at the .05 
level. Presentations, F(1,116)=5.546, p=.02, had a small effect size (eta-squared= .046) 
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indicating that there is not a lot of practical significance between the groups. The Smaller 
Institutions group had a mean of 4.53 for the quantitative research and analytics statement 
compared to the mean of the Larger Institutions group that was 4.97. These differences 
were also statistically significant, F(1,116)=5.563, p=.020. The effect size was also very 
small (2=.046). The final comparison that was statistically significant was the Technical 
Skills Combined score. The means were 4.48 for the Smaller Institutions group and 4.76 
for the Larger Institutions group; F(1,116)=4.708, p=.032. The effect size was small (eta-
squared=.039). Both of these scores were negatively skewed but their kurtoses were 
different. The Smaller Institutions group was platykurtic at -1.022 while the Larger 
Institutions group was Leptokurtic at 1.033 indicating more diversity in the smaller 
institutions and more agreement in the larger schools. The range of combined scores for 
the Smaller Institutions group was fairly narrow, 2.63 with a minimum of 3.13 and a 
maximum of 5.75. The Larger Institutions group had a range of 3.83, a minimum of 2.63 
and a high of 6.00. One other skill set, statistical methods, approached having a 
statistically significant difference, p=.09. Neither groups’ means were very high with 
Smaller Institutions at 4.18 and Larger Institutions at 4.53. Apparently they have more 
confidence in their quantitative research and analytics skills, which focus on planning and 
interpreting the research, than their actual skills with statistical method (see Table 8.3 for 
the Technical Skills descriptive statistics and Table 8.4 for the related ANOVAs).  
 There were no significant differences between the two groups in the Unique 
Knowledge power source statements. In fact, they were very similar in all means, 
skewness and kurtosis (see Table 8.5 and 8.6 for the descriptive statistics and ANOVAs). 
The Smaller Institutions group reported a higher mean (4.51) in the statement focused on 
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departmental interrelationships than the Larger Institutions group (4.40), indicating more 
interaction between IR and the departments at smaller institutions. The Smaller 
Institutions had a mesokurtic distribution (.059) to their answers , whereas the Larger 
Institutions group was more spread out with a platykurtic distribution (-.729). Neither 
group claimed to know much about campus politics as these had the lowest means and 
had a platykurtic distribution with only a small negative skew. The Unique Knowledge 
Combined score mean was 4.58 for the Smaller Institutions group and 4.63 for the Larger 
Institutions group with the Smaller Institutions group showing a moderately peaked 
kurtosis demonstrating less variation in participants answers compared to the Larger 
Institutions group. The ranges for the combined scores were the same for both groups: 
4.40; lows were 1.60, and the highs were 6.00 (Tables 8.5 and Table 8.6 has the related 
statistics).  
 Having legal prerogatives seemed to be more of a source of power for smaller 
institutions than larger ones. The mean for every statement in this power source was 
higher for the Smaller Institutions group than the Larger Institutions group, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that IR staffs are smaller in the Smaller Institutions group and therefor 
they have more responsibilities. Clearly evident was that the Smaller Institutions group 
felt they had to complete reports required by law and/or government regulations. Their 
mean was 5.17 for this statement compared to the Larger Institutions group at 4.48. This 
was a statistically significant difference, F(1,115)=4.767, p=031. The effect was small 
(eta-squared= .040). For the Less then group, this statement had a strong negative skew 
and strongly leptokurtic distribution (3.204) indicating a unified response in agreement 
with the statement. This was the only statement with a statistically significant difference. 
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Also worth noting was that neither group reported having used legal requirements to get 
data and information from faculty or staff very often. The means for this statement was 
small for both groups; 3.98 for Smaller Institutions and 3.77 for Larger Institutions. 
However, both groups’ responses had a fairly strong platykurtic (-1.053, -1.250) 
distribution indicating greater variance of answers. With the skewness (-.442, -.357) 
being small but negative, there appear to be those in IR who have used legal prerogatives 
to get their work done. The Legal Prerogative combined scores were similar for both 
groups but their kurtosis were opposite, only mildly. The Smaller Institutions group was 
leptokurtic demonstrating less variance in answers while the Larger Institutions group 
was platykurtic. For the Smaller Institutions group, the combined score mean was 4.41 
with a range of 5.00, a low of 1.00 and a high of 6.00. The Larger Institutions group’s 
mean was 4.18 with an identical range (Table 8.7 has the descriptive statistics for the 
Legal Prerogative power source and Table 8.8 has the ANOVAs).  
 The final power source comparison, Access to Decision Makers, did show some 
differences between the groups. The Smaller Institutions group reported only being 1.33 
positions removed from the President, compared to 1.59 for the Larger Institutions group 
and the Larger Institutions group felt that their boss was a high level decision maker more 
than the Smaller Institutions group. The mean for the Larger Institutions group was 5.14 
and the responses had a medium leptokurtic (1.349) distribution. Institutional researchers 
in the larger institutions reported meeting with high level decision makers regularly 
(M=4.67) compared to the smaller institutions (M=4.13). The difference in the groups for 
this statement was close to being statistically significant (p=.074). The Larger Institutions 
group also reported having a more centralized office than the Smaller Institutions group 
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(M=4.88 and 4.17). This difference was statistically significant, F(1,114)=6.884, p=.019. 
The effect size was medium (eta-squared- .06). Both of the groups had platykurtic (-
.386,-.202) distributions representing the diversity of organizational structures in higher 
education. The Access to Decision Makers combined score was also significantly 
different, F(1,116)=2.919, p=.010.The effect size was small (eta-squared= .03). The mean 
for the Larger Institutions group was 4.86 compared to 4.38 for the Smaller Institutions 
group. The range of combined scores for the Smaller Institutions group was 5.00 with a 
low of 1.00 and a high of 6.00 while the range for the Larger Institutions group was 4.25 
with a low of 1.75 and a high of 6.00 (see Tables 8.9 and 8.10 for the complete 
descriptive statistics and ANOVAs).  
 In summary, institutional researchers at institutions with less than 10,000 students were 
very similar to institutional researchers who work at larger institutions. Statistically 
significant differences were found in collecting institutional level information, report 
writing, quantitative research and analysis, completing reports required by law or 
regulations, meeting with decision makers and having a centralized office. Two of the 
power sources’ combined scores were also statistically different, Technical Skills and 
Access to Decision Makers. In each of these statements or combined scores, the Larger 
Institutions group had a higher mean. Throughout the power source statements there were 
many that had very peaked kurtosis indicating strong agreement in the participants while 
other statements demonstrated greater diversity in responses with very flat kurtosis. For 
the Smaller Institutions group, their highest reported power source was Control of 
Resources followed by Unique Knowledge, Technical Skills, Access to Decision makers 
and then Legal Prerogatives. Control of Resources was also the highest for the Larger 
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Institutions group. The next highest was Access to Decision Makers followed by 
Technical Skills, Unique Knowledge and then Legal Prerogatives.  
Table 8.1 
Control of Resources: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 Student Sample n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data Less than 10,000 60 5.10 1.623 -1.668 1.410 
 More than 10,000 58 5.05 1.711 -1.520 .737 
I collect institutional level information Less than 10,000 59 4.81 1.686 -1.237 .282 
 More than 10,000 57 5.44 1.180 -2.548 6.272 
I generate institutional level data Less than 10,000 59 5.19 1.603 -1.824 1.923 
 More than 10,000 58 5.05 1.638 -1.600 1.071 
I generate institutional level information Less than 10,000 58 5.43 1.258 -2.576 6.305 
 More than 10,000 58 5.45 1.111 -2.330 5.258 
I distribute institutional level data Less than 10,000 58 5.41 1.229 -2.379 5.248 
 More than 10,000 58 5.33 1.343 -2.117 3.549 
I distribute institutional level information Less than 10,000 58 5.29 1.427 -2.156 3.708 
 More than 10,000 58 5.47 1.096 -2.354 5.526 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data 
Less than 10,000 59 5.46 1.119 -2.297 4.997 
 More than 10,000 58 5.52 .755 -1.201 -.132 
I manage data warehouses and repositories Less than 10,000 60 3.87 1.882 -.211 -1.470 
 More than 10,000 58 3.62 2.101 -.193 -1.724 
Most institutional data and/or reports come 
from  my office 
Less than 10,000 59 4.66 1.226 -.765 .169 
 More than 10,000 58 4.50 1.417 -.536 -.896 
When there is an institutional level decision to 
be made, it is my office that provides the data 
and reports needed 
Less than 10,000 60 4.42 1.331 -.818 -.031 
 
More than 10,000 58 4.55 1.202 -.691 .141 
When there is a departmental decision to be 
made, it is my office that provides the data and 
reports needed 
Less than 10,000 60 3.62 1.250 .021 -.222 
 
More than 10,000 58 3.84 1.268 .088 -.705 
Control of Resources combined score Less than 10,000 60 4.83 .883 -1.252 1.831 
 More than 10,000 58 4.89 .830 -.648 -.329 
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Table 8.2 
Control of Resources: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
I collect institutional level data Between Groups .069 1 .069 .025 .875 
 Within Groups 322.245 116 2.778   
 Total 322.314 117    
I collect institutional level information Between Groups 11.326 1 11.326 5.314 .023 
 Within Groups 242.984 114 2.131   
 Total 254.310 115    
I generate institutional level data Between Groups .531 1 .531 .202 .654 
 Within Groups 301.794 115 2.624   
 Total 302.325 116    
I generate institutional level information Between Groups .009 1 .009 .006 .938 
 Within Groups 160.569 114 1.408   
 Total 160.578 115    
I distribute institutional level data Between Groups .216 1 .216 .130 .719 
 Within Groups 188.845 114 1.657   
 Total 189.060 115    
I distribute institutional level information Between Groups .862 1 .862 .533 .467 
 Within Groups 184.448 114 1.618   
 Total 185.310 115    
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data 
Between Groups .104 1 .104 .114 .737 
 Within Groups 105.127 115 .914   
 Total 105.231 116    
I manage data warehouses and repositories Between Groups 1.784 1 1.784 .449 .504 
 Within Groups 460.589 116 3.971   
 Total 462.373 117    
Most institutional data and/or reports come from my 
office 
Between Groups .758 1 .758 .432 .512 
 Within Groups 201.720 115 1.754   
 Total 202.479 116    
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, 
it is my office that provides the data and reports needed 
Between Groups .538 1 .538 .334 .565 
 Within Groups 186.928 116 1.611   
 Total 187.466 117    
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is 
my office that provides the data and reports needed 
Between Groups 1.535 1 1.535 .969 .327 
 Within Groups 183.787 116 1.584   
 Total 185.322 117    
Control of Resources combined score Between Groups .103 1 .103 .140 .709 
 Within Groups 85.274 116 .735   
 Total 85.377 117    
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Table 8.3 
Technical Skills: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
How would you rate your skills in the following 
areas? Student Sample n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management Less than 10,000 60 4.90 .986 -.671 .010 
 More than 10,000 58 4.98 1.084 -.649 -.910 
Presentations Less than 10,000 60 4.75 1.114 -.851 .130 
 More than 10,000 58 5.21 .987 -1.115 .214 
Writing reports Less than 10,000 60 4.93 1.006 -.689 -.088 
 More than 10,000 58 5.14 .963 -1.139 1.065 
Statistical methods Less than 10,000 60 4.18 1.214 -.188 -.453 
 More than 10,000 58 4.53 1.030 -.645 1.059 
Conceptualizing and planning research Less than 10,000 59 4.88 1.035 -.527 -.862 
 More than 10,000 58 5.09 1.064 -1.624 3.447 
Quantitative research and analytics Less than 10,000 60 4.53 1.033 -.379 -.281 
 More than 10,000 58 4.97 .955 -1.434 4.025 
Qualitative research and analytics Less than 10,000 60 4.12 1.106 -.393 -.034 
 More than 10,000 57 4.23 1.296 -.544 -.081 
Data mining Less than 10,000 60 3.53 1.578 -.090 -1.055 
 More than 10,000 58 3.97 1.414 -.169 -.874 
Technical Skills combined score Less than 10,000 60 4.48 .703 -.132 -1.022 
 More than 10,000 58 4.76 .738 -1.004 1.033 
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Table 8.4 
Technical Skills: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Data Management Between Groups .202 1 .202 .188 .665 
 Within Groups 124.383 116 1.072   
 Total 124.585 117    
Presentations Between Groups 6.156 1 6.156 5.546 .020 
 Within Groups 128.767 116 1.110   
 Total 134.924 117    
Writing reports Between Groups 1.235 1 1.235 1.271 .262 
 Within Groups 112.630 116 .971   
 Total 113.864 117    
Statistical methods Between Groups 3.636 1 3.636 2.862 .093 
 Within Groups 147.414 116 1.271   
 Total 151.051 117    
Conceptualizing and planning research Between Groups 1.227 1 1.227 1.114 .293 
 Within Groups 126.738 115 1.102   
 Total 126.966 116    
Quantitative research and analytics Between Groups 5.509 1 5.509 5.563 .020 
 Within Groups 114.864 116 .990   
 Total 120.373 117    
Qualitative research and analytics Between Groups .363 1 .363 .251 .617 
 Within Groups 166.218 115 1.445   
 Total 166.581 116    
Data Mining Between Groups 5.509 1 5.509 2.450 .120 
 Within Groups 260.864 116 2.249   
 Total 266.372 117    
Technical skills combined score Between Groups 2.446 1 2.446 4.708 .032 
 Within Groups 60.261 116 .519   
 Total 62.707 117    
 
Table 8.5 
Unique Knowledge: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 Student Sample n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very 
good understanding of the issues at my institution  
Less than 10,000 60 4.57 1.307 -.740 -.216 
 More than 10,000 58 4.86 1.067 -.972 .786 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Less than 10,000 59 4.83 1.053 -.933 .782 
 More than 10,000 58 4.86 1.034 -1.097 2.065 
I have responsibilities that involve many 
departments across campus 
Less than 10,000 60 4.85 1.287 -1.193 .779 
 More than 10,000 58 4.88 1.488 -1.375 .925 
I know more about the interrelationships of 
departments than most people on campus 
Less than 10,000 59 4.51 1.251 -.731 .059 
 More than 10,000 58 4.40 1.474 -.556 -.729 
I know more about campus politics than most people 
on campus 
Less than 10,000 59 4.07 1.298 -.423 -.485 
 More than 10,000 57 4.11 1.496 -.683 -.353 
Unique knowledge combined score` Less than 10,000 60 4.58 .922 -.938 1.024 
 More than 10,000 58 4.63 1.066 -.909 .328 
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Table 8.6 
Unique Knowledge: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
People respect my opinion because I have a very 
good understanding of the issues at my institution 
Between Groups 2.574 1 2.574 1.802 .182 
 Within Groups 165.630 116 1.428   
 Total 168.203 117    
I am able to understand the impact decisions have 
on departments and resources across campus 
Between Groups .029 1 .029 .027 .870 
 Within Groups 125.202 115 1.089   
 Total 125.231 116    
I have responsibilities that involve many 
departments across campus 
Between Groups .025 1 .025   
 Within Groups 223.805 116 1.929 .013 .909 
 Total 223.831 117    
I know more about the interrelationships of 
departments than most people on campus 
Between Groups .366 1 .366 .196 .659 
 Within Groups 214.625 115 1.866   
 Total 214.991 16    
I know more about campus politics than most 
people on campus 
Between Groups .041 1 .041 .021 .886 
 Within Groups 223.097 114 1.957   
 Total 223.138 115    
Unique knowledge combined score Between Groups .081 1 .081 .081 .776 
 Within Groups 114.919 116 .991   
 Total 115.000 117    
 
Table 8.7 
Legal Prerogatives: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 Student Sample n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to 
demand work from other individuals on campus 
Less than 10,000 59 4.03 1.629 -.502 -.747 
 More than 10,000 57 4.00 1.822 -.440 -1.362 
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Less than 10,000 59 5.17 1.476 -2.035 3.204 
 More than 10,000 58 4.48 1.903 -.779 -1.087 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other 
funding sources 
Less than 10,000 59 4.29 1.576 -.770 -.462 
 More than 10,000 56 4.05 1.803 -.353 -1.269 
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required 
reporting needs 
Less than 10,000 59 4.58 1.248 -.840 .258 
 More than 10,000 56 4.57 1.412 -.874 -.045 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Less than 10,000 58 3.98 1.722 -.442 -1.053 
 More than 10,000 57 3.77 1.793 -.357 -1.250 
Legal Prerogatives combined score Less than 10,000 59 4.42 1.163 -.921 .510 
 More than 10,000 58 4.19 1.314 -.557 -.558 
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Table 8.8 
Legal Prerogatives: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand 
work from other individuals on campus 
Between Groups .033 1 .033 .011 .916 
 Within Groups 339.932 114 2.982   
 Total 339.966 115    
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Between Groups 13.793 1 13.793 4.767 .031 
 Within Groups 332.788 115 2.894   
 
Total 346.581 1116    
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding 
sources 
Between Groups 1.581 1 1.581 .553 .459 
 Within Groups 3.22.941 113 2.858   
 Total 324.522 114    
People on my campus comply with my requests for information 
because they understand my required reporting needs 
Between Groups .001 1 .001 .000 .984 
 Within Groups 200.121 113 1.771   
 Total 200.122 114    
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Between Groups 1.278 1 1.278 .414 .521 
 Within Groups 349.018 113 3.089   
 Total 350.296 114    
Legal Prerogatives combined score Between Groups 1.557 1 1.557 1.013 .316 
 Within Groups 176.812 115 1.537   
 Total 178.369 116    
 
Table 8.9 
Access to Decision Makers: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size  
 Student Sample n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Less than 10,000 60 4.13 1.712 -.466 -1.039 
 More than 10,000 58 4.67 1.526 -.922 -.333 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Less than 10,000 60 4.62 1.530 -1.021 -.067 
 More than 10,000 57 4.84 1.360 -1.072 .234 
My boss is a high level decision maker Less than 10,000 60 4.98 1.347 -1.261 .671 
 More than 10,000 58 5.14 1.317 -1.503 1.349 
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Less than 10,000 59 4.17 1.620 -.435 -1.015 
 More than 10,000 57 4.88 1.255 -.885 -.386 
Access to Decision Makers combined score Less than 10,000 60 4.48 1.304 -.824 -.202 
 More than 10,000 58 4.86 1.069 -1.018 .655 
How many levels is your office of institutional 
research removed from the president on the 
organizational chart? 
Less than 10,000 60 1.33 1.052 .910 1.173 
 More than 10,000 56 1.59 .869 .060 -.657 
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Table 8.10 
Access to Decision Makers: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Between Groups 8.570 1 8.570 3.252 .074 
 Within Groups 305.709 116 2.635   
 Total 314.280 117    
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Between Groups 1.486 1 1.486 .707 .402 
 Within Groups 241.762 115 2.102   
 Total 243.248 116    
My boss is a high level decision maker Between Groups .705 1 .705 .397 .530 
 Within Groups 205.880 116 1.775   
 Total 206.585 117    
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Between Groups 14.520 1 14.520 6.884 .019 
 Within Groups 240.445 114 2.109   
 Total 254.966 115    
Access to Decision Makers combined score Between Groups 4.165 1 4.165 2.919 .010 
 Within Groups 165.543 116 1.427   
 Total 169.708 117    
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? 
Between Groups 1.898 1 1.898 2.024  .090 
 Within Groups 106.887 114 .938   
 Total 108.784 115    
 
Institutional Type Power Source Comparisons 
 As previously mentioned, the two comparison groups, Public (n=51) and Private 
(n=41), differed somewhat in size. Although the difference was not large, the sample 
groups were small so the Kruskal-Wallis test of variance was conducted after every 
ANOVA as the Kruskal-Wallis is more powerful when there are inequality of means 
(Lomax, 2001). The results indicated that there were but a few differences in means that 
were statistically significant for any of the power source statements. Most of the 
interesting differences were found in the kurtosis of each statement. The detailed 
descriptive statistics and the results of the ANOVA can be found in the tables located at 
the end of this discussion. 
 149 
 
 The results for the Control of Resources’ power source reflected the same 
strengths as the overall sample. Both the Public and the Private group had very high 
means for the statements concerning the collection, creation and distribution of data and 
information. The statement “I generate institutional level information” had one of the 
highest combinations of means and peaked kurtosis. The means, starting with Public and 
then Private, were 5.45 and 5.28 and had very strong negative skews, -2.339 and -2.215. 
The leptokurtic kurtosis was extremely high at 5.286 and 4.077 making a strong 
statement by both groups that they engage in the generation of institutional level 
information. The statement, “Faculty, administrators, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data,” had similar results. The Public mean was 5.45 compared to the 
Private mean that was 5.50. Both had strong negative skews, -2.292 and -2.189 and very 
strongly peaked kurtosis, 6.238 and 4.331. The Public and Private groups were a source 
of data and information for their institutions. The other kurtosis was also peaked but there 
were differences in how peaked the distribution was. The Public group was in agreement 
that they engaged in the collection of information with a kurtosis of 3.084 compared to 
the Private group that was only .185, almost mesokurtic. However, the Private group was 
more in agreement about their engagement in the distribution of data, with a leptokurtic 
distribution of 7.834 compared to only 1.323 for the Public group. The Private group felt 
the same way about the distribution of information with a kurtosis of 6.250 compared to 
2.701. There was one statement that had low means and wider distribution of responses; 
“I manage data warehouses and repositories.” The Public group mean was 3.73 with a 
platykurtic distribution of -1.613. The Private group mean was 3.66 with a platykurtic 
distribution of -1.562. Both results indicated that some institutional researchers engage in 
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managing data warehouses, but many do not. Both groups were also less active in 
providing data and reports for departmental decision. Overall, the Control of Resources 
combined mean score was 4.74 for the Public group and 4.81 for the Private group. The 
range for the combined score was 4.36 with a minimum of 1.64 and a maximum of 6.00 
for the Public group and 3.27 for the Private group with a minimum of 2.73 and a 
maximum of 6.00. Both means were negatively skewed but the distributions were 
leptokurtic (1.011) and slightly platykurtic (-.277) respectively (see table 9.1 for the more 
descriptive statistics and Table 9.2 for the results of the ANOVAs). 
 Skills in quantitative and qualitative research seem to be the difference between 
the Public and Private groups when it comes to the Technical Skills power source. The 
Private group had higher means on every skill except for statistical methods and 
quantitative research and analytics. Qualitative research and analytics skills stood out for 
the Private group as their mean was 4.29, their responses were negatively skewed and 
leptokurtic (1.889). The mean compared to the Public group, 3.78, was a difference that 
was statistically significant at the .05 level, F(1,90)=4.438, p=.012. The effect was small 
(eta-squared=.05). The highest means for all of the Technical Skills were from the Private 
group; presentation (5.05), report writing (5.12), and conceptualizing and planning 
research (5.08). For each of these skills, the Public group reported a greater distribution 
of responses as they were platykurtic or almost mesokurtic (-.584, -.248, .380). The 
results were somewhat surprising as the largest percentage of the Private group were 
affiliated with smaller institutions and should share those characteristics. The Smaller 
Institutions group in the previous comparison had lower means in all of the technical 
skills and one could reason that the Private group would have as well. The Private group 
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also had a higher mean on the Technical Skills combined score, 4.65, compared to 4.49 
for the Public group. The range for the Private Group’s combined score was 2.68 with a 
low of 3.58 and a high of 5.75. For the Public group, the range was 3.13 with a low or 
2.63 and a high of 5.75. Detailed statistics for the Technical Skills power source can be 
found in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.  
 The Private institutions also reported a higher mean on four of the six statements 
in the Unique Knowledge power source section. Private institutions had higher means in 
understanding the impact of decisions across campus, Private M=5.03, Public M=4.53; 
having across campus responsibilities, Private M=5.00, Public M= 4.69; knowing the 
interrelations of departments, Private M=4.53, Public M=4.20; and their Unique 
Knowledge Combined score, Public M=4.60, Public M= 4.44. The range for the 
combined score was 3.20 with a low of 2.80 and a high of 6.00 for the Private group. For 
the Public group, the range was 4.20 with a low of 1.60 and a high of 5.80. The 
characteristics for the Private group were similar to the characteristics one would expect 
at smaller institutions. The means for understanding the impact of decisions across 
campus were statistically significant at the .05 level, F(1,89)=5.506, p=.023. The effect 
size was small (eta-squared=.05). Most of the kurtosis for these statements were small 
and nearly mesokurtic, which indicated fairly even distributions around the means. The 
statement regarding understanding the impact a decision has across campus had the 
strongest kurtosis but was only 1.378 for the Public and 1.2.93 for the Private group. 
While the mean for the Public group on this statement was not high, 4.53, the kurtosis 
were at least in agreement. “Understanding campus politics” had the lowest means; 4.14 
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for the Public group and 3.83 for the Private group (Table 9.5 contains the descriptive 
statistics for this comparison and Table 9.6 contains the ANOVA results).  
 The means for the Legal Prerogatives statements were generally lower than most 
of the other power sources and the kurtosis were generally platykurtic or mesokurtic with 
a few exceptions. The Private group had higher means on every statement and the 
combined score than the Public group. The two strongest responses came from the 
Private group. The mean for the statement, “I complete reports that are required by law or 
government regulations,” was 5.10 for the Private group compared to 4.73 for the Public 
group. The Private group had a strong leptokurtic distribution of 2.450 compared to the 
Public group’s -.408. The other high mean was for the statement, “People comply with 
my requests for information because they understand my required reporting needs.” The 
Private group’s mean was 4.92 compared to 4.32 for the Public group, which is a 
statistically significant difference at the .05 level, F(1,87)=5.266, p= .027. The effect was 
medium (eta-squared=.06). The statements with the widest distribution of responses (as 
indicated by their kurtosis) for the Public group were having authority to demand work (-
1.203), completing reports for grants (-1.216), and using legal obligations to get 
information or data (-1.042). Using legal obligations was the only statement that had a 
moderate distribution for the Private group (-1.556). The Legal Prerogatives combined 
score means were 4.12 for the Public group and 4.49 for the Private group. The range of 
the combined scores for the Private group was 4.40 with a low of 1.75 and a high of 6.00. 
The range for the Public group was 5.00 with a low or 1.00 and high of 6.00. The Legal 
Prerogatives power source appears to be the weakest of the power sources with the widest 
distribution of responses. The Private group seems to have more power than the Public 
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group regarding Legal Prerogatives (the related statistical tables can be found in Table 
9.7 and 9.8).  
 There were very few differences between the Public group and the Private group 
on the Access to Decision Makers statements. None of the statements had a difference in 
their means that was statistically significant. The largest difference between the groups 
was the statement, “My boss is a high level decision maker” where the mean for the 
Public group was 4.88 and the mean for the Private group was 5.24. The mildly 
leptokurtic (1.009) distribution for the Private groups demonstrates their agreement 
compared to slightly leptokurtic (.882) distribution of the Public group. The large 
percentage of smaller institutions represented in the Private group may be apparent in this 
statement as smaller institutions tend to have smaller organizational charts. The Private 
group reported being 1.46 positions removed from their president compared to 1.60 
positions for the Public group. Part of this is due to the fact that the Public group had 
more researchers/analysts than the Private group that had a higher percentage of 
managers and directors. However, the Private group felt that their offices were less 
centralized than the Public group’s offices. The mean for this statement was 4.47 for the 
Public group and 4.13 for the Private group. The Private group also had a more 
platykurtic (-1.027) distribution. The Access to Decision Makers combined score mean 
was 4.51 for the Public group and 4.63 for the Private group. Both had fairly mesokurtic 
distributions. The range of the combined scores for the Public group was 5.00 with a low 
of 1.00 and a high of 6.00. The range for the Private group was 4.25 with a low of 1.75 
and a high of 6.00 (Table 9.9 contains the descriptive statistics for the comparison of 
these two groups. Table 9.10 contains the results of the ANOVA). 
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 In summary, there was not much difference between the Public and Private group 
regarding the power sources, although the Private group showed higher means than 
expected considering the larger percentage of small institutions in this group. The only 
statistically significant differences between the groups were in the areas of qualitative 
research and analytics, understanding the impact decisions have on departments and 
resources across campus, and having people comply with their requests for information. 
In each of these statements, the Private group had the higher means. Both groups showed 
very high means in collecting, creating, and distributing data and information; and both 
groups had very peaked responses showing strong agreement with the statements. The 
only other strongly leptokurtic response was the Private group’s responses to completing 
reports required by law or governmental regulation. The ranking of power sources for 
both groups was as follows: Control of Resources, Technical Skills, Access to Decision 
Makers, Unique Knowledge and Legal Prerogatives.  
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Table 9.1 
Control of Resources: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD. Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data Public 51 4.94 1.793 -1.424 .458 
 Private 41 5.00 1.673 -1.414 .555 
I collect institutional level information Public 50 5.20 1.400 -1.954 3.084 
 Private 40 4.80 1.713 -1.220 .185 
I generate institutional level data Public 51 5.00 1.720 -1.496 .621 
 Private 40 5.10 1.646 -1.731 1.690 
I generate institutional level information Public 51 5.45 1.137 -2.339 5.286 
 Private 39 5.28 1.450 -2.215 4.077 
I distribute institutional level data Public 50 5.08 1.563 -1.608 1.323 
 Private 40 5.50 1.062 -2.635 7.834 
I distribute institutional level information Public 51 5.20 1.414 -1.863 2.701 
 Private 39 5.41 1.272 -2.541 6.250 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information and/or 
data 
Public 51 5.45 1.026 -2.292 6.238 
 Private 40 5.50 .987 -2.189 4.331 
I manage data warehouses and repositories Public 51 3.73 2.011 -.206 -1.613 
 Private 41 3.66 1.931 -.100 -1.562 
Most institutional data and/or reports come from  my office Public 50 4.26 1.454 -.433 -.727 
 Private 41 4.78 1.151 -.579 -.693 
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it is my 
office that provides the data and reports needed 
Public 51 4.25 1.440 -.719 -.276 
 Private 41 4.44 1.119 -.515 -.595 
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my office 
that provides the data and reports needed 
Public 51 3.57 1.375 .163 -.564 
 Private 41 3.59 1.117 .114 -.066 
Control of Resources combined score Public 51 4.74 .946 -.995 1.011 
 Private 41 4.81 .811 -.596 -.277 
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Table 9.2 
Control of Resources: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig. 
I collect institutional level data Between Groups .079 1 .079 .026 .958 
 Within Groups 272.824 90 3.031   
 Total 272.902 91    
I collect institutional level information Between Groups 3.556 1 3.556 1.487 .340 
 Within Groups 210.400 88 2.391   
 Total 213.956 89    
I generate institutional level data Between Groups .224 1 .224 .079 .760 
 Within Groups 253.600 89 2.849   
 Total 253.824 90    
I generate institutional level information Between Groups .631 1 .631 .384 .722 
 Within Groups 144.525 88 1.642   
 Total 145.156 89    
I distribute institutional level data Between Groups 3.920 1 3.920 2.108 .263 
 Within Groups 163.680 88 1.860   
 Total 167.600 89    
I distribute institutional level information Between Groups 1.014 1 1.014 .552 .406 
 Within Groups 161.475 88 1.835   
 Total 162.489 89    
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information 
and/or data 
Between Groups .054 1 .054 .053 .809 
 Within Groups 90.627 89 1.018   
 Total 90.681 90    
I manage data warehouses and repositories Between Groups .102 1 .102   
 Within Groups 351.376 90 3.904 .026 .885 
 Total 351.478 91    
Most institutional data and/or reports come from my office Between Groups 6.103 1 6.103 3.467 .101 
 Within Groups 156.644 89 1.760   
 Total 162.747 90    
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it is 
my office that provides the data and reports needed 
Between Groups .771 1 .771 .451 .729 
 Within Groups 153.784 90 1.709   
 Total 154.554 91    
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my 
office that provides the data and reports needed Between Groups .006 1 .006 .004 .868 
 Within Groups 144.461 90 1.605   
 Total 144.467 91    
Control of Resources combined score Between Groups .135 1 .135 .171 .832 
 Within Groups 71.096 90 .790   
 Total 71.231 91    
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Table 9.3 
Technical Skills: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? 
Institutional Type n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management Public 51 4.92 1.055 -.582 -.868 
 Private 41 4.95 1.048 -.722 -.027 
Presentations Public 51 4.78 1.101 -.581 -.584 
 Private 41 5.05 1.048 -1.198 .947 
Writing reports Public 51 4.92 1.055 -.688 -.248 
 Private 41 5.12 .954 -1.163 1.551 
Statistical methods Public 51 4.37 1.183 -.476 .156 
 Private 41 4.32 1.171 -.564 .237 
Conceptualizing and planning research Public 51 4.78 1.238 -.888 .380 
 Private 40 5.08 .829 -.714 .220 
Quantitative research and analytics Public 51 4.75 1.055 -.949 1.728 
 Private 41 4.71 1.101 -.796 .151 
Qualitative research and analytics Public 51 3.78 1.154 .036 -.235 
 Private 41 4.29 1.146 -1.243 1.889 
Data mining Public 51 3.57 1.540 -.083 -.954 
 Private 41 3.73 1.533 -.266 -.943 
Technical Skills combined score Public 51 4.49 .796 -.456 -.596 
 Private 41 4.65 .665 -.453 -.878 
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Table 9.4 
Technical Skills: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
How would you rate your skills in the following 
areas? 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. 
Data Management Between Groups .020 1 .020 .018 .895 
 Within Groups 99.589 90 1.107   
 Total 99.609 91    
Presentations Between Groups 1.590 1 1.590 1.369 .213 
 Within Groups 104.530 90 1.161   
 Total 106.120 91    
Writing reports Between Groups .913 1 .913 .892 .370 
 Within Groups 92.077 90 1.023   
 Total 92.989 91    
Statistical methods Between Groups .070 1 .070 .050 .852 
 Within Groups 124.800 90 1.387   
 Total 124.870 91    
Conceptualizing and planning research Between Groups 1.894 1 1.894 1.630 .452 
 Within Groups 103.402 89 1.162   
 Total 105.297 90    
Quantitative research and analytics Between Groups .032 1 .032 .028 .961 
 Within Groups 104.174 90 1.157   
 Total 104.207 91    
Qualitative research and analytics Between Groups 5.874 1 5.874 4.438 .012 
 Within Groups 119.115 90 1.324   
 Total 124.989 91    
Data Mining Between Groups .604 1 .604 .256 .595 
 Within Groups 212.559 90 2.362   
 Total 213.163 91    
Technical skills combined score Between Groups .628 1 .628 1.146 .341 
 Within Groups 49.352 90 .548   
 Total 49.980 91    
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Table 9.5 
Unique Knowledge: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution  
Public 51 4.65 .955 -.511 .027 
 Private 41 4.56 1.501 -.776 -.577 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on departments 
and resources across campus 
Public 51 4.53 1.102 -1.011 1.378 
 Private 40 5.03 .947 -1.005 1.293 
I have responsibilities that involve many departments across 
campus 
Public 51 4.69 1.463 -1.302 .864 
 Private 41 5.00 1.225 -1.202 .634 
I know more about the interrelationships of departments than most 
people on campus 
Public 51 4.20 1.400 -.410 -.586 
 Private 40 4.53 1.219 -.508 -.570 
I know more about campus politics than most people on campus Public 51 4.14 1.327 -.903 .584 
 Private 40 3.83 1.357 -.250 -.635 
Unique knowledge combined score` Public 51 4.44 1.026 -1.316 1.269 
 Private 41 4.60 .948 -.436 -.844 
 
Table 9.6 
Unique Knowledge: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution 
Between Groups .168 1 .168 .112 .645 
 Within Groups 135.745 90 1.508   
 Total 135.913 91    
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Between Groups 5.506 1 5.506 5.121 .023 
 Within Groups 95.681 89 1.075   
 Total 101.187 90    
I have responsibilities that involve many departments 
across campus 
Between Groups 2.237 1 2.237 1.206 .280 
 Within Groups 166.980 90 1.855   
 Total 169.217 91    
I know more about the interrelationships of departments 
than most people on campus 
Between Groups 2.425 1 2.425 1.384 .286 
 Within Groups 156.014 89 1.756   
 Total 158.440 90    
I know more about campus politics than most people on 
campus 
Between Groups 2.186 1 2.186 1.217 .209 
 Within Groups 159.814 89 1.796   
 Total 162.000 90    
Unique knowledge combined score Between Groups .609 1 .609 .618 .488 
 Within Groups 88.602 90 .984   
 Total 89.210 91    
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Table 9.7 
Legal Prerogatives: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand 
work from other individuals on campus 
Public 51 3.84 1.690 -.365 -1.203 
 Private 40 4.18 1.678 -.565 -.829 
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Public 51 4.73 1.767 -1080 -.408 
 Private 40 5.10 1.598 -1.917 2.450 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding 
sources 
Public 50 3.94 1.707 -.211 -1.216 
 Private 40 4.38 1.547 -.846 -.231 
People on my campus comply with my requests for information 
because they understand my required reporting needs 
Public 50 4.32 1.347 -.722 .012 
 Private 39 4.92 1.061 -.955 .369 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Public 50 3.70 1.594 -.365 -1.042 
 Private 40 3.85 2.020 -.276 -1.556 
Legal Prerogatives combined score Public 51 4.12 1.245 -.544 -.106 
 Private 40 4.49 1.247 -.976 .007 
 
Table 9.8 
Legal Prerogatives: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to 
demand work from other individuals on campus 
Between Groups 2.469 1 2.469 .870 .342 
 Within Groups 252.520 89 2.837   
 Total 254.989 90    
I complete reports that are required by law or 
government regulations 
Between Groups 3.144 1 3.144 1.094 .370 
 Within Groups 255.757 89 2.874   
 Total 258.901 90    
I complete reports that are required by grants or other 
funding sources 
Between Groups 4.205 1 4.205 1.567 .249 
 Within Groups 236.195 88 2.684   
 Total 240.400 89    
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required 
reporting needs 
Between Groups 7.969  1 7.969 5.266 .027 
 Within Groups 131.649 87 1.513   
 Total 139.618 88    
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data 
and information I need from faculty or staff 
Between Groups .500 1 .500 .155 .464 
 Within Groups 283.600 88 3.223   
 Total 284.100 89    
Legal Prerogatives combined score Between Groups 3.067 1 3.067 1.975 .108 
 Within Groups 138.178 89 1.553   
 Total 141.244 90    
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Table 9.9 
Access to Decision Makers: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Public 51 4.22 1.689 -.639 -.848 
 Private 41 4.24 1.640 -.556 -.851 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene 
on my behalf 
Public 51 4.47 1.528 -.923 -.192 
 Private 41 4.85 1.352 -1.061 .049 
My boss is a high level decision maker Public 51 4.88 1.423 -1.301 .882 
 Private 41 5.24 1.090 -1.366 1.009 
I consider my office of institutional research to be centralized 
within the organizational structure of my institution 
Public 51 4.47 1.433 -.723 -.369 
 Private 40 4.13 1.556 -.348 -1.027 
Access to Decision Makers combined score Public 51 4.51 1.229 -1.052 .682 
 Private 41 4.63 1.131 -.825 -.019 
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? Public 50 1.60 .962 1.061 2.451 
 Private 41 1.46 .925 .312 -.708 
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Table 9.10 
Access to Decision Makers: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Between Groups .018 1 .018 .007 .968 
 
Within Groups 
250.18
8 
90 2.780   
 
Total 
250.20
7 
91    
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Between Groups 3.335 1 3.335 1.581 .195 
 
Within Groups 
189.82
8 
90 2.109   
 
Total 
193.16
3 
91    
My boss is a high level decision maker Between Groups 2.971 1 2.971 1.796 .235 
 
Within Groups 
148.85
5 
90 1.654   
 
Total 
151.82
6 
91    
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Between Groups 2.677 1 2.677 1.209 .294 
 
Within Groups 
197.08
1 
89 2.214   
 
Total 
199.75
8 
90    
Access to Decision Makers combined score Between Groups .307 1 .307 .218 .708 
 
Within Groups 
126.70
5 
90 1.408   
 
Total 
127.01
2 
91    
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? Between Groups .420 1 .420 .491 .522 
 Within Groups 76.195 89 .856   
 Total 76.615 90    
 
Job Description Power Source Comparisons 
The third subgroup comparison in this study explored the differences between 
participants who declared the term “IR Staff” as best describing their role with those who 
chose the term “IR Manager.” These groupings were important not only in determining 
the differences in the positions within IR but also in determining whether the research 
instruments were able to detect differences in power levels. If there were any differences 
between the groupings in terms of power, they should have been apparent in the inherent 
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differences between management employees and staff employees. The sample sizes for 
these two groups were considerably different, Staff  n=30, Manager n=67, so the 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was used to determine the significance of the differences 
(Lomax, 2001).The results found ten statistically significant differences at the .05 level in 
the means of power source statements and combined scores plus near significance for 
another seven statements. The descriptive statistics and results of the ANOVAs can be 
found on Tables 10.1 to 10.10 at the end of this section. 
 Three statements that neared statistically significant differences were found in the 
Control of Resources set of statements, although there were no significant differences in 
the Control of Resource statements. The statements; “I collect institutional level 
information,” F(1,93)=2.165, p=.09, ‘I generate institutional level data’, F(1,95)=3.055, 
p=.08, and “I generate institutional level information” F(1,94)=4.4428, p=.07 were all 
near significant. In addition to these three statements, the two groups had high means for 
the remaining statements regarding the collection, creation, and distribution of 
information and data; however, the Managers group had higher means on each of the 
statements than the Staff group. The lowest kurtosis for the Manager group on these 
statements was 2.536 for collecting institutional information (M=5.26) and the highest 
kurtosis was 10.603 for generating institutional information (M=5.64). Several of these 
statements for the Staff group were near mesokurtic or only slightly leptokurtic indicating 
that the Manager group had less variation in their responses and more agreement as to the 
presence of the power source. While there was more variance with the Staff group, the 
participants were in agreement, along with the individuals in the Manager group, that 
they distribute institutional level information (M=5.17, Kurtosis= 3.007). There were also 
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differences with the statement concerning faculty, administrators and staff asking the 
participant for information. The Manager group (M=5.68) had a very strong kurtosis, 
4.414 compared to the Staff group (M=5.43) whose kurtosis was .134. The Staff group 
did have higher means than the Manager group on three statements: most institutional 
data/reports come from my office (Staff M=4.83, Manager M= 4.62), when there is an 
institutional level decision to be made, my office provides the data/reports (Staff M= 
4.73, Manager M=4.42), and when there is a departmental decision to be made, my office 
provides the data/reports (Staff M=3.97, Manager M= 3.56). Each of these statements 
had a slightly platykurtic distribution for both groups. Apparently, the Manager group 
were more likely to manage data warehouses and repositories as their mean for this 
statement was 4.13 and was the only group in this study with a mean higher than 3.99 for 
this statement. This response had a slight negative skew (-.524) but had some variance 
with a platykurtic distribution of -1.191. The Control of Resources combined score was 
4.76 for the Staff group and 4.99 for the Manager group with a slightly flat distribution 
for the Staff (Kurtosis =-.978) and a fairly even distribution for the Managers (Kurtosis= 
.557). The range of combined scores for the Staff group was 3.00 with a low of 3.00 and 
high of 6.00, whereas the range for the Manager group was 3.27 with a low of 2.73 and a 
high of 6.00 (the descriptive statistics can be found in Table 10.1 and the ANOVA results 
can be found in Table 10.2). 
 The four technical skills with the highest means for the Staff group were data 
management (5.00), conceptualizing research (4.67), report writing (4.60), and 
quantitative research and analytics (4.60). The highest means for the Manager group were 
report writing (5.12), presentations (5.06), conceptualizing and planning research (5.05), 
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and data management (5.03). Report writing was the only the statement that neared a 
statistically significant difference at the .05 level, F(1,95)=5.518, p=07. The distribution 
for every statement but two was slightly platykurtic. The Staff group had a leptokurtic 
distribution of 1.408 for their skills in statistical methods with a mean of 4.43 and a 
distribution of 3.193 for their skills in quantitative research and analytics with a mean of 
4.67. The statistical methods skills plus qualitative research and analytics and data 
mining, were the only skills in which the Staff group had a higher mean than the Manager 
group. The means for the Technical Skills combined score was 4.50 for the Staff group 
and 4.63 for the Manager group.  The range of combined scores for the Staff group was 
3.38 with a minimum of 2.63 and a maximum of 6.00. The range for the Manager group 
was 2.75 with a minimum of 3.00 and a maximum of 5.75. In general, both groups, Staff 
and Manager, appeared to have a wide distribution of responses in rating their technical 
skills with only a few exceptions (a complete comparison of the Staff and Manager 
groups in the area of technical skills is listed on Table 10.3 and Table 10.4). 
 The power source in which there was the most difference between the Staff group 
and the Manager group was Unique Knowledge. Four of the six statements and the 
combined scores had a statistically significant difference at the .05 level. “People respect 
my opinion because I have a very good understanding of the issues at my institution” had 
a mean for the Staff group of 4.27 compared to the Manager group at 4.82. The 
difference was statistically significant, F(1,94)=4.22, p=.03. The effect was small (eta-
squared=.04). The statement; “I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus” also had means that were significantly 
statistically different, F(1,94)=11.559, p=.006. The effect size was small (eta-squared= 
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.04). The mean for the Staff group was 4.27 compared to the mean of the Manager group 
at 5.03. The distribution for the Manager group was leptokurtic (1.371) whereas the Staff 
group as platykurtic (-.207). The mean for the statement; “I know more about the 
interrelationships of departments than most people on campus” also were significantly 
significant, F(1,93)=7.881, p=.012. The effect size was likewise small (eta-squared- .07). 
The mean for the Staff group was 3.83 with a good platykurtic (-1.024) distribution. The 
mean for the Manager group was 4.68 with a slight leptokurtic (.300) distribution. The 
final measure that had a statistically significant difference was the Unique Knowledge 
combined score, F(1,94)=8.510, p=.008. The effect size was small (eta-squared- .08). The 
mean for the Staff group on this score was 4.13 with a slight platykurtic (-.502) 
distribution whereas the Manager group had a mean of 4.75 and a strong leptokurtic 
(2.144) distribution. The ranges of combined scores for both groups were the same at 
4.40 with a low of 1.60 and a high of 6.00. Both groups followed the trend of other 
subgroupings and reported having less knowledge of campus politics. The mean for the 
Staff group on this statement was 3.70 whereas the Manager group’s mean was 4.22. 
Both had a platykurtic (-.919,-.161) distribution (the descriptive statistics for this 
comparison can be found on Table 10.5 and the ANOVA results can be found on Table 
10.6). 
 The Legal Prerogative power source also revealed power differences between the 
Staff and Manager groups. Half of the statements and combined scores had means with 
statistically significant differences at the .05 level. Once again, the statement; “I complete 
reports that are required by law or government regulations” was the statement with the 
highest means. The mean for the Staff group was 4.37 and the Manager group was 5.42. 
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The difference in means were statistically significant, F(1,94)=10.371, p=.025. The effect 
size was small (eta-squared= .09). The Staff group had a good platykurtic distribution (-
1.293) indicating that some IR staff did not have legally required reports. The Manager 
group’s distribution was strongly leptokurtic (4.500). Neither group felt strongly that they 
had legal authority to demand information needed to complete their work. The Staff 
group’s mean was 3.47 and the Manager group’s mean was 4.28; the difference was not 
statistically different. The Staff group was in agreement that they had not used legal 
obligations to get faculty or staff to comply with their needs. Their mean was a low 2.97 
with a mild platykurtic (-1.326) distribution. The Manager group’s mean for this 
statement was 4.42 and was also slightly platykurtic (-.402). The difference in the means 
was statistically significant, F(1,93)=17.669, p=.001. The effect size moderate (eta-
squared=.15). The differences in the Legal Prerogative combined score was also 
statistically significant, F(1,94)=9.452, p=.024. The effect size was small (eta-
squared=.09). The mean for the Staff group for this score was 3.87 compared to the mean 
of the Manager group that was 4.63. The groups had opposing kurtosis (-1.023, 1.216). 
The ranges of combined scores for both groups were large. For the Staff group it was 
5.00 with a minimum of 1.00 and a maximum of 6.00. For the Manager group, the range 
was 4.60, the minimum was 1.40 and the maximum was 6.00 (see Tables 10.7 and 10.8 
for the descriptive statistics and the ANOVA results).  
 The Access to Decision Makers power source results showed further differences 
between the Staff and Manager groups, some of which are inherent with the positions. 
The statement; “My boss is a high level decision maker” had means that were statistically 
significant at the .05 level, F(1,94)=9.387, p=.003. The effect size was small (eta-
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squared= .08). One could reasonably expect that a subordinate would have a lower rate of 
agreement than the superior position regarding the boss being a high level decision 
maker. The Manager group reported that their office was 1.40 levels removed from the 
president compared to 1.57 levels for the Staff group. Similarly, there was a significantly 
statistical difference with the statement; “I meet with high level decision makers 
regularly,” F(1,95)=4.478, p= .032. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.04). Both 
groups had only a slightly leptokurtic distribution for these two statements. There was 
agreement by the two groups that their IR offices were centralized as they both had a 
mean score of 4.53. The Access to Decision Makers combined score for the Staff group 
was 4.23 whereas the Manager group’s combined mean was 4.79. The difference was 
statistically significant, F(1,95)=4.634, p=.012. The effect size was small (eta-squared-
.04).The range of combined scores for the Staff group was 4.25, the low was 1.75 and the 
high was 6.00 while the range for the Manager group was 5.00, the low was1.00 and the 
high was 6.00 (the descriptive statistics for these comparisons are located on Table 10.9. 
Table 10.10 contains the results of the ANOVA’s for these comparisons).  
 In summary, at the core of their IR jobs, the Manager and Staff groups are similar. 
There were no statistically significant differences in the Control of Resources or the 
Technical Skills power sources. The Manager group had higher means on most 
statements and the distributions varied by statements for these two power sources. The 
real differences emerged in the remaining power sources. Four of the six statements in 
the Unique Knowledge section demonstrated that the Manager group felt they had more 
power related to their unique knowledge of campus. The Manager group also had higher 
means in the Legal Prerogative section and indicated that they were more likely to use 
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their reporting obligations to get their work done. And lastly, perhaps by virtue of their 
higher positions, the Manager group reported having greater access to decision makers. 
Though some of these differences seem obvious, it is important understand that they did 
exist and the research tool was able to identify them. The highest ranked power source for 
the Staff group was Control of Resources followed by Technical Skills, Access to 
Decision Makers, Unique Knowledge and lastly, Legal Prerogatives. For the Manager 
group, Control of Resources was highest ranked. Second was Access to Decision Makers 
followed by Unique Knowledge while Technical Skills and Legal Prerogatives tied for 
fourth.  
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Table 10.1 
Control of Resources: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job 
Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data Staff 30 4.90 1.863 -1.318 .007 
 Managers 67 5.33 1.460 -2.131 3.258 
I collect institutional level information Staff 30 4.77 1.775 -1.326 .388 
 Managers 65 5.26 1.395 -1.876 2.563 
I generate institutional level data Staff 30 4.77 1.870 -1.129 -.409 
 Managers 67 5.37 1.434 -2.280 3.930 
I generate institutional level information Staff 30 5.10 1.561 -1.691 1.748 
 Managers 66 5.64 .922 -3.086 10.603 
I distribute institutional level data Staff 30 5.37 1.326 -2.165 4.046 
 Managers 66 5.45 1.192 -2.306 4.513 
I distribute institutional level information Staff 30 5.17 1.440 -1.870 3.007 
 Managers 66 5.56 1.069 -2.696 6.860 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information and/or 
data 
Staff 
30 5.43 .935 -1.283 .134 
 Managers 65 5.68 .664 -2.173 4.414 
I manage data warehouses and repositories Staff 30 3.37 2.157 .129 -1.805 
 Managers 67 4.13 1.858 -.524 -1.191 
Most institutional data and/or reports come from  my office Staff 30 4.83 1.177 -.607 -.586 
 Managers 65 4.62 1.208 -.417 -1.045 
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it is my 
office that provides the data and reports needed 
Staff 30 4.73 1.081 -.654 -.054 
 Managers 66 4.42 1.266 -.670 -.286 
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my office 
that provides the data and reports needed 
Staff 30 3.97 1.273 .281 -.996 
 Managers 66 3.56 1.191 -.092 -.309 
Control of Resources combined score Staff 30 4.76 .9229 -.355 -.978 
 Managers 67 4.99 .7147 -.931 .557 
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Table 10.2 
Control of Resources: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. 
I collect institutional level data Between Groups 3.802 1 3.802 1.496 .340 
 Within Groups 241.476 95 2.542   
 Total 245.278 96    
I collect institutional level information Between Groups 5.027 1 5.027 2.165 .090 
 Within Groups 215.921 93 2.322   
 Total 220.947 94    
I generate institutional level data Between Groups 7.621 1 7.621 3.055 .089 
 Within Groups 237.038 95 2.495   
 Total 244.660 96    
I generate institutional level information Between Groups 5.934 1 5.934 4.428 .075 
 Within Groups 125.973 94 1.340   
 Total 131.906 95    
I distribute institutional level data Between Groups .159 1 .159 .104 .880 
 Within Groups 143.330 94 1.525   
 Total 143.490 95    
I distribute institutional level information Between Groups 3.201 1 3.201 2.238 .132 
 Within Groups 134.424 94 1.430   
 Total 137.625 95    
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data 
Between Groups 1.218 1 1.218 2.114 .310 
 Within Groups 53.582 93 .576   
 Total 54.800 94    
I manage data warehouses and repositories Between Groups 12.211 1 12.211 3.198 .109 
 Within Groups 362.758 95 3.819   
 Total 374.969 96    
Most institutional data and/or reports come 
from my office 
Between Groups .975 1 .975 .679 .393 
 Within Groups 133.551 93 1.436   
 Total 134.526 94    
When there is an institutional level decision to 
be made, it is my office that provides the data 
and reports needed 
Between Groups 1.970 1 1.970 1.342 .316 
 Within Groups 137.988 94 1.468   
 Total 139.958 95    
When there is a departmental decision to be 
made, it is my office that provides the data and 
reports needed 
Between Groups 3.401 1 3.401 2.296 .228 
 Within Groups 139.224 94 1.481   
 Total 142.625 95    
Control of Resources combined score Between Groups 1.095 1 1.095 1.781 .342 
 Within Groups 58.419 95 .615   
 Total 59.514 96    
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Table 10.3 
Technical Skills: Descriptive Statistics by Job Descriptions 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? Job Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management Staff 30 5.00 1.114 -.641 -1.025 
 Managers 67 5.03 .937 -.744 -.248 
Presentations Staff 30 4.63 1.273 -.643 -.685 
 Managers 67 5.06 .983 -1.010 .580 
Writing reports Staff 30 4.60 1.276 -.453 -.820 
 Managers 67 5.12 .862 -.675 -.286 
Statistical methods Staff 30 4.43 1.135 -.960 1.408 
 Managers 67 4.28 1.204 -.250 -.374 
Conceptualizing and planning research Staff 30 4.67 1.348 -.969 .455 
 Managers 66 5.05 .867 -.674 -.115 
Quantitative research and analytics Staff 30 4.60 1.070 -1.274 3.193 
 Managers 67 4.75 1.005 -.663 .184 
Qualitative research and analytics Staff 30 4.13 1.279 -.372 -.010 
 Manager 66 4.12 1.170 -.361 -.303 
Data mining Staff 30 4.00 1.661 -.435 -.952 
 Managers 67 3.70 1.414 -.177 -.733 
Technical Skills combined score Staff 30 4.50 .865 -.432 -.488 
 Managers 67 4.63 .66 9 -.491 -.498 
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Table 10.4 
Technical Skills: ANOVA by Job Description 
How would you rate your skills in the following 
areas? 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal- 
Wallis Sig. 
Data Management Between Groups .018 1 .018 .019 .869 
 Within Groups 93.940 95 .989   
 Total 93.959 96    
Presentations Between Groups 3.767 1 3.797 3.767 .142 
 Within Groups 110.728 95 1.166   
 Total 114.495 96    
Writing reports Between Groups 5.590 1 5.590 5.518 .072 
 Within Groups 96.245 95 1.013   
 Total 101.835 96    
Statistical methods Between Groups .465 1 .465 .332 .466 
 Within Groups 132.979 95 1.400   
 Total 133.443 96    
Conceptualizing and planning research Between Groups 2.959 1 2.959 2.740 .320 
 Within Groups 101.530 94 1.080   
 Total 104.490 95    
Quantitative research and analytics Between Groups .443 1 .443 .422 .543 
 Within Groups 99.887 95 1.051   
 Total 100.330 96    
Qualitative research and analytics Between Groups .003 1 .003 .002 .964 
 Within Groups 136.497 94 1.425   
 Total 163.500 95    
Data Mining Between Groups 1.846 1 1.846 .827 .301 
 Within Groups 212.030 95 2.232   
 Total 213.876 96    
Technical skills combined score Between Groups .343 1 .343 .635 .573 
 Within Groups 51.310 95 .540   
 Total 51.653 96    
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Table 10.5 
Unique Knowledge: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job 
Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution  
Staff 30 4.27 1.285 -.329 -.697 
 Manager 66 4.82 1.189 -1.054 .768 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on departments 
and resources across campus 
Staff 30 4.27 1.337 -.526 -.207 
 Manager 66 5.03 .841 -.859 1.371 
I have responsibilities that involve many departments across 
campus 
Staff 30 4.60 1.499 -1.226 .655 
 Manager 66 4.97 1.324 -1.378 1.364 
I know more about the interrelationships of departments than most 
people on campus 
Staff 30 3.83 1.577 .012 -1.024 
 Manager 65 4.68 1.251 -.886 .300 
I know more about campus politics than most people on campus Staff 30 3.70 1.643 -.381 -.919 
 Manager 64 4.22 1.278 -.614 -.161 
Unique knowledge combined score` Staff 30 4.13 1.147 -.322 -.502 
 Manager 66 4.75 .8772 -1.228 2.144 
 
Table 10.6 
Unique Knowledge: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution 
Between Groups 6.273 1 6.273 4.222 .034 
 Within Groups 139.685 94 1.486   
 Total 145.958 95    
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Between Groups 12.027 1 12.027 11.559 .006 
 Within Groups 97.806 94 1.040   
 Total 109.833 95    
I have responsibilities that involve many departments 
across campus 
Between Groups 2.819 1 2.819 1.479 .183 
 Within Groups 179.139 94 1.906   
 Total 181.958 95    
I know more about the interrelationships of departments 
than most people on campus 
Between Groups 14.607 1 14.607 7.881 .012 
 Within Groups 172.382 93 1.854   
 Total 186.989 94    
I know more about campus politics than most people on 
campus 
Between Groups 5.497 1 5.497 2.790 .169 
 Within Groups 181.237 92 1.970   
 Total 186.734 93    
Unique knowledge combined score Between Groups 7.985 1 7.985 8.510 .008 
 Within Groups 88.207 94 .938   
 Total 96.193 95    
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Table 10.7 
Legal Prerogatives: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job 
Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand 
work from other individuals on campus 
Staff 30 3.47 2.013 .093 -1.686 
 Manager 65 4.28 1.495  -.725 -.231 
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Staff 30 4.37 2.125 -.772 -1.293 
 Manager 66 5.42 1.096 -2.149 4.500 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding 
sources 
Staff 30 4.33 1.729 -.685 -.813 
 Manager 64 4.31 1.572 -.666 -.567 
People on my campus comply with my requests for information 
because they understand my required reporting needs 
Staff 30 4.21 1.567 -.607 -.659 
 Manager 66 4.76 1.190 -1.148 1.131 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Staff 30 2.97 1.921 .426 -1.326 
 Manager 65 4.42 1.368 -.648 -.402 
Legal Prerogatives combined score Staff 30 3.87 1.508 -.235 -1.023 
 Manager 66 4.63 .923 -.937 1.216 
 
Table 10.8 
Legal Prerogatives: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to 
demand work from other individuals on campus 
Between Groups 13.476 1 13.476 4.811 .088 
 Within Groups 260.482 93 2.801   
 Total 273.958 94    
I complete reports that are required by law or 
government regulations 
Between Groups 23.068 1 23.068 10.371 .025 
 Within Groups 209.088 94 2.224   
 Total 232.156 95    
I complete reports that are required by grants or other 
funding sources 
Between Groups .009 1 .009 .003 .806 
 Within Groups 242.417 92 2.635   
 Total 242.426 93    
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required 
reporting needs 
Between Groups 6.110 1 6.110 3.532 .129 
 Within Groups 160.880 93 1.730   
 Total 166.989 94    
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data 
and information I need from faculty or staff 
Between Groups 43.080 1 43.080 17.669 .001 
 Within Groups 226.751 93 2.438   
 Total 269.832 94    
Legal Prerogatives combined score Between Groups 12.209 1 12.209 9.452 .024 
 Within Groups 121.421 94 1.292   
 Total 133.630 95    
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Table 10.9 
Access to Decision Makers: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job 
Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Staff 30 3.83 1.621 .080 -1.428 
 Manager 67 4.58 1.539 -.956 -.049 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene on 
my behalf 
Staff 30 4.23 1.716 -.520 -1.137 
 Manager 66 4.89 1.291 -1.391 1.514 
My boss is a high level decision maker Staff 30 4.33 1.493 -.419 -.753 
 Manager 67 5.22 1.241 -1.814 2.631 
I consider my office of institutional research to be centralized 
within the organizational structure of my institution 
Staff 30 4.53 1.408 -.510 -1.138 
 Manager 64 4.53 1.553 -.795 -.537 
Access to Decision Makers combined score Staff 30 4.23 1.133 -.265 -.667 
 Manager 67 4.79 1.210 -1.280 1.185 
How many levels is your office of institutional research removed 
from the president on the organizational chart? Staff 30 1.57 1.006 -.086 -.991 
 Manager 67 1.40 1.001 .883 1.281 
 
Table 10:10 
Access to Decision Makers: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Between Groups 11.617 1 11.617 4.748 .032 
 Within Groups 232.465 95 2.447   
 Total 244.082 96    
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Between Groups 9.001 1 9.001 4.370 .105 
 Within Groups 193.624 94 2.060   
 Total 202.625 95    
My boss is a high level decision maker Between Groups 16.434 1 16.434 9.387 .003 
 Within Groups 166.308 94 1.751   
 Total 182.742 96    
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 .860 
 Within Groups 209.404 92 2.276   
 Total 209.404 93    
Access to Decision Makers combined score Between Groups 6.532 1 6.532 4.634 .012 
 Within Groups 133.913 95 1.410   
 Total 140.445 96    
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? Between Groups .555 1 .555 .552 .332 
 Within Groups 95.486 95 1.005   
 Total 96.041 96    
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IR Managers by Institutional Type Power Source Comparisons 
 The first of the two subgroup comparisons of the power sources for IR managers 
examined the differences between IR managers who were affiliated with public, 4-year or 
more institutions (n=27) at the time of the survey with IR managers affiliated with private 
non-profit, 4-year or more institutions (n=25). There were very few statistically 
significant differences in the responses to any of the statements so this section is mainly 
focused on the higher and lower means and their corresponding distributions (Tables 11.1 
through 11.10, at the end of this section, provide the complete descriptive statistics and 
the results of the ANOVAs).  
 In the Control of Resources section, the responses reflected the patterns of IR 
Staff and Manager groups in the previous section but with perhaps a bit higher means as 
the groups were made up entirely of managers. Every statement regarding the collection, 
creation and distribution of data/information had a mean over 5.03 and very strong 
leptokurtic distributions. The statements with the highest means for the Public Manager 
group were: “I generate institutional level information” and “Faculty, administration, 
and/or staff often asks me for information and/or data.” Both statements had means of 
5.70 and kurtosis of 6.102 and 7.689 respectively. The next highest mean was, “I 
distribute institutional level information” with a mean of 5.37 and a kurtosis of 4.346. For 
the Private Manager group, the statements with the highest means were: “Faculty, 
administration, and/or staff often ask me for information and/or data” (M=5.75, Kurt= 
4.1430); “I generate institutional level information” (M=5.71, Kurt= 7.766); and “I 
distribute institutional level data” (M=5.68, Kurt= 5.373). The remaining statements had 
means below 4.69 and mild platykurtic distributions. The lowest rated statement was; 
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“When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my office that provides the data 
and reports needed.” The means and kurtosis for this statement were 3.41 and -.649 for 
the Public Manager group and 3.32 and -.089 for the Private Manager group. The Private 
Manager group also had the higher mean for the Control of Resources combined score, 
4.99, compared to 4.87 for the Public Manager group. The range of combined scores for 
the Public Manager group was 3.27, the minimum was 2.73 and the maximum was 6.00. 
For the Private Manager group, the range was 2.09, the minimum was 2.09, and the 
maximum was 5.82 (Tables 11.1 and 11.2 have the descriptive statistics and the results of 
the ANOVAs for this power source).  
 Only two technical skills had means over 5.00 for both groups. Data management 
had means of 5.07 and 5.16 for the Public and Private Manager groups respectively. 
However, the Private Manager group’s distribution was mildly platykurtic (-.429) 
whereas the other group’s distribution was mildly leptokurtic (.393). Report writing was 
the other skill with means over 5.00 for both groups. The group with the higher mean was 
the Private Manager group at 5.24 and a moderate platykurtic distribution of -1.158. The 
Public Manager group’s mean was 5.00 with a mildly flat kurtosis of -.650. The Private 
Manager group had one more skill, conceptualizing and planning research, in the high 
range with a mean of 5.21. This statement was only slightly skewed (-.045) and mildly 
platykurtic (-.114). The difference for this statement was nearing statistical significance. 
The skills in which the Public Manager group had a higher mean were statistical methods 
and quantitative research and planning. The means were, with the Public Manager group 
listed first, 4.33 and 4.20 for statistical methods and 4.85 and 4.60 for quantitative 
research and analytics. All of the distributions were mildly platykurtic. The mean for 
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qualitative research and analytics was higher for the Private Manager group, 4.36 
compared to 3.78, and the difference was very near to being statistically significant. Once 
again, data mining was the lowest ranked skill. The Technical Skills combined score had 
means of 4.52 for the Public Manager group with a range of 2.63, a low of 3.00, and a 
high of 5.63. For the Private Manager group’s combined score, the mean was 4.72, the 
range was 2.25 with a low of 3.50 and a high of 5.75 (Table 11.3 and 11.4 have the 
Technical Skills descriptive statistics and the results of the ANOVAs for Public and 
Private Manager groups).  
 For the Unique Knowledge power source, the Public Manager group reported a 
higher mean for having their opinion respected because of their knowledge (4.81 
compared to 4.68 for the Private Manager group) and for knowing about campus politics 
(4.33 compared to 3.79). The distribution for the campus politics statement was 
moderately peaked, 1.853, for the Public Manager group but mildly flat (-.574) for the 
Private Manager group. The Private Manager group felt strongly about their 
understanding of how decisions impact departments and resources (M=5.20) and having 
cross-campus responsibilities (M=5.04). The Public Manager group had means of 4.81 on 
both of these statements, but a stronger leptokurtic (1.601, 1.346) distribution than the 
Private Manager group. The mean was higher for the Private Manager group but they had 
more variety in their responses than the Public Manager group. No statement in this 
section had means with statistical significance or near significance. The Unique 
Knowledge combined score means were 4.63 for the Public Manager group and 4.68 for 
the Private Manager group. For the Public Manager group, combines scores had a range 
of 4.20, a low or 1.60 and a high of 5.80 whereas the Private Manager group had a range 
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of 3.20, a low of 2.80 and a high of 6.00.The Public Manager group had a strongly 
peaked kurtosis (3.068) whereas the Private Manager group had more diversity (-.309). 
Overall, the Public Manager group’s responses were narrower in their distribution 
whereas the Private Manager group showed much more diversity even though they had 
higher means on most statements (the complete detailed statistics can be found in Table 
11.5 and Table 11.6).  
 The strongest statement in the Legal Prerogatives power source was “I complete 
reports that are required by law or government regulations.” While the Private Manager 
group had the higher mean (5.68 verses 5.41), the Public Manager group had the stronger 
leptokurtic distribution (6.968 verses 2.462). While both groups have to work with laws 
and regulations, the Private Manager group’s campus colleagues understand their 
reporting needs and comply with their requests more than the Public Manager group’s 
counterparts. The mean for this statement was 5.20 for the Private Manager group and 
4.52 for the Public Manager group. The difference in means was statistically significant 
at the .05 level, F(1,50)=5.715, p<.021. The effect was small (eta-squared= .10). The 
Private Manager group had a mean of 4.48 for having authority to demand work from 
others based on their reporting requirements and also had a mean of 4.48 for having used 
legal obligations to get the data and information. This was the only time in the study 
where having authority to demand work and using that authority were equal, although 
there was a wider distribution in the responses to using the authority. The mean for the 
Legal Prerogatives combined score for the Public Manager group was 4.50 compared to 
4.86 for the Private Manager group. On this measure, the Private Manager group had a 
more peaked distribution (1.993) whereas the Public Manager group demonstrated more 
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variance in their distribution (-.958) (see Tables 11.7 and 11.8 for more data on this 
power source comparison).  
  Although the Public Manager group reported a higher mean for meeting with high 
level decision makers regularly (4.44 compared to 4.40), the Private Manager group had a 
higher mean for their boss being a high level decision maker (5.24 compared to 4.41) and 
for being able to ask a high level decision-maker to intervene on their behalf (5.40 
compared to 5.00). The difference in means for being able to ask a high level decision 
maker to intervene was statistically significant, F(1,50)= 5.549, p=.022. The effect was 
small (eta-squared= .09). The distributions for each statement in the Access to Decision 
Makers section were similar for each group. Both were strongly leptokurtic (Public 
Manager group = 2.847, Private Manager group= 4.469) for the boss as a decision maker 
statement and moderately leptokurtic (Public Manger group= 1.370, Private Manager 
group= 1.072) for the distribution of responses for the Access to Decision Makers 
combined score. The Public Manager group had a higher mean of 4.82 compared to 4.57 
for the Private Manager group. The range for combined scores for the Public Manager 
group was 5.00, the low was 1.00 and the high was 6.00. For the Private Manager group, 
the range was 4.00 with a low of 2.00 and a high of 6.00. The Private Manager group also 
reported having offices only 1.44 levels removed from the president while the Public 
Management group reported being 1.63 levels removed. The descriptive statistics for the 
comparisons of IR managers who work for public and private institutions can be found in 
Table 11.9. The results of the ANOVAs can be found in Table 11.10. 
 In summary, the IR managers who work for public institutions appear to have 
similar levels of power sources as IR managers who work for private institutions. Most of 
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the responses had moderate to high means but there were some difference in the 
distributions of the responses. The Public Manager group seemed to have a tighter, more 
peaked kurtosis on many of the statements even though their means were lower. By 
comparison, the Private Manager group had higher means but more variance in the 
responses perhaps indicating more diversity in their offices of institutional research 
and/or the organization of the institution. Only two statements had statistically significant 
differences: “People comply with my requests for information because they understand 
my reporting needs” and “If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene 
on my behalf.”  The Public Manager group had a higher mean on both of these 
statements. There may also be a difference in the amount of qualitative research 
conducted by the Private Manager group as their means were higher for that skill whereas 
the Public Manager group had higher means on the quantitative statements. These 
statements were near to statistical significance. When ranking the power sources based on 
the means of the combined scores, Control of Resources first for both groups. For the 
Public Manager group, the remainder of the ranking was: Unique Knowledge, Access to 
Decision Makers, Technical Skills, and Legal Prerogatives. Second for the Private group 
was Legal Prerogatives followed by Access to Decision Makers, Technical Skills and 
lastly, and Unique Knowledge.  
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Table 11.1 
Control of Resources: Descriptive Statistics: IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 IR Manager n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data Public Manager 27 5.15 1.634 -1.742 1.688 
 Private Manager 25 5.20 1.633 -1.910 2.309 
I collect institutional level information Public Manager 26 5.15 1.541 -1.841 2.475 
 Private Manager 24 5.04 1.546 -1.385 .722 
I generate institutional level data Public Manager 27 5.15 1.680 -1.775 1.608 
 Private Manager 25 5.60 1.190 -3.159 9.935 
I generate institutional level information Public Manager 27 5.70 .775 -2.621 6.102 
 Private Manager 24 5.71 .751 -2.811 7.766 
I distribute institutional level data Public Manager 
Private Manager 
26 5.15 1.515 -1.702 1.719 
  25 5.68 .802 -2.489 5.373 
I distribute institutional level information Public Manager 27 5.37 1.305 -2.215 4.346 
 Private Manager 24 5.71 .751 -2.811 7.766 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information 
and/or data 
Public Manager 27 5.70 .724 -2.756 7.689 
 Private Manager 24 5.75 .532 -2.131 4.143 
I manage data warehouses and repositories Public Manager 27 4.22 1.805 -.698 -.836 
 Private Manager 25 4.04 1.837 -.415 -1.302 
Most institutional data and/or reports come from  my 
office 
Public Manager 26 4.46 1.240 -.177 -1.160 
 Private Manager 25 4.68 1.249 -.587 -.854 
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it 
is my office that provides the data and reports needed 
Public Manager 27 4.22 1.423 -.597 -.508 
 Private Manager 25 4.36 1.150 -.609 -.378 
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my 
office that provides the data and reports needed 
Public Manager 27 3.41 1.309 -.060 -.649 
 Private Manager 25 3.32 .988 -437 -.089 
Control of Resources combined score Public Manager 27 4.87 .871 -.805 -.048 
 Private Manager 25 4.99 .632 -.665 -.675 
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Table 11.2 
Control of Resources: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
I collect institutional level data 
Between Groups .035 1 
.035 
2.668 
.013 .909 
 Within Groups 133.407 50    
 Total 133.442 51    
I collect institutional level information Between Groups .157 1 .157 .066 .798 
 Within Groups 114.343 48 2.382   
 Total 114.500 49    
I generate institutional level data Between Groups 2.650 1 2.650 1.234 .272 
 Within Groups 107.407 50 2.148   
 Total 110.058 51    
I generate institutional level information Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 .983 
 Within Groups 28.588 49 .583   
 Total 28.588 50    
I distribute institutional level data Between Groups 3.528 1 3.528 2.374 .130 
 Within Groups 72.825 49 1.486   
 Total 76.353 50    
I distribute institutional level information Between Groups 1.451 1 1.451 1.242 .271 
 Within Groups 57.255 49 1.168   
 Total 58.706 50    
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data 
Between Groups .027 1 .027 .066 .798 
 Within Groups 20.130 49 .411   
  Total 20.157 50    
I manage data warehouses and repositories Between Groups .431 1 .431 .130 .720 
 Within Groups 165.627 50 3.313   
 Total 166.058 51    
Most institutional data and/or reports come from 
my office 
Between Groups .608 1 .608 .393 
.534 
 
 Within Groups 75.902 49 1.549   
 Total 76.510 50    
When there is an institutional level decision to be 
made, it is my office that provides the data and 
reports needed 
Between Groups .246 1 .246 .146 .704 
 Within Groups 84.427 50 1.689   
 Total 84.673 51    
When there is a departmental decision to be made, 
it is my office that provides the data and reports 
needed 
Between Groups .099 1 .099 .073 .788 
 Within Groups 67.959 50 1.359   
 Total 68.058 51    
Control of Resources combined score Between Groups .182 1 .182 .311 .580 
 Within Groups 29.349 50 .587   
 Total 29.532 51    
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Table 11.3 
Technical Skills: Descriptive Statistics IR Manager by Institutional Type 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? IR Manager n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management Public Manager 27 5.07 .958 -1.007 .393 
 Private Manager 25 5.16 .898 -.712 -.429 
Presentations Public Manager 27 4.85 1.064 -.513 -.906 
 Private Manager 25 5.28 .792 -1.112 1.412 
Writing reports Public Manager 27 5.00 .961 -.562 -.650 
 Private Manager 25 5.24 .779 -.463 -1.158 
Statistical methods Public Manager 27 4.33 1.209 -.141 -.673 
 Private Manager 25 4.20 1.354 -.394 -.299 
Conceptualizing and planning research Public Manager 27 4.78 1.086 -.300 -1.199 
 Private Manager 24 5.21 .588 -.045 -.114 
Quantitative research and analytics Public Manager 27 4.85 .949 -.268 -.890 
 Private Manager 25 4.60 1.225 -.769 -.206 
Qualitative research and analytics Public Manager 27 3.78 1.086 .283 -.223 
 Private Manager 25 4.36 1.186 -1.266 1.602 
Data mining Public Manager 27 3.52 1.503 -.038 -.761 
 Private Manager 25 3.80 1.443 -.434 -.703 
Technical Skills combined score Public Manager 27 4.52 .779 -.418 -.892 
 Private Manager 25 4.72 .646 -.362 -.769 
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Table 11.4 
Technical Skills: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Data Management Between Groups .096 1 .096 .111 .741 
 Within Groups 43.212 50 .864   
 Total 43.308 51    
Presentations Between Groups 2.380 1 2.380 2.677 .108 
 Within Groups 44.447 50 .889   
 Total 46.827 51    
Writing reports Between Groups .748 1 .748 .970 .330 
 Within Groups 38.560 50 .771   
 Total 39.308 51    
Statistical methods Between Groups .231 1 .231 .141 .709 
 Within Groups 82.000 50 1.640   
 Total 82.231 51    
Conceptualizing and planning research Between Groups 2.355 1 2.355 2.988 .090 
 Within Groups 38.625 49 .788   
 Total 40.980 50    
Quantitative research and analytics Between Groups .823 1 .823 .693 .409 
 Within Groups 59.407 50 1.188   
 Total 60.231 51    
Qualitative research and analytics Between Groups 4.400 1 4.400 3.415 .071 
 Within Groups 64.427 50 1.289   
 Total 68.827 51    
Data Mining Between Groups 1.028 1 1.028 .473 .495 
 Within Groups 108.741 50 2.175   
 Total 109.769 51    
Technical skills combined score Between Groups .521 1 .521 1.008 .320 
 Within Groups 25.853 50 .517   
 Total 26.375 51    
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Table 11.5 
Unique Knowledge: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 IR Manager n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution  
Public Manager 27 4.81 .962 -.720 -.183 
 Private Manager 25 4.68 1.492 -1.034 .188 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Public Manager 27 4.81 .962 -1.000 1.601 
 Private Manager 25 5.20 .707 -.307 -.846 
I have responsibilities that involve many departments 
across campus 
Public Manager 27 4.81 1.388 -1.321 1.346 
 Private Manager 25 5.04 1.172 -1.096 .414 
I know more about the interrelationships of departments 
than most people on campus 
Public Manager 27 4.41 1.421 -.622 -.220 
 Private Manager 24 4.58 1.176 -.829 .181 
I know more about campus politics than most people on 
campus 
Public Manager 27 4.33 1.144 -1.056 1.853 
 Private Manager 24 3.79 1.318 -.203 -.547 
Unique knowledge combined score` Public Manager 27 4.63 .989 -1.701 3.068 
 Private Manager 25 4.68 .823 -.518 -.309 
 
Table 11.6 
Unique Knowledge: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good understanding 
of the issues at my institution 
Between Groups .236 1 .236 
.15
2 
.698 
 Within Groups 77.514 50 1.550   
 Total 77.50 51    
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on departments and 
resources across campus 
Between Groups 1.926 1 1.926 
2.6
69 
.109 
 Within Groups 36.074 50 .721   
 Total 38.000   51    
I have responsibilities that involve many departments across campus 
Between Groups .658 1 .658 
.39
6 
.532 
 Within Groups 83.034 50 1.661   
 Total 83.692 51    
I know more about the interrelationships of departments than most 
people on campus 
Between Groups .393 1 .393 
.22
8 
.635 
 Within Groups 84.352 48 1.721   
 Total 84.745 50    
I know more about campus politics than most people on campus 
Between Groups 3.728 1 3.728 
2.4
70 
.122 
 Within Groups 73.958 49 1.509   
 Total 77.686 50    
Unique knowledge combined score 
Between Groups .027 1 0.27 
.03
2 
.858 
 Within Groups 41.730 50 .835   
 Total 41.757 51    
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Table 11.7 
Legal Prerogatives: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 IR Manager n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to 
demand work from other individuals on campus 
Public Manager 27 4.22 1.340 -.543 -.100 
 Private Manager 25 4.48 1.503 -.998 .561 
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Public Manager 27 5.41 1.185 -2.532 6.968 
 Private Manager 25 5.68 .627 -1.858 2.462 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other 
funding sources 
Public Manager 26 4.00 1.766 -.330 -1.171 
 Private Manager 25 4.48 1.327 -.884 .591 
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required reporting 
needs 
Public Manager 27 4.52 1.189 -.863 .289 
 Private Manager 25 5.20 .816 -.899 .651 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Public Manager 27 4.33 1.144 -.222 -.981 
 Private Manager 25 4.48 1.636 -.675 -.926 
Legal Prerogatives combined score Public Manager 27 4.50 .9017 .086 -.958 
 Private Manager 25 4.86 .8321 -1.341 1.993 
 
Table 11.8 
Legal Prerogatives: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand 
work from other individuals on campus 
Between Groups .863 1 .863 .427 .516 
 Within Groups 100.907 50 2.018   
 Total 101.769 51    
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Between Groups .965 1 .965 1.049 .311 
 Within Groups 45.959 50 .919   
 Total 46.923 51    
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding 
sources 
Between Groups 2.936 1 2.936 1.197 .279 
 Within Groups 120.240 49 2.454   
 Total 123.176 50    
People on my campus comply with my requests for information 
because they understand my required reporting needs 
Between Groups 6.028 1 6.028 5.715 .021 
 Within Groups 52.741 50 1.055   
 Total 58.769 51    
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Between Groups .279 1 .279 .142 .708 
 Within Groups 98.240 50 1.965   
 Total 98.519 51    
Legal Prerogatives combined score Between Groups 1.720 1 1.720 2.278 .138 
 Within Groups 37.758 50 .755   
 Total 39.478 51    
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Table 11.9 
Access to Decision Makers: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 IR Manager n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Public Manager 27 4.44 1.672 -1.042 .015 
 Private Manager 25 4.40 1.500 -.676 -.347 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene 
on my behalf 
Public Manager 27 4.41 1.551 -1.083 .094 
 Private Manager 25 5.24 .879 -.913 .045 
My boss is a high level decision maker Public Manager 27 5.00 1.301 -1.698 2.847 
 Private Manager 25 5.40 1.041 -2.121 4.469 
I consider my office of institutional research to be centralized 
within the organizational structure of my institution 
Public Manager 27 4.44 1.577 -.811 -.305 
 Private Manager 24 4.21 1.615 -.436  -1.095 
Access to Decision Makers combined score Public Manager 27 4.57 1.329 -1.331 1.310 
 Private Manager 25 4.82 1.004 -1.081 1.072 
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? Public Manager 27 1.63 1.043 1.493 2.866 
 Private Manager 25 1.44 .917 .368 -.561 
 
Table 11.10 
Access to Decision Makers: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Between Groups .026 1 .026 .010 .920 
 Within Groups 126.667 50 2.533   
 Total 126.692 51    
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to intervene on 
my behalf 
Between Groups 8.998 1 8.998 5.549 .022 
 Within Groups 81.079 50 1.622   
 Total 90.077 51    
My boss is a high level decision maker Between Groups 2.077 1 2.077 1.484 .229 
 Within Groups 70.000 50 1.400   
 Total 72.077 51    
I consider my office of institutional research to be centralized 
within the organizational structure of my institution Between Groups .708 1 .708 .279 .600 
 Within Groups 124.625 49 2.543   
 Total 125.333 50    
Access to Decision Makers combined score Between Groups .828 1 .828 .590 .446 
 Within Groups 70.170 50 1.403   
 Total 70.998 51    
How many levels is your office of institutional research 
removed from the president on the organizational chart? Between Groups .467 1 
 
.467 
.482 .491 
 Within Groups 48.456 50 .969   
 Total 48.923 51    
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IR Managers by Experience Power Source Comparison 
The final comparisons also involved managers of IR, but this time the differences 
between IR managers who had worked in IR for 13 or less years, called the Less Time 
group (n=33), with managers who had worked in IR for 13 years or more, called the 
More Time group (n=34) were explored. There were 3 participants with 13 years of 
experience who were divided based on their years working in higher education as 
previously discussed. Like the comparison of IR staff and IR managers, this comparison 
also resulted in 10 statements whose means had statistically significant differences at the 
p< .05 level. Four of those differences occurred in the first power source, Control of 
Information (see Tables 12.1 through 12.10 found at the end of this section for all the 
descriptive statistics and results of the ANOVAs).  
As expected from previous comparisons, all of the statements regarding the 
collection, generation and distribution of institutional level data and/or information had 
means of 5.03 or above with negative skewness and leptokurtic distributions. There was 
one exception; the Less Time group had mean of 4.91 with a small leptokurtic 
distribution of .599 for the statement “I collect institutional level information.” The mean 
for the More Time group was 5.61 with a strong positive kurtosis of 6.619. The 
differences in means for this statement was statistically significant, F(1,63)=4.299, p<.04. 
The effect size was small (eta-square= .06). The means for the statements regarding the 
handling of information were slightly higher than the data statements, which is consistent 
with all the group comparisons in this study. Two statements, “I generate institutional 
level information” and “I distribute institutional level data,” had extremely high 
leptokurtic distributions for the More Time group, 22.305 and 10.429 respectively with 
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very high means, 5.76 and 5.61. While these were not the statements with the highest 
means, the participants in the More Time group were very much in agreement regarding 
these statements based on the kurtosis. The statement with the highest means were 
“Faculty, administration, and/or staff often ask me for information and/or data.”  The 
means for this statement were, for the Less Time group, 5.55 (Kurt =2.442) and 5.81 for 
the More Time group (Kurt= 6.692). The statement, “Most institutional data and/or 
reports come from my office” also had a significantly statistical difference in means, 
F(1,63)=5.798, p<.019. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .08). The Less Time 
group’s mean was 4.27 compared to 4.97 for the More Time group and the kurtoses were 
opposite, -1.390 and 1.880. The More Time group felt stronger about being the source of 
institutional information as they were in more agreement than the Less Time group. The 
final two items that were significantly different were the departmental decisions 
statement and the Control of Resources combined score. As with the other comparisons, 
both groups felt that their offices do not contribute as much too departmental decisions. 
The mean for the Less Time group was 3.27 compared to 3.85, F(1,64)=4.034m p<.049. 
The effect size was small (eta-squared= .06). The More Time group had mesokurtic 
distribution, -.030 while the Less Time group was slightly platykurtic, -.251.As could be 
expected from these statements, the More Time group had a higher mean for the 
combined score, 5.18 compared to 4.80 for the Less Time group. The difference was 
statistically significant, F(1,65)=5.062, p<.028. The effect size was small (eta-squared= 
.07). The Less Time group had a range of 3.27, a low of 2.73 and a high of 6.00 on their 
Control of Resources combined score. The range for the More Time group was 2.36 with 
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a low of 3.64 and a high of 6.00 (the descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 12.1 
while Table 12.2 has the results of the ANOVA). 
The self-ratings for the Technical Skills power source were very similar with only 
one skill statement that had a mean with statistically significant difference, data 
management, F(1,65)=4.575 p<.036. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .07). The 
mean for the More Time group was 5.26 and 4.79 for the Less Time group. The only skill 
statement in which the Less Time group had a higher mean was qualitative research and 
analytics where their mean was 4.30 compared to 3.94 for the More Time group. The 
More Time group ranked data management the highest followed by presentations and 
statistical methods. Conceptualizing and planning research was the highest ranked 
statement for the Less Time group; with a mean of 5.03, it was the only statement over 
the 5.00 mark. The More Time group’s mean on this skill statement was 5.06 and the 
kurtosis for this statement was opposite. The Less Time group had a wider distribution, -
1.029 while the More Time group had a stronger and narrower distribution, 2.110. Most 
of the statements in the technical skills had slightly platykurtic distributions for both 
groups. Overall, the More Time group expressed more agreement and strength in the 
Technical Skills power source and had a higher Technical Skills combined score mean, 
4.69 compared to 4.57 of the Less Time group. The range of combined scores for the 
Less Time group was 2.75, the low as 3.00 and the high was 5.75 compared to the More 
Time group whose range was 2.36, the low was 3.63 and the high was 6.00. 
The results for the Unique Knowledge power source were similar to the Technical 
Skills in that the More Time group scored higher means on every statement but one and 
there was only one statement with a statistically significant difference. The one statement 
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that the Less Time group scored higher than the More Time group was in having cross 
campus responsibilities, 5.12 compared to 4.82. Their distribution was the most peaked of 
any statement at 3.312 while the More Time group was only slightly peaked, .530. 
Despite being in strong agreement about their cross campus responsibilities, the Less 
Time group felt they did not know much about the interrelationships between 
departments. Their mean for this statement was only 4.33 compared to the mean of 5.03 
for the More Time group. This was a statistically significant difference, F(1,63)=5.401, 
p=.023. The effect size was extremely small (eta-squared= .001). This statement was the 
highest ranked for the More Time group while the cross campus responsibilities 
statement was the highest for the Less Time group. Both groups had a higher mean for 
understanding campus politics than in previous comparison groupings, 4.00 for the Less 
Time group and 4.44 for the More Time group. The Unique Knowledge combined score 
was 4.63 for the Less Time group with a range of 4.40, a low of 1.60 and a high of 6.00. 
For the More time group, the mean was 4.88 with a smaller range of 3.60, a low of 2.40 
and a high of 6.00 (complete statistics and ANOVA results can be found on Table’s 12.5 
and 12.6).  
The More Time group reported much stronger power in the Legal Prerogative 
power sources than the Less Time group with higher means in every statement. Four of 
the six statements had a statistically significant difference in means. “Legal requirements 
give me authority to demand work from others” was the first statement with a significant 
difference, F(1,63)=4.266, p=.043. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .06). The 
mean for the Less Time group was 3.91 compared to 4.66 for the More Time group. The 
distributions were -1.048 for the Less Time group and 1.762 for the More Time group. 
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The highest rated statement for both groups was the statement regarding completing 
reports required by law or regulations. Although both groups were in strong agreement 
with strong leptokurtic distribution, 2.262 for Less Time and 6.138 for More Time, their 
means had a statistically significant difference, F(1,64)=4.291, p=.042. The effect size 
was small (eta-squared= .06). The Less Time mean was 5.15 and the More Time mean 
was 5.70. The Less Time group’s second lowest mean was the statement regarding the 
actual use of legal obligations to get their work done. Their mean was 4.09 compared to 
More Time’s mean of 4.75. The difference in means is statistically significant, 
F(1,63)=3.944, p=051. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .06). Both groups 
displayed a platykurtic distribution, -.616 and -1.431 respectively. With the higher mean 
and the wider distribution, there were some IR managers in the More Time group who 
have used the power associated with having legal obligations often. The means for the 
Legal Prerogative combined scores were 4.37 for the Less Time group and 4.90 for the 
More Time group. This was a statistically significant difference, F(1,64)=5.774, p=.019. 
The effect size was small (eta-squared= .06). The Less Time group had a wider ranger for 
their combined score, 4.60, with a low of 1.60 and a high of 6.00. The range for the More 
Time group was 3.00, with a low of 3.00 and a high of 6.00 (see Table 12.7 for the 
related descriptive statistics and Table 12.8 for the results of the ANOVAs).  
The results for the Access to Decision Makers power sources were very similar 
with no statistically significant differences. Again, the More Time group rated their 
statements higher than the Less Time groups. Both groups were equal when it came to 
meeting with decision makers regularly, 4.58 for Less Time and 4.59 for More Time, but 
there was a greater difference in whether or not they could ask a high level decision 
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maker to intervene on their behalf. The mean for the Less Time group was 4.76 with a 
moderate leptokurtic distribution of 1.143. The More Time group’s mean was 5.03 and a 
strong leptokurtic distribution of 2.263. On average, the Less Time group reported being 
1.42 positions removed from the president compared to 1.38 positions for the More Time 
group. The combined score means were 4.68 for the Less Time group and 4.89 for the 
More time group. Both groups had wide ranges for their combined score: 4.00 for the 
Less Time group with a low of 2.00 and a high of 6.00 compared to the More Time 
group’s range of 5.00 with the low of 1.00 and a high of 6.00 (Tables 12.9 and 12.10 
have the results of the statistics for this power source).  
In summary, there were differences in the power levels of these two groups. IR 
managers with 13 or more years of experience were consistently higher on almost all 
statements and several of the mean differences were statistically significant. The More 
Time group reported that their office was where most institutional data and reports come 
from and were more involved at the departmental level. They rated their data 
management skills higher but were about equal in their ability to conceptualize research. 
They had fewer responsibilities across campus but they were more knowledgeable about 
the departments’ interrelationships. Perhaps what stood out the most was in the legal 
prerogative area. The More Time group reported that they had more legal requirements 
and more authority to demand work from others in order to complete these requirements. 
In addition to having authority to demand work, the More Time group used their 
authority to demand work more than any other group in this study. 
  
 196 
 
Table 12.1 
Control of Resources: Descriptive Statistics IR Manager by Experience  
 Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I collect institutional level data Less Time  33 5.03 1.776 -1.651 1.158 
 More Time 34 5.62 1.015 -2.646 6.032 
I collect institutional level information Less Time 32 4.91 1.673 -1.343 .599 
 More Time 33 5.61 .966 -2.643 6.619 
I generate institutional level data Less Time 33 5.33 1.407 -2.360 4.780 
 More Time 34 5.41 1.480 -2.322 4.022 
I generate institutional level information Less Time 33 5.52 .906 -1.795 2.160 
 More Time 33 5.76 .936 -4.583 22.305 
I distribute institutional level data Less Time 33 5.30 1.287 -1.829 2.152 
 More Time 33 5.61 1.088 -3.157 10.429 
I distribute institutional level information Less Time 33 5.42 1.226 -2.525 6.091 
 More Time 33 5.70 .883 -2.818 6.554 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for information 
and/or data 
Less Time 33 5.55 .794 -1.752 2.442 
 More Time 32 5.81 .471 -2.610 6.692 
I manage data warehouses and repositories Less Time 33 3.88 1.949 -.278 -1.490 
 More Time 34 4.38 1.758 -.805 -.659 
Most institutional data and/or reports come from  my 
office 
Less Time 33 4.27 1.281 .211 -1.390 
 More Time 32 4.97 1.031 -1.252 1.388 
When there is an institutional level decision to be made, it 
is my office that provides the data and reports needed 
Less Time 33 4.33 1.315 -.315 -.851 
 More Time 33 4.52 1.228 -1.115 .840 
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it is my 
office that provides the data and reports needed 
Less Time 33 3.27 1.180 .038 -.251 
 More Time 33 3.85 1.149 -.212 -.030 
Control of Resources combined score Less Time 33 4.80 .7585 -.895 .584 
 More Time 34 5.18 .6244 -.870 -.200 
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Table 12.2 
Control of Resources: ANOVA IR Manager by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
I collect institutional level data Between Groups 5.777 1 5.7772 2.782 .100 
 Within Groups 134.999 65 2.077   
 Total 140.776 
 
66 
   
I collect institutional level information Between Groups 7.956 1 7.956 4.299 .042 
 Within Groups 116.598 63 1.815   
 Total 124.554 64    
I generate institutional level data Between Groups .103 1 .103 .049 .825 
 Within Groups 135.569 65 2.086   
 Total 135.672 66    
I generate institutional level information Between Groups .970 1 .970 1.143 .289 
 Within Groups 54.303 64 .848   
 Total 55.273 65    
I distribute institutional level data Between Groups 1.515 1 1.515 1.067 .305 
 Within Groups 90.848 64 1.420   
 Total 92.364 65    
I distribute institutional level information Between Groups 1.227 1 1.227 1.076 .304 
 Within Groups 73.030 64 1.141   
 Total 74.258 65    
Faculty, admin, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data 
Between Groups 1.159 1 1.159 2.698 1.05 
 Within Groups 27.057 63 .429   
  Total 28.215 64    
I manage data warehouses and repositories Between Groups 4.246 1 4.246 1.235 .271 
 Within Groups 223.545 65 3.439   
 Total 227.791 66    
Most institutional data and/or reports come from my 
office 
Between Groups 7.870 1 7.870 5.798 .019 
 Within Groups 85.514 63 1.357   
 Total 93.385 64    
When there is an institutional level decision to be 
made, it is my office that provides the data and 
reports needed 
Between Groups .545 1 .545 .337 .564 
 Within Groups 103.576 64 1.618   
 Total 104.121 65    
When there is a departmental decision to be made, it 
is my office that provides the data and reports needed Between Groups 5.470 1 5.470 4.034 .049 
 Within Groups 86.788 64 1.356   
 Total 92.258 65    
Control of Resources combined score Between Groups 2.436 1 2.436 5.062 .028 
 Within Groups 31.279 65 .481   
 Total 33.715 66    
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Table 12.3 
Technical Skills: Descriptive Statistics IR Mangers by Experience 
How would you rate your skills in the 
following areas? Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Data Management Less Time 33 4.79 1.023 -.477 -.799 
 More Time 34 5.26 .790 -.913 .524 
Presentations Less Time 33 4.97 1.185 -.897 -.262 
 More Time 34 5.15 .744 -.717 742 
Writing reports Less Time 33 5.09 .980 -.827 -.278 
 More Time 34 5.15 .744 -.248 -1.101 
Statistical methods Less Time 33 4.30 1.380 -.359 -.515 
 More Time 34 4.26 1.024 -.034 -.536 
Conceptualizing and planning research Less Time 33 5.03 .984 -.483 -1.029 
 More Time 33 5.06 .747 -1.056 2.110 
Quantitative research and analytics Less Time 33 4.73 1.039 -476 -.072 
 More Time 34 4.76 .987 -.902 .772 
Qualitative research and analytics Less Time 33 4.30 1.237 -.517 -.592 
 More Time 33 3.94 1.088 -.339 .517 
Data mining Less Time 33 3.39 1.456 .159 -.808 
 More Time 34 4.00 1.326 -.497 -.069 
Technical Skills combined score Less Time 33 4.57 .7577 -.398 -.680 
 More Time 34 4.69 .5759 -.471 -.729 
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Table 12.4 
Technical Skills: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
How would you rate your skills in the following areas? Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Data Management Between Groups 3.807 1 3.807 4.572 .036 
 Within Groups 54.133 65 .833   
 Total 57.940 66    
Presentations Between Groups .527 1 .527 .541 .464 
 Within Groups 63.234 65 .973   
 Total 63.761 66    
Writing reports Between Groups .053 1 .053 .070 .792 
 Within Groups 48.992 65 .754   
 Total 49.045 66    
Statistical methods Between Groups .025 1 .025 .017 .897 
 Within Groups 95.587 65 1.471   
 Total 95.612 66    
Conceptualizing and planning research Between Groups .015 1 .015 .020 .888 
 Within Groups 48.848 64 .763   
 Total 48.864 65    
Quantitative research and analytics Between Groups .023 1 .023 .023 .880 
 Within Groups 66.663 65 1.026   
 Total 66.687 66    
Qualitative research and analytics Between Groups 2.182 1 2.182 1.608 .209 
 Within Groups 86.848 64 1.357   
 Total 89.030 65    
Data Mining Between Groups 6.151 1 6.151 3.176 .079 
 Within Groups 125.879 65 1.937   
 Total 132.030 66    
Technical skills combined score Between Groups .244 1 .244 .541 .465 
 Within Groups 29.318 65 .451   
 Total 29.562 66    
 
Table 12.5 
Unique Knowledge: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution  
Less Time 33 4.67 1.137 -.509 -.612 
 More Time 33 4.97 1.237 -1.626 2.710 
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Less Time 33 4.97 .883 -1.097 2.524 
 More Time 33 5.09 .805 -.554 -.147 
I have responsibilities that involve many departments across 
campus 
Less Time 33 5.12 1.244 -1.799 3.312 
 More Time 33 4.82 1.402 -1.104 .530 
I know more about the interrelationships of departments than 
most people on campus 
Less Time 33 4.33 1.315 -.754 .107 
 More Time 32 5.03 1.092 -1.016 .474 
I know more about campus politics than most people on campus Less Time 32 4.00 1.295 -.475 -.419 
 More Time 32 4.44 1.243 -.816 .520 
Unique knowledge combined score` Less Time 33 4.63 .9015 -1.298 3.00 
 More Time 33 4.88 .8473 -1.232 1.62 
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Table 12.6 
Unique Knowledge: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
People respect my opinion because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues at my institution 
Between Groups 1.515 1 1.515 1.074 .304 
 Within Groups 90.303 64 1.411   
 Total 91.818 65    
I am able to understand the impact decisions have on 
departments and resources across campus 
Between Groups .242 1 .242 .340 .562 
 Within Groups 45.697 64 .714   
 Total 45.939 65    
I have responsibilities that involve many departments 
across campus 
Between Groups 1.515 1 1.515 .863 .357 
 Within Groups 112.424 64 1.757   
 Total 113.939 65    
I know more about the interrelationships of departments 
than most people on campus 
Between Groups 7.913 1 7.913 5.401 .023 
 Within Groups 92.302 63 1.465   
 Total 100.215 64    
I know more about campus politics than most people on 
campus 
Between Groups 3.063 1 3.063 1.901 .173 
 Within Groups 99.875 62 1.611   
 Total 102.938 63    
Unique knowledge combined score Between Groups 1.035 1 1.035 1.353 .249 
 Within Groups 48.985 64 .765   
 Total 50.021 65    
 
Table 12.7 
Legal Prerogatives: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to 
demand work from other individuals on campus 
Less Time 33 3.91 1.702 -.335 -1.048 
 More Time 32 4.66 1.153 -1.014 1.762 
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Less Time 33 5.15 1.326 -1.666 2.262 
 More Time 33 5.70 .728 -2.55 6.138 
I complete reports that are required by grants or other 
funding sources 
Less Time 33 4.15 1.623 -.494 -.802 
 More Time 31 4.48 1.525 -.902 -.017 
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required reporting 
needs 
Less Time 33 4.58 1.347 -1.029 .590 
 More Time 33 4.94 .998 -1.077 1.236 
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Less Time 33 4.09 1.466 -.674 -.616 
 More Time 32 4.75 1.191 -.336 -1.431 
Legal Prerogatives combined score Less Time 33 4.37 1.031 -.774 .781 
 More Time 33 4.90 .7243 -.641 .051 
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Table 12.8 
Legal Prerogatives: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
Legal reporting requirements give me the authority to demand 
work from other individuals on campus 
Between Groups 9.069 1 9.069 4.266 .043 
 Within Groups 133.946 63 2.126   
 Total 143.015 64    
I complete reports that are required by law or government 
regulations 
Between Groups 4.909 1 4.909 4.291 .042 
 Within Groups 73.212 64 1.144   
 Total 78.121 65    
I complete reports that are required by grants or other funding 
sources 
Between Groups 1.766 1 1.766 .711 .402 
 Within Groups 153.984 62 2.484   
 Total 155.750 63    
People on my campus comply with my requests for 
information because they understand my required reporting 
needs 
Between Groups 2.182 1 2.182 1.553 .217 
 Within Groups 89.939 64 1.405   
 Total 92.121 65    
I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and 
information I need from faculty or staff 
Between Groups 7.057 1 7.057 3.944 .051 
 Within Groups 112.727 63 1.789   
 Total 119.785 64    
Legal Prerogatives combined score Between Groups 4.587 1 4.587 5.774 .019 
 Within Groups 50.850 64 .795   
 Total 55.438 65    
 
Table 12.9 
Access to Decision Makers: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Less Time 33 4.58 1.678 -1.049 -.061 
 More Time 34 4.59 1.417 -.836 -.026 
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Less Time 33 4.76 1.324 -1.245 1.143 
 More Time 33 5.03 1.262 -1.649 2.623 
My boss is a high level decision maker Less Time 33 5.12 1.269 -1.511 1.358 
 More Time 34 5.32 1.224 -2.250 4.989 
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Less Time 33 4.30 1.649 -.564 -.966 
 More Time 31 4.77 1.431 -1.107 .385 
Access to Decision Makers combined score Less Time 33 4.68 1.303 -.925 -.196 
 More Time 34 4.89 1.122 -1.806 4.073 
How many levels is your office of institutional 
research removed from the president on the 
organizational chart? 
Less Time 33 1.42 1.001 .221 -.938 
 More Time 34 1.38 1.015 1.539 3.812 
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Table 12.10 
Access to Decision Makers: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig 
I meet with high level decision makers regularly Between Groups .003 1 .003 .001 .974 
 Within Groups 156.296 65 2.405   
 Total 156.299 66    
If I need to, I can ask a high level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
Between Groups 1.227 1 1.227 .734 .395 
 Within Groups 107.030 64 1.672   
 Total 108.258 65    
My boss is a high level decision maker Between Groups .685 1 .685 .441 .509 
 Within Groups 100.956 65 1.553   
 Total 101.642 66    
I consider my office of institutional research to be 
centralized within the organizational structure of my 
institution 
Between Groups 3.548 1 3.548 1.483 .228 
 Within Groups 148.389 62 2.393   
 Total 151.938 63    
Access to Decision Makers combined score Between Groups .722 1 .722 .489 .487 
 Within Groups 95.949 65 1.476   
 Total 96.671 66    
How many levels is your office of institutional 
research removed from the president on the 
organizational chart? 
Between Groups .029 1 .029 .029 .866 
 Within Groups 66.090 65 1.017   
 Total 66.119 66    
 
Brief Summary of Research Question Two 
 In summary, when comparing the different groups, there were far more 
similarities than differences; in fact, there were relatively few differences that were 
statistically significant. A chart with the comparison of all groups can be found in 
Appendix B. At times, it was the difference in distribution, or kurtosis that made the 
difference between groups. The two groups that stood out as different were the IR Staff 
group and the More Time manager groups. The IR Staff were lower in most statements 
compared to the IR managers but also compared to the other subgroups. Just opposite of 
the IR Staff were the IR Managers with more than 13 years of experience. They reported 
strong scores on most statements and were very often in agreement with narrow 
distributions in their answers. The IR Managers group and private institution group 
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(Private) tended to have the higher means, but often times a wider distribution in their 
answers. It appears that the size of the institution and therefore the size of the IR staff had 
an affect the means of the power statements. Institutional researchers affiliated with a 
smaller staff often times performed more of the traditional roles of IR while staff in larger 
institutions may be more specialized. Experience also appeared to have an influence on 
the power levels as the More Time group had consistently high scores on most 
statements. In general, the individual groups reflected the responses of the overall sample 
found in research question one. The Control of Resources ranked first of all groups. Legal 
Prerogatives was last in all groups, except for IR managers at private institutions (Private) 
and IR managers with more experience (More Time) where this power source ranked 
second. The other power sources fell between these two sources with a mix of rankings.  
 
Research Question Three and Four 
“What were institutional researchers’ orientations toward power?”  and “How did 
institutional researchers’ orientations toward power vary by institutional level, 
institutional type,  job responsibilities, and experience?” 
  
The original survey design included the entire 40 question Power Orientation 
Scale (POS) designed by Goldberg, et al. (1983) but was reduced to one question 
representing the six power orientation constructs the survey was designed to measure. For 
this study, participants were asked to rank six statements representing the six power 
orientations, in order with which they most identified. The statements included: Power is 
exciting and desirable; Power is controlling information; Power is a natural and 
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instinctive drive that is within everybody; Power is having political connections; Power is 
personal charisma; and Power is having control and autonomy. The simplification was 
necessary because the length of the full survey created a risk of participants dropping out 
of the study. Research questions three and four are discussed in the same section because 
of the simplified measurements. For each comparison group and the overall sample, the 
two top power orientations are discussed. The orientations are referred to as: exciting and 
desirable, control of information, natural and good, political connections, personal 
charisma, and control and autonomy. Table 13.1 is a comprehensive display of the power 
orientation’s frequencies and percentages for each comparison group but the discussion 
of the results begins with the overall study sample’s responses.  
 Research question three sought to understand the power orientations for the 
overall sample of institutional researchers in this study. The power orientation that was 
most frequently ranked number one was control and autonomy with 40 selections or 
36.7%. A person having this orientation would understand power as the ability to control 
others, perhaps with rewards and punishments, and the desire to maintain personal 
freedom (Goldberg, et al., 1983). Since there were no definitions provided of the 
orientations or the terms “control” or “autonomy” participants may have interpreted  the 
term “control” as having control over their own circumstances, i.e. autonomy, rather than 
controlling others. Having political connections was the second most selected orientation. 
This orientation was selected 26 times or 25.5%. This orientation would understand 
power as being related to networking with decision makers and using political means as a 
way of influence (Goldberg, et al., 1983). These two orientations set the tone for the 
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comparison groups (see Table 13.1 has the statistics for the over sample’s responses to all 
of the power rankings).  
 Research question four sought to determine the difference in power orientations 
based on institutional size (less than 10,000 students, 10,000 students or more), 
institutional type (public 4-year or more, private non-profit, 4-year or more), job 
descriptions (IR staff, IR managers), managers by institutional type (managers at public 
4-year or more, managers at private, non-profit, 4-year or more), and managers by 
experience (IR managers with 13 years of experience or less, managers with 13 years of 
experience or more). Every group in the study, except one, selected control and autonomy 
as the orientation with which they most identified based on the frequency of number one 
rankings. With a few exceptions, control and autonomy also had the lowest means for 
each group indicating that if it was not ranked as number one, it was at least in the top 
half. For institutional size, the Smaller Institutions group’s number of responses for this 
statement was 21 or 39.6%, which is slight higher when compared to the Larger 
Institution group that was 18 or 32.7%. The mean for the responses for this group was 
2.49 for the Smaller Institution group and 2.56 for the Larger Institution group. The 
Larger Institution group indicated a lower mean for political connectedness but indicated 
more number one rankings for control and autonomy. For institutional types, the Public 
group’s number of responses was 17 or 37.0% compared to the Private group that had 17 
or 43.6% for the control and autonomy orientation. The mean for the Public group was 
2.37, which was not the lowest orientation. Again, the lowest mean for all orientations 
was political connectedness. The one group that did not select control and autonomy as 
number one was the IR Staff group in the job description comparison. They selected 
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political connections 11 times or 44.0% (M=2.28). The IR Manager group did select the 
control and autonomy orientation as their first choice, 25 times or 39.1% (M=2.47). For 
institutional type, eight participants or 32.0% of the Public Management group selected 
control and autonomy (M=2.72) compared to 13, or 52.0% of the Private Management 
group (M=2.16). In the final group comparisons of managers, the Less Time group had 
12 participants who selected control and autonomy, or 40.0% (M= 2.40) compared to 
38.2 %, or 13 participants in the More Time group (M=2.53).  
 The second most selected orientation was the same as the overall sample, political 
connections. For institutional size, the Smaller Institution group’s frequency of responses 
was 10 or 20.4% (M=2.86) compared to that of the Larger Institution group,  which was 
16 or 32.7% (M=2.21). For institutional types, the Public group’s responses were 13 or 
30.2% (M=2.33) compared to the Private group that had six or 17.6% (M=2.76). As 
previously mentioned, The Larger Institution group and the Public group had means for 
political connectedness that were lowest in their group. The one group who did not select 
political connectedness as their second orientation was the IR Staff group in the job 
description comparison. They selected control and autonomy 10 times or 35.7% 
(M=2.68). Unlike the IR Staff, the IR Manager group did select the political connections 
orientation as their second choice, 12 times or 19.7% (M=2.59). The final group 
comparisons were of managers by institutional type and experience. Five participants or 
21.7% (M=2.30) of the Public Manager group selected control and autonomy compared 
to four times, or 16.7% (M=2.87) of the Private Manager group. The Public Manager 
group’s mean was also the lowest for that group. The Less Time group selected political 
connectedness second, eight times or 26.7% (M=2.27), which was a lower mean than 
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their first choice. The More Time group was the only group to select charisma as their 
second highest orientation; five participants, or 16.1% chose it as number one. The mean 
was 3.13. 
 Somewhat surprising, in light of the high responses in the control of resources 
power source, was the fact that the control of information orientation was not ranked 
higher. This orientation was usually ranked fourth in both frequency and means. It is 
possible that institutional researchers did not associate the information they created with 
having power. The More Time group did rank control of information as equal with 
political connections for third.  
There were only three differences in means that were statically significant. 
Differences between the Smaller Institution group and the Larger Institution group on 
political connectedness were statistically significant at the .05 level, F(1,99)=5.826, 
p<.018. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .05). The institutional type comparisons 
also had significant differences. For the orientation “power is controlling information” 
the mean for the Public group was 3.36 compared to the Private group whose mean was 
3.94, F(1,76)=2.739, p<.040. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.-3). “Power is a 
natural and instinctive drive” had statistically significantly different means at the .05 
level, F(1,78)=6.013, p<.016. The effect size was small (eta-squared =.07) and the means 
were 4.74 for the Public group and 3.91 for the private group (see Table 13.2 for the 
complete statistics concerning power orientations and the comparison groups).  
The findings from Research Question Three and Four indicated that most 
institutional researchers in the sample understood power as having control and autonomy. 
This view fits well with Mintzberg’s (1983b) assertion that analysts are mostly concerned 
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about using power to maintain their job security and less concerned about influencing 
decisions. The power to ensure freedom in their work and the ability to perform their 
duties autonomously would keep the institutional researcher out of political struggles. 
However, because political connectedness was the second most selected power 
orientation, institutional researchers were aware of the political activities within their 
institutions, even if they did not engage in politics nor completely understand it.  
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Table 13.1 
Power Orientations: Frequencies of Number 1 Rankings 
 Overall Sample    
Power is… N f of #1 % N f of # 1 % 
exiting and desirable 103 6 5.8    
controlling 
information 
100 9 9.0    
natural and good 102 10 9.8    
political connections 102 26 25.5    
personal charisma 102 10 9.8    
control and autonomy 109 40 31.7    
 Less than 10,000 More than 10,000 
exiting and desirable 52 2 3.8 51 4 7.8 
controlling 
information 
50 5 10.0 49 4 8.2 
natural and good 50 6 12.0 52 4 7.7 
political connections 49 10 20.4 52 16 30.8 
personal charisma 51 5 9.8 50 5 10.0 
control and autonomy 53 21 39.6 55 18 32.7 
 Public Institutions Private Institutions 
exiting and desirable 46 3 6.5 37 1 2.7 
controlling 
information 
42 5 11.9 36 3 8.3 
natural and good 46 2 4.3 34 3 8.8 
political connections 43 13 30.2 34 6 17.6 
personal charisma 43 4 9.3 36 5 13.9 
control and autonomy 46 17 37.0 39 17 43.6 
 IR Staff IR Managers 
exiting and desirable 28 2 7.1 58 3 5.2 
controlling 
information 
26 1 3.8 58 6 10.3 
natural and good 26 1 3.8 60 6 10.0 
political connections 25 11 44.0 61 12 19.7 
personal charisma 26 2 7.7 61 5 8.2 
control and autonomy 28 10 35.7 64 25 39.1 
 Public Manager Private Manager 
exiting and desirable 23 1 4.3 24 1 4.2 
controlling 
information 
21 4 19.0 24 1 4.2 
natural and good 25 1 4.0 23 2 8.7 
political connections 23 5 21.7 24 4 16.7 
personal charisma 23 2 8.7 24 3 12.5 
control and autonomy 25 8 32.0 25 13 52.0 
 Less Time More Time 
exiting and desirable 29 1 3.4 29 2 6.9 
controlling 
information 
27 2 7.4 31 4 12.9 
natural and good 28 4 14.3 32 2 6.3 
political connections 30 8 26.7 31 4 12.9 
personal charisma 30 5 16.7 31 5 16.1 
control and autonomy 30 12 40.0 34 13 38.2 
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Table 13.2 
Power Orientations: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics 
 Overall Sample  
 n M SD Skewness Kurtosis n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Power is exciting desirable 103 4.59 1.472 -.956 .098      
Power is controlling 
Information 
100 3.87 1.600 .241 -1.106      
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
102 4.10 1.644 -.514 -.901      
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
102 2.53 1.369 .905 .292      
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
102 3.33 1.430 .095 -.998      
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
109 2.51 1.507 .709 -.231      
 Less than 10,000 More than 10,000 
Power is exciting desirable 52 4.67 1.396 -1.001 .353 41 4.51 1.554 -.918 -.066 
Power is controlling 
Information 
50 3.80 1.591 -.260 -1.043 
49 3.90 1.610 -.202 -1.157 
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
50 3.96 1.702 -.401 -1.065 52 4.23 1.592 -.638 -.660 
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
49 5.86 1.581 .739 -.465 52 2.21 1.073 .550 -.502 
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
54 3.22 1.346 .152 -.771 50 3.48 1.515 -.034 -1.142 
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
53 2.49 1.540 .692 -.526 55 2.56 1.488 .730 -.159 
 Public Institutions Private Institutions 
Power is exciting desirable 46 4.74 1.467 -1.202 .788 37 4.54 1.346 -.742 -.068 
Power is controlling 
Information 
42 3.36 1.575 .237 -1.024 36 3.94 1.548 -391 -.868 
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
46 4.74 1.290 -1.241 1.519 34 3.91 1.730 -.229 -1.306 
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
43 2.33 1.286 1.112 1.255 34 2.76 1.458 .935 .292 
Power is personal 
charisma 
43 3.35 1.395 .052 -.916 36 3.44 1.557 -.083 -1.082 
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
46 2.37 1.339 .611 -.475 39 2.36 1.513 .837 -.252 
 IR Staff IR Manager 
Power is exciting desirable 28 4.54 1.644 -.849 -.401 58 4.55 1.379 -.964 .470 
Power is controlling 
Information 
26 3.58 1.332 .206 -.752 58 3.98 1.681 -.362 -1.116 
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
26 4.46 1.363 -.939 .444 60 4.07 1.666 -.450 -.968 
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
25 2.28 1.487 1.046 .321 61 2.59 1.371 1.069 .692 
Power is personal 
charisma 
26 3.19 1.443 .242 -1.231 61 3.39 1.382 .111 -.785 
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
28 2.68 1.657 .661 -.517 64 2.47 1.532 .771 -.355 
 Public Manager Private Manager 
Power is exciting desirable 23 4.65 1.369 -.932 .541 24 4.58 1.349 -1.005 .850 
Power is controlling 
Information 
21 3.33 1.770 .155 -1.347 24 4.04 1.459 -.353 -.839 
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
25 4.60 1.384 -.942 .444 23 4.00 1.706 -.361 -1.142 
Power is having political 23 2.30 1.185 1.503 3.175 24 2.87 1.569 .887 -.046 
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skills and connections 
Power is personal 
charisma 
23 3.35 1.335 .044 -.557 24 3.42 1.472 .000 -.676 
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
25 2.72 1.487 .277 -.868 25 2.16 1.625 1.367 .789 
 Less Time More Time 
Power is exciting desirable 29 4.55 1.298 -.859 .629 29 4.55 1.478 -1.071 .530 
Power is controlling 
Information 
27 4.04 1.629 -.410 -1.047 31 3.94 1.750 -.334 -1.168 
Power is a natural and 
instinctive drive 
28 4.14 1.799 -.517 -.980 32 4.00 1.566 -.430 -.943 
Power is having political 
skills and connections 
30 2.27 1.337 1.698 2.848 31 2.90 1.350 .708 .187 
Power is personal 
charisma 
30 3.67 1.155 .139 -1.057 31 3.13 1.544 .351 -.756 
Power is having control 
and autonomy 
30 2.40 1.453 .683 -.481 34 2.53 1.619 .832 -.287 
 
 
Research Question Five 
“What were institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their 
role in influencing institutional decisions?” 
  
The fifth research question addressed Mintzberg’s (1983b) assertion that analysts 
have power but lack the will to use it. As previously demonstrated in the literature 
review, some institutional researchers feel that they should actively use their power to 
influence decisions and some do not (Billups & Delucia, 1990; Delaney, 2009; Donhardt, 
2012; Hearn, 1988; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Perry, 1972; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; 
Saunders, 1983; Saupe, 1990; Serban, 2002; Suslow, 1972). This portion of the study first 
sought to understand whether institutional researchers felt they should be active or 
passive in influencing decisions and then sought to understand if institutional researchers 
felt they had the ability to influence decisions. The will to influence measure consisted of 
nine statements. Four statements represented the opinion that IR staff should be active in 
influencing decisions and four statements represented the opinion that IR should be 
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passive. The last question was a neutral question regarding their opinion of IR as a 
resource. Additionally, participants were asked to rate how much influence IR should 
have on establishing budgets, resource allocation, retention issues, program review, 
curriculum, and student success programs.  
 The overall study sample was in strong agreement with the statement, “IR is a 
powerful resource for decision-makers.” The mean for this statement was 5.53; it had a 
strong negative skew (-2.537) and a very strong leptokurtic distribution (8.858). It is safe 
to say that institutional researchers felt they were a powerful resource; however, there 
were some differences in whether they believe institutional researchers should be an 
active or passive power for decision-making. When participants were asked their level of 
agreement with the statement “I am an active participant in the decision making process”, 
the mean was only 3.47 with only a slight platykurtic distribution of answers indicating 
that some were obviously more active than others. The highest rated statement for the 
active influence was the idea that institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions. This statement’s mean, although the highest, was only 4.36 with only a 
slight negative skew (-.646) and a mesokurtic distribution (-.059). The statement “I want 
to be more involved in the decision-making process” had a modest mean of 4.22 and a 
platykurtic distribution of -.929. In fact, all of the active statements showed mesokurtic to 
slightly platykurtic distribution, which indicated some variety in their answers but 
nothing overwhelming. The statement with the lowest mean, indicating a more passive 
approach, was; “I include a subjective component in my outputs”; the mean was only 
2.97. In comparison, on the passive side of the statements, “My outputs are always 
objective” had the second highest mean of any statement at 4.70 and a mesokurtic 
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distribution (-.013). The statement with the highest mean was, “The work of IR should be 
free of any personal philosophy and politics.” The mean was 4.84 but did have some 
slight variety in the platykurtic distribution (-.553). Two other statements were worth 
noting.  The statement, “IR has served its purpose when it has provided information and 
stimulated reflection” had a mean of 4.64 and the only leptokurtic distribution possibly 
indicating the belief that IR’s role is to provide information for discussion only. The other 
statement, “I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making process other than 
providing information” had a low mean of 2.59. In fact, it was the lowest in the passive 
series of statements. In this case, the low mean, actually indicated a desire to more be 
involved. There seemed to be a bit of a mixed message in that they wanted to be change 
agents and to be involved in the decision-making process beyond providing information, 
but they believed in being passive in doing so. The mean score for the combined passive 
statements was 4.21 compared to the mean for the combined active statements of 3.75. 
For the passive statements combined scores, the range was 4.25, with a low of 1.75 and a 
high of 6.00. The range for the active statements was large, 5.00 with a low of 1.00 and a 
high of 6.00. In order to determine an overall level of the desire to be active in decision 
making, the responses to the passive statements were reversed scored and then added to 
the active scores to create a Total combined score. The mean for the Total combined 
score was only 3.25 with a 3.63 range, a low of 1.00 and a high of 4.63. In summary, the 
participants felt that IR should take a passive approach in influencing institutional 
decisions but had a certain level of desire to be an active participant beyond simply 
providing information. (Table 14.1 provides the descriptive data for these statements).  
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Table 14.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics Overall Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making 118 3.47 1.523 .056 -.929 
I want to be more involved in the decision-making process 119 4.22 1.519 -.422 -.865 
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
119 4.36 1.339 -.646 -.059 
I include a subjective component in my outputs 115 2.97 1.386 .188 -.925 
Active combined score 114 3.75 .980 -.211 -.368 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective 119 4.79 1.057 -.708 -.013 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making process 
other than providing information 
119 2.59 1.591 .805 -.498 
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and 
politics 
118 4.84 1.247 -.792 -.553 
IR has served its purpose when it has provided information 
and stimulated reflection 
118 4.64 1.224 -.861 .289 
Passive combined score 118 4.21 .816 .025 .239 
Total combined score 114 3.25 .707 -.535 .159 
IR is a powerful resource for decision makers 118 5.53 .813 -2.537 8.858 
 
 The second part of understanding the will to influence asked the participants to 
indicate how much influence they felt they should have on decisions in the following 
areas: establishing budgets, resource allocation, retention issues, program review, 
curriculum, and student success programs. Participants felt the strongest about 
influencing issues related to retention. The mean was high at 5.00 and it had a strong, 
leptokurtic distribution indicating a good amount of agreement among participants. 
Program review was the second highest at 4.72 with a moderate distribution of 1.513. 
The area that they felt they should have the least influence was on curriculum issues. The 
mean was only 3.39 with a slight platykurtic distribution (Table14.2 has the responses to 
all of the issues).  
  
 215 
 
Table 14.2 
Amount of IR Influence: Descriptive Statistics Overall Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Establishing budgets 117 3.63 1.483 -.215 -.752 
Resource allocation 117 3.83 1.354 -.426 -.386 
Retention issues 117 5.00 1.122 -1.379 2.090 
Program Review 117 4.90 1.213 -1.303 1.513 
Curriculum 117 3.39 1.339 -.030 -.616 
Student success programs 117 4.72 1.272 -1.242 1.310 
 
Whether or not institutional researchers have the will to influences decisions does 
not necessarily mean that they are able to influence decisions. The second part of 
research question five tried to determine if the participants were able to influence 
decision-making based on their own reported estimates. This section consisted of 13 
statements to which the participants were asked to express their level of agreement. An 
Ability to Influence combined total score was calculated based on those responses. An 
additional question asked how much control participants had over their own work and is 
discussed after the ability to influence questions.  
The mean for the Combined Ability to Influence score was 4.10 reflecting a mild 
confidence in the participants’ ability to influence institutional level decisions. The 
statement with the highest mean, 4.92, was “My data are often used in decision-making.” 
It had a mild leptokurtic distribution of .263 indicating a small level of agreement. Data 
that comes from IR seemed to be more influential than reports as the statement “My 
reports are often used in decision-making” ranked third with a mean of 4.79 and a mild 
leptokurtic distribution, .412. Between these two statements was the statement 
“Administrators respect my opinion and work” with a mean of 4.92 and a kurtosis of 
.360. However, the statement “My opinion is often considered in decision-making” only 
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ranked 10
th
 with a mean of 3.89 and a moderate platykurtic distribution of -1.019. It 
appeared that directly expressing their opinion was less influential than the outputs 
produced by IR. Of the outputs, their data was slightly more influential than their reports. 
Even though their outputs were influential, a mean of only 4.14 was achieved for the 
participants’ involvement in framing research questions. This statement and most of the 
other statements had a mildly flat distribution indicating some variance in the 
distribution. Participants felt that they did define their institutions for internal and 
external constituents; the means were 4.45 and 4.47 respectively. When it comes to 
having a negative or positive impact on projects or departments, the participants took a 
much more positive view in their responses. The mean for helping projects and 
department receive funding was 3.54 while causing them to lose funding was only 2.27. 
Identifying excellence/success had a mean of 4.25 while the mean for identifying issues 
was only 4.20. IR’s role in campus politics appears to be mixed. The statement “I am 
often asked to provide data that supports the particular view point of a group” was only 
3.54 but it was moderately platykurtic, -1.151, indicating that some institutional 
researchers were asked to participate in politics (Table 13.4 has the complete descriptive 
statistics for the ability to influence statements).  
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Table 14.3 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics Overall Sample 
 N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-making 121 4.79 1.322 -1.062 .412 
My data are often used in decision-making 120 4.92 1.199 -.996 .263 
My opinion is often considered in decision-making 121 3.89 1.532 -.340 -1.019 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and work 120 4.11 1.333 -.375 -.519 
Administrators respect my opinion and work 120 4.83 1.079 -.965 .360 
Projects and/or departments have lost funding because of my 
reports 
118 2.27 1.394 .773 -.519 
Projects and/or departments have received funding because 
of my reports 
118 3.54 1.528 -.471 -.956 
My reporting defines our institution to external constituents 120 4.45 1.489 -.764 -.310 
My reporting defines our institution to internal constituents 118 4.47 1.424 -.851 -.020 
I am involved in helping to frame research questions for 
decision-making 
120 4.14 1.563 -.521 -.810 
I help identify issues on campus 119 4.20 1.459 -.591 -.515 
I help identify excellence/success on campus 118 4.25 1.503 -.736 -.257 
I am often asked to provide data that supports the particular 
view point of a group 
121 3.54 1.618 .016 -1.151 
Ability to Influence combined score 121 4.10 .940 -.279 -.641 
 
 In seeking to understand how much power and influence institutional researchers 
had over their own projects and work, the study asked participants to rate how much 
control they had in the following areas: what projects they work on, how their research is 
conducted, when the work is due, how data is interpreted, how data is presented, and how 
their budget is spent. The only two areas with a mean above 4.00 were how their research 
is conducted (M=4.85, Kurt=354) and how their data are presented (M=4.63, Kurt=.717). 
The means for the remaining statements ranged from 3.46 to 3.99, all of which had 
platykurtic distributions. How the budget is spent had the most variation in distribution, -
1.248, which seems reasonable since the overall sample included IR staff and 
management (the full results can be found in Table 13.4).  
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Table 14.4 
Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics Overall Sample 
How much control do you have over…? N M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
What projects you work on 118 3.99 1.284 -.329 -.624 
How your research is conducted 117 4.85 1.164 -.928 .354 
When your work is due 118 3.46 1.292 .156 -.615 
How your data are interpreted 118 3.86 1.389 -.298 -.796 
How your data are presented 118 4.63 1.161 -.965 .717 
How your budget is spent 117 3.86 1.866 -.454 -1.248 
  
To summarize the results of research question five, the participants in the overall 
sample felt strongly that IR was a powerful resource for decision-making but they were 
not that active in the decision-making process themselves. In terms of being more active, 
the participants indicated that they thought IR should be change agents and expressed a 
desire to be more involved in decision-making. However, they also indicated that they 
were objective in their work and felt like they have completed their job once they have 
submitted their work and stimulated reflection. It may be that institutional researchers did 
not want to influence decisions but wanted to be involved in more decisions through their 
traditional objective approach. However, it may be difficult to be change agents and 
maintain their passive approach because influence is needed to create change. Retention, 
program reviews and student success programs were the areas they felt they should have 
had the most participation. The participants also indicated that they only had a mild to 
moderate ability to influence decisions. Data and reports were the most popular way of 
influencing but their opinions had little influence on decisions. They also felt that they 
had little to no influence on departments or projects losing funding and only mildly 
influenced increases in funding. Institutional researchers did not appear to have much 
influence over their own work other than how the research was conducted and how the 
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data were presented. In summary, institutional researchers in this study were passive in 
their will to influence but wanted to be involved with more decision-making through their 
objective data and reports, but not necessarily in trying to influence decisions. 
 
Research Question Six 
“How did institutional researchers’ feelings and attitudes about their role in 
influencing institutional decisions vary by institutional size, institutional type, job 
responsibilities, and experience?” 
 
The sixth research question looked at the differences in the will to influence and 
the ability influence to decisions by comparison groups. This section of the results 
addresses both the will and the ability of the subgroups. As with the previous 
comparisons, the results of each subgroup comparison are discussed before discussing the 
next subgroup comparison. Charts for each grouping are located at the end of each text 
section. Once again, descriptive statistics and ANOVAs were used to explore the 
differences in each group.  
 
Institutional Size Will and Ability Comparison 
Along with every other subgroup and the overall sample, both the Smaller 
Institutions group and the Larger Institutions group agreed that IR is a powerful resource 
for decision-makers. The Smaller Institutions group had a mean of 5.48 for this statement 
with a considerably stronger leptokurtic distribution of 13.137 compared to the Larger 
Institutions group whose distribution was a strong 3.855. The Larger Institutions group’s 
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mean for this statement was 5.57. For the statements reflecting the active influence 
perspective, there were no statistically significant differences between the groups. The 
Smaller Institutions group had a lower mean, 3.36, on the statement; “I am an active 
participant in decision-making” and a higher mean, 4.27, on the statement; “I want to be 
more involved in the decision-making process.” Both of the statements had a mild 
platykurtic distribution. The means for the Larger Institutions group for the same 
statements were; 3.61 and 4.19. The distribution was moderately platykurtic for these 
statements. The Smaller Institutions group also reported being less subjective in their 
reports with a mean of 2.98 compared to 3.00 for the Larger Institutions, but felt more 
strongly about acting as agents of change with a mean of 4.41 compared 4.36. This was 
the only statement with a leptokurtic distribution, although it was small. The mean for the 
Active Combined score was 3.75 for the Smaller Institutions group with a range of 4.00, 
a low of 1.50 and high of 5.50. The mean score for the Larger Institutions group was 
3.78. The range of combined scores was 5.00 with a low of 1.00 and a high of 6.00.  
For the passive will statements, the Smaller Institutions group had a higher mean 
on all of the statements although none of the differences in means were statistically 
different. Both groups felt that their outputs were objective, Public M= 4.86 Private M= 
4.74, although the Larger Institutions group had a slightly peaked kurtosis (.347) 
compared to the even distribution of the Smaller Institutions group (-.015). The highest 
mean for the Smaller Institutions group was the belief that the work of IR should be free 
of personal philosophy and politics. Their mean was 5.02 compared to 4.64 of the Larger 
Institutions group. For this statement the Smaller Institutions group showed more 
agreement with a leptokurtic distribution of .360 while the Larger Institutions group was 
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moderately platykurtic (-1.128). Neither group agreed strongly with the statement, “I 
prefer not to be more involved with decision-making other than providing information.” 
The Smaller Institutions group was only 2.81 while the Larger Institutions group’s mean 
was even lower at 2.38. The Passive Combined score was 4.37 for the Smaller 
Institutions group with a range of 4.37, a low of 3.00 and a high of 6.00. The mean for the 
Larger Institutions group was 4.03 with a range of 4.25, a low of 1.75 and a high of 6.00. 
The differences in means for the Passive Combined score is statistically different at the 
.05 level; F(1,114)= 4.526, p=.036. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .03). The 
Total Combined score, with the passive scores reversed, were low indicating two very 
passive groups. The mean for the Smaller Institutions group was 3.18 with a range of 
2.63, a low of 1.63 and a high of 4.25. The mean for the Larger Institutions group was a 
bit higher at 3.33 and a range of 3.63, a low of 1.00 and a high of 4.63 (see Table 15.1 for 
the descriptive statistics and Table 15.2 for the results of the ANOVAs).  
When asked what amount of participation institutional researchers should have on 
establishing budgets, resource allocation, retention issues, program review, curriculum, 
and student success seminars, both groups were in agreement about retention issues. The 
mean for the Smaller Institutions group was 5.02 and the mean for the Larger Institutions 
group was 5.00. Both had strong leptokurtic distributions of 2.618 and 2.019. Program 
review had the highest mean for the Larger Institutions group at 5.03 and a moderate 
kurtosis of 1.658. This was the second highest for the Smaller Institutions group with a 
mean of 4.78 and a kurtosis of 2.106. Working with student success programs was third 
for both groups followed by resource allocation, establishing budgets, and curriculum. 
The means for the curriculum participation was right at the mid-point range for the 
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Smaller Institutions group that was 3.50 and 3.31 for the Larger Institutions group. The 
distributions were only mildly platykurtic (-.512, -.459) indicating that some institutional 
researchers believed they should cross into the territory of faculty and be involved in 
curriculum issues. None of the differences in means were statistically significant (see 
Tables 15.3 and 15.4 for the related statistics).  
Overall, the Larger Institutions group reported having more ability to influence 
decision than the Smaller Institutions group. “My reports are often used in decision-
making” had the highest mean for the Larger Institutions group. Their mean was 5.05 
compared to 4.56 the Smaller Institutions group. The distribution for the Larger 
Institutions group was slightly leptokurtic at .673 while the Smaller Institutions group 
was Mesokurtic at -.071. The differences in means for this statement was statistically 
significant at the .05 level, F(1,115)= 4.399, p=.038. The effect size was small (eta-
squared= .03). The statement with the highest mean for the Smaller Institutions group 
was “My data are often used in decision-making” with a mean of 4.79. This was the 
second highest for the Larger Institutions group, M=5.00. Most of the statements for the 
Larger Institutions group had an average near 4.50 while several statements for the 
Smaller Institutions group were below 4.0. Most of the distributions had a mild kurtosis 
and were usually platykurtic. Similar to the overall sample, both groups felt they have 
little influence on departments or projects losing funding as the means were 2.26 for the 
Smaller Institutions group and 2.22 for the Larger Institutions group. But they did feel 
like they somewhat helped departments receive funding with 3.50 for the Smaller 
Institutions group’s mean and 3.55 for the Larger Institutions group’s mean. This pattern 
repeated itself for the statements about identifying issues and identifying 
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excellence/success. One other statement had a difference in means that was statistically 
significant at the .05 level was, “I am involved in helping to frame research questions for 
decision-making.” The mean for the Smaller Institutions group was 3.85 compared to 
4.51 of the Larger Institutions group, F(1,114)= 5.436, p=.021. The effect size was small 
(eta-squared= .04). The Ability to Influence Combined score was 3.98 for the Smaller 
Institutions group and 4.20 for the Larger Institutions group. The range of combined 
scores for the Smaller Institutions group was 3.83 with a low of 1.82 and a high of 5.75 
while the range for the Larger Institutions group was 4.00 with a low of 2.00 and a high 
of 6.00 (Table 15.5 provides further details about the descriptive statistics and Table 15.6 
provides ANOVA information).  
When it comes to control over their work, both groups reported only having mild 
to moderate control. The highest statement was control over how their research was 
conducted with means of 4.78 for the Smaller Institutions group and 4.93 for the Larger 
Institutions group. Both distributions were mildly leptokurtic: .288 and .338. The second 
highest statement was control over how their data were presented with means of 4.51 for 
Smaller Institutions and 4.74 for Larger Institutions. There were some difference in the 
distributions as Smaller Institutions group’s distribution was .959 compared to -.099. The 
area of least control was when their work was due. The Smaller Institutions mean was 
3.51 while the Larger Institutions mean was 3.43. Both kurtosis were mild: -.738 and -
.379. There were no differences in means that were statistically significant (Table 15.7 
provides further details about the descriptive statistics and Table 15.8 provides ANOVA 
information). 
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In summary, both groups had only a modest will to influence decisions as they 
both had higher means on the passive statements than the active statements.The Smaller 
Institutions group appeared to be less interested in being more active and scored higher 
on the passive statements. Clearly, both groups believed their outputs should be objective 
and free of personal philosophy and politics. However, both groups believed that IR 
could be change agents who provide solutions and also indicated an interest in being 
more involved in decision-making. Retention, student success and program reviews were 
the areas they felt they should participate in the most. Institutional researchers’ ability to 
influence appeared to be modest. The most significant way they felt they had influence 
was through their reports for the Larger Institutions group and their data for the Smaller 
Institutions group. The Larger Institutions group felt they received more respect from 
both faculty and administrators than the Smaller Institutions group. Only the Larger 
Institutions group was involved with framing research questions at a significant level. 
Both groups seemed to be used for political posturing only slightly and both groups were 
not very active in identifying issues or causing departments to lose funding. In their own 
domain, both groups felt they had most control over how their projects were carried out, 
which seems like it would be closely related to the ability to frame research questions. 
Finally, participants felt that they had only modest influence on what projects they 
worked on and when they were due. 
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Table 15.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 
Student Sample n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Smaller 
Institutions 
59 3.36 1.423 .079 -.850 
 Larger 
Institutions 
57 3.61 1.645 -.047 -1.066 
I want to be more involved in the decision-
making process  
Smaller 
Institutions 
59 4.27 1.507 -.544 -.673 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.19 1.561 -.355 -1.001 
Institutional researchers should be change 
agents who provide solutions to problems 
Smaller 
Institutions 
59 4.41 1.275 -.767 .298 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.36 1.410 -.641 -.121 
I include a subjective component in my 
outputs 
Smaller 
Institutions 
56 2.98 1.342 .127 -.892 
 Larger 
Institutions 
57 3.00 1.439 .223 -.963 
Active combined score Smaller 
Institutions 
56 3.75 .862 -.378 -.363 
 Larger 
Institutions 
56 3.78 1.096 -.201 -.475 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Smaller 
Institutions 
59 4.86 1.106 -.832 -.015 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.74 1.001 -.646 .347 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-
making process other than providing 
information 
Smaller 
Institutions 
59 2.81 1.655 .686 -.795 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 2.38 1.520 .937 -.130 
The work of IR should be free of personal 
philosophy and politics 
Smaller 
Institutions 
58 5.02 1.116 -1.055 .360 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.64 1.360 -.519 -1.128 
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Smaller 
Institutions 
58 4.78 1.044 -.585 -.383 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.48 1.392 -.812 -.077 
Passive combined score Smaller 
Institutions 
58 4.37 .705 .441 -.329 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 4.06 .897 .032 .189 
Total combined score Smaller 
Institutions 
56 3.18 .618 -.683 -.016 
 Larger 
Institutions 
56 3.33 .791 -.619 .186 
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Smaller 
Institutions 
58 5.48 .843 -2.949 13.137 
 Larger 
Institutions 
58 5.57 .797 -2.063 3.855 
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Table 15.2 
Will to Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Between Groups 1.931 1 1.931 .818 .368 
 Within Groups 269.034 114 2.360   
 Total 270.966 115    
I want to be more involved in the decision-
making process 
Between Groups .194 1 .194 .083 .774 
 Within Groups 270.575 115 2.353   
 Total 270.769 116    
Institutional researchers should be change 
agents who provide solutions to problems 
Between Groups .058 1 .058 .032 .858 
 Within Groups 207.634 115 1.806   
 Total 207.692 116    
I include a subjective component in my 
outputs 
Between Groups .009 1 .009 .005 .946 
 Within Groups 214.982 111 1.937   
 Total 214.991 112    
Active combined score Between Groups .027 1 .027 .028 .867 
 Within Groups 107.008 110 .973   
 Total 107.035 111    
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Between Groups .443 1 .443 .398 .530 
 Within Groups 128.036 115 1.113   
 Total 128.479 116    
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-
making process other than providing 
information 
Between Groups 5.515 1 5.515 2.183 .142 
 Within Groups 290.604 115 2.527   
  Total 296.120 116    
The work of IR should be free of personal 
philosophy and politics 
Between Groups 4.172 1 4.172 2.697 .103 
 Within Groups 176.379 114 1.547   
 Total 180.552 115    
IR has served its purpose when it has 
provided information and stimulated 
reflection 
Between Groups 2.491 1 2.491   
 Within Groups 172.569 114 1.514 1.646 .202 
 Total 175.060 115    
Passive combined score Between Groups 2.950 1 2.950 4.526 .036 
 Within Groups 74.319 114 .652   
 Total 77.269 115    
Total combined score Between Groups .608 1 .608 1.205 .275 
 Within Groups 55.481 110 .504   
 Total 56.089 111    
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Between Groups .216 1 .216 .320 .573 
 Within Groups 76.707 114 .673   
 Total 76.922 115    
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Table 15.3 
Amount of IR Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 
Student Sample n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
What amount of participation should IR 
have in… 
      
Establishing budgets Smaller Institutions 58 3.60 1.401 -.319 -.628 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.71 1.545 -.167 -.800 
Resource allocation Smaller Institutions 58 3.90 1.334 -.540 -.242 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.78 1.390 -.354 -.422 
Retention issues Smaller Institutions 58 5.02 1.084 -1.404 2.618 
 Larger Institutions 58 5.00 1.170 -1.430 2.019 
Program review Smaller Institutions 58 4.78 1.170 -1.245 2.016 
 Larger Institutions 58 5.03 1.256 -1.497 1.658 
Curriculum Smaller Institutions 58 3.50 1.315 -.384 -.512 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.31 1.366 .265 -.459 
Student success programs Smaller Institutions 58 4.72 1.295 -1.370 1.794 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.72 1.268 -1.169 1.043 
 
Table 15.4 
Amount of IR Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Between Groups .310 1 .310 .143 .706 
 Within Groups 247.897 114 2.175   
 Total 248.207 115    
Resource allocation Between Groups .422 1 .422 .228 .634 
 Within Groups 211.466 114 1.855   
 Total 211.888 115    
Retention issues Between Groups .009 1 .009 .007 .935 
 Within Groups 1444.983 114 1.272   
 Total 144.991 115    
Program review Between Groups 1.940 1 1.940 1.316 .254 
 Within Groups 168.017 114 1.474   
 Total 169.957 116    
Curriculum Between Groups 1.043 1 1.043 .580 .448 
 Within Groups 204.914 114 1.797   
 Total 205.957 115    
Student success programs Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
 Within Groups 187.175 114 1.642   
 Total 187.172 115    
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Table 15.5 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 
Student Sample n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-
making 
Smaller Institutions 
59 4.56 1.355 -.818 .071 
 Larger Institutions 58 5.05 1.176 -1.242 .673 
My data are often used in decision-
making 
Smaller Institutions 58 4.79 1.136 -.693 -.367 
 Larger Institutions 58 5.00 1.284 -1.236 .777 
My opinion is often considered in 
decision-making 
Smaller Institutions 59 3.80 1.483 -.261 -.982 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.02 1.573 -.422 -1.014 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Smaller Institutions 
59 3.93 1.244 -.202 -.592 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.33 1.369 -.538 -.370 
Administrators respect my opinion and 
work 
Smaller Institutions 
58 4.71 1.124 -.847 .032 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.97 1.059 -1.123 .824 
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Smaller Institutions 
57 2.26 1.316 .562 -1.027 
 Larger Institutions 58 2.22 1.439 1.017 .085 
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Smaller Institutions 58 3.50 1.417 -.651 -.780 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.55 1.602 -.389 -1.067 
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Smaller Institutions 59 4.54 1.454 -.888 -.039 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.31 1.536 -.637 -.503 
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Smaller Institutions 59 4.29 1.498 -.610 -.615 
 Larger Institutions 56 4.59 1.345 -1.103 .992 
I am involved in helping to frame 
research questions for decision-making 
Smaller Institutions 
59 3.85 1.649 -.202 -1.116 
 Larger Institutions 57 4.51 1.390 -.907 .041 
I help identify issues on campus Smaller Institutions 59 4.05 1.382 -.540 -.431 
 Larger Institutions 57 4.37 1.531 -.778 -.340 
I help identify excellence/success on 
campus 
Smaller Institutions 
58 4.12 1.546 -.681 -.377 
 Larger Institutions 57 4.37 1.472 -.812 -.034 
I am often asked to provide data that 
supports the particular viewpoint of a 
group 
Smaller Institutions 
59 3.46 1.601 .119 -.979 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.50 1.636 .037 -1.235 
Ability to Influence Combined score Smaller Institutions 59 3.98 9.14 -.226 -.479 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.20 .955 -.357 -.648 
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Table 15.6 
Ability to Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
My reports are often used in decision-making Between Groups 7.091 1 7.091 4.399 .038 
 Within Groups 185.387 115 1.612   
 Total 192.479 116    
My data are often used in decision-making Between Groups 1.241 1 1.241 .845 .360 
 Within Groups 167.517 114 1.469   
 Total 168.759 115    
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Between Groups 1.424 1 1.424 .610 .437 
 Within Groups 268.542 115 2.335   
 Total 269.966 116    
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Between Groups 4.572 1 4.572 2.676 .105 
 Within Groups 196.505 115 1.709   
 Total 201.077 116    
Administrators respect my opinion and work Between Groups 1.940 1 1.940 1.627 .205 
 Within Groups 135.948 114 1.193   
 Total 137.888 115    
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .044 1 .044 .023 .880 
 Within Groups 215.139 113 1.904   
 Total 215.183 114    
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .078 1 .078 .034 .854 
 Within Groups 260.845 114 2.288   
 Total 260.922 115    
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Between Groups 1.575 1 1.575 .704 .403 
 Within Groups 257.058 115 2.235   
 Total 258.632 116    
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Between Groups 2.606 1 2.606 1.282 .260 
 Within Groups 229.655 113 2.032   
 Total 232.261 114    
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Between Groups 12.679 1 12.679 5.436 .021 
 Within Groups 265.873 114 2.332   
 Total 278.552 115    
I help identify issues on campus Between Groups 2.924 1 2.924 1.377 .243 
 Within Groups 242.111 114 2.124   
 Total 245.034 115    
I help identify excellence/success on campus Between Groups 1.764 1 1.764 .774 .381 
 Within Groups 257.418 113 2.278   
 Total 259.183 114    
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoint of a group 
Between Groups .053 1 .053 .020 .888 
 Within Groups 301.144 115 2.619   
 Total 301.197 116    
Ability to Influence Combined score Between Groups 1.344 1 1.344 1.537 .218 
 Within Groups 100.520 115 .874   
 Total 101.863 116    
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Table 15.7 
 Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Size 
 
Student Sample n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Smaller Institutions 59 4.02 1.266 -.455 -.302 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.00 1.298 -.249 -.773 
How your research is conducted Smaller Institutions 58 4.78 1.257 -.931 .288 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.93 1.074 -.915 .338 
When your work is due Smaller Institutions 59 3.51 1.292 .006 -.738 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.43 1.299 .281 -.379 
How your data are interpreted Smaller Institutions 59 3.76 1.442 -.317 -.951 
 Larger Institutions 58 3.97 1.350 -.245 -.687 
How your data are presented Smaller Institutions 59 4.51 1.237 -1.067 .959 
 Larger Institutions 58 4.74 1.085 -.738 -.099 
How your budget is spent Smaller Institutions 59 4.19 1.747 -.718 -.742 
 Larger Institutions 57 3.58 1.927 -.241 -1.497 
 
Table 15.8 
Control Over Their Own Work: ANOVA by Institutional Size 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Between Groups .008 1 .008 .005 9.43 
 Within Groups 188.983 115 1.643   
 Total 188.991 116    
How your research is conducted Between Groups .698 1 .698 .511 .476 
 Within Groups 155.810 114 1.367   
When your work is due Total 156.509 115    
 Between Groups .175 1 .175 .105 .747 
 Within Groups 192.970 115 1.678   
 Total 193.145 116    
How your data are interpreted Between Groups 1.203 1 1.203 .616 .434 
 Within Groups 224.609 115 1.953   
 Total 225.812 116    
How your data are presented Between Groups 1.587 1 1.587 1.171 .282 
 Within Groups 155.866 115 1.355   
 Total 157.453 116    
How your budget is spent Between Groups 10.699 1 10.699 3.169 .078 
 Within Groups 384.844 114 3.376   
 Total 395.543 115    
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 Institutional Type Will and Ability Comparison 
 There were very little differences between public, 4-year institutions and private 
for-profit, 4-year institutions when comparing institutional researchers’ will and ability to 
influence decision-making. No statistically significant differences were found in any of 
the means for these sets of statements. For the Will to Influence Total Combined scores, 
the means for both groups were under the 3.50 mid-point on the agreement scale. The 
Public group’s mean was 3.25 compared to the Private group’s mean of 3.12. The range 
of combined scores for the Public group was 3.63 with a low of 1.00 but a high of only 
4.63. The high for the Private group was lower, 4.25, with a low of 1.63 and a range of 
2.63.The means for the Passive Combined score was 4.12 for the Public group with a 
range of 3.50, a low of 2.50 and a high of 6.00. The Private group’s mean was 4.33 with a 
range of 4.25, a low of 1.75 and a high of 6.00. The statement the Private group felt most 
strongly about was that the work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and politics; 
the mean was 5.05 with a mild leptokurtic distribution of .632. For the same statement, 
the Public group’s mean was 4.56 and the distribution was platykurtic, -1.082. The Public 
group’s highest statement was; “IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection.” Their mean for this statement was 4.68 with a 
kurtosis of .956. The mean was higher than the Private group’s mean of 4.12 with a 
kurtosis of -.820. Both groups felt their outputs were mostly objective; the Public group’s 
mean was 4.62 while the Private group’s was 4.95. Both responses were slightly 
leptokurtic: .250 and .200. By having low means for the preferring not to be involved in 
decision making, both groups inversely indicated some interest in being more active in 
decision-making.  
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The Active Combined score means were 3.63 for the Public group and 3.69 for 
the Private group; both were barely over the mid-point of the scale and had only a slight 
platykurtic distribution. Institutional researchers in the Private group reported being more 
active in decision-making and in their desire to be more involved; M= 3.38 and M= 4.29 
respectively. The Public group’s mean was 3.22 for being actively involved and 4.02 for 
wanting to be more involved. For all of the active statements, the distribution was mildly 
platykurtic indicating some level of disagreement. Both groups expressed agreement that 
IR should be change agents but also disagreed with the statement that they included 
subjectivity in their work. Strong agreement was expressed with the idea that IR was a 
powerful resource for decision-makers (Table 16.1 has the descriptive statements for the 
will to influence statements and Table 16.2 contains the ANOVA information).  
 Retention issues and program review were the two areas both groups felt IR 
should be involved to a fairly significant amount. The Private group felt most strongly 
about retention issues with a mean of 5.10 and strong leptokurtic distribution of 4.297. 
For the same statement, the Public group’s mean was 4.94, also with a strong leptokurtic 
distribution, 2.292. Involvement in program reviews also brought strong agreement with 
the Public group. The peaked kurtosis (3.439) surrounded a mean of 4.98, while the mean 
of the Public group was 4.61 and only slight agreement with a kurtosis of .362. 
Curriculum issues had a difference in means that was near statistical significance. The 
Private group felt that it was more acceptable to be involved with curriculum with a mean 
of 3.61 and only a mildly platykurtic distribution of -.449. The mean on this statement for 
the Public group was 3.06, also with a mild platykurtic distribution, -.223 (see Tables 
16.3 and 16.4 for the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results). 
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 Institutional researchers at public institutions were very similar to institutional 
researchers who worked at private institutions in their ability to influence decisions. Both 
groups had a mean of 4.00 for the Ability to Influence combined score with mildly 
platykurtic distributions. The range of combined scores for the Public group was 3.85 
with a low of 1.92 and a high of 5.77. The range for the Public group was slightly more 
constricted at 3.44 with a low of 2.31 and a high of 5.75. Three statements had reasonably 
high levels of agreements. “Administrators respect my opinion and work” had a mean of 
4.84 for the Public group and 4.90 for the Private group. The Public group had a mild 
distribution of .522 while the Public group was moderately peaked at 1.040. The next 
highest was, “My data is often used in decision-making” with a Public group mean of 
4.65 and a Private group mean of 4.90. Both distributions were slightly platykurtic. 
Slightly less agreement was found on the statement, “My reports are often used in 
decision-making.” The mean for the Public group was 4.62 with a slight platykurtic 
distribution of -.357. The mean for the Private group was 4.76 with a slight leptokurtic 
distribution, .590. Despite having their data and reports used in decision-making, the 
means for “my opinion is often considered in decision-making” were barely above the 
mid-point range. On this statement, the Public group was higher with a mean of 3.84 and 
a moderate platykurtic distribution of -1.117. The mean for the Private group was 3.73 
and a distribution of -.974. The low means of this statement were in agreement with the 
high means of providing objective outputs and low means of adding subjectivity. All 
remaining statements had means below 4.45 and were slightly platykurtic in their 
distributions. Like the overall sample and the comparisons by institutional size, these 
groups did not feel they caused projects or departments to lose funding; they did not feel 
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like they identified issues; and they also had lower means on identifying success and 
excellence. Both groups felt that they helped define the institution internally and 
externally and neither were used very much in supporting the viewpoints of various 
groups (Table 16.5 contains the descriptive statistics followed by the ANOVA results in 
Table 16.6). 
 When asked their level of control over their own work, there were two areas that 
had statistically significant means at the .05 level. The first was control over what 
projects the participants work on, F(1,89)= 3.267, p=.038. The effect size was small (eta-
squared= .03). The mean for the Public group was 3.72 compared to the Private group 
mean of 4.20. Control over when the work is due was the other statement, F(1,89)= 
4.486, p=.040. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .04). The mean for the Public 
group was 3.08 while the mean for the Private group was 3.61. Both had mild platykurtic 
distributions. Control over due dates was the area with the lowest mean. The area with 
the highest mean was control over how the research was conducted with a Public mean of 
4.62 and Private mean of 4.83. The Private group had moderate agreement with a kurtosis 
of 1.270 while the Public group’s responses were evenly distributed.  
  Both the Public and the Private groups generally had low means on the will to 
influence and the ability to influence decisions. The Public group reported a surprisingly 
low mean for being an active participant in decision-making, but the Private group had a 
mean only slightly higher for the same statement; both were under 3.50. Both groups felt 
strongly about remaining objective in their work but the Private group felt particularly 
strong about keeping personal philosophies and politics out of their work. Involvement in 
curriculum issues was another area that stood out for the Private Group. The Private 
 235 
 
group also felt stronger that their data and reports were used in decision-making but 
neither group felt that their opinions were considered in the decision-making process. In 
all, when divided by Public and Private institutions, institutional researchers showed a 
stronger inclination toward passive participation in decision-making and only mild levels 
of agreement in their ability to influence decisions.  
Table 16.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Public 50 3.22 1.447 .146 -.557 
 Private 40 3.38 1.390 .061 -.976 
I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process 
Public 50 4.02 1.597 -.378 -.986 
 Private 41 4.29 1.453 -.438 -.529 
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
Public 50 4.30 1.474 -.665 -.296 
 Private 41 4.51 1.207 -.748 .446 
I include a subjective component in my outputs Public 48 2.98 1.391 .286 -.662 
 Private 39 2.74 1.312 .209 -1.138 
Active combined score Public 48 3.63 1.032 -.599 -.468 
 Private 38 3.69 .760 -.129 -.808 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Public 50 4.62 1.008 -.530 .250 
 Private 41 4.95 1.094 -.982 .200 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making process 
other than providing information 
Public 50 2.64 1.626 .763 -.563 
 Private 38 2.66 1.575 .802 -.439 
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and 
politics 
Public 50 4.56 1.296 -.401 -1.082 
 Private 40 5.05 1.176 -1.198 .632 
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Public 50 4.68 1.186 -.947 .956 
 Private 40 4.63 1.234 -.519 -.820 
Passive combined score Public 50 4.12 .739 .454 .575 
 Private 40 4.33 .879 -.299 .781 
Total combined score Public 48 3.25 .753 -.932 .864 
 Private 38 3.12 .638 -.576 -.385 
IR is a powerful resource for decision makers Public 50 5.40 .990 -2.473 7.700 
 Private 40 5.53 .716 -1.638 2.871 
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Table 16.2 
Will to Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal- 
Wallis 
Sig. 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Between Groups .543 1 .534 .264 .609 
 Within Groups 177.955 88 2.022   
 Total 178.489 89    
I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process 
Between Groups 1.675 1 1.675 .712 .401 
 Within Groups 209.468 89 2.354   
 Total 211.143 90    
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
Between Groups 1.014 1 1.014 .548 .461 
 Within Groups 164.744 89 1.851   
 Total 165.758 90    
I include a subjective component in my outputs Between Groups 1.194 1 1.194 .649 .423 
 Within Groups 156.415 85 1.840   
 Total 157.609 86    
Active combined score Between Groups .081 1 .081 .096 .758 
 Within Groups 71.515 84 .851   
 Total 71.596 85    
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Between Groups 2.471 1 2.471 2.252 .137 
 Within Groups 97.682 89 1.098   
 Total 100.154 90    
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making 
process other than providing information 
Between Groups .008 1 .008 .003 .956 
 Within Groups 228.740 89 2.570   
  Total 228.747 90    
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy 
and politics 
Between Groups 5.336 1 5.336 3.447 .067 
 Within Groups 136.220 88 1.548   
 Total 141.556 89    
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Between Groups .067 1 .067 .046 .830 
 Within Groups 128.255 88 1.457   
 Total 128.322 89    
Passive combined score Between Groups 1.003 1 1.003 1.550 .758 
 Within Groups 56.975 88 .647   
 Total 57.978 89    
Total combined score Between Groups .356 1 3.56 .716 .400 
 Within Groups 41.747 84 .497   
 Total 42.102 85    
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Between Groups .347 1 .347 .450 .504 
 Within Groups 67.975 88 .772   
 Total 68.322 89    
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Table 16.3 
Amount of Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Public 49 3.78 1.636 -.336 -.961 
 Private 41 3.51 1.247 -.192 -.201 
Resource allocation Public 49 3.86 1.443 -.737 -.225 
 Private 41 3.95 1.264 -3.73 -.126 
Retention issues Public 49 4.94 1.215 -1.551 2.292 
 Private 41 5.10 1.044 -1.588 4.297 
Program review Public 49 4.61 1.397 -1.078 .362 
 Private 41 4.98 1.060 -1.404 3.439 
Curriculum Public 49 3.06 1.265 .203 -.223 
 Private 41 3.61 1.376 -.331 -.449 
Student success programs Public 49 4.65 1.362 -1.445 1.575 
 Private 41 4.68 1.331 -1.117 .986 
 
Table 16.4 
Amount of Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig. 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Between Groups 1.548 1 1.548 .714 .400 
 Within Groups 190.775 88 2.168   
 Total 192.322 89    
Resource allocation Between Groups .198 1 .198 .106 .745 
 Within Groups 163.902 88 1.863   
 Total 164.100 89    
Retention issues Between Groups .563 1 .563 .433 .512 
 Within Groups 114.426 88 1.300   
 Total 114.989 89    
Program review Between Groups 2.947 1 2.947 1.871 .175 
 Within Groups 138.608 88 1.575   
 Total 141.556 89    
Curriculum Between Groups 6.716 1 6.716 3.874 .052 
 Within Groups 152.572 88 1.734   
 Total 159.289 89    
Student success programs Between Groups .020 1 .020 .011 .917 
 Within Groups 159.980 88 1.818   
 Total 160.000 89    
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Table 16.5 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-making Public 50 4.62 1.455 -.910 -.357 
 Private 41 4.76 1.220 -.894 .590 
My data are often used in decision-making Public 49 4.65 1.393 -.788 -.392 
 Private 41 4.90 1.136 -.769 -.371 
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Public 50 3.84 1.583 -.273 -1.117 
 Private 41 3.73 1.467 -.208 -.974 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and work Public 50 4.06 1.268 -.117 -.554 
 Private 41 4.12 1.269 -.240 -.859 
Administrators respect my opinion and work Public 50 4.84 1.076 -1.00 .522 
 Private 41 4.90 .970 -1.008 1.040 
Projects and/or departments have lost funding 
because of my reports 
Public 
50 2.28 1.356 .744 -.315 
 Private 39 2.13 1.361 .747 -.940 
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Public 50 3.34 1.533 -.180 -.949 
 Private 40 3.48 1.467 -.692 -.851 
My reporting defines our institution to external 
constituents 
Public 50 4.34 1.465 -.664 -.476 
 Private 41 4.44 1.517 -.713 -.267 
My reporting defines our institution to internal 
constituents 
Public 48 4.44 1.319 -.758 -.038 
 Private 41 4.34 1.460 -.735 .016 
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Public 
50 4.02 1.574 -.547 -.780 
 Private 41 3.90 1.562 -.244 -.982 
I help identify issues on campus Public 50 4.06 1.621 -.550 -.881 
 Private 41 4.02 1.351 -.494 -.156 
I help identify excellence/success on campus Public 50 4.18 1.466 -.729 -.218 
 Private 40 4.03 1.625 -.571 -.604 
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoint of a group 
Public 
50 3.54 1.541 .061 -1.148 
 Private 41 3.22 1.605 .348 -.756 
Ability to Influence Combined score Public 50 4.00 .983 -.444 -.564 
 Private 41 4.00 .853 .028 -.634 
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Table 16.6 
Ability to Influence: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig. 
My reports are often used in decision-making Between Groups .417 1 .417 .227 .871 
 Within Groups 163.341 89 1.835   
 Total 163.758 90    
My data are often used in decision-making Between Groups 1.388 1 1.388 .844 .515 
 Within Groups 144.712 88 1.644   
 Total 146.100 89    
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Between Groups .264 1 .264 .113 .708 
 Within Groups 208.769 89 2.346   
 Total 209.033 90    
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Between Groups .086 1 .086 .054 .768 
 Within Groups 143.210 89 1.609   
 Total 143.297 90    
Administrators respect my opinion and work Between Groups .088 1 .088 .083 .915 
 Within Groups 94.330 89 1.060   
 Total 94.418 90    
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .505 1 .505 .274 .557 
 Within Groups 160.439 87 1.844   
 Total 160.944 88    
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .405 1 .405 .179 .560 
 Within Groups 199.195 88 2.264   
 Total 199.600 89    
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Between Groups .221 1 .221 .100 .700 
 Within Groups 197.318 89 2.217   
 Total 197.538 90    
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Between Groups .204 1 .204 .106 .796 
 Within Groups 167.032 87 1.920   
 Total 167.236 88    
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Between Groups .311 1 .311 .126 .670 
 Within Groups 220.590 89 2.479   
 Total 220.901 90    
I help identify issues on campus Between Groups .029 1 .029 .013 .639 
 Within Groups 201.796 89 2.267   
 Total 201.824 90    
I help identify excellence/success on campus Between Groups .534 1 .534 .225 .690 
 Within Groups 208.355 88 2.368   
 Total 208.889 89    
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoint of a group 
Between Groups 2.134 1 2.314 .938 .333 
 Within Groups 219.444 89 2.466   
 Total 221.758 90    
Ability to Influence Combined score Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 .857 
 Within Groups 76.580 89 .860   
 Total 76.580 90    
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Table 16.7 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics by Institutional Type 
 
Institutional 
Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Public 50 3.72 1.230 .084 -.619 
 Private 41 4.20 1.269 -.926 .516 
How your research is conducted Public 50 4.62 1.048 -.609 .011 
 Private 40 4.83 1.279 -1.282 1.270 
When your work is due Public 50 3.08 1.192 .141 -.276 
 Private 41 3.61 1.181 -132 -.770 
How your data are interpreted Public 50 3.74 1.352 -.174 -.549 
 Private 41 3.85 1.406 -.521 -.644 
How your data are presented Public 50 4.62 1.141 -.566 -.543 
 Private 41 4.44 1.226 -1.436 1.776 
How your budget is spent Public 49 3.57 1.756 -.389 -1.274 
 Private 41 4.17 1.856 -.706 -.850 
 
Table 16.8 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: ANOVA by Institutional Type 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig. 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Between Groups 5.085 1 5.085 3.267 .038 
 Within Groups 138.519 89 1.556   
 Total 143.604 90    
How your research is conducted Between Groups .934 1 .934 .699 .166 
 Within Groups 117.555 88 1.336   
 Total 118.489 89    
When your work is due Between Groups 6.322 1 6.322 4.486 .040 
 Within Groups 125.436 89 1.409   
 Total 131.758 90    
How your data are interpreted Between Groups .291 1 .291 .153 .573 
 Within Groups 168.742 89 1.896   
 Total 169.033 90    
How your data are presented Between Groups .738 1 .738 .530 .542 
 Within Groups 123.878 89 1.392   
 Total 124615 90    
How your budget is spent Between Groups 8.017 1 8.017 2.469 .076 
 Within Groups 285.805 88 3.248   
 Total 293.822 89    
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Job Description Will and Ability Comparison 
 Institutional researchers who were not in management did not indicate having 
much of a will to influence decisions. None of the means for the active statements for the 
IR Staff group were above 3.93.The mean for the statement, “I am an active participant in 
decision-making had a very low mean of 2.90 and only a mildly platykurtic distribution 
of -.499, which indicated that not many participants strayed too far from the mean. More 
participants in the IR Staff group desired to be more involved, but the mean for this 
statement was only 3.79; it had a broader distribution of -1.021. The belief that 
institutional researchers should be change agents had a mean of 3.93 with a moderate 
platykurtic distribution of -1.019. In comparison, the statement with the highest mean for 
the  IR Manager group was “I want to be more involved” and had a mean of 4.42 but a 
slightly platykurtic distribution. There was more agreement about IR acting as change 
agents as the mean was 4.39 with a slight leptokurtic distribution. IR managers barely had 
a mean over the midpoint for the statement “I am active participant in decision-making.” 
The mean was 3.59 and had a mild platykurtic distribution of -.972. However this mean 
had a statistically significant difference from the mean of the IR Staff at the .05 level, 
F(1,93)=4.300, p=.039. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.04). The Active 
Combined score for the IR Staff group was below the midpoint at 3.37. The range of 
combined scores was 4.23, the low was 1.00, and the high was 5.23. The mean for the IR 
Manager group on the Active Combined score was 3.83 with a range of 4.00. The low 
was 1.50 and the high was 5.50. Both groups had very low means for including a 
subjective component in their work and neither group indicated much will to actively 
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influence decisions on any statements. However, the IR Manager group had higher means 
on every statement. 
 As could be expected based on the active means, the IR Staff had higher means on 
all of the passive statements except one; “My outputs are always objective.” The mean 
for the IR Staff group was 4.72 with a mild platykurtic distribution while the IR Manager 
group had a mean of 4.87 with a small leptokurtic distribution. Both groups showed 
strong agreement that the work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and politics 
and that IR has served its purpose once it provides information and stimulated reflection. 
The means for the IR Staff group were 4.93 and 4.79 respectively. In comparison, the IR 
Manager group’s means were 4.82 and 4.79. These responses for both groups were 
mildly platykurtic for the first statement and mildly leptokurtic for the second. For the 
statement, “I prefer not to be involved in decision-making other than providing 
information,” the IR Staff had a mean of 3.10 with a moderate distribution of -1.253 
while the IR Manager group had a mean of 2.46 and a very mild platykurtic distribution, -
.181. The Passive Combined score for the IR Staff group was 4.38 with a range of 3.50, a 
low of 2.50 and a high of 6.00. The mean for the IR Manager group was 4.18 with the 
same range, low and high as the IR Staff group. The Total Combined score for the IR 
Staff was 3.00 with a range of 3.63, a low of 1.00 and a high of 4.63. IR Manager’s had a 
mean of 3.31, a range of 3.00, a low of 1.63 and high of 4.63, There was a statistically 
significant difference in the means, F(1,91)=3.870, p=.046. The effect size was small 
(eta-squared= .04) (Table 17.1 has the descriptive statistics for this group and Table 17.2 
has the results of the ANOVA).  
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 Like the previous comparison groups, the IR Staff and the IR Manager groups 
selected retention issues as the area in which they should be most actively involved. This 
was followed by program review, student success programs, resource allocation, 
establishing budgets, and curriculum. The mean for the retention issues was 4.93 with a 
mild leptokurtic distribution of .374 while the IR Manager group’s mean was 5.02 and a 
strong leptokurtic distribution of 3.156. Issues with program review ranked second (IR 
Staff M= 4.90, IR Manager M=4.80) but there was more agreement with student success 
program participation. The means were 4.66 and 4.79 with leptokurtic distributions of 
.365 and 2.408. Neither of the means for the curriculum issues were above the 3.50 
midpoint (see Tables 17.3 and 17.4 for more statistical information).  
 IR Staff indicated that there were two areas in which they felt strongly about 
having the ability to influence decisions: the use of their reports (M=5.07) and data 
(M=5.03) in decision making. Both of the statements had a mild leptokurtic distribution. 
By comparison, the IR Manager group’s means were 4.76 and 4.94. These statements 
were the highest rated for both groups and the only two statements (other than causing 
programs and departments to lose funding) in which the IR Staff had higher means than 
the IR Managers. Two other statements were also rated fairly high for the IR managers. 
The first was, “Administrators respect my opinion.” The IR Manager group had a mean 
of 4.80 and a mesokurtic distribution, .070, whereas the IR Staff group had a mean of 
4.55 and distribution of -.094. The other statement with a high mean was, “My reporting 
defines our institution to external constituents,” which had a mean of 4.73 and leptokurtic 
distribution of .412 for the IR Manage group and a mean of 4.03 with a moderate 
platykurtic distribution for the IR Staff group. Again, neither group felt they had 
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influence on departments or projects losing funding or in identifying issues on campus. 
Nor did they feel departments or projects received funding because of them, although the 
IR Managers moderately felt that they did help identify success (IR Manager M=4.30, IR 
Staff M=3.66). Being asked to provide data to support for a particular viewpoint was low 
for both groups with means under the 3.50 midpoint. Both groups felt they had mild 
influence on framing research questions; the IR Staff group’s mean was 3.79 with a 
moderate distribution of -1.117, whereas the IR Manager group’s mean was 4.20 with a 
mild distribution of -.491. There was no statistically significant difference between any of 
the means. IR Managers had a higher mean on the Ability to Influence combined score, 
4.11 with a mild platykurtic distribution of -.269. Their range for combined scores was 
3.83 with a low of 1.92 and a high of 4.75. The mean for the IR Staff group was 3.88 
with a mild platykurtic distribution of -.682. The range was 3.77; the low was 2.00 and 
the high was 5.77 (the complete statistical information can be found on Tables 17.3 and 
17.4). 
 IR Managers have more control over their projects, how research is conducted, 
due dates, data interpretation, data presentation, and their budget than the IR Staff. The 
area in which they had the most control over was how they conduct research. The mean 
for the IR Managers was 4.99 (Kurt= -.429) but the mean for the IR Staff was 4.41 
(Kurt= -.014). The next highest area was control over how their data was presented. The 
IR Manager mean was 4.67 and the IR Staff mean was 4.38. How the budget was spent 
was their third highest area with the IR Managers group having a mean of 4.39 compared 
to 2.34 for the IR Staff group. The difference in mean was a statistically significant 
difference at the .05 level; F(1,93)= 31.941, p=.001. The effect size was medium (eta-
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squared=.25). Two other areas also had statistically significant differences. Determining 
what projects they work on had means of 4.16 for the IR Managers and 3.52 for the IR 
Staff; F(1,94)=5.438, p=.023. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.05). How their data 
is interpreted was the last area with a significant difference. The IR Manager mean was 
4.06 while the IR Staff group’s mean was 3.38; F(1,94)=4.720, p=.024. The effect size 
was small (eta-squared=.04) (Table 17.5 has the descriptive statistics for the areas of 
control. Table 17.6 has the related ANOVA results). 
 To summarize the results for the comparison of IR Staff and IR Managers, the IR 
Manager group had more will and ability to influence decisions than the IR Staff, which 
was not surprising considering the inherent differences in positions. IR Staff had a very 
low mean for their active participation in decision-making and less desire to be involved 
than the IR Manager group. How similar the two groups were in their agreement with the 
passive influence statements was somewhat surprising. This can be seen as an affirmation 
that passive and objective approach to institutional research is common with the 
profession in general rather than being related to the position within institutional 
research. Both groups felt that IR should be involved with issues related to retention, 
program reviews and student success. Regarding the ability to influence decision-making, 
both groups felt that their reports and data were the strongest ways they influence, but the 
IR Staff group’s means were higher than the IR Managers group. This could possibly be 
because the IR Staff group had fewer ways of influencing so that their reports and data 
were rated higher or it could mean that IR Managers group produced fewer reports and 
less data and see it as a less significant part of their job. IR Managers also had high 
means in the respect they receive from administrators and in their role in defining the 
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institution for external constituents. Within the IR office, both groups indicated that they 
had the most influence over how their work is conducted and how their data is presented.  
 
Table 17.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description  
 Job Description n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making IR Staff 29 2.90 1.372 .377 -.499 
 IR Manager 66 3.59 1.549 -.124 -.972 
I want to be more involved in the decision-
making process 
IR Staff 
29 3.79 1.497 .174 -1.021 
 IR Manager 67 4.42 1.509 -.724 -.400 
Institutional researchers should be change 
agents who provide solutions to problems 
IR Staff 
29 3.93 1.646 -.347 -1.019 
 IR Manager 67 4.39 1.243 -.639 .257 
I include a subjective component in my outputs IR Staff 28 2.82 1.634 .473 -.950 
 IR Manager 66 2.97 1.189 .060 -.949 
Active combined score IR Staff 28 3.37 1.102 -.007 -.715 
 IR Manager 65 3.83 .874 -.460 -.391 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective IR Staff 29 4.72 1.099 -.446 -.331 
 IR Manager 67 4.87 1.028 -.929 .489 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-
making process other than providing 
information 
IR Staff 
29 3.10 1.633 .192 -1.253 
 IR Manager 67 2.46 1.531 .922 -.181 
The work of IR should be free of personal 
philosophy and politics 
IR Staff 
29 4.93 1.280 -.851 -.647 
 IR Manager 67 4.82 1.230 -.755 -.573 
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
IR Staff 
29 4.79 1.424 -1.203 .705 
 IR Manager 67 4.58 1.130 -.794 .550 
Passive combined score IR Staff 29 4.38 .838 -.372 .246 
 IR Manager 67 4.18 .751 .353 -.095 
Total combined score IR Staff 28 3.00 .802 -.033 .325 
 IR Manager 65 3.31 .652 -.614 .229 
IR is a powerful resource for decision makers IR Staff 29 5.48 .911 -1.771 2.262 
 IR Manager 66 5.52 .864 -2.856 11.263 
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Table 17.2 
Will to Influence: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig. 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Between Groups 9.714 1 9.714 4.300 .039 
 Within Groups 208.644 93 2.243   
 Total 218.358 94    
I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process 
Between Groups 7.901 1 7.901 3.486 .052 
 Within Groups 213.057 94 2.267   
 Total 220.958 95    
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
Between Groups 4.227 1 4.227 2.235 .252 
 Within Groups 177.773 94 1.891   
 Total 182.000 95    
I include a subjective component in my outputs Between Groups .432 1 .432 .242 .451 
 Within Groups 164.047 92 1.783   
 Total 164.479 93    
Active combined score Between Groups 4.065 1 4.065 4.528 .068 
 Within Groups 81.701 91 .898   
 Total 85.766 92    
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Between Groups .405 1 .405 .368 .492 
 Within Groups 103.584 94 1.102   
 Total 103.990 95    
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making 
process other than providing information 
Between Groups 8.310 1 8.310 3.406 .066 
 Within Groups 229.346 94 2.440   
  Total 237.656 95    
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy 
and politics 
Between Groups .246 1 .246 .158 .571 
 Within Groups 145.713 94 1.550   
 Total 145.958 95    
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Between Groups .901 1 .901 .601 .176 
 Within Groups 141.057 94 1.501   
 Total 141.958 95    
Passive combined score Between Groups .851 1 .851 1.403 .158 
 Within Groups 57.021 94 .607   
 Total 57.872 95    
Total combined score Between Groups 1.899 1 1.899 3.870 .046 
 Within Groups 44.660 91 .491   
 Total 46.559 92    
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Between Groups .021 1 .021 .027 .900 
 Within Groups 71.726 93 .771   
 Total 71.747 94    
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Table 17.3 
Amount of Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job Description n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets IR Staff 29 3.79 1.677 -.235 -1.002 
 IR Manager 66 3.53 1.480 -.252 -.823 
Resource allocation IR Staff 29 3.72 1.461 -.441 -.721 
 IR Manager 66 3.79 1.387 -.320 -.515 
Retention issues IR Staff 29 4.93 1.252 -1.153 .374 
 IR Manager 66 5.02 1.015 -1.396 3.156 
Program review IR Staff 29 4.90 1.345 -1.122 .137 
 IR Manager 66 4.80 1.180 -1.170 1.567 
Curriculum IR Staff 29 3.38 1.590 .065 -1.089 
 IR Manager 66 3.23 1.200 -.070 -.289 
Student success programs IR Staff 29 4.66 1.370 -1.021 .365 
 IR Manager 66 4.79 1.234 -1.505 2.408 
 
Table 17.4 
Amount of Influence: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig. 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Between Groups 1.391 1 1.391 .585 .456 
 Within Groups 221.198 93 2.378   
 Total 222.589 94    
Resource allocation Between Groups .082 1 .082 .041 .934 
 Within Groups 184.823 93 1.987   
 Total 184.905 94    
Retention issues Between Groups .143 1 .143 .120 .888 
 Within Groups 110.847 93 1.192   
 Total 100.989 94    
Program review Between Groups .176 1 .176 .116 .444 
 Within Groups 141.129 93 1.518   
 Total 141.305 94    
Curriculum Between Groups .466 1 .466 .263 .681 
 Within Groups 164.418 93 1.768   
 Total 164.884 94    
Student success programs Between Groups .355 1 .355 .218 .798 
 Within Groups 151.582 93 1.630   
 Total 151.937 94    
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Table 17.5 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job Description n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-making IR Staff  29 5.07 1.252 -1.313 .785 
 IR Manager 67 4.76 1256 -.901 .207 
My data are often used in decision-making IR Staff 29 5.03 1.267 -1.200 .450 
 IR Manager 66 4.94 1.108 -.788 -.433 
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
IR Staff 29 3.31 1.628 -.008 -1.315 
 IR Manager 67 3.96 1.451 -.350 -.963 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and work IR Staff 29 3.97 1.349 -.308 -.466 
 IR Manager 66 3.98 1.353 -.126 -.738 
Administrators respect my opinion and work IR Staff 29 4.55 1.152 -.662 -.094 
 IR Manager 66 4.80 1.140 -.949 .070 
Projects and/or departments have lost funding 
because of my reports 
IR Staff 29 2.28 1.461 .884 -.175 
 IR Manager 64 2.23 1.269 .696 -.632 
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
IR Staff 29 3.38 1.545 -.381 -1.048 
 IR Manager 65 3.52 1.491 -.470 -.923 
My reporting defines our institution to external 
constituents 
IR Staff 29 4.03 1.721 -.418 -1.081 
 IR Manager 66 4.73 1.296 -.959 .412 
My reporting defines our institution to internal 
constituents 
IR Staff 28 4.43 1.526 -.932 .085 
 IR Manager 65 4.45 1.358 -.751 -.161 
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
IR Staff 29 3.79 1.634 -.223 -1.117 
 IR Manager 66 4.20 1.521 -.642 -.491 
I help identify issues on campus IR Staff 29 3.66 1.565 -.339 -.870 
 IR Manager 65 4.18 1.402 -.586 -.391 
I help identify excellence/success on campus IR Staff 29 3.66 1.758 -.150 -1.190 
 IR Manager 64 4.30 1.388 -.961 .562 
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoints of a group 
IR Staff 29 3.34 1.758 .531 -1.145 
 IR Manager 67 3.45 1.530 -.068 -1.013 
Ability to Influence Combined score IR Staff 29 3.88 .975 .021 -.682 
 IR Manager 67 4.11 .896 -.553 -.269 
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Table 17.6 
Ability to Influence: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis Sig. 
My reports are often used in decision-making Between Groups 1.917 1 1.917 1.217 .179 
 Within Groups 148.041 94 1.575   
 Total 149.958 95    
My data are often used in decision-making Between Groups .182 1 .182 .136 .467 
 Within Groups 124.723 93 1.341   
 Total 124.905 94    
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Between Groups 8.417 1 8.417 3.713 .070 
 Within Groups 213.073 94 2.267   
 Total 221.490 95    
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Between Groups .008 1 .008 .004 .987 
 Within Groups 169.950 93 1.827   
 Total 169.958 94    
Administrators respect my opinion and work Between Groups 1.272 1 1.272 .973 .236 
 Within Groups 121.612 93 1.308   
 Total 122.884 94    
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .034 1 .034 .019 .910 
 Within Groups 161.277 91 1.772   
 Total 161.312 92    
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .414 1 .414 .182 .671 
 Within Groups 209.043 92 2.272   
 Total 209.457 93    
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Between Groups 9.670 1 9.670 4.682 .079 
 Within Groups 192.056 93 2.065   
 Total 201.726 94    
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Between Groups .006 1 .006 .003 .890 
 Within Groups 180.919 91 1.988   
 Total 180.925 92    
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Between Groups 3.286 1 3.286 1.357 .260 
 Within Groups 225.198 93 2.421   
 Total 228.484 94    
I help identify issues on campus Between Groups 5.621 1 5.621 2.661 .126 
 Within Groups 194.336 92 2.112   
 Total 199.597 93    
I help identify excellence/success on campus Between Groups 8.218 1 8.218 3.597 .091 
 Within Groups 207.911 91 2.285   
 Total 216.129 92    
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoints of a group 
Between Groups .214 1 .214 .084 .635 
 Within Groups 241.119 94 2.565   
 Total 241.333 95    
Ability to Influence Combined score Between Groups 1.129 1 1.129 1.331 .237 
 Within Groups 79.741 94 .848   
 Total 80.870 95    
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Table 17.7  
IR Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics by Job Description 
 
Job Description n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on IR Staff 29 3.52 1.271 -.322 -.470 
 IR Manager 67 4.16 1.238 -.470 -.487 
How your research is conducted IR Staff 29 4.41 1.402 -.813 -.014 
 IR Manager 67 4.99 1.121 -.834 -.429 
When your work is due IR Staff 29 3.07 1.252 .214 -.253 
 IR Manager 67 3.54 1.247 -.015 -.654 
How your data are interpreted IR Staff 29 3.38 1.293 -.033 -.679 
 IR Manager 67 4.06 1.455 -.472 -.865 
How your data are presented IR Staff 29 4.38 1.347 -.759 .034 
 IR Manager 67 4.67 1.160 -1.003 .841 
How your budget is spent IR Staff 29 2.34 1.565 .580 -1.292 
 IR Manager 66 4.39 1.654 -.976 -.186 
 
Table 17.8  
IR Control Over Their Own Work: ANOVA by Job Description 
 
Source SS df MS F 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Sig. 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Between Groups 8.471 1 8.471 5.438 .023 
 Within Groups 146.435 94 1.558   
 Total 154.906 95    
How your research is conducted Between Groups 6.605 1 6.605 4.499 .052 
 Within Groups 138.020 94 1.468   
When your work is due Total 144.625 95    
 Between Groups 4.440 1 4.440   
 Within Groups 146.519 94 1.559 2.848 .101 
 Total 150.958 95    
How your data are interpreted Between Groups 9.370 1 9.370 4.720 .024 
 Within Groups 186.589 94 1.985   
 Total 195.958 95    
How your data are presented Between Groups 1.730 1 1.730 1.165 .338 
 Within Groups 139.604 94 1.485   
 Total 141.333 95    
How your budget is spent Between Groups 84.596 1 84.896 31.941 .000 
 Within Groups 246.309 93 2.648   
 Total 330.905 94    
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IR Managers by Institutional Type Will and Ability Comparison 
 Only two of the four active will to influence statements had means over 3.50 
when IR managers of public institutions were compared to IR managers of private 
institutions. The statement “Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems” had a mean of 4.37 and a leptokurtic distribution of .331 
for the Public Manager group. The Private Manager group had a mean of 4.52 and a 
slightly more leptokurtic distribution of .897 for the same statement. The other statement 
with a mean above 3.50 was “I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process.” The mean for the Public Manager group was 4.30 with a slight platykurtic 
distribution of -.435 whereas the Private Manager group’s mean was 4.40 with a 
distribution of -.685. Neither group considered themselves to be active participants in 
decision-making as the mean for the Public Manager group was 3.41 with a distribution 
of -.801 and the mean for the Private Manager group was 3.50 with a distribution of -
.835. Adding subjective components to outputs was something else, neither group 
engaged in as indicated by the low means of 2.92 for the Public Managers and 2.84 for 
the Private Managers. The Public Manager groups’ Active Combined score was 3.74 with 
a range of 3.50, a minimum of 1.50, and a maximum of 5.00. For the Private Manager 
group, the mean was 3.79, the range was 3.00, the minimum was 2.25, and the maximum 
was 5.25. None of the statements that measured the will to influence decisions had a 
difference of means that was statistically significant; although it appeared that the Private 
Manager group had slightly more desire to influence decisions than the Public Manager 
group.  
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 At the same time, the Private Manager group also reported being more passive in 
the decision making process as their means were higher on all of the passive statements. 
The statement with the highest means was “My outputs are always objective” with means 
of 4.67 for the Public Managers and 5.12 for the Private Managers. Both distributions 
were slightly leptokurtic. “The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and 
politics” had means of 4.48 for the Public Managers and 5.04 for the Private Managers. It 
was the second highest for the Private Managers but only third for the Public Managers. 
The Public Managers had more variety in their distribution, which was -1.075 compared 
to -.550 for the Private Managers group. The Public Managers felt more strongly that IR 
had served its purpose when it provided information and stimulated reflection. Their 
mean was 4.56 with a mesokurtic distribution of -.066 compared to a mean of 4.64 and a 
moderate platykurtic distribution of -1.107 for the Private Managers. Again, both groups 
expressed their desire to be involved in decision-making by having low means in the 
statement “I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making process other than 
providing information.” The Public Manager’s mean was 2.37 while the Private Manager 
group’s was 2.76. The Passive Combined score was 4.01 for the Public Manager group 
with a narrow range of 2.25, a low of 3.00 and a high of 5.25. The Mean for the Private 
Manager group was 4.39 with a range of 3.00, a low of 3.00 and a high of 6.00. Despite 
having a lower Active combined score, the Public Manager group had a higher Total 
Combined mean, which indicated an overall desire to be more active. Their mean was 
3.35 with a range of 2.63, a low of 1.75 and a high of 4.38 whereas the Private Manager 
group had a mean of 3.17, a range of 2.25, a low of 1.63, and a high of 3.88. Both groups 
 254 
 
strongly felt that IR was a powerful resource for decision-makers (see Table 18.1 for the 
descriptive data and Table 18.2 for the results of the ANOVA).  
 Both the Public Manager group and the Private Manager group felt strongly that 
they should be involved in retention issues. The means for this statement were 4.96 and 
5.08 respectively. The Public Manager group’s distribution was a moderate 1.260 but the 
Private Manager group’s distribution was a strong 5.458. Both groups also felt strongly 
about being involved with student success programs and program reviews. For student 
success programs, the mean was 4.77 for the Public Managers and 4.76 for the Private 
Managers and both had strong leptokurtic distributions of 2.328 and 2.695. On program 
reviews, the mean was 4.42 for the Public Managers and 4.92 for the Private Managers. 
The Private Managers group had a strong leptokurtic distribution of 3.743 but the Public 
Manager’s distribution was only .394. The groups felt less strongly about establishing 
budgets and resource allocations with means between 3.50 and 3.95. There was, however, 
a statistically significant difference of means, at the .05 level for involvement in 
curriculum issues, F(1,49)=4.611, p=.037. The effect size was small (eta-squared=.086). 
The Public Manager group’s mean was 2.92 compared to 3.64 for the Private Manager 
group. Both distributions were mildly platykurtic (see Tables 18.3 and 18.4 for the 
complete statistics).  
When it comes to the ability to influence decisions, the Private Manager group 
had a higher mean on seven statements, the Public group had higher means on four 
statements, and the two groups were near equal on three statements. There were no 
differences in means that were statistically significant at the .05 level. The Private 
Managers had higher means on the statements regarding the use of their data and reports 
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for decision making. Their mean was 4.80 with a moderately platykurtic distribution, -
1.253, for the use of reports compared to 4.48 for the Public manager group with a slight 
platykurtic distribution, -.356. The highest of all the statements, with a mean of 5.00, was 
for the use of data in decision- making for the Private Managers. For the same statement, 
the Public group mean was 4.69 and both groups’ distribution were nearly equal. Neither 
group felt that their opinion was considered in decision-making with means of 3.81 for 
the Public Managers and 3.92 for the Private Managers. For this statement, the Public 
Managers showed less agreement with distribution of -1.104 compared to -.724 for the 
Private Managers group. Again, the Private Manager group showed higher means for 
faculty and administrators respecting their opinion and work. Both groups felt like they 
received more respect from administrators than faculty. The Public Managers had higher 
means for the statement regarding departments and/or projects receiving or losing 
funding because of their work, although neither statement for either group was very high. 
The mean for departments receiving funding was 3.52 for the Public Manager group and 
3.29 for the Private Manager group who also had greater distribution in their responses. 
Both groups had low means for identifying issues on compass but the Private Manager 
group was slightly higher, 4.12 compared to 3.93 but they were near equal on identifying 
excellence or success, (Public Manager  M= 4.19, Private Manager M=4.17). The Public 
Manager group felt more strongly that their reports defined their institution to external 
constituents with a mean of 4.96, which was the highest mean for the Public Managers 
and had a mild leptokurtic distribution of .863. For the same statements, the Private 
Manager group’s mean was 4.64 with a distribution of -.255. The two groups were nearly 
equal on defining their institutions for internal constituents, 4.46 and 4.44. The last area 
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in which the Public group reported a higher mean was in providing data to support a 
particular group’s viewpoint but the mean was only barely above the midpoint range at 
3.56. The moderate platykurtic distribution, -1.068 indicated that some Public Managers 
were asked to be involved with campus politics. The mean for the Private Managers was 
3.32 with a mild platykurtic distribution, -.782. The last area for which the Private 
Manager group reported having more ability to influence was in helping to frame 
research questions. Their mean was 4.24 compared to the Public Manager group’s mean 
of 3.81. The Public Managers also had a broader distribution, -1.040. On the Ability to 
Influence Combined score measure, the means for the two groups were very close. The 
mean for the Public Manager group was 4.04 with a mild platykurtic distribution of -.556, 
and the mean for the Private Manager group was 4.08 with a slight leptokurtic 
distribution of .127. The range for combined scores for the Public Manager group was 
3.28 with a low of 1.92 and a high of 5.31. For the Private Manager group, the range was 
3.44 with a low of 2.31 and a high of 5.75 (see Tables 18.5 and 18.6 for the 
corresponding descriptive statistics and ANOVA results). 
The Private Managers reported having more control over all measured areas of 
their work. How their work is conducted was the area with the highest means of 5.20 and 
a mild leptokurtic distribution, 1.350. The mean for the Public Managers was 4.59 with a 
mild platykurtic distribution of -.645. The difference in means was statistically significant 
at the .05 level, F(1,50)-4.237, p=.045. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .07). How 
the budget is spent was the next highest and also had a statistically significant difference 
in means, F(1,49)=6.975, p=.011. The effect size was small (eta-squared= .12). The mean 
for the Private Manager group was 5.00 compared to the Public Manager group at 3.92. 
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The Private Managers were also in strong agreement as their distribution was 3.436. The 
Private Managers were also in good agreement over how their data was presented with a 
leptokurtic distribution of 2.681 around the mean of 4.64. The mean for the Public 
Managers was 4.53 with a mild platykurtic distribution of -.509. The remaining areas of 
control had means below the 4.0 mark with the exception of what projects the Private 
group worked on. The means for that statement was 4.44. The remaining means, in 
descending order are what projects IR works on, how data are interpreted, and when their 
work was due (the complete descriptive statistics for the areas of control can be found on 
Table 18.7 while the ANOVA results can be found on Table 18.8) 
In general, the Public and Private Manager groups were very similar. Although 
the Private Managers had a slightly higher combined active score, they were considerably 
higher on the passive combined score so that the total combined score for the Public 
Manager group was higher than the Private Managers. The Public Managers indicated 
that they were slightly more subjective, less objective and perhaps more open to IR 
moving beyond the traditional role of just providing data for discussion. Retention issues 
and student success programs were areas that both groups felt were important to be 
involved in but they differed significantly on their involvement with curriculum issues. 
The Private Manager group was much more interested in being involved in this area. The 
data and reports were the ways both groups reported to have the most ability to influence 
decisions but the Public Manager group had more influence in programs receiving or 
losing funding. They were also more likely to be used as a resource in campus politics by 
providing supporting data. The two groups were very close on the Ability to Influence 
combined score. There were differences between how much control they had in their own 
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areas. How research was conducted and how the budget was spent were the two areas 
where the difference was statistically significant with the Private Managers having the 
higher means. Overall, the Private Managers reported more control over all of the various 
areas related to their work.  
Table 18.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Manager Type n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Public Manager 27 3.41 1.500 -.103 -.801 
 Private Manager 24 3.50 1.383 -.269 -.835 
I want to be more involved in the decision-
making process 
Public Manager 27 4.30 1.564 -.730 -.435 
 Private Manager 25 4.40 1.658 -.644 -.685 
Institutional researchers should be change 
agents who provide solutions to problems 
Public Manager 27 4.37 1.334 -.748 .331 
 Private Manager 25 4.52 1.262 -.860 .897 
I include a subjective component in my 
outputs 
Public Manager 26 2.92 1.294 .033 -1.127 
 Private Manager 25 2.84 1.068 .120 -.868 
Active combined score Public Manager 26 3.74 .973 -.594 -.557 
 Private Manager 24 3.79 .761 -.424 .-.443 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Public Manager 27 4.67 1.109 -.913 .758 
 Private Manager 25 5.12 .971 -1.146 .685 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-
making process other than providing 
information 
Public Manager 27 2.37 1.497 1.013 .093 
 Private Manager 25 2.76 1.715 .675 -.668 
The work of IR should be free of personal 
philosophy and politics 
Public Manager 27 4.48 1.397 -.507 -1.075 
 Private Manager 25 5.04 .978 -.666 -.550 
IR has served its purpose when it has 
provided information and stimulated 
reflection 
Public Manager 27 4.56 1.050 -.481 -.066 
 Private Manager 25 4.64 1.075 -.286 -1.107 
Passive combined score Public Manager 27 4.01 .616 .291 -.554 
 Private Manager 25 4.39 .794 .626 -.185 
Total combined score Public Manager 26 3.35 .641 -.814 .354 
 Private Manager 24 3.17 .667 -1.112 .252 
IR is a powerful resource for decision 
makers 
Public Manager 27 5.33 1.074 -2.748 9.797 
 Private Manager 24 5.50 .780 -1.798 3.499 
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Table 18.2 
Will to Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Between Groups .109 1 .109 .052 .820 
 Within Groups 102.519 49 2.092   
 Total 102.627 50    
I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process 
Between Groups .140 1 .140 .054 .817 
 Within Groups 129.630 50 2.593   
 Total 129.769 51    
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
Between Groups .291 1 .291 .172 .680 
 Within Groups 84.536 50 1.691   
 Total 84.827 51    
I include a subjective component in my outputs Between Groups .088 1 .088 .062 .804 
 Within Groups 69.206 49 1.412   
 Total 69.294 50    
Active combined score Between Groups .033 1 .033 .043 .837 
 Within Groups 37.018 48 .771   
 Total 37.051 49    
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Between Groups 2.668 1 2.668 2.441 .124 
 Within Groups 54.640 50 1.093   
 Total 57.308 51    
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making 
process other than providing information 
Between Groups 1.971 1 1.971 .765 .386 
 Within Groups 128.856 50 2.577   
  Total 130.827 51    
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy 
and politics 
Between Groups 4.049 1 4.049 2.747 .104 
 Within Groups 73.701 50 1.474   
 Total 77.750 51    
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Between Groups .093 1 .093 .082 .776 
 Within Groups 56.427 50 1.129   
 Total 56.519 51    
Passive combined score Between Groups 1.791 1 1.791 3.583 .064 
 Within Groups 25.001 50 .500   
 Total 26.792 51    
Total combined score Between Groups .422 1 .422 .986 .326 
 Within Groups 20.547 48 .428   
 Total 20.969 49    
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Between Groups .353 1 .353 .939 .534 
 Within Groups 44.000 49 .898   
 Total 44.353 50    
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Table 18.3 
Amount of Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 
Manager Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Public Manager 26 3.81 1.524 -.457 -.628 
  Private Manager 25 3.52 1.229 -.563 -.450 
Resource allocation Public Manager 26 3.92 1.440 -.726 .137 
 Private Manager 25 3.92 1.288 -.348 -.439 
Retention issues Public Manager 26 4.96 1.038 -1.079 1.260 
 Private Manager 25 5.08 1.152 -1.946 5.458 
Program review Public Manager 26 4.42 1.270 -.765 .394 
 Private Manager 25 4.92 1.187 -1.619 3.734 
Curriculum Public Manager 26 2.92 .935 -.475 -.567 
 Private Manager 25 3.64 1.411 -.456 -.215 
Student success programs Public Manager 26 4.77 1.275 -1.539 2.328 
 Private Manager 25 4.76 1.393 -1.645 2.695 
 
Table 18.4 
Amount of Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Between Groups 1.055 1 1.055 .548 .436 
 Within Groups 94.278 49 1.924   
 Total 95.333 50    
Resource allocation Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 .994 
 Within Groups 91.686 49 1.871   
 Total 91.686 50    
Retention issues Between Groups .179 1 .179 .149 .701 
 Within Groups 58.802 49 1.200   
 Total 58.980 50    
Program review Between Groups 3.147 1 3.147 2.079 .156 
 Within Groups 74.786 49 1.514   
 Total 77.333 50    
Curriculum Between Groups 6.551 1 6.551 4.611 .037 
 Within Groups 69.606 49 1.421   
 Total 76.157 50    
Student success programs Between Groups .001 1 .001 .001 .980 
 Within Groups 87.175 49 1.779   
 Total 87.176 50    
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Table 18.5 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 
Manager Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-
making 
Public Manager 
27 4.48 1.503 -.842 -.356 
 Private Manager 25 4.80 1.118 -.350 -1.253 
My data are often used in decision-making Public Manager 26 4.69 1.225 -.626 -.741 
 Private Manager 25 5.00 1.118 -.778 -.743 
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Public Manager 27 3.81 1.545 -.342 -1.104 
 Private Manager 25 3.92 1.382 -.257 -.724 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Public Manager 
27 3.96 1.400 -.020 -.777 
 Private Manager 25 4.12 1.301 .007 -.926 
Administrators respect my opinion and 
work 
Public Manager 
27 4.78 1.155 -.825 -.151 
 Private Manager 25 4.88 1.013 -1.310 1.888 
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Public Manager 27 2.48 1.369 .285 -1.230 
 Private Manager 23 2.00 1.206 1.022 .157 
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Public Manager 27 3.52 1.553 -.370 -.783 
 Private Manager 24 3.29 1.459 -.465 -1.026 
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Public Manager 27 4.96 1.055 -.981 .863 
 Private Manager 25 4.64 1.440 -.760 -.255 
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Public Manager 26 4.46 1.272 -.601 -.409 
 Private Manager 25 4.44 1.387 -.680 -.015 
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Public Manager 27 3.81 1.688 -.464 -1.040 
 Private Manager 25 4.24 1.393 -.467 -.193 
I help identify issues on campus Public Manager 27 3.93 1.517 -.365 -.847 
 Private Manager 25 4.12 1.333 -.581 .144 
I help identify excellence/success on 
campus 
Public Manager 
27 4.19 1.442 -.848 .039 
 Private Manager 24 4.17 1.551 -.912 .298 
I am often asked to provide data that 
supports the particular viewpoints of a 
group 
Public Manager 27 3.56 1.528 -.218 -1.068 
 Private Manager 25 3.32 1.626 .256 -.782 
Ability to Influence Combined score Public Manager 27 4.03 1.027 -.701 -.556 
 Private Manager 25 4.08 .809 -.105 .127 
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Table 18.6 
Ability to Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
My reports are often used in decision-making Between Groups 1.317 1 1.317 .742 .393 
 Within Groups 88.741 50 1.775   
 Total 90.058 51    
My data are often used in decision-making Between Groups 1.207 1 1.207 .875 .354 
 Within Groups 67.538 49 1.378   
 Total 68.745 50    
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Between Groups .144 1 .144 .067 .797 
 Within Groups 107.914 50 2.158   
 Total 108.058 51    
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Between Groups .320 1 .320 .175 .678 
 Within Groups 91.603 50 1.832   
 Total 91.923 51    
Administrators respect my opinion and work Between Groups .136 1 .136 .114 .737 
 Within Groups 59.307 50 1.186   
 Total 59.442 51    
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups 2.879 1 2.879 1.712 .197 
 Within Groups 80.741 48 1.682   
 Total 83.620 49    
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups .654 1 .654 .287 .595 
 Within Groups 111.699 49 2.280   
 Total 112.353 50    
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Between Groups 1.354 1 1.354 .860 .358 
 Within Groups 78.723 50 1.574   
 Total 80.077 51    
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Between Groups .006 1 .006 .003 .954 
 Within Groups 86.622 49 1.768   
 Total 86.627 50    
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Between Groups 2.347 1 2.347 .973 .329  
 Within Groups 120.634 50 2.413   
 Total 122.981 51    
I help identify issues on campus Between Groups .489 1 .489 .239 .627 
 Within Groups 102.492 50 2.050   
 Total 102.981 51    
I help identify excellence/success on campus Between Groups .004 1 .004 .002 .965 
 Within Groups 109.407 49 2.233   
 Total 109.412 50    
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoints of a group 
Between Groups .720 1 .720 .290 .592 
 Within Groups 124.107 50 2.482   
 Total 124.827 51    
Ability to Influence Combined score Between Groups .028 1 .028 .033 .857 
 Within Groups 43.171 50 .863   
 Total 43.200 51    
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Table 18.7 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Institutional 
Type 
 
Manager Type n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Public Manager 27 3.93 1.141 .322 -.627 
 Private Manager 25 4.44 1.158 -1.506 2.472 
How your research is conducted Public Manager 27 4.59 1.152 -.407 -.645 
 Private Manager 25 5.20 .957 -1.362 1.350 
When your work is due Public Manager 27 3.37 1.182 -.345 -.547 
 Private Manager 25 3.52 1.229 -.123 -1.047 
How your data are interpreted Public Manager 27 3.89 1.502 -.238 -1.114 
 Private Manager 25 3.96 1.457 -.628 -.617 
How your data are presented Public Manager 27 4.52 1.221 -.594 -.509 
 Private Manager 25 4.64 1.221 -1.624 2.681 
How your budget is spent Public Manager 26 3.92 1.647 -.740 -.702 
 Private Manager 25 5.00 1.225 -1.627 3.436 
 
Table 18.8 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: ANOVA IR Managers by Institutional Type 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Between Groups 3.430 1 3.430 2.598 .113 
 Within Groups 66.012 50 1.320   
 Total 69.442 51    
How your research is conducted Between Groups 4.789 1 4.789 4.237 .045 
 Within Groups 56.519 50 1.130   
 Total 61.308 51    
When your work is due Between Groups .291 1 .291 .200 .656 
 Within Groups 72.536 50 1.451   
 Total 72.827 51    
How your data are interpreted Between Groups .066 1 .066 .030 .863 
 Within Groups 109.627 50 2.193   
 Total 109.692 51    
How your data are presented Between Groups .192 1 .192 .129 .721 
 Within Groups 74.501 50 1.490   
 Total 74.692 51    
How your budget is spent Between Groups 14.781 1 14.781 6.975 .011 
 Within Groups 103.846 49 2.119   
 Total 118.627 50    
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IR Managers by Experience Will and Ability Comparison 
 The final comparison for the will and the ability to influence decisions examines 
the differences between IR managers with 13 years of IR experience or less, called the 
“Less Time” group, with IR managers with 13 years of IR experience or more, called the 
“More Time” group. While there was only one statement measuring the will to influence 
that had a statistically significant difference in means, there were some trending 
differences. The Less Time group had higher means for all of the active statements but 
one while the More Time group had higher means for all of the passive statements. The 
one active statement in which the More Time group had a higher mean was “I am an 
active participant in decision-making.” The More Time group’s mean was 3.70 with a 
mild platykurtic distribution of -.689 while the Less Time group mean was under the 
midpoint mark at 3.48 with a moderate distribution of -1.221. As might be expected, the 
Less Time group indicated that they want to be more involved in the decision making 
process more that the More Time group did. The Less Time mean was 4.61 with a slight 
leptokurtic distribution compared to a mean of 4.25 and mild platykurtic distribution of -
.838 for the More Time group. There was a moderate level of agreement for the Less 
Time group that IR staff should act as change agents. The distribution was 1.093 with a 
mean of 4.52. Managers in the More Time group were less inclined to agree with a 
distribution of -.123 and a mean of 4.26. Neither group felt strongly about including a 
subjective component to their outputs but the difference in means was statistically 
significant at the .05 level, F(1,64)=6.712, p=.012. The effect size was small (eta-
squared=.09). The mean for the Less Time group was only 3.33 but the mean for the 
More Time group was even lower, 2.61. Both distributions were mildly platykurtic. 
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Managers with less experience had a higher mean on the Active combined score, 3.98 
and a slight leptokurtic distribution of .293. Their range of combined scores was smaller 
than the More Time group, 3.25 with a low of 2.25 and a high of 5.50. The mean for the 
More Time group was 3.76 with a slight platykurtic distribution of -.347. Their range was 
3.75, the low was 1.50 and the high was 5.25 (Tables 19.1 and 19.2 have the descriptive 
statistics and ANOVA results for the active will statements).  
 Corresponding to the their lower means on the active statements, the More Time 
group had higher means on all of the passive will statements than the Less Time group, 
with one exception. The two groups’ means on the statement “I prefer not to be involved 
in the decision-making process other than providing information” were near equal; the 
mean for the Less Time group was 2.48 and the mean for the More Time group was 2.44. 
Two statements had a mean of 4.91 in the More Time group: “My outputs are always 
objective” and “The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and politics.”  By 
comparison, the Less Time group mean was 4.82 for the first statement and 4.73 for the 
second. The objective statement had mild leptokurtic distributions for both groups. For 
the philosophy and politics statements, the Less Time group was in moderate 
disagreement with a platykurtic distribution of -1.040 compared to -.256 for the More 
Time group. The remaining statement, “IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection” revealed a wider difference between the groups. 
The Less Time group’s mean was 4.39 with mild leptokurtic agreement whereas the 
More Time group’s mean was 4.76 and mild platykurtic disagreement. The Passive 
Combined score for the Less Time group was 4.10 with a range of 3.50, a low of 2.50 and 
a high of 6.00. The mean for the More Time group was 4.25 with a range of 3.00, a low 
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of 3.00 and a high of 6.00. Overall, for the will to influence, the Total Combined score 
was 3.43 for the Less Time group with a mesokurtic distribution of .059. Their range of 
combined scores was 2.75 with a low of 1.88 and a high of 4.63. For the More Time 
group, the mean was a low 3.17, also with a mesokurtic distribution, -.064. Their range 
was narrower at 2.38 with a low of 1.63 and a high of 4.00. As with the rest of the study, 
both groups felt that IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers. The mean for the 
Less Time group was 5.61 with a slight leptokurtic distribution. The More Time group’s 
mean was lower, 5.42, but they had a much stronger level of agreement with a 
distribution of 10.681 (see Tables 19.1 and 19.2 for the complete statistics).  
 Even though the more experienced IR managers indicated being more passive in 
their will to influence decisions, in terms of rating the amount of participation IR should 
have in budgets, resource allocations, retention issues, program review, curriculum, and 
student success, the More Time group had higher means than the Less Time group in 
every area. Retention was the area with the highest rating with means of 4.91 for the Less 
Time group and 5.12 for the More Time group. The Less Time group had a strong 
leptokurtic distribution of 4.084, but the More Time group was only moderate, 1.877. 
Participating in program reviews had moderate leptokurtic responses for both groups and 
means of 4.69 for the Less Time group and 4.91 for the More Time group. Student 
success programs had stronger leptokurtic responses of 2.372 and 2.949 respectively and 
means of 4.75 and 4.82. Establishing budgets, resource allocations, and curriculum all 
had means under 4.00 with platykurtic distributions. Curriculum issues had means for 
both groups under 3.35. None of the differences in means were statistically significant 
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(the complete statistics for the levels of participation ratings can be found on Tables 19.3 
and 19.4).  
 Although the Less Time group had more of a will to influence decision-making, 
the More Time group reported having more ability to influence decision-making as they 
had higher means in the majority of the ability to influence statements. However, none of 
the difference in the means were statistically significant at the .05 level. Institutional 
researchers’ data and reports had the most influence on decision-making based on their 
higher means. IR data statement was the higher of the two statements with a mean of 4.76 
for the Less Time group and 5.12 for the More Time group with both distributions being 
mildly platykurtic. The use of reports had slightly lower means of 4.70 and a kurtosis of -
.320 for the Less Time group compared to 4.82 and a moderate leptokurtic distribution of 
1.071 for the More Time group. Both groups felt strongly that administrators respected 
their opinion and work with means of 4.66 and 4.94, the Less Time group being the lower 
of the two. Respect from faculty was lower with means of 3.76 for the Less Time group 
and 4.21 for the More Time group who had a moderately platykurtic distribution of -
1.101. For the funding of projects and departments both groups felt they had little 
influence. The means for the loss of funding were below 2.50 and below 3.70, 
respectively, for receiving funding. The More Time group had a mean of 4.38 with a 
mesokurtic distribution for identifying issues on campus whereas the Less Time group 
mean was 4.06 with a mild platykurtic distribution. For identifying issues or excellence 
on campus, the Less Time group mean was 4.22 and the More Time group mean was 
4.38. Both groups had leptokurtic responses. The More Time group also had higher 
means for defining their institutions for internal and external constituents than the Less 
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Time group. The means for both groups on both statements were in the low to mid-4.0 
range. Framing research questions for decision-making was the one area where the Less 
Time group had the higher mean, 4.42 with a mesokurtic distribution compared to 3.97 
for the More Time group with a mild platykurtic distribution. IR managers indicated that 
they did not get involved with campus politics and were not asked to provide data to 
support specific viewpoints. The mean for the Smaller Institutions group was 3.27 and 
the mean for the More Time group was 3.62. The two groups were essentially equal when 
responding to the statement “My opinion is often considered in decision-making.” The 
Less Time group mean was 3.97 with a kurtosis of -1.012 compared to a mean of 3.94 
with a kurtosis of -.879 for the More Time group. Lastly, the More Time group had a 
higher mean on the Ability to Influence combined score. Their mean was 4.22 with a 
mesokurtic distribution, a range of 3.15, low of 2.31 and a high of 5.46. The mean for the 
Less Time was 4.00 with a range of 3.83, low of 1.92 and a high of 5.75 (Table 19.5 has 
the descriptive statistics for the ability to influence measure. Table 19.6 has the results of 
the ANOVA). 
 The ability to control their work had similar results to the ability to influence 
measures in that the More Time group felt they had more control than the Less Time 
group and there were no statistically significant differences. In order from the highest 
mean to the lowest, the areas of control for the Less Time group were how their research 
was conducted (4.85), how their data are presented (4.52), how their budget is spent 
(4.09), what projects they work on (4.09), how their data are interpreted (3.82), and when 
their work is due (3.70). Only the area of data presentation had a leptokurtic distribution, 
the other areas had mild to moderate platykurtic distributions. For the More Time group, 
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the order was similar, how their research is conducted (5.12), how their data is presented 
(4.82), how their budget is spent (4.70) and tied for fourth were what projects they work 
on and how their data is presented (4.29). The kurtosis for the More Time group ranged 
from -.770 to 1.534. Although there were no significant statistical differences, the More 
Time group felt they had more control over their work than the Less Time group (Tables 
19.7 and 19.8 have all the related statistics for these measures).  
 To summarize the comparison of the IR managers with 13 years of experience or 
less with those with 13 years of experience or more, the Less Time group demonstrated a 
desire to take a more active role in decision making compared to the More Time group, 
but the More Time group felt they were already more involved than the Less Time group. 
The Less Time group felt more strongly about being change agents and being subjective 
in their work, whereas the More Time group was more passive and felt stronger about IR 
being limited to providing information for discussion that was objective and free of 
personal philosophy and politics. Retention issues, program reviews and student success 
programs were the three areas both groups felt they should be involved with the most. 
Regarding their ability to influence decisions, the More Time group indicated that they 
had more ability in all areas except in helping to frame research questions for decision-
making. As with other comparison groups, the More Time group and the Less Time 
group felt that their data and reports were how they were most able to influence decisions 
and that funding issues was the least. How they conduct their research and how they 
present their data were areas over which both groups felt they had the most control.  
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Table 19.1 
Will to Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 
Manager 
Experience n M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Less Time 33 3.48 1.623 -.158 -1.221 
 More Time 33 3.70 1.489 -.046 -.689 
I want to be more involved in the decision-
making process 
Less Time 
33 4.61 1.345 -.938 .378 
 More Time 34 4.24 1.653 -.528 -.838 
Institutional researchers should be change 
agents who provide solutions to problems 
Less Time 
33 4.52 1.202 -.785 1.093 
 More Time 34 4.26 1.286 -.529 -.123 
I include a subjective component in my outputs Less Time 33 3.33 1.109 -.136 -.913 
 More Time 33 2.61 1.171 .350 -.698 
Active combined score Less Time 33 3.98 .838 -.595 .293 
 More Time 32 3.67 .894 -.340 -.347 
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Less Time 33 4.82 .983 -.874 .887 
 More Time 34 4.91 1.083 -1.031 .475 
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-
making process other than providing 
information 
Less Time 
33 2.48 1.482 .737 -.539 
 More Time 34 2.44 1.599 1.106 .217 
The work of IR should be free of personal 
philosophy and politics 
Less Time 
33 4.73 1.098 -.473 -1.040 
 More Time 34 4.91 1.357 -.992 -.256 
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Less Time 
33 4.39 1.298 -.711 .176 
 More Time 34 4.76 .923 -.479 -.412 
Passive combined score Less Time 33 4.10 .762 .370 .293 
 More Time 34 4.25 .744 .379 -.320 
Total combined score Less Time 33 3.43 .621 -.261 .059 
 More Time 32 3.17 .668 -.920 -.064 
IR is a powerful resource for decision makers Less Time 33 5.61 6.59 -1.465 .998 
 More Time 33 5.42 1.032 -2.965 10.681 
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Table 19.2 
Will to Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Active Statements 
I am an active participant in decision-making Between Groups .742 1 .742 .306 .582 
 Within Groups 155.212 64 2.425   
 Total 155.955 65    
I want to be more involved in the decision-making 
process 
Between Groups 2.302 1 2.302 1.011 .318 
 Within Groups 147.996 65 2.277   
 Total 150.299 66    
Institutional researchers should be change agents who 
provide solutions to problems 
Between Groups 1.050 1 1.050 .677 .414 
 Within Groups 100.860 65 1.552   
 Total 101.910 66    
I include a subjective component in my outputs Between Groups 8.727 1 8.727 6.712 .012 
 Within Groups 83.212 64 1.300   
 Total 91.939 65    
Active combined score Between Groups 1.591 1 1.591 2.210 .150 
 Within Groups 47.297 63 .751   
 Total 48.888 64    
Passive Statements 
My outputs are always objective Between Groups .147 1 .147 .137 .713 
 Within Groups 69.644 65 1.071   
 Total 69.791 66    
I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making 
process other than providing information 
Between Groups .032 1 .032 .013 .908 
 Within Groups 154.625 65 2.379   
  Total 154.657 66    
The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy 
and politics 
Between Groups .570 1 .570 .373 .543 
 Within Groups 99.281 65 1.527   
 Total 99.851 66    
IR has served its purpose when it has provided 
information and stimulated reflection 
Between Groups 2.302 1 2.302 1.825 .181 
 Within Groups 81.996 65 1.261   
 Total 84.299 66    
Passive combined score Between Groups .383 1 .383 .674 .414 
 Within Groups 36.939 65 .568   
 Total 37.323 66    
Total combined score Between Groups 1.096 1 1.096 2.636 .109 
 Within Groups 26.189 63 .416   
 Total 27.285 64    
IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers Between Groups .545 1 .545 .728 .397 
 Within Groups 47.939 64 .749   
 Total 48.485 65    
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Table 19.3 
Amount of Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 
Manager 
Experience n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Less Time 32 3.34 1.599 .051 -1.119 
 More Time 34 3.71 1.360 -.579 -.078 
Resource allocation Less Time 32 3.59 1.500 -.040 -.815 
 More Time 34 3.97 1.267 -.607 .265 
Retention issues Less Time 32 4.91 1.088 1.565 4.084 
 More Time 34 5.12 .946 -1.159 1.877 
Program review Less Time 32 4.69 1.148 -1.107 1.976 
 More Time 34 4.91 1.215 -1.329 1.850 
Curriculum Less Time 32 3.22 1.184 -.453 -.375 
 More Time 34 3.24 1.232 .244 -.111 
Student success programs Less Time 32 4.75 1.320 -1.482 2.372 
 More Time 34 4.82 1.167 -1.581 2.949 
       
 
Table 19.4 
Amount of Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
What amount of participation should IR have 
in… 
      
Establishing budgets Between Groups 2.162 1 2.162 .986 .324 
 Within Groups 140.278 64 2.192   
 Total 142.439 65    
Resource allocation Between Groups 2.341 1 2.341 1.221 .273 
 Within Groups 122.689 64 1.917   
 Total 125.030 65    
Retention issues Between Groups .737 1 .737 .712 .402 
 Within Groups 66.248 64 1.035   
 Total 66.985 65    
Program review Between Groups .829 1 .829 .592 .444 
 Within Groups 89.610 64 1.400   
 Total 90.439 65    
Curriculum Between Groups .005 1 .005 .003 .956 
 Within Groups 93.586 64 1.462   
 Total 93.591 65    
Student success programs Between Groups .089 1 .089 .058 .811  
 Within Groups 98.941 64 1.546   
 Total 99.030 65    
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Table 19.5 
Ability to Influence: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 
Manager 
Experience n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
My reports are often used in decision-making Less Time 33 4.70 1.287 -.795 -.320 
 More Time 34 4.82 1.242 -1.055 1.071 
My data are often used in decision-making Less Time 33 4.76 1.146 -.683 -.443 
 More Time 33 5.12 1.053 -.938 -.339 
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Less Time 33 3.97 1.447 -.406 -1.012 
 More Time 34 3.94 1.476 -.314 -.879 
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and work Less Time 33 3.76 1.393 -.128 -.578 
 More Time 33 4.21 1.293 -.052 -1.101 
Administrators respect my opinion and work Less Time 32 4.66 1.208 -.802 -.295 
 More Time 34 4.94 1.071 -1.134 .762 
Projects and/or departments have lost funding 
because of my reports 
Less Time 32 2.03 1.204 .882 -.353 
 More Time 32 2.44 1.318 .550 -.761 
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Less Time 33 3.36 1.578 -.292 -1.195 
 More Time 32 3.69 1.401 -.675 -.424 
My reporting defines our institution to external 
constituents 
Less Time 33 4.61 1.413 -.725 -.391 
 More Time 33 4.85 1.176 -1.285 2.157 
My reporting defines our institution to internal 
constituents 
Less Time 33 4.21 1.576 -.475 -.892 
 More Time 32 4.69 1.061 -.875 .874 
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Less Time 33 4.42 1.562 -.924 .031 
 More Time 33 3.97 1.468 -.449 -.646 
I help identify issues on campus Less Time 33 4.06 1.368 -.428 -.518 
 More Time 32 4.31 1.447 -.793 -.015 
I help identify excellence/success on campus Less Time 32 4.22 1.362 -.832 .376 
 More Time 32 4.38 1.431 -1.140 1.086 
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoints of a group 
Less Time 33 3.27 1.464 .194 -.868 
 More Time 34 3.62 1.596 -.323 -.937 
Ability to Influence Combined score Less Time 33 4.00 .937 -.409 -.300 
 More Time 34 4.22 .855 -.711 -.031 
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Table 19.6 
Ability to Influence: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
My reports are often used in decision-making Between Groups .268 1 .268 .168 .683 
 Within Groups 103.911 65 1.599   
 Total 104.179 66    
My data are often used in decision-making Between Groups 2.182 1 2.182 1.800 .184 
 Within Groups 77.576 64 1.212   
 Total 79.758 65    
My opinion is often considered in decision-
making 
Between Groups .014 1 .014 .006 .937 
 Within Groups 138.852 65 2.136   
 Total 138.866 66    
I feel that faculty respect my opinion and 
work 
Between Groups 3.409 1 3.409 1.888 .174 
 Within Groups 115.576 64 1.806   
 Total 118.985 65    
Administrators respect my opinion and work Between Groups 1.338 1 1.338 1.031 .314 
 Within Groups 83.101 64 1.298   
 Total 84.439 65    
Projects and/or departments have lost 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups 2.641 1 2.641 1.656 .203 
 Within Groups 98.844 62 1.594   
 Total 101.484 63    
Projects and/or departments have received 
funding because of my reports 
Between Groups 1.704 1 1.704 .764 .385 
 Within Groups 140.511 63 2.230   
 Total 142.215 64    
My reporting defines our institution to 
external constituents 
Between Groups .970 1 .970 .574 .451 
 Within Groups 108.121 64 1.689   
 Total 190.091 65    
My reporting defines our institution to 
internal constituents 
Between Groups 3.671 1 3.671 2.022 .160 
 Within Groups 114.390 63 1.816   
 Total 118.062 64    
I am involved in helping to frame research 
questions for decision-making 
Between Groups 3.409 1 3.409 1.484 .228 
 Within Groups 147.030 64 2.297   
 Total 150.439 65    
I help identify issues on campus Between Groups 1.031 1 1.031 .521 .473 
 Within Groups 124.754 63 1.980   
 Total 125.785 64    
I help identify excellence/success on campus Between Groups .391 1 .391 .200 .656 
 Within Groups 120.969 62 1.951   
 Total 121.359 63    
I am often asked to provide data that supports 
the particular viewpoints of a group 
Between Groups 1.992 1 1.992 .849 .360 
 Within Groups 152.575 65 2.347   
 Total 154.567 66    
Ability to Influence Combined score Between Groups .776 1 .776 .965 .330 
 Within Groups 52.294 65 .805   
 Total 53.070 66    
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Table 19.7 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: Descriptive Statistics IR Managers by Experience 
 
Manager 
Experience n M SD 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Less Time 33 4.03 1.262 -.259 -1.095 
 More Time 34 4.29 1.219 -.713 .482 
How your research is conducted Less Time 33 4.85 1.149 -.476 -1.226 
 More Time 34 5.12 1.094 -1.277 .993 
When your work is due Less Time 33 3.70 1.212 -.045 -.417 
 More Time 34 3.38 1.280 .048 -.770 
How your data are interpreted Less Time 33 3.82 1.530 -.176 -1.079 
 More Time 34 4.29 1.360 -.803 -.258 
How your data are presented Less Time 33 4.52 1.253 -.797 .579 
 More Time 34 4.82 1.058 -1.257 1.534 
How your budget is spent Less Time 33 4.09 1.739 -.756 -.763 
 More Time 33 4.70 1.531 -1.289 .983 
 
Table 19.8 
IR Control Over Their Own Work: ANOVA IR Managers by Experience 
 Source SS df MS F Sig. 
How much control do you have over..       
What projects you work on Between Groups 1.166 1 1.166 .757 .387 
 Within Groups 100.029 65 1.539   
 Total 101.194 66    
How your research is conducted Between Groups 1.213 1 1.213 .964 .330 
 Within Groups 81.772 65 1.258   
 Total 82.985 66    
When your work is due Between Groups 1.658 1 1.658 1.067 .306 
 Within Groups 100.999 65 1.554   
 Total 102.657 66    
How your data are interpreted Between Groups 3.793 1 3.793 1.813 .183 
 Within Groups 135.968 65 2.092   
 Total 139.761 66    
How your data are presented Between Groups 1.593 1 1.593 1.187 .280 
 Within Groups 87.184 65 1.341   
 Total 88.776 66    
How your budget is spent Between Groups 6.061 1 6.061 2.259 .138 
 Within Groups 171.697 64 2.683   
 Total 177.758 65    
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Summary of the Comparisons of the Will and the Ability to Influence Decision 
 Overall, there were not a lot of differences within the comparison subgroups when 
examining their will and ability to influence decision-making. Generally speaking, 
institutional researchers reported taking a passive approach to influencing decision but 
indicated they want to be more involved with decision-making and that institutional 
researchers should act as change agents. At the same time, there were very strong feelings 
that their work should be objective and free of personal philosophy and politics; they 
viewed their task as complete after they presented data and stimulated reflection. As far 
as being actively involved in making decisions, for the statement “I am an active 
participant in decision-making,” the group with the lowest mean was the IR Staff (2.90); 
the group with the highest mean was the IR managers with more experience (3.70). The 
group with the least will to be more involved was the IR Staff group (3.79) and the group 
who demonstrated the most will to be more involved was their counterpart, the IR 
Manager group (4.42). Managers with 13 years of experience or less (Less Time) had the 
highest mean for the Active Will combined score (3.98) and the Total Combined Will 
(3.43) indicating their overall desire to be more active participants in decision-making. 
The group with the highest mean on the Passive Combined score was the Private 
Managers group (4:39) indicating the strongest desire to remain objected and less 
influential in the decision decision-making process. There were only a few areas that had 
statistically significant differences in means on their statements: The Smaller Institutions 
group had a higher mean on the Passive Combined score than the Larger Institutions 
group; IR Managers had higher means than IR Staff on the Active Will combined score 
and the Total Will Combined score; and Less Time managers had a higher mean than the 
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More Time group for the statement “I add a subjective component to may outputs.”  
Across the board, all groups selected retention, program review and student success 
programs as areas in which they should participate.  
 Participants indicated that their ability to influence decisions was only moderate. 
Their data and reporting are how they influence decisions the most overall, but they felt 
as though their opinions were not often considered in decision-making. IR managers with 
13 or more years of experience had the highest mean for this statement, 3.94, whereas IR 
staff had the lowest mean, 3.31. These two groups also had the highest and lowest means 
for the Ability to Influence Combined score; the More Time group’s mean was 4.22 and 
the IR Staff group’s mean was 3.88. There were only two comparisons that had a 
statistically significant difference in means and both were in the comparisons by 
institutional size: the Larger Institutions group had a higher means than the Smaller 
Institutions group regarding the use of their data in decision-making; and the Larger 
Institutions group also was more involved in framing research questions. All groups were 
in agreement in that they had the most control over how their research is conducted and 
how their data are presented.  
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Research Question Seven 
“Which variables related to power best explained institutional researchers’ ability 
to influence decisions?” 
 
Research Question Seven sought to understand which of the variables in the 
survey best determined the participants’ ability to influence decisions. This question was 
exploratory in nature in that it was trying to identify variables that contribute most to 
institutional researchers’ ability to influence decisions rather than being a confirmatory 
question that sought to affirm an existing model or theory, nor was the question seeking 
to actually predict institutional researchers’ ability to influence decisions (Lomax, 2001; 
Stevens, 1999). To answer the question, a linear regression was used to determine the 
independent variables that had greatest impact on influencing the dependent variable. The 
Ability to Influence Combined, an average of responses from the Ability to Influence 
series of statements explored in research questions five and six, served as the dependent 
variable. Within that series of statements, participants reported that their data and reports 
were used in decision-making; these two statements consistently had the highest means 
and narrowest distributions in all groupings. A total of 24 independent variables were 
considered for the regression, which is generally considered to be too many for a 
predictive model and raises concerns over multicollinearity (Lomax, 2001; Stevens, 
1999). However, none of the inter-correlations were near the .80 level recommended by 
Stevens (1999). Three of the possible 24 independent variables were not used in the 
regression. The Control of Resources and Technical Skills combined scores from the 
power source measurement were not used because of their very high ratings for all 
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participants. The job description of the participant, IR staff or IR manager, was not used 
because it is generally understood that a manager would naturally have more ability to 
influence decisions than would an analyst/researcher who reports to the manager. The 
variables used in the regression included the combined scores for the remaining power 
sources, various background data, power orientations ratings, and the Will to Influence 
Combined score (see Table 20.1 for the complete list of variables).  
Table 20.1 
Ability to Influence Regression Variables 
Unique Knowledge Combined Score Years Working in Institutional Research 
Legal Prerogative Combined Score Years Working in Higher Education 
Access to Decision-Makers Combined Score Years Working at Current Institution 
Will to Influence Combined Score Size of Institutional Research Staff 
Power is Exciting and Desirable Rating Number of Institutional Level Committees Served On 
Power is Controlling Information Rating Number of Departmental Level Committees Served On 
Power is Natural and Good Rating Job Title 
Power is Having Political Connections Rating Level of Education Achieved 
Power is Having Personal Charisma Rating Institutional Size (Student Sample) 
Power is Control and Autonomy Institutional Type ( Public or Private 4 year or more) 
 
 Because there was no theory or predetermined model driving this research 
question, the variables were entered simultaneously in the order they appeared in the 
survey. The stepwise selection procedure was selected to identify which variables were 
the most related to the Ability to Influence Combined score. The stepwise method was 
chosen because of its ability to continuously asses and re-assess the contribution of each 
variable  (Lomax, 2001; Stevens, 1999). After conducting tests using the forward, 
backward and block methods, it was decided to use the stepwise method with 
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simultaneous loading of variables as it  produced the highest R
2 
 with very little shrinkage 
in the adjusted R
2 
as new variables were added
 
(Lomax, 2001). The stepwise process 
produced seven models from the 21 variables. Each new model produced a significant F 
change. The final model resulted in an R
2
 of .771. Because of the large number of 
variables entered into the regression and the small sample size, it was important to report 
the adjusted R
2
 to compensate for the possibility of the model overstating the independent 
variables’ predictive power (Lomax, 2001; Stevens, 1999). The shrinkage from R2 to the 
adjusted R
2
 was small, as the adjusted R
2
 for the seventh model was .742; in other words, 
the final model accounted for 74% of the of the variance in the Ability to Influence score 
(Table 20.2 provides the summary of the seven models produced in the regression).  
 
Table 20.2 
Ability to Influence Regression Model Summary 
      Change Statistics 
Model R R2 
R2  
Adjusted  
SE of 
Estimate 
R2 
Change 
F  
Change Df1 Df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .696a .484 .476 .70649 .484 57.224 1 61 .000 
2 .799b .639 .627 .59612 .155 25.680 1 60 .000 
3 .821c .674 .658 .57094 .035 6.408 1 59 .014 
4 .841d .707 .687 .54618 .033 6.470 1 58 .014 
5 .858e .736 .713 .52273 .029 6.322 1 57 .015 
5 .868f .754 .728 .50912 .018 4.087 1 56 .048 
7 .878g .771 .742 .49534 .017 4.160 1 55 .046 
 
 The seventh model produced in the stepwise process resulted in the use of seven 
variables that made significant contributions to the variance in the Ability to Influence: 
Unique Knowledge Combined score, Access to Decision-Makers Combined score, Legal 
Prerogatives Combined score, Years Working at Current Institution, Institutional Size, 
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Power as Personal Charisma, and Power as Having Political Connections. The following 
results utilized the unstandardized coefficients (see Table 20.3 for the complete 
coefficient statistics). The results for models one through six are located in Appendix C. 
For every one unit increase in the Unique Knowledge Combined score, there was a .490 
unit increase in the Ability to Influence score after partialling the effects of the remaining 
predictors. This was a significant predictor, p=.000. For every one unit increase in the 
Access to Decision Makers Combined score, there was a .187 unit increase in the Ability 
to Influence score after partialling the effects of the remaining predictors. This was a 
significant predictor, p=.008. For every one unit increase in the Legal Prerogatives 
Combined score, there was a .200 increase in the Ability to Influence score after 
partialling the effects of the remaining predictors. This was a significant predictor, 
p=.001. For every one unit increase in the Years Working at Current Institution variable, 
there was a-.022 decrease in the Ability to Influence score after partialling the effects of 
the remaining predictors. This was a significant negative predictor, p= .004. For every 
one unit increase in the Institutional Size, there was a .128 increase in the Ability to 
Influence score after partialling the effects  of the remaining predictors, p= .012. For 
every one unit increase in Power as Personal Charisma rating, there was a .103 increase 
in the Ability to Influence score after partialling the effects of the remaining predictors, 
p=.030. For every one unit increase in Power as Having Political Connections, there was 
a .097 increase in the Ability to Influence score after partialling the effects of the 
remaining predictors, p= .046.  
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Table 20.3 
Ability to Influence Model 7 Coefficients 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Correlations 
Model 7 B SE B t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part 
(Constant) -1.002 .422 
 
-2.374 .021 
   
Unique 
Knowledge 
.490 .071 .544 6.937 .000 .696 .683 .447 
Access to 
Decision-Makers 
.187 .068 .231 2.769 .008 .658 .350 .179 
Legal 
Prerogatives 
.200 .059 .257 3.375 .001 .556 .414 .218 
Yrs. at Institution -.022 .007 -.206 -3.026 .004 -.014 -.378 -.195 
Institutional Size .128 .049 .177 2.601 .012 .043 .331 .168 
Charisma .103 .046 .159 2.222 .030 .376 .287 .143 
Political .097 .048 .138 2.040 .046 .200 .265 .132 
 
 Based on the high R
2
 and the small shrinkage to the adjusted R
2
, model seven 
with its corresponding seven variables was the best model for understanding the variance 
in the Ability to Influence scores. With the addition of each variable there was a 
significant F change and all variables in the final model were significant contributors to 
the model. A close approximation of the contribution of each variable was achieved by 
squaring the semi-partial correlation. The Unique Knowledge Combined score was the 
largest contributor (19.2%) followed by the Legal Prerogatives Combined score (4.8%) , 
Access to Decision-Makers Combined score (3.8%), Institutional Size (2.8%), Power as 
Personal Charisma (2.0%), Power as Having Political Connections (1.7%),  and last, 
Years Working at Current Institution (-3.8%). Having all three power sources available 
was important in order to utilize power in different ways: having unique knowledge 
provides an additional controllable resource; having legal prerogatives provides leverage 
to influence; and having access to decision-makers provides a more direct way to 
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influence the decision-maker. Seeing power as being related to charisma and political 
connections may indicate an understanding and presence of social power and people 
skills, which was not measured in this survey. Institutional size may be related to having 
a larger presence on campus; however, one could argue that on a smaller campus the 
institutional researchers could work more directly with the decisions-makers. The final 
variable, Years Working at Current Institution, was a bit more confusing as it was 
reasonable to expect that more time at an institution would increase institutional 
researchers’ ability to influence through networking and relationships as well as their 
unique knowledge through the accumulation of historical knowledge, but that did not 
seem to be the case. It might be that many of the participants with more IR experience, 
did not have doctoral degrees, but Level of Education Achieved did not significantly 
contribute to the model. Missing from the model was the Will to Influence Combined 
score which confirmed that just because institutional researchers have the will to 
influence decisions, they may not have the power and ability to do so.  
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Chapter V 
Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
 This research sought to gain an understanding of power as it relates to the position 
of institutional research in institutions of higher education. More specifically, this 
research attempted to confirm and determine at what level institutional researchers 
possess the necessary power, as described by Mintzberg (1983b), to influence decision-
makers both directly and indirectly and if so, what were their orientations toward the 
concept of power and their feelings regarding their role in decision making. The format 
of this chapter follows the conceptual framework of this study; it will begin with a 
discussion about the background and contextual information of the participants and is 
followed by a discussion of Mintzberg’s five power sources. Next, the participants’ 
orientations toward power are discussed followed by a discussion of institutional 
researchers’ will to influence decisions and the ability to influence. Finally, this chapter 
discusses the variables that best explained the reasons behind the participants’ ability to 
influence decisions. Unlike the results section in the previous chapter, subgroups and the 
overall sample are discussed together and the research questions are combined according 
to the conceptual framework of the study. The chapter ends with a final statement of 
conclusions and recommendations for further research topics.  
 
Discussion of Background Variables 
 The overall sample of participants in this study had an average of almost 10 years 
of experience working in IR and an average of nine years working at their current 
institution. All comparison groups were very close in their years of experience with the 
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exception of the IR Staff group who had significantly less experience than IR Managers; 
IR staff reported working in their position an average of 5.58 years compared to IR 
managers who had 10.65 years of experience. A comparison of IR Managers by years of 
experience showed a statistically significant difference in years of experience, which by 
definition makes sense, but the amount of difference was surprising; IR managers with 13 
years of experience or less had an average of 6.5 years of experience compared to 20.9 
years of experience for the more experienced group. The literature review indicated that 
institutional researchers with more experience considered themselves to be more effective 
and influential in their jobs (Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; 
Walton, 2005). This study was unable to confirm this observation as the total years of 
experience was not a variable that contributed significantly to the participants’ Ability to 
Influence Combined score but the study did find that years served at their current 
institution had an inverse relationship with the Ability to Influence score. It should be 
noted that the number of years worked at an institution was a contributing factor to the 
participants’ ability to influence decisions but the number of years worked in IR as a 
variable was not. This finding might suggest a shift in the ideology of IR as the study 
found that less experienced IR managers are seeking to have more influence on decision-
making compared to a more passive approach of the more experienced group. This is an 
area for future research.  
 Another explanation for the inverse relationship between years of experience and 
the ability to influence might be related to the level of education achieved by the 
participants. Overall, 43.7% of the sample in the study had earned a Ph.D. or Ed.D. and 
42.9% had earned a Master’s degree. However, when comparing years of experience, 
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60.6% of IR managers in the Less Time group had a Ph.D. compared to 35.5% of the 
More Time group. Having a Ph.D., regardless of the specialty, has been found to be 
related to institutional researchers’ effectiveness and influence (Delaney, 1997; Knight, et 
al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). This might be because of the collegial 
aspect of higher education; having degree credentials might allow institutional 
researchers to be seen as equal to faculty. However, this research did not confirm the 
previous findings in the literature as the educational level was not found to be a 
significant variable in explaining the participants’ Ability to Influence Combined score. 
Participants from larger institutions were more likely to have earned a Ph.D. or Ed.D. 
than participants from smaller institutions, which is consistent with the literature review 
(Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). Half  of the 
participants from institutions with more than 10,000 students had a Ph.D. compared to 
36.7% at the smaller institutions. IR managers were also more likely to have earned a 
Ph.D. than IR staff. 
  The group with the highest scores on the Ability to Influence Combined score, 
the More Time managers, also had one of the lowest percentages of doctoral degrees, 
which may explain why the level of degree was not a contributing factor to the Ability to 
Influence Combined scores. Conversely, the group with the highest Will to Influence 
scores, the Less Time managers also had the highest percentages of doctoral degrees. It 
may be that at this time, the doctoral degree is associated with a desire to influence, but 
as these institutional researchers gain experience and the percentage of More Time 
managers with doctoral degrees increases, the doctoral degree might become a 
contributing factor to the Ability to Influence Combine score.  
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 Having the title of Assistant Director has also been found to be an indicator of 
effectiveness and influence for institutional researchers, but only 10.9% of the 
participants in this study indicated they had the title of Assistant Director, which was too 
small a number to serve as a subgroup for this study to confirm the literature (Delaney, 
1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Walton, 2005). Just over 51.0% of 
participants indicated they held the title of Director of IR with the remaining 40.0% 
having titles of analyst, researcher or “other.” Because of the smaller IR staffs in private 
institutions, there was a higher percentage of participants from private institutions who 
held the title of Director. In all cases, the percentage of participants who indicated that 
Manager of IR was the best description of their job, was higher than the percentage of 
those who indicated that Director best described their title; 56.8% of the overall sample 
indicated that IR Manager best described their role. For this study, no implications were 
made based on the participants’ job titles other than the understanding that a manager 
inherently has more power than staff.  
The size of the institution was significant in this study as the different levels of 
school size were not fully representative of the AIR population; 30.5% of respondents 
came from institutions with more than 20,000 students while 33.3% came from the 
smallest two levels, under 5,000 students. Compared to the AIR population, this is an 
overrepresentation of the largest institutions and an underrepresentation of the smaller 
institutions. Many of the comparison subgroupings echoed the findings of the comparison 
subgroups by size because, after dividing the group by other attributes, it was found that 
they were essentially split by institutional size, which may have limited the variation in 
the findings of the comparison groups. In the comparison of public institutions to private 
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institutions, the private institutions tended to be small and the public institutions tended to 
be large. This was also true when the managers from private institutions were compared 
to managers of public institutions. Even in comparing IR Staff to IR Managers, it played 
a role because the larger institutions are more likely to have more IR Staff than the 
smaller institutions. Ultimately, the size of the institution was found to be a significant 
variable in predicting the participants’ Ability to Influence Combined score. Institutional 
size as a variable and its contribution to the Ability to Influence Combined score will be 
addressed in the discussion of research question seven.  
 The roles performed by institutional researchers were the same across all 
comparison subgroups with a few exceptions. Institutional research for decision making 
and institutional use was the role that was most often identified, followed by IR for 
external reporting and statistical analysis. IR staff reported qualitative research and 
analysis as the fourth most popular role while being much further down on every other 
group’s list. Another difference was that less experienced managers listed accreditation 
and planning high on the list, with supervision of IR staff very low on the list. No other 
group, besides the Less Time group, ranked accreditation and planning that high. This 
may be another indication of a shift in a changing role of IR. The more experienced 
group that listed supervision of IR staff third but should be noted again, that the More 
Time group had a larger IR staff than the Less Time group. The roles of institutional 
research discussed in the literature review are slightly different, although closely related 
to those asked in the background information section of the survey. The roles in the 
literature review, such as framing questions and managing data, will be addressed later in 
this section. The purpose for collecting information about the roles performed by 
 289 
 
participants for this study was to determine if the participants performed similar roles. 
Having similar roles and responsibilities increased the validity of the study. Had the 
participants had very different roles, it would have been difficult to make comparisons 
across subgroups. 
 Working in a centralized IR office, having a strong network of relationships, and 
having a strong understanding of issues across campus either by having a 
multidisciplinary background or by having responsibilities across campus also increases 
the chances of institutional researchers being influential (Ehrenberg, 2005; Serban & 
Luan, 2002; Suslow, 1972). This study found that only a moderate percentage of the 
overall sample considered their office to be centralized. Offices in smaller institutions 
and in private institutions tended to have less centralized offices than the larger and 
public institutions and had more variation in their answers indicating that smaller and 
private institutions have more diversity in their organizational structure. Whether or not 
the IR office was centralized, there was much agreement with the statement “I have 
responsibilities that involved many departments across campus.”   Having cross-campus 
responsibilities is a good conduit that helps institutional researchers to increase their 
knowledge, network, and expertise, but for some reason, the Less Time IR manager 
group stands had a higher level of agreement with the statement than the rest of the 
groups. Perhaps this is a reflection of the high percentage of doctoral degrees in the Less 
Time group combined with the fact that they are affiliated with smaller institutions. 
 Reporting to the president of the institution or other high ranking administrators- 
has been shown to be a factor related to influence. Reporting to a high level administrator 
also reflects the idea that the work of IR is of central importance to the institution and 
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will increase the scope of responsibility of the IR office (Knight & Leimer, 2009; Knight, 
et al., 1995; Leimer, 2011; Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990; Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005). 
Participants in this study reported that their offices were situated on the organizational 
chart, 1.48 levels below the president. Participants associated with smaller and/or private 
institutions were situated slightly closer to the office of president than participants 
associated with the larger institutions. Unfortunately, this study was not set up in such a 
way that it could definitively determine the exact title of the person to whom IR reports; 
there is too much variety in higher education to do so. Several participants indicated that 
they either report to multiple administrators or that the administrator to whom they report 
maintains multiple titles. Because of the variety of responses and the way the data were 
collected, it is not possible to determine how the reporting structure of the institution 
affected the participants’ power or its use.  
 In the final analysis of the variables that influenced the participants’ Ability to 
Influence Combined score, nine variables related to the participants’ background were 
used and only two had a significant contribution to the variance in scores: institutional 
size and years worked at their current institution, which was a negative predictor. 
However, it appears that the size of the institution is also related to the level of education 
the participants were likely to have obtained, whether or not they were affiliated with a 
private institution, and how far removed the IR office was from the President’s office. 
The reason for this appears to be nothing more than the characteristics of the institutions. 
The smaller institutions included community colleges that do not require doctoral degrees 
to teach or work. The same can be said for some smaller private institutions. As far as the 
distance the IR office is from the President’s office, this would be reflective of the fact 
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that smaller institutions have fewer organizational levels than larger institutions and 
therefore IR offices are more likely to be closer to the president on the organizational 
chart. The numbers of years participants spent working in IR was also used for a 
comparison group, which exposed some differences in IR managers and areas of potential 
research. This difference, as well as others, will be more evident in the discussions of 
power sources and the will to influence decisions. 
  
Discussion of Power Sources 
 Mintzberg (1983b) described five sources of power common to analysts. To be 
successful in influencing decisions, analysts must have at least one of the five powers that 
include the ability to control resources, technical skills, unique knowledge, legal 
prerogatives, and access to decision-makers. The control of resources was the first power 
source measured and proved to be the strongest power source of the five. Seven of the 
eleven statements in the control of resources section had means over 5.00 for the overall 
sample and for almost all of the comparison groups as well. The Control of Resources 
Combined score for the overall sample was 4.87. The survey asked about data and 
information. The term “data” was defined as a single or statistic or a set of numbers or 
statistics while information was defined as providing context in relation to numbers or 
statistics. There were very little differences between the statements concerning data and 
information, although generating institutional level data and information generally ranked 
higher than gathering or collecting data and information. There was a statistically 
significant difference between smaller institutions and larger ones for collecting 
institutional information but there were no other statistically significant differences 
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concerning the collection/ creation/ distribution of data and/or information. For these six 
questions, the Larger Institutions group had higher means than the Smaller Institutions 
group, the Private group had higher means than the Public group, IR manages had higher 
means than the IR staff, IR managers at private institutions had higher means than those 
at public institutions, and IR managers with more experience had higher means than those 
with less experience. All of the scores were high confirming the belief that the number 
one strength of IR is the ability to provide and analyze information (Knight & Leimer, 
2009; Leimer, 2011; Matsen, 1993; Saunders, 1983; Terenzini, 1999). Information is 
power as well as a commodity, but do institutional research truly control it (Bahniuk, et 
al., 1996; Farley, 1987; Frost, 1987; Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981)? 
 To control information is to control the decision-making process (Suslow, 1972). 
For information to be power, one must be able to control access to it and it must be a 
valuable, irreplaceable and uncertain (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962; Frost, 
1987; Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). The statement with the consistently highest means in 
the controlling resources was “Faculty, administrators, and/or staff often ask me for 
information and/or data”; the More Time group of IR managers’ mean was near 6.00. 
There is clear agreement that IR is a major source of information for their institutions. 
However, they might not be the only source. The statement “When an institutional level 
decision is to be made, it is my office that provides data and reports needed” only had a 
moderate mean for the overall sample. The mean was low for the same statement about 
departmental decisions. In fact, the statement “Most institutional level data and/or reports 
come from my office” also only had a moderate mean. For the departmental level 
information statement the lowest means were associated with the Less Time IR manager 
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group and the Private institutions group. Survey participants also indicated that they were 
not very involved with managing data warehouses and repositories, which would provide 
further control over data and information. It is clear that IR is involved with a valuable 
and needed resource as demonstrated by their collecting/creating/distributing of data and 
information. It is also clear that they are a “go to” resource when faculty, administrators, 
and staff on campus need information, but what is not clearly evident is how much they 
are truly able to control the information and if they are the only source of the information. 
Resource dependency theory holds that in order to have power, the resource must be 
valuable, irreplaceable, and uncertain (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962; Frost, 
1987; Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). The one who controls the resource must be able to 
control access to the resource and its release (Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). It may be 
possible that IR controls only a portion of the information needed for decision-making, 
which would still provide IR with power but if the same information can be found 
elsewhere, then IR does not have the control of information in the truest sense of resource 
dependency theory. As a result IR, does not have the control of resources power source at 
the high levels as one might expect.  
 There were a few additional pieces of information worth noting from the control 
of resources analysis. When comparing institutional types, private institutions have 
considerably higher means than public institutions in providing institutional level 
information but they were very similar in providing departmental information. IR staff 
had lower means than IR managers for collecting/creating/distributing information and/or 
data but higher means when it came to providing information at both the institutional and 
departmental level. There were statistically significant differences between Less Time 
 294 
 
managers and More Time managers in the statement “Most institutional level information 
comes from my office” and in the Control of Resources Combined scores; More Time 
managers were higher in both statements. The Control of Resources was the highest rated 
power source of the five and was followed by the Technical Skills power source.  
 Mintzberg (1983b) referred to analysts’ systems of expertise, their technical skills, 
as their primary means of influence. The ability to provide and analyze information has 
been called IR’s number one strength (Knight & Leimer, 2009; Leimer, 2011; Matsen, 
1993; Saunders, 1983; Terenzini, 1999). For institutional researchers, the system of 
expertise involves managing data, assessing the needs of their clients, capturing, pulling 
and reporting data (Delaney, 1997; Leimer, 2011; Lyons, 1976; Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 
1990). The technical skills portion of the survey was designed to measure these matters. 
For the overall sample, report writing was the highest ranked skill. This fits well with the 
literature that states that quality reporting that is comprehensive, objective and accurate is 
what is expected by high level administrators who also expect it to be contextual (Billups 
& Delucia, 1990; Ehrenberg, 2005; Fincher, 1981; Serban & Luan, 2002). Subgroups 
who felt they met this expectation and had means for report writing over 5.00 include: 
large institutions, public and private institutions, IR managers, IR managers at private 
institutions and IR managers in both the less experienced and more experienced groups.  
Before any report can be written, the research must be conducted, and prior to 
that, the research must be conceptualized. Conceptualizing and planning research was the 
technical skill with the second highest mean. Being involved in framing the research 
questions, determining who should be involved, identifying issues and defining situations 
are how institutional researchers can influence the decision-making process in a way that 
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will utilize their skills in conceptualizing research and their unique knowledge and still 
allow them to write objective reports (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Billups & Delucia, 1990; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Data management was the third highest ranked technical skill with a mean for the 
overall sample. While not defined in the survey, data management generally means 
determining the data that is to be captured, the data that needs to be pulled for research, 
and cleaning data so that it can be used accurately and correctly (Delaney, 1997; Leimer, 
2011; Lyons, 1976; Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990). Every group in this study reported 
having strong data management skills but the IR managers with less experience reported 
a slightly lower mean than the rest of the subgroups. Separate, but related to data 
management, is the skill of data mining that is not a very highly rated skill in this study. 
In fact, it was the lowest ranked skill for the overall sample. The two groups with highest 
means were the IR staff group and the IR managers with more experience. The least 
skilled in data mining were the IR managers with less experience; the difference between 
them and the more experienced group was statistically significant.  
Having good presentations skills has been found to increase the effectiveness and 
influence of institutional researchers and was the fourth ranked skill in the survey 
(Billups & Delucia, 1990). The overall sample’s mean was strong but there was a 
statistically significant difference between participants who work at smaller institutions 
and those who work at larger ones. It seems that institutional researchers have confidence 
in their ability to produce quality final products, reports and presentations, and in their 
ability at the beginning of the process, data management and conceptualizing research; 
however, they  appear to much less confident in their ability to conduct the research.  
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The three remaining skills- statistical methods, quantitative research and 
analytics, and qualitative research and analytics- were the three lowest ranked skills not 
including data mining. Quantitative research and analytics had a moderate mean for the 
overall sampling and was the highest of the three remaining skills. Participants at larger 
institutions had a statistically significant different mean from the participants who work 
at smaller institutions. The statistical methods skill had a modest mean for the overall 
sampling. Leimer (2011) and Walton (2005) listed qualitative research as a necessary 
skill in order to have organizational intelligence but qualitative research skills was not 
highly ranked in this survey. Private institutions had a larger and statistically significant 
different mean from public institutions for qualitative research and analytics.  
The Technical Skills Combined score was moderately strong for the overall 
sample but the strength of this skill set is not found in the actual research performed by 
institutional researchers. Instead it was the front and back end of the process. Participants 
report being skilled at data management, conceptualizing research, report writing and 
presentation but were less confident in their ability to perform statistical methods, 
qualitative and quantitative research, and data mining. This probably may not keep 
institutional researchers from being effective in influencing decisions but it may limit 
their scope and ability to influence decisions. 
Having control of information and technical skills is needed to produce 
meaningful outcomes, but institutional researchers’ unique knowledge of their institutions 
enables them to improve their work by providing context to their reports. Their 
understanding of multiple perspectives and internal issues across campus and external 
issues can be very valuable in helping committees make decisions (Ehrenberg, 2005; 
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Knight, et al., 1997; Saupe, 1990; Terenzini, 1999). For the unique knowledge power 
source, the mean of the Unique Knowledge Combined score for the overall sample was  
moderately strong  even though previous studies have indicated that institutional 
researchers feel under qualified in the area of contextual knowledge of issues (Knight, et 
al., 1997). In fact, the mean for the statement “People respect my opinion because I have 
a very good understanding of issues at my campus” was moderate at 4.47. Participants 
also indicated that they understand the impact decisions have on departments and 
resources across campus. The mean for this statement was also strong and was tied for 
the statement with the highest mean in this power source. The other statement was “I 
have responsibilities that involve many departments across campus.”  Perhaps it is in 
understanding campus relationships and politics that institutional researchers feel under 
qualified. The statement regarding their understanding of the interrelationships of 
departments had a lower mean while the statement regarding their understanding of 
campus politics was even lower. The work of IR is often used in political conflict to 
pursue decisions, refute accusations, and to increase power but this statement indicates 
that is perhaps not the case with the participants of this survey (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; 
Walton, 2005). Serban and Luan (2002) and Saunders (1983) suggest that IR staff must 
understand the campus relationships in the political realm work if they wish to participate 
in policy formation. This is especially important when the institution’s decision-making 
process can be described as political and in some decisions in cybernetic organizations 
(Vires, 2009). 
The study of unique knowledge across comparison subgroups did reveal some 
differences. Larger institutions had higher means than smaller ones on the unique 
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knowledge statements with the exception of understanding departmental interrelations. 
Private institutions, which were generally smaller in this study, had higher means than 
public institutions in all statements except for understanding political issues. 
Additionally, there was a statistically significant difference between the means for 
understanding the impact decisions have on departments and resources. IR managers had 
higher means than IR staff in all areas with statistically significant differences in 
understanding the impact of decisions and interrelationships. The comparison of 
managers by public and private institutions revealed very high means for both groups for 
having cross-campus responsibilities and understanding the impact of decisions. IR 
managers with more experience were higher in all areas than the managers with less 
experience except for having cross-camps responsibilities. There was a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups for understanding the interrelationships of 
departments. Overall, institutional researchers do have a unique knowledge in their 
understanding of campus issues and by having cross-campus responsibilities but perhaps 
they may need to gain a better understanding of departmental interrelationships and 
politics if they wish to have a greater impact on decision-making. In fact, as will be 
discussed later, understanding power as being related to having political connections is a 
variable that contributes to the Ability to Influence Combined score. 
Having legal prerogatives gives one the power to require others to act in a certain 
way to ensure there is no violation of the law. This was Mintzberg’s (1983b) fourth 
power source and was expected to be the weakest of the five power sources for 
institutional research, and it was. Nowhere in the literature were the legal prerogatives of 
IR discussed although completing reports for IPEDS, Regents, and grants are a traditional 
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part of the work of IR. The legal requirements are present, but they are not often viewed 
as a means for power. Although legal prerogatives were the weakest power source for the 
overall sample, it was the power source with the most diversity and statistically 
significant difference in means. In each comparison group, one group had a higher means 
than the other on every statement. The groups with the higher means and therefore more 
power related to having legal prerogatives were: smaller institutions, private institutions, 
IR managers, IR managers at private institutions, and IR managers with more experience. 
Having to complete reports that are required by law or government had the highest score 
of the statements. There were statistically significant differences between the smaller 
institutions and the larger ones, IR staff and IR managers, and managers with more and 
less experience. Managers with more experience had the highest mean. Completing 
reports required for grants or other funding sources had the weakest mean for the overall 
sample.  
Despite having reports to complete that were required by law and government 
regulations, participants did not feel that they had authority to demand work from others 
on campus in order to complete their reports. The overall sample’s mean for this 
statement was low, but the group with the highest mean was the IR managers with more 
experience. Their mean was in the moderate range and was significantly different from 
the less experienced managers. Apparently the participants did not need to demand work 
from others in order to complete their work because the statement “People on my campus 
comply with my request for information because they understand my required reporting 
needs” had a moderate mean for the overall sample. Much of the work of IR has 
apparently been incorporated into the culture of the institution. There was a statistically 
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significant difference of the means for the IR managers at private institutions and those at 
public institutions. The final statement attempted to understand if the participants actually 
used their legal prerogatives to get needed information from staff or faculty. For the 
statement “I have used legal obligations or regulations to get data and information I need 
from faculty or staff” the mean for the overall sample was 3.88 but there are those who 
have used this power source. The mean for the more experienced IR managers had a 
strong mean that was statistically significant from the less experienced IR managers. The 
IR staff group had the lowest mean. As previously mentioned, the Legal Prerogative 
Combined score was low to moderate for the overall sample with the only group with 
statistically significant different means being the IR managers with more and less 
experience. It is clear from this portion of the study that institutional researches do have 
legal requirements related to their work but they do not necessarily see that as giving 
them the right to demand others to comply with their reporting needs. There are those, 
however, who have used legal requirements as way to get others to comply with their 
needs. It appears that most institutions have a culture that understand IR’s reporting needs 
and comply without institutional researchers having to use this power source. Lastly, this 
power source is more related to government and legal reporting than it is related to grants 
and funding, perhaps because grants are often a departmental issue.   
Having access to high ranking decision-makers is the last of Mintzberg’s (1983b) 
power sources and one that is most dependent on the organizational structure of the 
institution. IR offices that are situated high on the organizational chart have more access 
to decision-makers (Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Suslow, 1972; 
Walton, 2005). In addition to having access, institutional researchers can increase their 
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influence through their cross-campus responsibilities and by developing formal and 
informal relationships that will help them understand the expectations and style of the 
decision-makers as well as the decision-making process (Billups & Delucia, 1990; 
Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Serban & Luan, 2002; Suslow, 1972). Access to 
decision-makers is important enough that some scholars in the field feel that IR managers 
should act as Chief  Information Officers and be members of the president’s cabinet 
(Knight & Leimer, 2009). IR offices that report to lower levels of administration or are 
housed in specialized units (decentralized) will have less influence on decision-makers  
(Delaney, 1997; Fincher, 1981; Knight, et al., 1997; Serban & Luan, 2002; Suslow, 
1972). The access to decision-makers power source appears to be reasonably strong for 
institutional researchers in this study.  
The Access to Decision-Makers Combined score for the overall sample was one 
of the highest ranked power sources. As previously discussed, there is some variation in 
whether or not the participants’ offices are centralized as the mean was moderate for the 
agreement with the statement “I consider my IR office to be centralized”. The largest 
difference in means was between the larger institutions and the smaller institutions. 
Larger institutions in this study tended to have more centralized offices than the smaller 
ones and the difference was statistically significant. However, the smaller schools tended 
to be situated closer to the president on the organizational chart. Even though some 
offices are not centralized, there was strong agreement that the person to whom IR 
reports to is considered a high level decision maker. Every group, except for IR Staff 
reported that its boss was a high level decision-maker; participants who worked at private 
institutions had the highest mean. Having a supervisor who is a decision-maker does not 
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mean that institutional researchers meet with them regularly. The statement “I meet with 
high level decision makers regularly” had only a weak mean for the overall sample. IR 
Staff had the lowest means and was statistically different from the mean of the IR 
Managers. Participants did feel that they could ask a high level-decision maker to 
intervene on their behalf if it was needed. For the overall sample, the mean was strong for 
this statement. There was a statistically significant difference between the means of the 
IR managers at private institution and those at public institutions. For the Access to 
Decision-Makers Combined scores, there were several groups with statistically 
significant differences: the larger schools had a higher mean than the smaller institutions; 
IR manages had higher means than the IR Staff; IR managers at private institutions had 
higher means than IR managers at private institutions; and IR managers with more 
experience had higher means than IR managers with less experience.  
Access to decision-makers is a moderately strong power source because of two 
factors: participants’ bosses are high-level decision-makers and they can ask a high level 
decision-maker to intervene on their behalf if needed. However, the participants seem to 
be lacking in regular meetings with high level decision-makers, which is where they can 
have the most influence on the decisions by sharing information and recommendations. It 
may be possible that participants do meet regularly with their bosses, but view it simply 
as “just a meeting with my boss” and not an “important meeting with a high-level 
decision-maker”. More importantly, is whether or not these meetings are held to discuss 
administrative issues concerning the IR office or if the meetings are held to discuss 
institutional issues.  
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All of Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources are present in the role of instructional 
research at a moderate to strong level. However, there appears to be weak areas within 
each of the power sources. In the Control of Resources power source, institutional 
researchers are very strong in the area of collecting, creating and distributing data and/or 
information and they affirmed that IR is a source of information for faculty, 
administrators, and staff. However, it appears that information for decision making at 
both the institutional level and departmental level is available from other sources in 
addition to IR, which weakens the use of resource dependency theory in this situation. If 
this is truly the case, the power associated with the control of resources depends on 
individual decision that needs to be made and who has the information needed for the 
decision. The technical skills power source is also a strength for institutional researchers. 
Participants felt they were best skilled at report writing, presentations and 
conceptualizing research but were weaker in the areas of statistical methods, qualitative 
research and analytics, and data mining. They reported a moderate confidence in the 
skills in quantitative research and analytics. It is the middle part of the IR production 
process (research, analytics, and data mining) that institutional researchers can improve 
on. There is no reason to doubt that participants cannot perform the statistics needed for 
their analysis and reporting, but there may be a question as to whether or not they can 
confidently perform advanced inferential statistical methods and data mining needed to 
dig deeper in their research of institutional issues. If IR desires to move toward the role of 
“action research” in order to be change agents, they may need skills in advanced 
statistical methods and in data mining to really develop new solutions to their 
institution’s problems.  
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Understanding problems and implementing change requires knowledge of the 
institution as well as knowledge of the interdepartmental relations and politics. 
Participants in this study felt that their strength in the unique knowledge power source 
was related to their having responsibilities across campus and in their understanding 
about how decisions affect departments and resources. However, they did not feel very 
strong about their understanding of the interrelatedness of departments and politics on 
campus, which are two areas that are vital if institutional researchers wish to be 
influential in the decision-making process. Participants could increase their unique 
knowledge power in these areas by increasing their access to decision-makers power. 
While most participants felt that their boss was a high level decision-maker and that there 
was a high level decision maker on whom they could call on to intervene on their behalf, 
they did not meet with high level decision-makers regularly. Increasing the number of 
meetings with decision-makers may build stronger professional relationships that may 
increase the usage of their data and information, help conceptualize research to solve 
issues, and increase their understanding of relationships and politics on campus. The last 
power source, legal prerogatives, had the most variation in responses and the lowest 
score. Participants have legal and governmental requirements to complete reports but this 
is not seen as a way to demand that others comply with requests. Even if it were true, the 
power probably would not extend beyond getting other people to provide the data needed 
to complete reports. Only IR managers with more experience indicated that they have 
actually used their legal requirements as a way to influence the actions of others. 
 In summary, all five power sources are present within institutional research, 
which provides the potential for this group of analysts to be able to intentionally 
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influence decisions. However, in each power source, there appears to be areas of 
weaknesses that may inhibit or limit how much power is actually present. How that 
power is used, or not used, may be a factor of the institutional researcher’s natural 
orientation toward and understanding of power.  
 
Discussion of Power Orientations 
The purpose of the power orientation measure was to understand if there was a 
common orientation within the profession of institutional research and also to try to 
understand how institutional researchers might use their power to influence decisions. 
According to Goldberg, Cavanaugh, and Larson (1983), the way power is used is 
dependent on the person’s orientation toward power. As previously mentioned, the full 
Power Orientation Survey (POS) consists of 40 questions based on six power orientation 
constructs: power is exciting and desirable, power is controlling information, power is a 
natural and instinctive force, power is having political connections, power is personal 
charisma, and power is having control and autonomy. Because of the need to shorten the 
overall survey, the POS was reduced to one question asking participants to rank the type 
of orientations that best reflected their understanding of power; no definitions or 
explanations were provided. Peoples’ orientation toward power is based on their own 
meaning of power and is a reflection of their past experience (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; 
Goldberg, et al., 1983).  
Two power orientations were clearly more prevalent among the participants of 
this survey. The first was the understanding of power as being related to control and 
autonomy. A person with this understanding will view power as the ability to get others 
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to do as they wish, and in doing so, the person who gains power will also gain 
independence and autonomy (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Farley, 1987; Goldberg, et al., 1983). 
This study provided no indication that institutional researchers desire to control others to 
get them to do as they wish for political reasons. The word “control” might have been 
associated with autonomy and perhaps, if the full POS had been administered, control 
and autonomy might not have been the highest ranked orientation. However, autonomy is 
a concept that is generally synonymous with higher education and also fits the personality 
of one who enjoys working with data and numbers. Institutional researchers who 
understand power as control and autonomy may use their power to enable them to work 
independently and free of political pressure. 
The second highest ranked orientation was seeing power through political 
relationships. Persons with this orientation would seek to gain and use power via the 
political process (Bahniuk, et al., 1996; Farley, 1987; Goldberg, et al., 1983). The fact 
that understanding power as political was the second highest ranked is somewhat 
surprising considering how low the means were for the unique knowledge power source 
statement “I know more about campus politics than most people on campus.” Perhaps 
institutional researchers, in their work with high level decision-makers, have witnessed 
politics within the decision-making process or perhaps have seen their objective and 
rational data set aside for political reasons, which may explain why the political 
orientation is so prevalent. There were only two exceptions to these two rankings. The 
first group who ranked politics above control and autonomy was the IR Staff. The second 
were the more experienced IR managers who ranked control and autonomy first, but 
ranked charisma second while politics and controlling information tied for third.  
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The fact that the controlling information power source was not ranked higher for 
all participants emphasizes the point made in the power orientation section; despite 
having control of information and having power that is inherent in controlling 
information, institutional researchers do not see the information they provide as source of 
power. The reason for this was not clear from this survey. Perhaps it is because they 
simply do not associate information with power. Higher education is based on the 
creation and transfer knowledge, so the sharing of knowledge may be seen as normal 
within IR. Withholding knowledge may be the exception. Regardless of whether or not 
the control of information was highly ranked, the two that were- control and autonomy 
and political- makes sense when viewing institutes of higher education as cybernetic 
organizations. The idea that a person is autonomous fits well with the characteristics of 
the collegial and professional bureaucracy organizations where everyone is seen being 
equal and has freedom and autonomy in their own area of expertise. The political 
orientation fits the understanding that decisions are often negotiated and there is a 
constant struggle to secure resources within higher education (Vires, 2009). People who 
view power as autonomy seek to use power as a way to freedom and the ability to self-
govern. Their interest in influencing decisions may not extend beyond protecting their 
freedom to carry out their duties as they best see fit. This orientation might partially 
explain why institutional researchers prefer their work to remain objective. By focusing 
on “just the facts” without a subjective component to their reports, they might be 
avoiding politics and conflict. This leads us to the next discussion, the will and the ability 
to influence.  
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Discussion of the Will and the Ability to Influence Decisions 
 Mintzberg (1983b) felt that analysts had no real interest in using their power to 
influence decisions other than to secure their continued employment. They are interested 
in the betterment of the organization for which they work, but not necessarily interested 
in gaining or using power for purposes other than their own autonomy. Therefore, 
analysts have power, but often lack the will to use it. Within the profession of 
institutional research there are those who believe institutional researchers should be 
intentionally active participants in the decision-making process and those who believe 
that institutional researchers should remain objective and passive in their influence. This 
study sought to determine whether or not institutional researchers felt they were a 
powerful resource and if they had the will to actively influence the decision-making 
process. Almost every participant in this study felt that IR was a powerful resource for 
decision-makers. While participants agreed that they are a powerful resource they had a 
stronger inclination for the passive will as opposed to the active will.  
 It has been stated that the intention of IR is to promote action regardless of 
whether or not institutional researchers purposefully influence the decision-making 
process (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Serban, 2002). For those who believe that IR should 
have an active will to influence decisions, they feel that IR should be “change agents” 
that engage in action research; not only should IR identify issues on campus and 
departments that are underperforming, they should also provide solutions for change and 
problem-solving  (Delaney, 2009; Donhardt, 2012; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Saunders, 
1983; Saupe, 1990; Serban, 2002). Both Perry (1972) and Saunders (1983) felt that IR 
should be involved in policy-making and development. Some institutional researchers 
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have expressed frustration because of their limited ability to have an influence on policy 
confirms a desire to be more involved (Hearn, 1988; Knight & Leimer, 2009).  
 The results for the active will portion of the study indicated a low level of 
agreement for the having an active will. Most participants were not actively involved in 
the decision-making process and there was only a moderate level of agreement in their 
desire to be more involved. For the statement “I am an active participant in decision-
making” the mean level of agreement for the overall sample was low while the desire to 
be more involved statement had a more moderate mean. There was a statistically 
significant difference between IR Staff and IR Managers in their being actively involved. 
The IR managers had the higher score for this statement. Perhaps this difference is 
inherent in the differences between management and staff positions. If an IR staff 
member had a greater desire to be involved in making decision, this might be an 
indication of a desire to advance to a management position. 
 The highest of all the active will statements was “Institutional researchers should 
be change agents who provide solutions to problems”. This statement had a modest mean 
indicating a reasonable level of agreement with the associated literature. The group with 
the highest mean was the less experienced IR managers. Currently, however, participants 
in this study are not providing a subjective component that includes their feelings or 
political influence to their outputs that might be required if IR wish to in act change. The 
mean for the overall sample for this statement (“I include a subjective component in my 
outputs”) was very low indicating moderate disagreement. The less experienced IR 
managers also had a higher agreement indicating more of a willingness to be subjective. 
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The less experienced IR managers also had the highest Active Combined score making 
them the group with the most will to actively influence decisions. 
 Those who believe that IR should take a passive role in influencing decisions 
argue that studies and research conducted by IR already represent a very active role and 
that objectivity and rationality are the hallmark of the institutional researcher (Fincher, 
1981; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Suslow, 1972). Giving opinions and recommendations are 
not part of the traditional role of IR. Instead, IR traditionally remains neutral and 
objective and free of personal philosophy and politics (Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005). The 
means for this study reflected the passive perspective in literature more than the active 
perspective. The agreement level for the statement “My outputs are always objective” 
was strong for the overall sample with the IR managers at private institutions having the 
highest mean. There was also moderate to strong levels of agreement for the statements 
“The work of IR should be free of personal philosophy and politics” and “IR has served 
its purpose when it has provided information and stimulated reflection.” The smaller 
institutions, private institutions, and IR manages at private institutions all had very strong 
means for the first statement. However, when asked about their level of agreement with 
the statement “I prefer not to be involved in the decision-making process other than 
providing information” the mean for the overall sample was very low inversely indicating 
a moderate desire to be involved at a deeper level than being the provider of information. 
The IR staff group had the highest level of agreement while the IR managers in public 
institutions had the lowest level of agreement. The only statistically significant difference 
in means for the passive statements was the Passive Combined score for the comparison 
by institutional size where the larger institutions had the lower passive score. The Passive 
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Combined score for the overall sample was low to moderate indicating moderate levels of 
agreement with the passive will statements but considerably higher than the mean for the 
active will statements. Most of the groups were very similar in their responses with very 
few statistically significant differences.  
 Total Combined score for the active and passive will statements had the passive 
statements reversed scored so that the Total Combined score measured an overall level of 
a desire to be actively involved in the decision-making process. For the overall sample, 
the Total Combined score was low reflecting the traditional roles and philosophy of IR. 
The group that had the highest mean was the less experienced IR managers perhaps 
indicating a desire to change the role of IR. Their counterpart, the more experienced IR 
managers had a much lower mean. It is unclear why there is such a difference in means 
(even though it is non-significant). Perhaps it is the differences in age, experience, level 
of education (there were more Ph.D.s and Ed.D.s in the Less Time group) that are factors. 
A final question for the will to influence section asked the level of influence IR should 
have on the following areas: establishing budgets, resource allocation, retention issues, 
program review, curriculum, and student success programs. Across the board, the top 
three areas were always retention issues, program review, and student success programs. 
For the overall sample, retention issues ranked first followed by program review and then 
student success programs. There were some slight variations in ranking but all groups had 
these three and all three had high means.  
 Decisions in higher education are never based solely on the work of institutional 
researchers but are based on the academic and professional judgment of the decision-
makers (Saupe, 1990). The work of IR does reflect an active role but is traditionally 
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passive and non-directional  (Suslow, 1972). Although it is not a very strong voice, this 
study did indicate that institutional researchers felt that they can act as change agents who 
can provide solutions and that they want to be more involved in decision-making beyond 
providing information. Perry (1972) and Saunders (1983) advocated for IR to act as a 
third voice in decision making that provides rational options in policy making and 
process development. To do this, institutional researchers must learn to provide a 
subjective aspect to their work that includes their professional opinion and make 
recommendations to solutions or they can remain objective and provide as many rational 
solutions as possible. Even this approach would involve some subjectivity in determining 
what solutions are put into their reports. It appears that if there is a shift to a more active 
involvement, it may come from the less experienced group of IR managers as they had 
the highest scores on the active will statements. But just having a will to be influential 
does not mean that they will have the ability to influence.  
 The ability to influence decisions section was developed from the possible ways 
institutional researchers can have an influence found in the literature review. There was a 
large range of mean scores across the possible ways of influence, from as low as 2.00 to a 
high of 5.12. The Ability to Influence Combined score for the overall sample, however, 
was mild to moderate. The group with the highest combined score was the IR managers 
with more experience while the low was the IR Staff group. There was only one 
statement in all of the comparisons that was found to be statistically significant; the larger 
institutions had a higher mean for their involvement in framing research questions than 
the smaller institutions. All groups had very similar means.  
 313 
 
 As discussed in the will to influence section, traditionally, providing an opinion or 
recommendation is not a part of the regular routine for institutional researchers (Suslow, 
1972; Walton, 2005). When presented with the statement, “My opinion is often 
considered in decision-making” the mean level of agreement was mild overall. IR at 
larger institutions had their opinions considered the most while the least considered group 
was the IR Staff. Even though their opinion is not often considered, institutional 
researchers’ reports and data are. After all, objective and rational reporting are the 
hallmarks of IR work (Fincher, 1981; Knight & Leimer, 2009; Suslow, 1972). When IR 
gives their data and reports to others, they are providing a source of power to the receiver 
(Hearn, 1988; Rourke & Brooks, 1966). However, the information is only as powerful as 
the decision-maker’s inclination to use it. When a decision-maker does not utilize the 
information provided by IR, IR loses power and the information is not a valuable 
resource. In such cases, IR may need to work on educating the decision-makers about the 
value of the data and what all is available to them (Ehrenberg, 2005; Fincher, 1981). The 
statement (s), “My reports (data) are often used in decision-making” had the highest 
means for all the ability to influence statements. Generally, data statements had a higher 
mean than the reports statements did. The group with the most influence was the more 
experienced IR managers while the lowest group was IR managers at public institutions. 
 Even though institutional researchers’ reports and data were being used at a pretty 
strong level, participants indicated that their opinions and work outputs were not 
respected at the same strong level. The statement (s), “I feel faculty (administrators) 
respect my opinion and work” had mild agreement levels for the overall sample for the 
faculty statement and moderate for the administrator statement. All participants felt that 
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the administrator respected their work more than the faculty. The group with the highest 
mean was the participants at the larger institutions for the administrators statement while 
the lowest mean was the group of IR managers with less experience for the faculty 
statement. Suslow (1972) suggested that IR needs to keep a balance between appeasing 
faculty and administers because he felt that working more with one will negatively 
influence the relation with other. It appears that participants in this study are on the 
administrative side of the balance. Having a Ph.D. and faculty experience can help build 
relationships with faculty; however, it was the less experienced IR managers who had 
more Ph.D.’s but had the lowest mean for the faculty statement (Delaney, 1997; Knight, 
et al., 1997; Rourke & Brooks, 1966; Saunders, 1983; Suslow, 1972; Walton, 2005).  
 Retention issues, program review, and student success programs were the three 
areas that participants felt that IR should participate in the most. IR’s potential powers in 
these areas were discussed in the literature review. Institutional researchers can identify 
units and programs that are no longer fulfilling their objectives and/or missions or are 
unable to prove their contribution to the mission of the institution, which could affect the 
programs funding (Saunders, 1983; Saupe, 1990; Suslow, 1972). Beyond reviewing 
programs, IR can identify internal issues with administrative units and external issues that 
may affect the institution. Conversely, they can also identify successful units and 
programs that can positively affect their funding (Fincher, 1981; Knight, et al., 1997; 
Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990). Participants in this study indicated that they had very little 
to do with departments or programs losing funding. The lowest group’s mean being 
related to IR managers at private institutions. There was more agreement with the 
statement about helping departments or programs to receive funding but the overall mean 
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was still weak. The most influential was the more experienced IR managers. They also 
had the highest mean for identifying success and excellence on campus. The overall mean 
score for identifying success and excellence was slightly higher than the mean for 
identifying issues. Again, it was the IR managers at private institutions who had the 
lowest means. While the participants of the study indicated a belief that they should be 
involved in program review, they did not indicate that they actually have much influence 
in it, especially when it comes to influencing funding. 
 Identifying issues, determining the measure of success or failure, and 
understanding who should be involved in making decisions are related to having 
institutional knowledge and the ability to properly frame research questions and conduct 
research (Morgan, 2006). When asked their level of agreement with the statement, “I am 
involved in helping to frame research questions for decision-making” the overall sample 
had a mild to moderate mean agreement. The group with the highest mean was the more 
experienced IR manager group while the lowest was the IR staff. Conceptualizing 
research was one of the highest technical skills for all of the participants, which makes 
the low rating of the ability to influence in this manner somewhat surprising, although it 
ranked in the middle of the other manners of influence in the study. As Saunders (1983) 
stated, helping to define the research question is helping to influence the decision. How 
the research question is framed influences how to determine which departments or 
programs are successful and which are not. This in turn helps to define the institution 
both internally and externally.  
 By creating new knowledge and making recommendations, institutional research 
engages in social construction that can define the institution based on its strengths and 
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weaknesses, to both internal and external constituents (Matsen, 1993). The level of 
agreement for the statement (s), “My reports define our institution to internal (external) 
constituents” had moderate level means for the overall sample. Even though they did not 
feel that they influence funding or even identify success or failure very often, participants 
did feel they are at least defining the institution. This might be on the level of completing 
fact books that create an image for public consumption or it might be identifying 
retention issues that refocus the energies and resources of the institution and redefines 
institutional priorities. Between the internal and external statements, the IR managers and 
public institutions had the highest mean for defining the institution for external 
constituents. The lowest mean was from the IR Staff group in defining the institution 
internally.  
 Of course any report or data that will influence the distribution of resources, 
internally or externally, introduces political maneuvering into the decision-making 
process. As much as IR would like to treat decision-making as a rational process based on 
data, that is not the case. Institutional research must understand the political realm and 
characteristics of their institutions (Saunders, 1983). Institutional research is called upon 
to provide data that can be used to persuade a decision-maker, to refute an accusation, or 
to increase power of a smaller player in a political conflict (Rourke & Brooks, 1966; 
Walton, 2005). As previously reported, participants’ understanding of political relations 
on campus was very low and they do not feel that they are used very often in political 
conflicts. The statement, “I am often asked to provide data that supports the particular 
view point of a group” had a low mean for the overall sample. The group used most in 
political maneuvering was the more experienced IR managers. The group with the lowest 
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group mean was the private institution group. It is possible that when faculty or staff 
comes to IR for data and information, IR might not be aware of whether or not the 
information is being used for political purposes. Once the data are released to the 
recipient, power is transferred and is used how the recipient chooses.  
 The follow-up question to the ability to influence section asked participants to rate 
how much control they had over issues in their own areas. The issues included: what 
projects you work on, how your research was conducted, when your work is due, how 
your data is interpreted, how your data are presented, and how your budget is spent. 
Every group and the overall sample determined that they had the most control over how 
their research was conducted. This is interesting considering they only had moderate 
levels in the ability to influence the framing of the research question and the technical 
skills of qualitative and quantitative research were not high, nor were skills related to 
statistical methods. On the other hand, conceptualizing research was one of the highest 
ranked technical skills. The participants indicated that they had the most control over how 
their data were interpreted and how their data were presented. What projects participants 
worked on and how their budgets were spent were the next highest picked areas of 
control. When their work was due was the lowest. How their research is conducted had 
consistently strong means. The purpose of this follow up question was simply to get an 
initial impression about how much power institutional researchers had over their 
immediate area and work. The implications are that they have a moderate level of 
influence but if they were more involved in identifying issues and defining the research 
questions, they might have more control over how their research is conducted and what 
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projects they work on. Institutional researchers whose power orientation is autonomy 
might be interested in using their power in this way.  
 Overall, the institutional researchers who participated in this study tended to agree 
with the more traditional roles of IR in the literature that describe the work of IR as 
objective, rational, free of personal opinion and politics, and that it is complete once it 
has stimulated conversation. They do not have a very strong will to influence decisions 
but would like to act as change agents by identifying issues and making suggestions for 
improvement. There is very little subjective content included in their output, which may 
need to change if they wish to be more involved with the decision-making process 
beyond providing information. Currently, their opinion is not considered in decision-
making very often unless they are a manager who has worked in IR for some time. Their 
work has won the respect of the administration but is only slightly respected by the 
faculty. This could be improved by increasing their presence in departmental issues and 
improving their networking skills. As was expected, the reports and data are how IR has 
the most influence on decisions as they are often used in the decision-making process, 
although meeting more regularly with high level decision-makers and pushing to have 
their data and expertise used more, would increase the use of their data and therefore their 
influence. Being more involved in framing research questions will also increase their 
ability to influence decisions. Participants indicated that IR should be involved in 
program reviews but it appears their work has little to do with funding of departments 
and programs. To be influential, IR would need to work more closely with those who 
determine if funds will increase or decrease for the departments and programs under 
review. This of course will increase their presence in the political struggles for resources, 
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which they feel they are not currently involved in. Understanding power from a political 
perspective was the second highest ranked power orientation in this study and perhaps 
could be one area that could most increase their ability to influence. This would require 
them to increase their networking, understand the political relations on campus and be 
more aware of when they are being asked to support a particular view point. As it turns 
out, having a political orientation toward power was one of the variables that most 
explained the participants’ ability to influence decisions.  
Discussion of the Variables that Contribute to the Ability to Influence 
 After exploring the power sources available to IR, power orientations, and the will 
to influence, this study sought to understand what variables might contribute to some 
institutional researchers being more influential than others. The final model produced by 
the linear regression using the step-wise method identified seven contributing variables 
that helped explain the variances in the Ability to Influence Combined score. From 
Mintzberg’s power sources, the control of information power source and the technical 
skills power source were not included in the regression because these two sources are at 
the heart of what IR does. The control of information can be used in all decision-making 
models to influence decisions. Institutional researchers can influence decisions in two 
main ways by controlling information. First, if IR is the sole source of information, the 
information they provide can define the problem, limit or expand the solutions, and 
determine who is involved simply based on the objective or subjective data/information 
they provide. Secondly, the information institutional researchers provide is power; so if 
IR controls who does or does not receive information, they influence who does or does 
not have power in the decision-making process. This would probably be most useful in 
 320 
 
the political model where decisions are negotiated or the bureaucratic model where the 
rational decisions are often based on IR information. However, the control of information 
might not be as effective in the collegial model where decisions are based on faculty 
knowledge and expertise. Since the cybernetic models uses all three types, controlling 
information can be influential in that model as well. Having the technical skills power 
source can be effective in bureaucratic model as long as IR has unique skills that the 
decision-makers do not have and are therefore dependent on the skilled outputs of IR. 
Technical skills can also help in collegial models if IR is respected by the faculty. 
Institutional researchers who help faculty in their research and publications might be able 
to have their skills respected enough to be invited to participate in the collegial decision-
making process. In the political process, technical skills will be influential only to the 
extent that they are able to support the political parties involved. While the controlling 
resource power source and technical skills power source were not included in the 
regression model, the remaining three power sources were. 
 Higher scores in unique knowledge, access to decision-makers, and legal 
prerogatives were included in the regression and proved to be major contributors. Within 
the unique knowledge measurements, most participants had strong scores in the 
statements regarding understanding how decisions impact departments, having cross-
campus responsibilities, and having their opinion respected because of their 
understanding of the institution. That leaves the variance in the remaining two statements, 
the understanding of interdepartmental relationships and campus politics. This finding 
emphasized the need for institutional researchers to have some level of awareness 
concerning the political reality of decision-making and the need for institutional 
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researchers to have people skills and an understanding of people with whom they are 
working (Saunders, 1983). Unique knowledge can help institutional researchers in 
collegial decision-making if the knowledge is seen as relevant and the institutional 
researcher is seen as a subject matter expert. This power source can also be influential in 
the bureaucratic model, especially in a highly structured decision-making process. IR’s 
unique knowledge might provide broader information to decision-makers who might 
have a narrow scope of influence and a limited understanding of the situation because of 
the specialization that occurs in a bureaucracy. In the political model, unique knowledge 
is knowledge that the political actors do not have but need to obtain in order to support 
their cause and negotiate a solution. 
 The legal prerogative power source contribution appears to come from two 
possible areas, either from affecting funding related to grants or other funding sources, 
which few participants felt they did, or from their belief that they have authority to 
demand work and the willingness to actually use it. As mentioned earlier, the ability to 
demand work from others probably does not extend beyond demanding constituents to 
provide data needed for reporting, unless the IR department has some additional non-
traditional responsibilities. What is more likely is the idea that someone who has the 
authority to demand work would actually use that authority. In other words, the fact that 
participants used their authority, or power, demonstrates a higher will to influence than 
those who have not used their authority. The actual use of power, then, contributes to a 
high Ability to Influence Combined score. It would seem that legal prerogatives would be 
used the same way in all decision-making models, assuming that decision-makers are 
interested in complying with legal requirements. However, if the legal requirement power 
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source is dependent on the willingness of the institutional researcher to use it, it might be 
more effective in the political model as a tool for negotiation but threatening legal 
requirements might be seen as offensive in the collegial or bureaucratic model. 
Demanding action based on legal requirements might not set well in the collegial model 
when decision makers are considered equal nor would it set well in the bureaucratic 
model if the institutional researcher threatens the established chain of command.  
 Since most participants reported to a high level decision-maker, the probable 
statement that makes access to high level decision-makers power source a contributing 
factor to explaining the variance of the Ability to Influence Combined score was the 
statement about meeting with high level decision-makers regularly. This is another 
reflection of the need for institutional researchers to have a reasonable level of political 
and people skills. The more decision-makers and/or faculty know IR, the more likely they 
will be able to trust their data, consider their opinion, and be aware of all the reports and 
information available to them through IR. Institutional researchers can still be objective 
and rational in their work, but meeting more regularly with decision-makers will increase 
the likelihood that IR is included in the framing of the research questions, finding 
solutions, and considering the broader impact of decisions (Billups & Delucia, 1990; 
Ehrenberg, 2005; Fincher, 1981; Serban & Luan, 2002). Of course, having access to high 
level decision makers would be helpful in any decision-making model but perhaps less so 
in the political and the collegial models where decisions are negotiated or mutually 
agreed upon, unless the access to the decision maker enables institutional researchers to 
be seen as an equal to those involved in making the decision. It would be most beneficial 
in a bureaucratic model when the decisions can be handed down from the highest level of 
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the organization. The higher the level of access, the more influential the institutional 
researcher could be. 
 Institutional size, based on student population, was the fourth largest contributor 
to the variance in the Ability to Influence Combined score. There are two reasons that 
may explain this based on this study. First, there seems to be more variation in the 
placement of the IR department in the smaller institutions. While institutional researchers 
at smaller institutions reported being closer to the president on the organizational chart, 
they also reported that they are less centralized and have more of a chance of reporting to 
a more specialized area such as enrollment management. Larger institutions have IR 
departments that are more centralized and are more likely to report to a higher level 
decision-maker. Being more centralized provides the department with more exposure on 
campus and promotes the image of being a part of the larger decision-making structure 
(Knight & Leimer, 2009; Knight, et al., 1995; Matsen, 1993; Saupe, 1990; Suslow, 1972; 
Walton, 2005). Being involved at a higher level allows the IR office at larger institutions 
to have more of an influence. The second explanation is that the larger institutions have 
larger IR departments. With larger departments comes more resources and stature in 
addition to the ability to engage in a larger variety of institutional research projects. 
Additionally, the participants from the larger institutions served on more institutional 
level committees than the smaller institutions. More involvement increases opportunity 
and therefore the ability to influence decisions. Larger institutions of higher education are 
more likely than smaller ones to be described as a cybernetic organization because of the 
increasing complexity of the organization (Vires, 2009). Therefore, institutional 
researchers who desire to actively influence decisions must be prepared to determine if a 
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decision being made is using a collegial, political or bureaucratic process and act 
accordingly. 
 The next two variables in the model were the power orientations of personal 
charisma and political connections. Both charisma and political connections place 
emphasis on the need to understand people and the interrelationships on campus. It is not 
necessary for institutional researchers to become charismatic individuals in order that 
they may have greater influence, but they should be aware of who on campus has the 
charismatic personalities and learn to work with those individuals. Often, it will be the 
more charismatic individuals who have the political connections. Decision-making 
processes that involve charismatic individuals and political negotiation have a need for 
the objective and rational voice represented by IR (Perry, 1972; Saunders, 1983; Suslow, 
1972). The objective and rational voice can represent a perspective that sees the needs of 
the institution as a whole instead of the needs of an individual or a political group. In 
order to be present at the decision-making table, institutional researchers must learn to 
understand and work with both of these orientations. Institutional researchers can use 
both the charisma and political orientations to be very effective in influencing decision-
making in the collegial and political organization. Using charisma can help them to be 
seen as an equal to the decision makers. Being politically oriented can increase their 
willingness to engage in the political negotiations. Additionally, institutional researchers 
can influence decisions by attempting to be a rational voice in both processes. However, 
in the bureaucratic organization, the institutional research might be most effective by 
focusing on providing rational data, information, and solutions.  
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 Years of experience was the final variable that was related to the variance in the 
Ability to Influence score and the only variable that had an inverse relationship. It seems 
reasonable to assume that having spent more time at an institution would increase 
institutional researchers’ unique knowledge and expand their political network thereby 
increasing their ability to influence decisions but that does not seem to be this case. From 
the information gathered in this study, there are two plausible explanations for the 
inverse-relationship. First, there were fewer participants who had earned a Ph.D. or Ed.D. 
in the more experienced IR managers group than the less experienced IR managers. This 
might have resulted in a decrease in their agreement with statements regarding having 
their work and opinions respected by faculty and administrators. When decisions are 
made that have a collegial component to the process, the lack of a terminal degree, and 
therefore lack of faculty experience, might be a factor in their ability to influence the 
decision-makers, faculty in particular (Delaney, 1997; Knight, et al., 1997; Rourke & 
Brooks, 1966; Vires, 2009; Walton, 2005). The second explanation from the data is that 
the more experienced IR managers simply did not have a very high mean on the Will to 
Influence Combined score. This group had the means to influence but simply remained 
true to the traditional role of IR of not engaging in the decision-making process beyond 
providing objective information and reporting for the consideration of the decision-
makers. 
What was clear from the linear regression was that most of these variables involve 
the ability to understand and interact with people. Understanding the political process and 
having people skills appear to be underlying themes related to the ability to influence 
decisions. In the collegial process, institutional researchers must understand the 
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requirements to be seen as equals to decisions makers. They can do this by increasing 
their credentials or by being viewed as a subject matter expert. Decisions based on the 
political process require the institutional researcher to understand who is participating in 
the process and their information needs. IR can then provide or withhold information as 
is needed to influence the negotiations. In the bureaucratic process, IR can provide the 
rational voice and use their access to decision makers to influence decisions based on 
their rational opinions. The cybernetic organization requires institutional researchers to 
work with all three processes and to be able to understand which process is being used on 
each decision that is being made. Not every contributing variable is needed to actively 
influence decisions, but the more variables institutional researchers have at their disposal, 
the more opportunity they will have should they decide to actively influence a decision.  
  
Conclusion 
 This study confirmed the presence of all five of Mintzberg’s power sources within 
the position of institutional research even though each power source has areas of 
weakness. The reports and data that are the main outputs of IR are the anchors of the 
control of resource power source. IR is a powerful resource for decision-makers but it is 
not the only source of information in institutions of higher education. While IR will 
probably never be able to control information in the truest sense of resource dependency 
theory, institutional researchers can strive to produce accurate and useful information that 
is placed in context to the decision being made, thereby controlling information by being 
the most trusted and respected source of information. Institutional researchers have very 
good skills in reporting, presenting information, and conceptualizing research, which 
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makes their technical skills a strong power source. By increasing their skills in data 
mining and more complex research techniques in quantitative/qualitative research and 
analytics, they can increase their ability to diagnose issues and develop solutions. The 
stronger their research skills are, the more objective and rational solutions they can 
present. Without increasing their skills in these areas, institutional researchers may need 
to increase the level of subjectivity in their reports if they wish to be more influential. A 
better understanding of campus politics and interdepartmental relationships would 
increase institutional researchers’ unique knowledge power source and further 
complement their understanding of the impact of decisions across campus and help them 
with their cross-campus responsibilities. The legal prerogatives power source is present 
but will most likely be limited to helping IR get the information they need to complete 
reports. While having legal requirements is a contributor to the ability to influence 
decision, it may be more a reflection of a personality trait of someone who is willing to 
use their authority than actually having legal requirements that requires action to be taken 
by others. The final power source, access to high-level decision-makers, is present but 
appears to be underutilized as participants indicated that they do not meet with decision-
makers regularly. Increasing their people skills and political orientation could help 
increase the strength of this power source.  
 Institutional researchers have two orientations or understandings of power. The 
strongest is the control and autonomy orientation, which would indicate that institutional 
researchers view power as a way to ensure they can do their jobs with as much freedom 
as possible. It appears to reflect an interest in working more with data and research rather 
than people and politics. To increase their influence, or to simply increase their 
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involvement in decision-making, institutional researchers can develop the second most 
popular orientation, political connections. This would place an emphasis on 
understanding the political realm of higher education, which does not necessarily mean 
that they would need to be directly involved with campus politics but at least understand 
it, how it works, and the needs of those engaged in the political conflicts of decision-
making. 
 This study also revealed that institutional researchers wish to remain objective 
and rational in their work but would also like to be more involved in the decision-making 
process beyond simply providing information. To do so may require institutional 
researchers to increase their people skills and be willing to get more involved in campus 
politics. Their reports and data are used and are respected in the decision-making process 
but they have little influence on identifying programs and departments that have issues 
and they are not involved with influencing funding. To truly get involved as change 
agents, institutional researchers need be more involved in identifying problems and using 
their skills to provide rational and objective solutions and alternatives.  
 Finally, this study found that institutional researches that have a greater ability to 
influence decisions have a strong presence of all five power sources. They view power as 
being related to having personal charisma and political connections indicating that they 
have a stronger understanding of the need for people skills and political relationships. 
And lastly, they are not necessarily the ones with more experience at their current 
institution; in fact, there is an inverse relationship between institutional experience and 
the ability to influence.  
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 This study was able to contribute to the existing knowledge by confirming 
Mintzberg’s (1983b) power sources in analysts who work in higher education in the role 
of institutional research. It demonstrated that the literature on institutional research 
reflects the attitudes of institutional researchers; they desire to increase their involvement 
in the decision-making process beyond providing information and they want to help 
improve their institutions by acting as change-agents. However, they also want to remain 
as the objective voice in decision-making and provide rational solutions for the 
consideration of others. It is the opinion of this researcher that if institutional researchers 
wish to increase their ability to have a positive impact on the decision-making process, 
they have the power sources and the opportunity to do so but it will require them to 
improve their understanding and comfort level of campus politics and increase their 
research skills to go deeper than descriptive statistics and into data mining and inferential 
statistics.  
 
Implications 
Implications for Institutional Researchers 
The implications for this study begin with institutional researchers. If institutional 
researchers desire to increase their influence on decision-making in higher education, 
they have the power sources available to them to do so; however, it will require them to 
reorient themselves from viewing power as a means to protect their jobs and the freedom 
to carry out their work undisturbed (autonomy) to viewing power as being related to 
social interaction (political and charisma). The development of people skills will aid 
institutional researchers to better “market” their reports, solutions, and opinions to 
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decision-makers through increased interactions. Increasing the amount of meetings with 
decision-makers will increase the chances of being involved in framing research 
questions and planning research enabling institutional researchers to influence decisions 
from the beginning of the process. Institutional researchers can also focus on building 
stronger relationships with members of the faculty in order to gain more respect from the 
faculty and to increase their influence. Having a Ph.D. and some teaching and publication 
experience can help with this. Working with the faculty on research projects can also 
improve their relationships. Improving people skills of institutional researchers can 
increase their influence, but there are some power sources that could be improved as well. 
 The control of resources power source and the technical skills power source are 
complimentary power sources. It is unlikely that institutional researchers would be able 
to control all information within an institution, but by increasing their technical skills, 
particularly in the areas of data management and statistical methods, they can be the most 
trusted and valuable source of information on campus. By introducing more advanced 
statistical methods into their research, institutional researchers may be able to take their 
analytics deeper than correlations and closer to causation when researching institutional 
issues and making projections. This would allow institutional researchers to provide more 
data-based solutions that would allow them to provide solutions and recommendations 
while remaining objective in their reporting. Improving their people skills, as discussed in 
the previous paragraph, would increase the chances of institutional researchers meeting 
more regularly with high level decision-makers, and thereby improving their “access to 
high level decision-makers” power source. The remaining two power sources might have 
limitations to them. While institutional researchers have unique knowledge in their 
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understanding of the issues and complexity of their institution, it is only unique to the 
extent that others on campus do not bother to obtain it. Nevertheless, institutional 
researchers should strive to maintain an intimate knowledge of their institution in order to 
provide the proper context to their research and to properly design their research plans. 
The final power source, legal prerogatives, will probably not extend beyond the need to 
get other departments to provide information needed for reporting. This power source is 
probably not worth developing within the traditional scope of the duties of institutional 
researchers.  
Implications for Administrators 
  Institutional research is a valuable resource that can be further developed as a tool 
to improve decision-making by providing objective solutions to complex problems in a 
cybernetic organization. Institutional researchers desire to be more involved in the 
decision-making process by providing solutions that are unbiased by opinions and 
politics. Including institutional researchers at the beginning of the decision-making 
process can better utilize their research skills in planning research and framing research 
questions. Being included throughout the decision-making process will better utilize 
institutional researchers’ unique knowledge of the institution, data sets, and research 
skills. Centralizing the IR office and perhaps elevating it on the organizational chart will 
improve institutional researchers’ perspective of the institution and allow them to provide 
better contextual information in their reports. Providing resources needed for training will 
allow them to better develop their skill set and improve their research capabilities. 
Increasing the size of the IR staff will allow institutional researchers to expand beyond 
the duties mandatory reporting required by the governing bodies and be more involved in 
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helping to identify successful programs on campus and programs that may need to be 
reconsidered. Institutional researchers are lacking some respect from the members of 
faculty; while administrators cannot force that issue to improve, they can encourage 
institutional researchers to interact more with the faculty such as partnering in research. 
Institutional researchers can also be encouraged to pursue terminal degrees, teach, and 
publish in order to improve their standing in the collegial decision-making process as 
well as to allow for the personal development of the IR staff. 
Power sources available to institutional researchers are available to the 
administrators to which they report. Therefore, the control of resources and institutional 
researchers’ unique knowledge can be used to keep the administrator highly informed and 
enable the administrator to provide more objective solutions as well as the ability to 
engage in political debate armed with accurate and meaningful data. Of course, this 
information is a result of the technical skills available to the administrators via the 
institutional researchers. Institutional researchers with cross-campus responsibilities can 
provide administrators a means of knowing what is going on within the various 
departments across campus and the issues with which they may be dealing. The more 
administrators develop and utilize institutional researchers, the better they will be able to 
handle the increasing demand for accountability in higher education. 
Implications for State Systems of Higher Education 
 Like administrators within the institutions themselves, the state governing bodies 
can take advantage of the power sources available to institutional researchers. Control of 
resources, technical skills, access to decision-makers, and unique knowledge apply to 
institutional researchers at the state level as well as the institutional level. However, 
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institutional researchers for the state governing bodies might have more ability to develop 
legal prerogatives related to reporting and compliance than the IR staff working at the 
institutions. Developing better relationships between the IR staff at the two levels can 
increase the influence of institutional researchers at both levels by increasing the control 
of information, further developing unique knowledge beyond their institutions, and by 
providing more access to a different set of decision-makers. The two levels of 
institutional researchers working together could develop better reporting, better 
contextual knowledge, and better objective solutions to the issues facing higher education 
in their particular state system. 
Implications for the Association of Institutional Research 
 Institutional researchers with less experience expressed a greater desire to be 
involved in the decision making process than their more experienced counterparts. This 
might indicate a shifting, or perhaps a future shift in the ideology of institutional research 
to which AIR might wish to adjust their programing by adding components that focus on 
developing institutional researchers’ ability to influence decisions. AIR‘s conferences, 
workshops, and professional development institutions provide plenty of opportunities for 
institutional researchers to develop their skills, but AIR might consider adding 
components that help members increase their ability to influence. Teaching them how to 
utilize the power sources available to them and perhaps more importantly, helping 
institutional researchers develop their people skills so that they are better equipped to 
navigate the political and collegial aspects of decision making in higher education. 
Additional training about higher education as an organization (history and decision-
 334 
 
making, for example) will increase institutional researchers’ unique knowledge and 
awareness of their environment.  
 While every institution is unique in its organization and structure, it would benefit 
the profession of institutional research to develop recommendations to standardize the 
placement of IR offices and the scope of their responsibilities. This could include the 
recommendation to centralize the IR office and make it the responsibility of a higher 
level decision-maker, both of which would increase the level of influence that IR has on 
decisions. Perhaps the most important implication of this research is for AIR to continue 
to develop research opportunities to research institutional researchers themselves.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The nature of this research was exploratory with the intent to gain an 
understanding power as it relates to the position of institutional research. It was 
successful in that it confirmed the presence of power in the form of Mintzberg’s (1983b) 
power sources, identified institutional researchers’ orientation toward power, and it 
confirmed that some institutional researchers have more of a will and ability to influence 
decision than others. Lastly, it identified variables that appear to contribute to a higher 
ability to influence decisions. While there are several specific issues that could be further 
explored, such as why IR appears to have very little effect on departments or programs 
losing funding, there are four larger areas of potential research that stand out. 
 The first potential area of research is a qualitative study of highly influential 
institutional researchers. Doing so would provide richer data to help understand the roles 
the influential institutional researchers perform at their institutions, their attitudes toward 
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the work of IR, the areas in which they are most influential and the skills they feel help 
them the most. After analyzing the data, a better quantitative survey could be developed 
based on the themes derived from the qualitative analysis. This information could be used 
to shape the profession of institutional research should there be a need or desire for IR to 
shift into a more active role in decision-making. 
 If there is a division amongst institutional researchers as to whether or not the 
profession should be more active or not, it appears that the division is between less 
experienced IR managers and those with more experience; this is the second area of 
potential research. This study identified several areas where the two groups of IR 
managers differ; many were statistically significant: the roles they perform (less 
experienced managers perform more roles and include assessment and planning), active 
and passive will to influence, desire to act as change agents, and a desire to be more 
influential. These two groups may represent a shift in ideology from a more traditional 
role of simply providing information to a more aggressive role that includes subjective 
recommendations and has a more active role in decision-making. If that divide and 
ideological shift is truly there, it can provide direction for the future of IR. 
 The third area of potential research is to conduct a gap analysis between the 
perception how influential and effective institutional researchers believe they are and 
how influential and effective their constituents (bosses and decision-makers for example) 
believe they are. The benefit of this study is that it could provide a more complete 
understanding of IR’s level of influence and identify areas that IR can improve upon. The 
information could help create professional development opportunities and provide a 
better understanding of IR’s place in higher education. The difficulty in this type of 
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study, considering the diversity in IR, is identifying who is best qualified to evaluate the 
contributions of the institutional researcher and making sure it is a fair comparison 
amongst all participants.  
 The final area recommended for study is the institutional researchers themselves. 
A better understanding of the personalities and interests of institutional researchers who 
enjoy their profession can potentially help the development of the profession by 
identifying the traits needed for a long and fulfilling career. This study could include the 
full Power Orientation Survey that would confirm institutional researchers’ 
understanding of power and how they might seek to use it. The results of this study must 
be viewed with caution because the Power Orientation Survey (POS) was reduced to one 
question; using the full POS would confirm these findings. The Strong Interest Inventory, 
which uses Holland Codes to match natural interests with careers, could be used to 
identify the type of codes that best describe institutional researchers: Realistic (enjoys 
working with tools, animals, or machines), Conventional (enjoys working with numbers, 
data, and records), Enterprising (enjoys leading, managing, and persuading), Social 
(enjoys informing, enlightening, and developing), Artistic (enjoys creativity and 
unstructured environments), or Investigative (likes to observe, learn analyze, evaluate, 
and problem solve) (Reardon & Lenz, 1998). Institutional research is not currently listed 
in the Dictionary of Holland Occupational codes, so perspective institutional researchers 
cannot look up the profile of an institutional researcher to determine if the career would 
be a good fit or not (Gettfredson & Holland, 1996). Institutional researchers come from a 
variety of backgrounds; so it would be beneficial to the profession to find as many 
common themes amongst the practitioners as possible.  
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 Most of the research in higher education revolves around faculty or high level 
administrators; so any studies that focus on IR will help develop the profession. 
Institutional researchers spend their days working with data about their institution and 
they rarely have time to conduct research on themselves. Perhaps this study and future 
studies will be able to assist in the continued development of the IR profession, and in 
doing so, enable institutional researchers to continue to help improve their institutions 
and higher education.  
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Appendix B: Comparison of Power Source Table 
Table 21.1 
Comparison of Means for Power Source Statements 
 
 
 
Overall Institutional Size Institutional Type Job Description Manager Type Manager Experience 
 
   
Less than 
10,000 
More than 
10,000 
Public Private IR Staff IR Manager 
Public 
Manager 
Private 
Manager 
Less Time More Time 
 
 
M Kurt M Kurt M Kurt M K M K M Kurt M Kurt M Kurt M Kurt M Kurt M Kurt 
I collect institutional level 
data 
CR 5.13 1.297 5.10 1.410 5.05 0.737 4.94 0.458 5.00 0.555 4.90 0.007 5.33 3.258 5.15 1.688 5.20 2.309 5.03 1.158 5.62 6.032 
I collect institutional level 
information 
CR 5.14 2.037 4.81 0.282 5.44 6.272 5.20 3.084 4.80 0.185 4.77 0.388 5.26 2.563 5.15 2.475 5.04 0.722 4.91 .599 5.61 6.619 
I generate institutional level 
data 
CR 5.11 1.326 5.19 1.923 5.05 1.071 5.00 0.621 5.10 1.69 4.77 
-
0.409 
5.37 3.93 5.15 1.608 5.60 9.935 5.33 4.780 5.41 4.022 
I generate institutional level 
information 
CR 5.41 5.284 5.43 6.305 5.45 5.258 5.45 5.286 5.28 4.077 5.10 1.748 5.64 10.603 5.70 6.102 5.71 7.766 5.52 2.160 5.76 22.305 
I distribute institutional level 
data 
CR 5.40 4.519 5.41 5.248 5.33 3.549 5.08 1.323 5.50 7.834 5.37 4.046 5.45 4.513 5.15 1.719 5.68 5..373 5.30 2.152 5.61 10.429 
I distribute institutional level 
information 
CR 5.37 4.353 5.29 3.708 5.47 5.526 5.20 2.701 5.41 6.250 5.17 3.007 5.56 6.86 5.37 4.346 5.71 7.766 5.42 6.091 5.70 6.554 
Faculty, admin, and/or staff 
often ask me for information 
and/or data 
CR 5.49 4.99 5.46 4.997 5.52 -0.132 5.45 6.238 5.50 0.374 5.43 0.134 5.68 4.414 5.70 7.689 5.75 4.143 5.55 2.442 5.81 6.692 
I manage data warehouses 
and repositories 
CR 3.81 
-
1.544 
3.87 -1.47 3.62 -1.724 3.73 
-
1.613 
3.66 
-
1.562 
3.37 
-
1.805 
4.13 -1.191 4.22 
-
0.836 
4.04 
-
1.302 
3.88 
-
1.490 
4.38 -.659 
Most institutional data 
and/or reports come from 
my office 
CR 4.59 
-
0.508 
4.66 0.169 4.50 -0.896 4.26 
-
0.727 
4.78 
-
0.693 
4.83 
-
0.586 
4.62 -1.045 4.46 -1.16 4.68 
-
0.854 
4.27 
-
1.390 
4.97 1.388 
When there is an 
institutional level decision to 
be made, it is my office that 
provides the data and reports 
needed 
CR 4.48 
-
0.092 
4.42 -0.031 4.55 0.141 4.25 
-
0.276 
4.44 
-
0.595 
4.73 
-
0.054 
4.42 -0.286 4.22 
-
0.508 
4.36 
-
0.378 
4.33 -.851 4.52 .840 
When there is a 
departmental decision to be 
made, it is my office that 
provides the data and reports 
CR 3.75 
-
0.511 
3.62 -0.222 3.84 -0.705 3.57 
-
0.564 
3.59 
-
0.066 
3.97 
-
0.996 
3.56 -0.309 3.41 
-
0.649 
3.32 
-
0.089 
3.27 -.251 3.85 -.030 
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needed 
Control of Resources 
combined score 
CR 4.87 0.975 4.83 1.831 4.89 -0.329 4.74 1.011 4.81 
-
0.277 
4.76 
-
0.978 
4.99 0.557 4.87 
-
0.048 
4.99 
-
0.675 
4.80 .584 5.18 -.200 
Data Management TS 4.98 
-
0.444 
4.90 0.01 4.98 -0.91 4.92 
-
0.868 
4.95 
-
0.027 
5.00 
-
1.025 
5.03 -0.248 5.07 0.393 5.16 
-
0.429 
4.79 -.799 5.26 .524 
Presentations TS 4.94 0.063 4.75 0.13 5.21 0.214 4.78 
-
0.584 
5.05 0.947 4.63 
-
0.685 
5.06 0.58 4.85 
-
0.906 
5.28 1.412 4.97 -.262 5.15 -.717 
Writing reports TS 5.02 0.216 4.93 -0.088 5.14 1.065 4.92 
-
0.248 
5.12 1.551 4.60 -0.82 5.12 -0.286 5.00 -0.65 5.24 
-
1.158 
5.09 -.278 5.15 -1.101 
Statistical methods TS 4.39 0.082 4.18 -0.453 4.53 1.059 4.37 0.156 4.32 0.237 4.43 1.408 4.28 -0.374 4.33 
-
0.673 
4.20 
-
0.299 
4.30 -.515 4.26 -.536 
Conceptualizing and 
planning research 
TS 4.99 1.128 4.88 -0.862 5.09 3.447 4.78 0.38 5.08 0.22 4.67 0.455 5.05 -0.115 4.78 
-
1.199 
5.21 
-
0.114 
5.03 
-
1.029 
5.06 2.110 
Quantitative research and 
analytics 
TS 4.77 1.03 4.53 -0.281 4.97 4.025 4.75 1.728 4.71 0.151 4.60 3.193 4.75 0.184 4.85 -0.89 4.6 
-
0.206 
4.73 -.072 4.76 .772 
Qualitative research and 
analytics 
TS 4.16 
-
0.131 
4.12 -0.034 4.23 -0.081 3.78 
-
0.235 
4.29 1.889 4.13 -0.01 4.12 -0.303 3.78 
-
0.223 
4.36 1.602 4.30 -.592 3.94 .517 
Data mining TS 3.82 
-
0.912 
3.53 -1.055 3.97 -0.874 3.57 
-
0.954 
3.73 
-
0.943 
4.00 
-
0.952 
3.70 -0.733 3.52 
-
0.761 
3.80 
-
0.703 
3.39 -.808 4.00 -.069 
Technical Skills combined 
score 
TS 4.633 
-
0.207 
4.48 -1.022 4.76 1.033 4.89 
-
0.596 
4.65 
-
0.878 
4.50 
-
0.488 
4.63 -0.498 4.52 
-
0.892 
4.72 
-
0.769 
4.57 -.680 4.69 -.729 
People respect my opinion 
because I have a very good 
understanding of the issues 
at my institution 
UK 4.73 0.273 4.57 -0.216 4.86 0.786 4.65 0.027 4.56 
-
0.577 
4.27 
-
0.697 
4.82 0.768 4.81 
-
0.183 
4.68 0.188 4.67 -.612 4.97 2.710 
I am able to understand the 
impact decisions have on 
departments and resources 
across campus 
UK 4.85 1.316 4.83 0.782 4.86 2.065 4.53 1.378 5.03 1.293 4.27 
-
0.207 
5.03 1.371 4.81 1.601 5.20 
-
0.846 
4.97 2.524 5.09 -.147 
I have responsibilities that 
involve many departments 
across campus 
UK 4.85 0.837 4.85 0.779 4.88 0.925 4.69 0.864 5.00 0.634 4.60 0.655 4.97 1.364 4.81 1.346 5.04 0.414 5.12 3.312 4.82 .530 
I know more about the 
interrelationships of 
departments than most 
people on campus 
UK 4.48 
-
0.333 
4.51 0.059 4.4 -0.729 4.20 
-
0.586 
4.53 -0.57 3.83 
-
1.024 
4.68 0.3 4.41 -0.22 4.58 0.181 4.33 .107 5.03 .474 
I know more about campus 
politics than most people on 
campus 
UK 4.08 
-
0.358 
4.07 -0.485 4.11 -0.353 4.14 0.584 3.83 
-
0.635 
3.70 
-
0.919 
4.22 -0.161 4.33 1.853 3.79 
-
0.547 
4.00 -.419 4.44 .520 
Unique Knowledge 
combined score 
UK 4.606 0.626 4.58 1.024 4.58 1.024 4.44 1.269 4.60 
-
0.844 
4.13 
-
0.502 
4.75 2.144 4.63 3.068 4.68 
-
0.309 
4.63 3.00 4.88 1.62 
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Legal reporting 
requirements give me the 
authority to demand work 
from other individuals on 
campus 
LP 3.98 
-
1.137 
4.03 -0.747 4.00 -1.362 3.84 
-
1.203 
4.18 
-
0.829 
3.47 
-
1.686 
4.28 -0.231 4.22 
-
0.100 
4.48 0.561 3.91 
-
1.048 
4.66 1.762 
I complete reports that are 
required by law or 
government regulations 
LP 4.80 0.01 5.17 3.204 4.48 -1.087 4.73 
-
0.408 
5.10 2.45 4.37 
-
1.293 
5.42 4.500 5.41 6.968 5.68 2.462 5.15 2.262 5.70 6.138 
I complete reports that are 
required by grants or other 
funding sources 
LP 4.19 
-
0.939 
4.29 -0.462 4.05 -1.269 3.94 
-
1.216 
4.38 
-
0.231 
4.33 
-
0.813 
4.31 -0.567 4.00 
-
1.171 
4.48 0.591 4.15 -.802 4.48 -.017 
People on my campus 
comply with my requests for 
information because they 
understand my required 
reporting needs 
LP 4.61 0.176 4.58 0.258 4.57 -0.045 4.32 0.012 4.92 0.369 4.21 
-
0.659 
4.76 1.131 4.52 0.289 5.20 0.651 4.58 .590 4.94 1.236 
I have used legal obligations 
or regulations to get data 
and information I need from 
faculty or staff 
LP 3.88 
-
1.151 
3.98 -1.053 3.77 -1.25 3.70 
-
1.042 
3.85 
-
1.556 
2.97 
-
1.326 
4.42 -0.402 4.33 
-
0.981 
4.48 
-
0.926 
4.09 -.616 4.75 -1.431 
Legal Prerogatives 
combined score 
LP 4.302 
-
0.221 
4.42 0.51 4.19 -0.558 4.12 
-
0.106 
4.49 0.007 3.87 
-
1.023 
4.63 1.216 4.50 
-
0.958 
4.86 1.993 4.37 .781 4.90 .051 
I meet with high level 
decision makers regularly 
ADM 4.37 
-
0.787 
4.13 -1.039 4.67 -0.333 4.22 
-
0.848 
4.24 
-
0.851 
3.83 
-
1.428 
4.58 -0.049 4.44 0.015 4.40 
-
0.347 
4.58 -.061 4.59 -.026 
If I need to, I can ask a high 
level decision maker to 
intervene on my behalf 
ADM 4.73 0.141 4.62 -0.067 4.84 0.234 4.47 
-
0.192 
4.85 0.049 4.23 
-
1.137 
4.89 1.514 4.41 0.094 5.24 0.045 4.76 1.143 5.03 2.623 
My boss is a high level 
decision maker 
ADM 5.06 0.986 4.98 0.671 5.14 1.349 4.88 0.882 5.24 1.009 4.33 
-
0.753 
5.22 2.631 5.00 2.847 5.40 4.469 5.12 1.358 5.32 4.989 
I consider my office of 
institutional research to be 
centralized within the 
organizational structure of 
my institution 
ADM 4.53 -0.54 4.17 -1.015 4.88 -0.386 4.47 
-
0.369 
4.13 
-
1.027 
4.53 
-
1.138 
4.53 -0.537 4.44 
-
0.305 
4.21 
-
1.095 
4.30 -.966 4.77 .385 
Access to Decision Makers 
combined score 
ADM 4.671 0.308 4.48 -0.202 4.86 0.655 4.51 0.682 4.63 
-
0.019 
4.23 
-
0.667 
4.79 1.185 4.57 1.31 4.82 1.072 4.68 -.196 4.89 4.073 
How many levels is your 
office of institutional 
research removed from the 
president on the 
organizational chart? 
ADM 1.48 0.252 1.33 1.173 1.59 -0.657 1.60 2.451 1.46 
-
0.708 
1.57 
-
0.991 
1.40 1.281 1.63 2.866 1.44 
-
0.561 
1.42 -.938 1.38 3.812 
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Appendix C: Regression Models 
Table 21.2 
Models 1-6 Coefficients 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Correlations 
Model B SE B t Sig. Zero-order Partial Part 
1   (Constant) 1.151 .387 
 
2.977 .004 
   
Unique Knowledge .627 .083 .696 7.565 .000 .696 .696 .696 
2   (Constant) .298 .367 
 
.813 .419 
   
Unique Knowledge .455 .078 .504 5.843 .000 .696 .602 .453 
Access to Decision-Makers .354 .070 .437 5.068 .000 .658 .547 .393 
3  (Constant) .050 .365 
 
.136 .892 
   
Unique Knowledge .402 .077 .446 5.193 .000 .696 .560 .386 
Access to Decision-
Makers 
.300 .070 .371 4.270 .000 .658 .486 .317 
Legal Prerogatives .168 .066 .216 2.531 .014 .556 .313 .188 
4  (Constant) .057 .349 
 
.164 .870 
   
Unique Knowledge .453 .077 .503 5.907 .000 .696 .613 .420 
Access to Decision-
Makers 
.286 .067 .354 4.252 .000 .658 .487 .302 
Legal Prerogatives .170 .064 .218 2.674 .010 .556 .331 .190 
Yrs. at Institution -.020 .008 -.188 -2.544 .014 -.014 -.317 -.181 
5  (Constant) -.476 .396 
 
-1.203 .234 
   
Unique Knowledge .474 .074 .525 6.410 .000 .696 .647 .436 
Access to Decision-
Makers 
.264 .065 .326 4.054 .000 .658 .473 .276 
Legal Prerogatives .204 .062 .262 3.270 .002 .556 .397 .223 
Yrs. at Institution -.022 .008 -.206 -2.896 .005 -.014 -.358 -.197 
Institutional Size .128 .051 .178 2.514 .015 .043 .316 .171 
6  (Constant) -.643 .394 
 
-1.630 .109 
   
Unique Knowledge .471 .072 .522 6.543 .000 .696 .658 .434 
Access to Decision-
Makers 
.213 .068 .264 3.127 .003 .658 .386 .207 
Legal Prerogatives .210 .061 .270 3.456 .001 .556 .419 .229 
Yrs. at Institution -.024 .008 -.218 -3.136 .003 -.014 -.386 -.208 
Institutional Size .141 .050 .195 2.808 .007 .043 .351 .186 
Charisma .096 .048 .149 2.022 .048 .376 .261 .134 
 
 
